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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Two — the heavens and the stars

QUESTION VII. Whether the heavens and the stars are animate

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QUESTION VII. Whether the heavens and the stars are animate.1

QUAESTIO VII. An caeli et astra sint animata.

FUIT sane plurimorum et maximorum Philosophorum sententia sydera animam et vitam habere: videlicet hoc Pythagorei, hoc Platonici, hoc Aristotelici, hoc denique Stoici censuerunt. Plato in Epinomide iubet astra ut Deos caelestes a nobis honorari et coli. Aristoteles libr. 2 de Caelo, text. 13, quod caelum sit animatum propterea differentias positionis, hoc est dextrum et sinistrum, sursum et deorsum, ante et retro, naturaliter in eo esse argumentatur. Et in textu 61 eiusdem libri affirmat decipi eos qui existimant astra esse inanima, cum anima vitaque con[stent]...
It was indeed the opinion of very many and very great Philosophers that the heavenly bodies have soul and life: this, namely, the Pythagoreans held, this the Platonists, this the Aristotelians, this finally the Stoics. Plato in the Epinomis bids that the stars be honored and worshipped by us as celestial gods. Aristotle, in the second book On the Heaven, text 13, argues that because the heaven is animate, therefore the differences of position—that is, right and left, up and down, before and behind—are naturally in it. And in text 61 of the same book he affirms that those are deceived who think the stars to be inanimate, since they con[sist] of soul and life...2
...[con]stent. Philo in libro de Opificio mundi, in lib. item de Somniis, et in lib. de Gigantibus, stellas et viventes et intelligentes esse sentit. Quid Avicennae visum est? in caelo esse animam sentientem praeditam sensu interiori, quam Graeci vocant φαντασίαν: quae opinio videtur non usquequaque displicuisse Simplicio, non modo interiorem sensum, sed aliquot etiam sensus exteriores caelo assignanti. Is enim in Commentariis super textum quinquagesimum primi libri de Caelo, praeter gustum et olfactum, alios tres, visum, auditum et tactum, in caelis esse arbitratur. Cum enim exposuisset opinionem Alexandri qui negavit astra esse sensitiva, quod sensitivum non sit nisi ubi est vegetativum, sicut tradit Aristoteles lib. 2 de Anima, quapropter non nisi aequivoce astra posse appellari animata, subiungit Simplicius:
...they consist [of soul and life]. Philo, in his book On the Making of the World, and likewise in his book On Dreams, and in his book On the Giants, holds the stars to be both living and intelligent. What was Avicenna's view? That in the heaven there is a sentient soul endowed with an interior sense, which the Greeks call φαντασία (imagination): which opinion seems not wholly to have displeased Simplicius, who assigns to the heaven not only an interior sense but also several of the exterior senses. For he, in his Commentaries on the fiftieth text of the first book On the Heaven, thinks that, besides taste and smell, three other senses—sight, hearing, and touch—are in the heavens. For when he had set forth the opinion of Alexander, who denied that the stars are sensitive—because the sensitive is found only where the vegetative is, as Aristotle teaches in the second book On the Soul, wherefore the stars can be called animate only equivocally—Simplicius adds:3

It is strange, he says, if the heaven is indeed sensible and tangible, but not sensitive—as though it were better for a body not to perceive than to perceive—that the baser bodies should have sense, but those which are the noblest of all and the most divine should lack all sense. Perhaps, then, it is not fitting to attribute to the heaven the material and most passive senses, such as taste and smell; but to grant it the others, the nobler and surer, is not absurd: for the heavenly bodies, touching one another, do not touch insensibly, and they behold all things, and hear all things. Thus Simplicius.4

Mirum, inquit, si caelum est quidem sensibile et tangibile, non est autem sensitivum, etiam quasi melius sit corpori non sentire quam sentire, ignobiliora quidem corpora sensum habere, quae vero nobilissima omnium sunt atque divinissima, omni sensu carere. Forte igitur materiales sensus et maxime passivos, ut gustum et odoratum, caelo tribuere non convenit; ceteros autem nobiliores et certiores ei concedere non exit absurdum: tangentibus enim se invicem non insensibiliter se tangunt, et omnia intuentur, et omnia audiunt. Haec Simplicius.

