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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Two — the heavens and the stars

QUESTION V. By what the heavens are moved—whether by Angels, or by themselves

LatineEnglish

QUESTION V. By what the heavens are moved—whether by Angels, or by themselves.1

QUAESTIO V. A quo moveantur caeli, ab Angelisne, an a seipsis.

NON a se moveri caelos sed ab Angelis, non tam facile atque evidenter ex sacris litteris possum colligere, quam est plurimorum et maximorum Philosophorum atque Theologorum consensu firmatum, mihique multis rationibus persuasum. Etenim orbes caelestes divina ratione potentiaque cieri ac regi, nec sua vi sed ab Angelis (quos philosophi Platonici deos appellabant) in orbem perpetuo agi, concors fuit Platonicorum et Peripateticorum Stoicorumque sententia. Nam cum caelum sit corpus simplex et in omnibus partibus suis secundum substantiam uniforme, non potest seipsum movere: non enim potest in ipso distincte signari pars quae moveat et altera pars quae moveatur. Nec ulla ratio posset reddi cur primum caelum (si quidem a se moveretur) ab Oriente in Occidentem potius moveatur quam e contrario, aut quam a polo uno versus alterum polum: nam cum usquequaque sit uniforme et secundum om[nes]...
That the heavens are moved not by themselves but by Angels, I cannot gather from the sacred writings so easily and evidently as it is established by the consensus of very many and very great Philosophers and Theologians, and persuaded to me by many reasons. For that the celestial orbs are set in motion and ruled by divine reason and power, and are driven round perpetually not by their own force but by Angels (whom the Platonist philosophers called gods), was the concordant opinion of the Platonists, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics. For since the heaven is a simple body and uniform in all its parts according to substance, it cannot move itself: for in it there cannot be distinctly marked off a part that moves and another part that is moved. Nor could any reason be given why the first heaven (if indeed it were moved by itself) should move from East to West rather than the contrary, or rather than from one pole toward the other: for since it is everywhere uniform and, in respect of all [its parts]...2
...[om]nes partes suas, quod attinet ad substantiam, prorsus indifferens, similiter qualibet ex parte et in quamlibet partem moveri deberet. Propter has enim differentias motus in caelo observatas argumentatur in secundo libro de Caelo Aristoteles caelum esse animatum, quod in corpore simplici in animoque, si a seipso moveretur, tales differentiae motus nequaquam esse possent. Quid quod, si caelum se ipsum moveret, reflecteretur in se ipsum et supra suam propriam operationem? quod tamen adeo proprium esse intelligentis naturae libro 1 de Anima censet Aristoteles, ut neget id, praeter intellectum, aliis ullis animae nostrae partibus attribui posse. Et vero quae posset reddi causa probabilis cur caelum in orbem perpetuo ageretur, cum eo motu nec sibi quicquam acquirat nec quod habet tueatur et conservet? cur etiam, confecto semel spatio suo et una integra conversione absoluta, non desinat moveri, sed infinities idem spatium repetat ac remeet?
...all its parts, as far as concerns substance, is utterly indifferent, it ought to be moved alike from any part and toward any part. For on account of these observed differences of motion in the heaven Aristotle argues, in the second book On the Heaven, that the heaven is animate, since in a simple body—and indeed in mind—if it were moved by itself, such differences of motion could by no means exist. What of this: that if the heaven moved itself, it would be reflected back upon itself and above its own proper operation? which, however, Aristotle holds in book 1 On the Soul to be so proper to an intelligent nature that he denies it can be attributed to any other parts of our soul besides the intellect. And indeed, what probable cause could be given why the heaven should be driven round perpetually in a circle, since by that motion it neither acquires anything for itself nor guards and preserves what it has? and why, when its course has once been completed and one entire revolution finished, it does not cease to move, but infinitely repeats and retraces the same course?3
AD HOC, qui negat caelos moveri ab Angelis, nullam profecto reliquam facit viam et rationem philosophicam qua cognosci et probari queat Angelos esse. Si enim motus caeli non est effectus Angeli, quae alia potest afferri eius actio vel effectus, naturali vel sensus vel rationis iudicio nobis manifestus et compertus, ex quo Angeli natura deprehendi et demonstrari valeat? Denique, cum totus mundus sublunaris non alia ratione ordinaria, quae nobis quidem naturaliter sit manifesta, regatur et moderetur a Deo quam per motus caelorum et syderum ministeria, si caelum non ab aliqua intelligente natura, sed sua vi naturaliter a se ipso moveri ponatur, nihil plane suppetet quo physica ratione demonstrari queat res sublunares Dei cura et providentia gubernari: quaecumque enim alia vel solent vel etiam possunt ad id probandum adduci argumenta, vel admodum tenuia et infirma sunt, vel nimis particularia et obscura atque incerta, nisi hoc uno veluti supposito fundamento nitantur atque firmentur. Atque hoc ita esse indicio est, quod inter philosophos quicumque negarunt caelos moveri ab intelligentiis, sed vel casu, ut Democritus et Epicurus, vel naturali sua vi et impetu, ut Strato Lampsacenus Theophrasti discipulus, eos constat nullos esse putasse Angelos, omnemque Dei providentiam ex hoc mundo sustulisse; contra vero qui haec duo crediderunt, etiam motum caelorum a mente et ratione proficisci censuerunt.