VERUM, omissis philosophis, venio ad scriptores Ecclesiasticos. Origenes primo tomo Commentariorum in Ioannem non modo stellas putat esse animatas, sed etiam virtutis atque vitii capaces. Iob enim capite vigesimoquinto appellat stellas immundas; quare non veretur Origenes dicere Christum non tantum pro peccatis hominum, sed etiam astrorum esse mortuum. In primo autem libro περὶ ἀρχῶν, capit. septimo, ostendit astra esse animalia et ratione praedita, quae in virtutibus proficiunt et deficiunt, et addicta sunt ministerio motus caelestis propter usus hominum, a quo tamen ministerio post diem iudicii vacabunt; idemque confirmat extrema homilia in librum Numerorum. Eodem spectasse videtur Hieronymus initio Commentariorum super Ecclesiasten, interpretando verba illa Salomonis de sole, Gyrans gyrando vadit Spiritus: ait enim Solem vocari spiritum eo quod animet, inspiret et vegetet; vel quod ipse spiritu alatur, sicut Poëta dixit:
BUT, leaving the philosophers, I come to the Ecclesiastical writers. Origen, in the first volume of his Commentaries on John, thinks the stars not only to be animate, but even capable of virtue and vice. For Job, in chapter 25, calls the stars unclean; wherefore Origen does not fear to say that Christ died not only for the sins of men, but also of the stars. And in the first book of On First Principles, chapter 7, he shows that the stars are living beings endowed with reason, which advance and fall back in virtues, and are bound to the ministry of celestial motion for the uses of men, from which ministry, however, they will rest after the day of judgment; and the same he confirms in the last homily on the book of Numbers. To the same point Jerome seems to look, at the beginning of his Commentaries on Ecclesiastes, in interpreting those words of Solomon about the sun, Whirling about, the spirit goes: for he says that the sun is called ‘spirit’ because it animates, inspires, and quickens; or because it is itself fed by spirit, as the Poet said:5

And the shining globe of the moon, and the Titanian stars, a Spirit within sustains.6

Lucentemque globum lunae, Titaniaque astra Spiritus intus alit.

B. Augustinus in hac quaestione dubius et incertus fuit. Nam in 2 libro de Genesi ad litteram cap. 18 proponit hanc quaestionem, sed intactam inexplicatamque praeteriit. In Enchiridio autem capite quinquagesimooctavo ait non esse sibi exploratum et certum utrum sydera sensum et mentem habeant, et ad societatem beatorum Angelorum pertineant. In primo item libro Retractationum capite quinto et undecimo revocat et corrigit quod scripserat in libro de Immortalitate animae capite decimoquinto, et quod scripserat in 6 libro de Musica capite decimoquarto, mundum esse animatum et magnum [quoddam animal]...
The blessed Augustine, in this question, was doubtful and uncertain. For in the second book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 18, he raises this question, but passed it by untouched and unexplained. And in the Enchiridion, chapter 58, he says that it is not ascertained and certain to him whether the heavenly bodies have sense and mind, and belong to the society of the blessed Angels. Likewise, in the first book of the Retractations, chapters 5 and 11, he recalls and corrects what he had written in his book On the Immortality of the Soul, chapter 15, and what he had written in the sixth book On Music, chapter 14, that the world is animate and a great [living being]...7
...[magnum] quoddam animal: hoc, inquam, Augustinus corrigit, non tanquam falso, sed tanquam temere dictum, cum id sibi nec esse nec non esse compertum et comprehensum fuisset. Nam quod in libro de Cognitione verae vitae (qui in tomo nono operum Augustini continetur) capite sexto scriptum est, Qui sydera rationabilia vel saltem sensibilia corpora arbitrantur, iure sensu carentes inter irrationabilia computantur, nil nos movere debet, cum certo certius sit auctorem eius libri non esse Augustinum. Et in libro decimotertio de Civitate Dei capite decimosexto tradit non continuo concedendum esse Platoni sydera esse viventia, intelligentia et beata, et mundum esse magnum quoddam animal: adiicit tamen eiusmodi quaestionem alio loco esse discutiendam. Aureolus, referente Capreolo in secundo Sententiarum, probabile putavit astra esse animata; nec Scotus quidem abnuere videtur, quippe libro secundo Sent. distinctione decimaquarta quaestione prima, Si astra, inquit, non sunt animata, id creditum erit potius quam demonstratum. Beatus Thomas in quaestionibus disputatis quaest. de Anima articulo octavo, et in Opusculo de Angelis capite secundo, et libro secundo contra gentes capite septuagesimo, ex sensu Aristotelis et, ut verba eius sonant, etiam ex suo, demonstrat caelos vere animatos esse anima intelligente. Caietanus in explanando illa verba Davidis quae sunt in Psalmo 135, Qui fecit caelos in intellectu, ait haec verba sic posse accipi ut significetur caelos factos esse a Deo cum intellectu, hoc est in[telligentes]...
...a great living being: this, I say, Augustine corrects, not as false, but as rashly said, since it had been ascertained and grasped by him neither to be so nor not to be so. For as to what is written in the book On the Knowledge of the True Life (which is contained in the ninth volume of Augustine's works), chapter 6—Those who reckon the heavenly bodies to be rational, or at least sensible, bodies are rightly, as lacking sense, counted among irrational things—this ought not to move us at all, since it is more certain than certain that the author of that book is not Augustine. And in the thirteenth book of The City of God, chapter 16, he delivers that it is not to be conceded outright to Plato that the heavenly bodies are living, intelligent, and blessed, and that the world is a great living being; yet he adds that a question of this kind is to be discussed in another place. Aureolus, as Capreolus reports in the second book of the Sentences, thought it probable that the stars are animate; nor indeed does Scotus seem to deny it, since in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 14, question 1, he says, If the stars are not animate, that will be believed rather than demonstrated. The blessed Thomas, in his Disputed Questions, the question On the Soul, article 8, and in the Opusculum On the Angels, chapter 2, and in the second book Against the Gentiles, chapter 70, from the meaning of Aristotle and—as his words sound—also from his own, demonstrates that the heavens are truly animate with an intelligent soul. Cajetan, in explaining those words of David in Psalm 135, Who made the heavens in understanding, says these words can be so taken that it is signified that the heavens were made by God with understanding, that is, un[derstanding]...8
...[in]telligentes, iuxta opinionem Philosophorum qui existimarunt sydera vita et intellectu esse praedita. His accedit quod Ecclesia in praefatione sacri Canonis Deum his verbis concelebrat, Per quem maiestatem tuam laudant Angeli, adorant Dominationes, tremunt Potestates, caeli caelorumque virtutes ac beata Seraphin socia exultatione concelebrant. Putat autem Caietanus in tractatu de Indulgentiis virtutes caelorum vocari eorum animas. Nam si ab Angelis caeli tantum extrinsecus moventur, satis fuerat dixisse Laudant Angeli; nec ratio ulla erat ut, si virtutes caelorum significarent naturales vires et facultates quas habent caeli, et astra recenserentur ab Ecclesia in commemoratione ordinum Angelicorum, cuiusmodi sunt Angeli, Potestates, Dominationes et Seraphin; nec erat ratio cur caeli distincte commemorarentur, et separatim ab ipsis virtutes caelorum, cum nomine caeli tam substantiam eius quam naturales proprietates, vires aliasque dotes significare et intelligere soleamus.
...understanding, according to the opinion of the Philosophers who judged the heavenly bodies to be endowed with life and intellect. To these is added that the Church, in the preface of the sacred Canon, celebrates God with these words: Through whom the Angels praise thy majesty, the Dominations adore, the Powers tremble; the heavens and the powers of the heavens, and the blessed Seraphim, with shared exultation celebrate together. And Cajetan, in his treatise On Indulgences, thinks that ‘the powers of the heavens’ are called their souls. For if the heavens are moved by the Angels only from without, it would have been enough to have said ‘the Angels praise’; nor would there be any reason why, if ‘the powers of the heavens’ signified the natural forces and faculties which the heavens have, the heavenly bodies should be recounted by the Church in the commemoration of the Angelic orders—such as the Angels, Powers, Dominations, and Seraphim; nor was there any reason why the heavens should be commemorated distinctly, and the powers of the heavens separately from them, since by the name of ‘heaven’ we are wont to signify and understand both its substance and its natural properties, forces, and other endowments.9
Sed revera haec ratio Caietani valde infirma est: nam caelos esse factos in intellectu, phrasi Hebraea, significat esse a Deo factos summa arte, ratione et intelligentia: Hebraeis enim frequens est dicere in aliquo pro eo quod est per aliquid vel cum aliquo, sumendo in pro per vel cum. Virtutes autem caelorum appellantur Angeli qui eos movent: cum enim primo generali vocabulo nominasset Angelos, mox distincte et proprie memorat Potestates, Dominationes, Sera[phin]...
But in truth this reasoning of Cajetan is very weak: for ‘that the heavens were made in understanding,’ by the Hebrew idiom, signifies that they were made by God with supreme art, reason, and understanding; for among the Hebrews it is frequent to say ‘in something’ for ‘by something’ or ‘with something,’ taking ‘in’ for ‘by’ or ‘with.’ And ‘the powers of the heavens’ are called the Angels who move them: for when he had first named the Angels by a general word, he straightway distinctly and properly mentions the Powers, the Dominations, the Sera[phim]...10
...[Sera]phin et motores ac rectores caelorum; vel per virtutes caelorum significantur ipsa sydera, in quibus omnis caelorum vis et potestas constat et viget: nam et Aristoteles lib. 12 Metaphysicae astra facit fines orbium caelestium.