TO THIS add that whoever denies the heavens to be moved by Angels leaves, in truth, no remaining philosophical way and means by which it can be known and proved that Angels exist. For if the motion of the heaven is not the effect of an Angel, what other action or effect of an Angel can be brought forward, manifest and ascertained to us by the judgment of nature, of sense, or of reason, from which the nature of an Angel might be apprehended and demonstrated? Finally, since the whole sublunary world is ruled and governed by God by no other ordinary means—naturally manifest to us, at least—than by the motions and ministries of the heavens and the heavenly bodies, if the heaven be supposed to be moved not by some intelligent nature, but by its own force, naturally, of itself, there will plainly be nothing at hand by which it could be demonstrated by physical reasoning that sublunary things are governed by the care and providence of God: for whatever other arguments are wont, or even can, be brought forward to prove this, are either very slight and weak, or too particular and obscure and uncertain, unless they rest and are made firm upon this one as a presupposed foundation. And that this is so is shown by the fact that, among the philosophers, whoever denied that the heavens are moved by intelligences—but rather by chance, as Democritus and Epicurus, or by their own natural force and impulse, as Strato of Lampsacus, the disciple of Theophrastus—it is agreed that they thought there were no Angels, and removed all the providence of God from this world; whereas, on the contrary, those who believed these two things also held that the motion of the heavens proceeds from mind and reason.4
NEC Philosophia modo, sed Theologia etiam hoc docet. Etenim sententia est Dionysii Areopagitae et Augustini aliorumque Patrum, plerisque omnibus Theologis scholasticis probatissima, ita Deum providentia sua hunc mundum administrare ut infima regat per media, haec autem per summa; corpora item inferiora gubernet per superiora, et haec per spiritus. Est quoque in ore Theologis omnibus Angelos Divinae providentiae administros, provinciis et regnis singulisque hominibus esse quasi tutores et cu[stodes]...
NOR does Philosophy only, but Theology also, teach this. For it is the opinion of Dionysius the Areopagite and of Augustine and of the other Fathers, most approved by well-nigh all the scholastic Theologians, that God so administers this world by His providence that He rules the lowest things through the middle, and these through the highest; and likewise governs inferior bodies through superior, and these through spirits. It is also on the lips of all theologians that the Angels, as ministers of Divine providence, are, as it were, guardians and ke[epers] of provinces and kingdoms and of individual men...5
...[cu]stodes et rectores a Deo praefectos: quanto igitur credibilius est eos praesidere motui caelorum, scilicet ex quo pendet rerum sublunarium salus et incolumitas, et per quem huius nostratis mundi cura et administratio agitur? Ad hanc sententiam persuadendam applicant quidam nonnullas Scripturae sententias: aiunt enim hoc significare Scripturam quotiescumque vocat virtutes caelorum, ut cum inquit Matthaei vigesimoquarto, Virtutes caelorum commovebuntur, et cum Ecclesia canit, Caeli caelorumque virtutes, et cum Iob cap. nono tradit coram Deo curvari eos qui portant orbem. Iam vero si caelum post diem iudicii a motu quo nunc in orbem agitur (ut fere Theologorum fert sententia) omnino vacabit, quis non videt quanto congruentius sit huic opinioni si ponatur caelum non a se ipso moveri sed ab Angelis? Etenim continuatio et perpetuatio motus localis ex movente potius quam ex mobili pendet: quare si Angelus movet caelum, cum voluntarie ac libere moveat, non est difficile intellectu quemadmodum post diem iudicii, Angelo Dei iussu non amplius movente caelum, nullus futurus sit caeli motus. At vero, si caelum sua vi moveretur a seipso, motus esset ei omnino naturalis, tam ratione principii passivi quam activi, et attingeret perfectionem caeli, ob idque haberet caelum naturalem propensionem ad suum motum; quapropter non posset eo privari nisi miraculose et violente, et tunc careret perfectione quadam naturaliter sibi convenienti ac debita. Incredibile autem est in illo praestantissimo et perfectissimo, qui post diem iudicii futurus est mundi statu, quicquam, nedum principes mundi partes caelum et sydera, imperfecte violente et contra naturam suam, idque in omnem aeternitatem esse permansurum.
...keepers and rulers set over them by God: how much more credible, therefore, is it that they preside over the motion of the heavens—on which depends the safety and soundness of sublunary things, and through which the care and administration of this world of ours is carried on? To persuade this opinion, some apply certain texts of Scripture: for they say that Scripture means this whenever it calls things ‘the powers of the heavens,’ as when it says in Matthew chapter 24, The powers of the heavens shall be moved, and when the Church sings, The powers of the heavens and of the heavens of heavens, and when Job, in chapter 9, delivers that those who bear up the world are bowed down before God. Now indeed, if the heaven after the day of judgment will rest wholly from the motion by which it is now driven round (as is generally the opinion of the Theologians), who does not see how much more congruous it is to this opinion, if the heaven be supposed to be moved not by itself but by Angels? For the continuation and perpetuation of local motion depends rather on the mover than on the thing moved: wherefore, if an Angel moves the heaven, since it moves voluntarily and freely, it is not hard to understand how, after the day of judgment, the Angel by God's command no longer moving the heaven, there will be no motion of the heaven. But if the heaven were moved by its own force, from itself, the motion would be wholly natural to it, both by reason of the passive and of the active principle, and would attain the perfection of the heaven, and on that account the heaven would have a natural propensity to its own motion; wherefore it could not be deprived of it except miraculously and violently, and then it would lack a certain perfection naturally fitting and due to it. But it is incredible that in that most excellent and most perfect state of the world which will be after the day of judgment, anything—much less the chief parts of the world, the heaven and the stars—should remain imperfectly, violently, and against its own nature, and that for all eternity.6