...Seraphim, and the movers and rulers of the heavens; or by ‘the powers of the heavens’ are signified the heavenly bodies themselves, in which all the force and power of the heavens consists and is in vigor: for Aristotle too, in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, makes the stars the ends of the celestial orbs.11
VERUMTAMEN, contraria huic opinioni longe probabilior videtur sententia, et cum doctrina Theologica et Ecclesiastica multo congruentior. Certe astra non esse animata censet Basilius homilia 3 in Genesim, et Ambrosius lib. 2 Hexameron cap. 4. Cyrillus lib. 3 contra Iulianum affirmat opinionem Platonis, quod caeli vita et ratione sint praediti, non Christianis modo sed Philosophis etiam adversari; idemque velut certum dogma Christianae disciplinae libro 2 capite sexto arbitratur Damascenus. Lactantius vero in capite 5 libri 2 egregie confutat eos qui astra animam et rationem habere ex pulcherrima eorum dispositione motusque constantia argumentabantur. Hoc etiam confirmat Basilius in Commentatio Psalmi 48. Hieronymus autem in Epistola 59 ad Avitum inter errores Origenis hunc etiam recenset: ita enim scribit, Solem quoque et lunam et astra cetera censet esse animata; immo, sicut nos homines ob quaedam peccata his sumus circumdati corporibus quae crassa sunt et pigra, sic et caeli luminaria talia vel talia accepisse corpora, ut vel plus vel minus luceant; et daemones ob maiora delicta aëreo corpore esse vestitos.
NEVERTHELESS, the opinion contrary to this one seems far more probable, and much more congruous with Theological and Ecclesiastical doctrine. That the stars are certainly not animate is held by Basil in homily 3 on Genesis, and by Ambrose in the second book of the Hexameron, chapter 4. Cyril, in the third book against Julian, affirms that the opinion of Plato—that the heavens are endowed with life and reason—is contrary not only to Christians but also to the Philosophers; and the same Damascene reckons, as a certain dogma of Christian teaching, in his second book, chapter 6. Lactantius, in the fifth chapter of his second book, excellently refutes those who argued that the stars have soul and reason from their most beautiful disposition and the constancy of their motion. This too Basil confirms in his commentary on Psalm 48. And Jerome, in his 59th Epistle to Avitus, reckons this also among the errors of Origen: for thus he writes, He holds that the sun also and the moon and the rest of the stars are animate; nay, that, just as we men, on account of certain sins, are encompassed with these bodies which are gross and sluggish, so also the luminaries of the heaven received such or such bodies, that they might shine more or less; and that the demons, on account of greater faults, are clothed with an aerial body.12
Et in libro 13 Commentariorum in Isaiam, explanans illa verba quae sunt in capite 45, Manus mea tetenderunt caelos, et omni militiae eorum ego praecepi, annotavit ea verba dedisse quibusdam occasionem errandi, ut solem et astra habere rationem opinarentur. Sic autem inibi ait Hieronymus: Illud quod scriptum est, Ego omnibus stellis praecepi, occasionem quibusdam tribuit quod astra rationalia sint et animam sensumque habeant. Neque enim, aiunt, praeciperet nisi intelligentibus — non recordantes quod in Iona scriptum sit, Praecepit Dominus spiritui comburenti; et rursum, Praecepit vermi matutino; et quod in Evangelio Salvator ventos et mare increpaverit, in quibus sensum atque rationem non esse perspicuum est. Haec Hieronymus. Posset fortasse cuipiam videri non tam Hieronymus supradictis duobus locis damnasse opinionem aientium astra esse animata, quam vel causam quam reddebat Origenes cur Angeli addicti essent animandis astris (nimirum propter peccata prius admissa), vel rationem qua nonnulli eam opinionem inepte confirmabant, reprobasse. Iam vero, quod supra ex commentatio Hieronymi super primum caput Ecclesiastae productum est testimonium, animationem solis nequaquam astruit, quippe duplicem ibi ponit Hieronymus interpretationem cur sol dicatur Spiritus: aut quia vere spiritu vivifico ipse animetur et vigeat, iuxta illos versus Virgilii supra memoratos; aut quod suo motu et lumine vitam rebus omnibus inspiret atque infundat.
And in the thirteenth book of his Commentaries on Isaiah, explaining those words in chapter 45, My hand stretched out the heavens, and I commanded all their host, he noted that these words gave to some an occasion of erring, so that they supposed the sun and the stars to have reason. Thus Jerome there says: That which is written, I have commanded all the stars, gave occasion to some to think that the stars are rational and have soul and sense. For, they say, He would not command save things that understand—not remembering what is written in Jonah, The Lord commanded the burning wind; and again, He commanded the morning worm; and that in the Gospel the Savior rebuked the winds and the sea, in which it is plain that there is no sense and reason. Thus Jerome. It might perhaps seem to someone that Jerome, in the two aforesaid passages, condemned not so much the opinion of those who say the stars are animate, as either the reason which Origen gave why the Angels were assigned to animating the stars (namely, on account of sins previously committed), or the reasoning by which some ineptly confirmed that opinion. And as for the testimony adduced above from Jerome's commentary on the first chapter of Ecclesiastes, it by no means establishes the animation of the sun, since Jerome there sets down a twofold interpretation why the sun is called ‘spirit’: either because it is truly animated and quickened by a life-giving spirit, according to those verses of Virgil mentioned above; or because by its motion and light it breathes and infuses life into all things.13
Sanctus Bonaventura in 2 Sententiarum distinctione 14 opinionem dicentium astra esse animata non dubitavit falsam et erroneam appellare, et sane meritissimo. Si enim animae astrorum sunt Angeli, profecto astra honorari et coli a nobis oporteret: tum quod eorum animae sint non modo sanctae sed etiam beatae; tum etiam quia religiose honoramus corpora beatorum hominum, ut Petri et Pauli, quae tamen beatissimis eorum animis nunc non vivificantur et animantur. Esse autem animas caelorum (si quidem caeli animas habent) omnino beatas aperte docet Augustinus in Enchiridio ad Laurentium capite vigesimooctavo, cum ait, Angelis aliquibus impia superbia deserentibus Deum, et in huius aëris imam caliginem de superna caelesti habitatione deiectis, residuus numerus Angelorum in aeterna cum Deo beatitudine et sanctitate permansit. Quanquam in 58 cap. eiusdem libri dubitanter ea de re videtur loqui, cum inquit, Sed nec illud quidem certum habeo utrum ad eandem societatem pertineant Sol et Luna et cuncta sydera, quamvis nonnullis lucida corpora esse, non cum sensu vel intelligentia videantur. Nullum vero astris honorem et cultum a nobis esse exhibendum perspicue docet nos Deus per Mosen, capite quarto Deuteronomii, Ne forte, inquit, elevatis oculis ad caelum videas Solem et Lunam et omnia astra caeli, et errore deceptus adores ea et colas, quae creavit Dominus Deus tuus in ministerium cunctis gentibus quae sub caelo sunt. Atque his verbis innuit Moses propterea stellas non esse a nobis adorandas et colendas, quod sint conditione naturae dignitateque inferiores nobis, videlicet propter servitium et usum hominis a Deo conditae.
Saint Bonaventure, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 14, did not hesitate to call the opinion of those who say the stars are animate false and erroneous, and indeed most deservedly. For if the souls of the stars are Angels, surely the stars ought to be honored and worshipped by us: both because their souls would be not only holy but also blessed; and also because we religiously honor the bodies of blessed men, such as Peter and Paul, which yet are now neither quickened nor animated by their most blessed souls. And that the souls of the heavens (if indeed the heavens have souls) are wholly blessed, Augustine plainly teaches in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapter 28, when he says, Some Angels having, by impious pride, forsaken God, and having been cast down from the heavenly habitation on high into the lowest gloom of this air, the remaining number of the Angels persevered in eternal blessedness and holiness with God. Although in the 58th chapter of the same book he seems to speak doubtfully on the matter, when he says, But neither do I hold this for certain, whether the Sun and Moon and all the heavenly bodies belong to the same society—although to some they seem to be luminous bodies, not endowed with sense or intelligence. But that no honor and worship is to be shown by us to the stars, God plainly teaches us through Moses, in the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy: Lest perhaps, He says, lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the Sun and the Moon and all the stars of heaven, and, deceived by error, adore and worship them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations that are under heaven. And by these words Moses implies that the stars are not to be adored and worshipped by us, because they are inferior to us in condition of nature and in dignity—namely, created by God for the service and use of man.14
AD HOC, vel animae syderum sunt naturaliter beatae (at nec gratia nec gloria ulli praeter Deum potest esse naturalis), aut sunt beatae ex Dei gratia et munere: aut igitur simul creatae fuerunt beatae (quod est contra communem Theologorum sententiam, nec ulli creaturae datum praeter Christi animam), aut tales factae sunt ut possent beatitudinem vel bene merendo consequi vel peccando amittere — potuerunt igitur peccare. Age, demus peccasse: namque si quod possibile est ponatur esse, ut tradunt philosophi, nihil consequi debet absurdum vel impossibile. Quaero quid illis factum fuisset si peccassent? Num animae illae remansissent in suis orbibus? Sed non fit credibile, ceteris omnibus Angelis malis de caelo deiectis in infernum, animas illas remansisse in caelo; et vero, caelum non est locus damnatorum. Sin autem etiam animae illae detrusae essent de caelo, quid tum fieret orbibus caelestibus quos illae animabant? Num etiam ipsi e suo loco deturbati essent deorsum? An remansissent in suo loco sed inanimi? An alias illis animas Deus indidisset? Verum haec omnia quam sint improbabilia et absurda, nemo non videt. Sed ad haec posset fortasse quispiam respondere: animas caelorum initio potuisse quidem peccare, si quidem natura earum et libertas voluntatis per se consideretur; Deum tamen prae[scivisse]...