Translator’s notes

  1. The fifth question of Book II. ↩
  2. That the heavens are moved not by themselves but by Angels—the concordant view of Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics (the Platonists calling the Angels ‘gods’). A simple, uniform body cannot move itself. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘nes’). ↩
  3. Aristotle, De Caelo 2 (the differences of celestial motion argue the heaven is animate) and De Anima 1 (self-reflection is proper to intellect alone). A self-moved, uniform heaven would have no reason to move E→W rather than otherwise, nor to keep repeating its circuit endlessly. ↩
  4. If the heaven's motion is not an Angel's effect, no naturally evident sign of Angels remains; and since the sublunary world is ordinarily governed through the celestial motions, denying Angelic movers undermines the physical proof of divine providence. Democritus and Epicurus (chance) and Strato of Lampsacus (Theophrastus's disciple; natural force) denied Angelic movers, and so denied both Angels and providence. ↩
  5. Marginal gloss: "Dionysius Areopagita lib. de caelesti hierarchia." Pseudo-Dionysius (De caelesti hierarchia), Augustine, and others: God rules the lowest through the middle, these through the highest; inferior bodies through superior, and these through spirits. The Angels are guardians of provinces, kingdoms, and individual men. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘stodes’; signature E). ↩
  6. The Angels as God's appointed guardians and rulers. ‘The powers of the heavens’ (Matthew 24:29; the Church's hymn; Job 9:13). If the heaven's motion ceases after the Judgment (the common theological view), it accords far better that the heaven is moved by Angels than by itself, since otherwise its rest would be violent and contrary to nature forever. ↩