TO THIS: either the souls of the heavenly bodies are naturally blessed (but neither grace nor glory can be natural to any save God), or they are blessed by God's grace and gift; either, then, they were created blessed (which is against the common opinion of the theologians, and was granted to no creature save the soul of Christ), or they were made such that they could either obtain blessedness by meriting well, or lose it by sinning—they could, therefore, sin. Come, let us grant that they sinned: for if what is possible be posited as existing, as the philosophers teach, nothing absurd or impossible ought to follow. I ask, what would have been done with them if they had sinned? Would those souls have remained in their orbs? But it is not credible that, all the other evil Angels having been cast down from heaven into hell, those souls remained in heaven; and indeed, heaven is not the place of the damned. But if those souls too had been thrust down from heaven, what then would become of the celestial orbs which they animated? Would they too have been cast down from their place below? Or would they have remained in their place, but inanimate? Or would God have implanted other souls in them? But how improbable and absurd all these things are, everyone sees. But to these someone might perhaps reply: that the souls of the heavens could indeed have sinned in the beginning, if their nature and freedom of will be considered in itself; that God, however, fore[knew]...15
...[prae]scivisse eas minime peccaturas, et praeordinasse ne unquam peccarent, gratiam illis efficacem tribuendo, qua in exordio suo bene usae in posterum confirmatae sunt in gratia; et nunc quidem non esse beatas, sed usque ad diem iudicii esse in statu merendi, et per continuam orbium suorum conversionem (quam propter Dei obedientiam et amorem electorum libentissime agunt) semper magis ac magis aeternam felicitatem promereri. Itaque quod de Henoch et Helia, qui usque ad diem iudicii beatitudinem suam exspectant et quotidie eam promerentur, tradiderunt sancti Patres, idem de animabus caelorum dici posset. In tota autem superiori argumentatione positum est tanquam certum animas caelorum non esse factas aliquanto prius quam animarent et vivificarent caelos, sicut nec anima rationalis creatur priusquam informet corpus humanum: contra rationem enim naturalis formae est (quemadmodum docet Aristoteles lib. 12 Metaphysicae textu 16) ut ea tempore aliquo id cuius forma est antecedat.
...foreknew that they would by no means sin, and preordained that they should never sin, by bestowing on them efficacious grace, with which, having used it well in their beginning, they were thereafter confirmed in grace; and that they are not now blessed, but until the day of judgment are in the state of meriting, and by the continual revolution of their orbs (which they most gladly perform for the obedience of God and the love of the elect) ever more and more merit eternal felicity. And so what the holy Fathers have handed down concerning Enoch and Elijah—who until the day of judgment await their beatitude and daily merit it—the same might be said of the souls of the heavens. But in the whole foregoing argument it is laid down as certain that the souls of the heavens were not made any while before they animated and quickened the heavens, just as the rational soul is not created before it informs the human body; for it is against the nature of a natural form (as Aristotle teaches in book 12 of the Metaphysics, text 16) that it should at any time precede that of which it is the form.16
CETERUM, ratio illa vehementius urget: si Angelus est anima caeli, ergo motus circularis erit intrinsece ac per se naturalis, non caelo solum sed etiam Angelo qui est eius anima, et ad perfectionem eius pertinebit: sicut enim inanimatorum corporum perfectio potius est in quiete quam in motu, ita e contrario animatorum perfectio magis est in motu quam in quiete; idque tanto magis verum est quanto quidque perfectiorem animam habet et motum. Quare post diem iudicii vacatio motus caelestis violenta esset, et caelo et Angelo, et contra utriusque naturam et perfectionem eis accideret.
But that reasoning presses more forcibly: if the Angel is the soul of the heaven, then circular motion will be intrinsically and of itself natural, not only to the heaven but also to the Angel which is its soul, and will belong to its perfection: for just as the perfection of inanimate bodies is rather in rest than in motion, so, on the contrary, the perfection of animate ones is more in motion than in rest; and this is the more true the more perfect a soul and motion each thing has. Wherefore, after the day of judgment, the cessation of celestial motion would be violent, and would befall both the heaven and the Angel against the nature and perfection of both.17
Nec sane nihil habet ponderis ratio illa beati Thomae, qua is utitur in prima parte quaestione 70 articulo tertio, ut probet caelum vere non esse animatum, priorem scilicet opinionem quam in aliis scriptis secutus fuerat sapienter corrigens: Coniunctio, inquit, formae cum materia non fit propter materiam, est enim materia propter formam, non autem contra propter materiam est forma. Fit igitur eiusmodi consociatio et copulatio praecipue propter formam, videlicet ut forma, societate et quasi adminiculo materiae, melius actionem suam exercere et propriam perfectionem facilius adipisci queat. Angeli vero qui caelum movet duae sunt actiones, intelligere et movere: illa est Angelo interior propriorque atque perfectior, ad quam rite obeundam nihil ei opus est corpore caelesti; non enim, quemadmodum animus noster corporalium sensuum ministerio utitur ad intelligendum, sic Angelus ad explendas mentis suae functiones ullis caeli adiumentis utitur, aut iuvari potest. Ad movendum autem caelum non est necessaria coniunctio Angeli cum orbe caelesti tanquam formae cum materia: satis enim est si caelo solum adsit tanquam motor mobili, per virtutis applicationem et contactum ei aptatus et adiunctus. Non me fugit huic rationi sic occurrisse nonnullos, meliorem fore motum caelestem si a principio interno [efficiatur]...
Nor indeed is that reasoning of the blessed Thomas without weight, which he employs in the First Part, question 70, article 3, to prove that the heaven is truly not animate—wisely correcting the earlier opinion which he had followed in other writings: The union, he says, of form with matter does not come about for the sake of matter, for matter is for the sake of form, not, conversely, form for the sake of matter. Such an association and coupling, therefore, comes about chiefly for the sake of the form, namely that the form, by the partnership and, as it were, the support of matter, may better exercise its action and more easily attain its proper perfection. But of the Angel that moves the heaven there are two actions, to understand and to move: the former is interior to the Angel and more proper and more perfect, and for performing it duly it has no need of a celestial body; for the Angel does not, as our mind uses the ministry of the bodily senses for understanding, use any helps of the heaven to fulfill the functions of its mind, nor can it be aided by them. But for moving the heaven the union of the Angel with the celestial orb, as of form with matter, is not necessary: for it is enough that it be present to the heaven only as a mover to a movable, fitted and joined to it by the application of power and by contact. I am not unaware that some have met this reasoning thus: that celestial motion would be better if it were produced by an internal principle [than by an external]...18
...[a principio] interno efficiatur quam ab externo, praestantioremque fore conditionem caeli si ipsum a se moveatur quam si ab alio externa vi agitatuque conversetur: quod enim a se movetur id nobilius est (auctore Aristotele libr. 8 Physicorum) quam quod extrinsecus cietur ab alio. Verum, ut quod isti dicunt melius sit aut caeli aut motus caelestis respectu, non tamen melius esse respectu Angeli; quin conditionem eius multo deteriorem faceret: oporteret enim Angelum esse formam et partem caeli, substantiamque imperfectam, nec a corpore caelesti ullo modo separabilem. Quare non est committendum ut, dum caeli et motus caelestis dignitatem plus aequo augere volumus, praestantiam naturae quae Angelum maxime decet inepte minuamus.
...by an internal principle than by an external, and that the condition of the heaven would be more excellent if it were moved by itself than if it were turned about by another by an external force and agitation: for what is moved by itself is nobler (on Aristotle's authority, in book 8 of the Physics) than what is set in motion from without by another. But, granting that what these men say be better in respect of the heaven or of celestial motion, yet it would not be better in respect of the Angel; nay, it would make its condition far worse: for the Angel would have to be a form and part of the heaven, and an imperfect substance, in no way separable from the celestial body. Wherefore it must not be ventured that, while we wish to exalt the dignity of the heaven and of celestial motion beyond measure, we ineptly diminish that excellence of nature which most befits the Angel.19
PORRO, Aristotelem quoque in eadem fuisse sententia me quidem certe dubitare non sinunt quae scripsit ipse in lib. 8 Physicorum et in lib. 12 Metaphysicae. Docet enim intelligentias esse perfectas et absolutas substantias, esse prorsus indivisibiles et extra magnitudinem positas; et cum sempiterno motu orbes circumagant, nec per se tamen nec per accidens ipsas moveri; esse puros actus omnis expertes potentiae; earumque doctrinam propriam esse Metaphysicae, quae res a materia omnino abiunctas contemplatur. Haec vero nullo modo intelligentiis conveniunt si quidem illae naturales formae et verae caelorum animae ponantur: namque essent substantiae imperfectae et inhaerentes in corporibus et ab illis quoquomodo inseparabiles; nec essent puri actus omnique vacantes potentia; nec possent non motu suorum orbium, saltem per accidens, ipsae quoque una moveri; denique earum tractatio non pertineret ad Metaphysicam, quippe quae in rebus ab omni materiae concretione, non tantum cogitatione rationeque sed etiam re ipsa segregatis, potissime versatur.
FURTHERMORE, that Aristotle too was of the same opinion, the things which he himself wrote in book 8 of the Physics and in book 12 of the Metaphysics certainly do not allow me to doubt. For he teaches that the intelligences are perfect and absolute substances, utterly indivisible and set outside magnitude; and that, though they turn the orbs about with everlasting motion, they themselves are moved neither of themselves nor by accident; that they are pure acts, devoid of all potency; and that their doctrine belongs properly to Metaphysics, which contemplates things wholly separated from matter. But these things in no way agree with the intelligences if they are posited as natural forms and the true souls of the heavens: for then they would be imperfect substances, inherent in bodies and in no way separable from them; nor would they be pure acts, void of all potency; nor could they but be moved along with the motion of their orbs, at least by accident; and finally, their treatment would not belong to Metaphysics, which is engaged above all with things separated from every concretion of matter—not only in thought and reason, but also in reality itself.20

Translator’s notes

  1. The seventh question of Book II. ↩
  2. Marginal gloss: "Multorum opinio, caelos esse animatos." Very many great philosophers (Pythagoreans, Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics) held the heavenly bodies to have soul and life. Plato, Epinomis (the stars to be honored as celestial gods). Aristotle, De Caelo 2 (text 13: the heaven animate, hence the natural differences of position; text 61: those who think the stars inanimate are deceived). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘stent’; signature E 3). ↩
  3. Philo (De opificio mundi; De somniis; De gigantibus) holds the stars living and intelligent. Avicenna: the heaven has a sentient soul with an interior sense, the Greek φαντασία (imagination). Simplicius (In De Caelo 1, on text 50) assigns the heaven three exterior senses (sight, hearing, touch). Alexander of Aphrodisias denied the stars sentient (the sensitive presupposes the vegetative, Aristotle De Anima 2); so they are animate only equivocally. ↩
  4. Simplicius, In De Caelo 1 (commenting on text 50): the heaven, being the noblest body, should not lack the nobler senses (sight, hearing, touch). ↩
  5. Marginal gloss: "Origenes putavit caelos esse animatos et virtutis ac vitii capaces, quin etiam pro illis Christum esse mortuum." Origen (Comm. in Ioannem 1; Peri Archon / De principiis 1.7; Hom. in Numeros): the stars animate, capable of virtue and vice (Job 25:5, ‘the stars are not clean’); Christ died even for the stars. Jerome (on Ecclesiastes 1:6, ‘the spirit goes whirling about’): the sun called ‘spirit.’ ↩
  6. Virgil, Aeneid 6.725–726. ↩
  7. Marginal gloss: "Augustinus de caelis utrum sint animati, dubitanter velut suspensa sententia loquitur." Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.18 (raises but leaves the question); Enchiridion 58; Retractationes 1.5 & 1.11 (correcting De immortalitate animae 15 and De musica 6.14, where he had called the world an animate ‘great animal’). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘magnum’). ↩
  8. Augustine corrects himself (not as false but rashly said). The De cognitione verae vitae (in his works, tom. 9) is spurious; De civ. Dei 13.16 (one need not at once concede to Plato that the stars are living and blessed). Aureolus (in Capreolus, In II Sent.) and Scotus (In II Sent. d.14 q.1); Aquinas (Quaest. disp. de Anima a.8; De spiritualibus creaturis [Opusc. de Angelis] 2; SCG 2.70) holds the heavens animate with an intelligent soul; Cajetan on Psalm 135[136]:5 (‘Qui fecit caelos in intellectu’). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘telligentes’). ↩
  9. The Preface of the Mass (‘...the heavens and the powers of the heavens, and the blessed Seraphim...’). Cajetan (Tract. de Indulgentiis) takes ‘the powers of the heavens’ to mean the souls of the heavens. ↩
  10. Pererius's rebuttal: ‘the heavens made in understanding’ (Psalm 135) is a Hebrew idiom = made by God with supreme art, reason, and understanding (Hebrew ‘in’ = ‘by/with’); ‘the powers of the heavens’ = the Angels who move them. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘Sera’). ↩
  11. ‘The powers of the heavens’ = the movers and rulers of the heavens, or the heavenly bodies themselves. Aristotle, Metaphysics 12 (the stars as the ends of the celestial orbs). ↩
  12. Marginal gloss: "Verior sententia, caelos intrinsecus et secundum substantiam non esse animatos." The contrary (truer) view—the stars are not animate: Basil (Hom. 3 in Gen.), Ambrose (Hexaem. 2.4), Cyril (Contra Iulianum 3), Damascene (De fide 2.6), Lactantius (Div. inst. 2.5). Jerome (Ep. 59 ad Avitum) lists this among Origen's errors. ↩
  13. Marginal glosses: "Iona 4"; "Lucae 8." Jerome (In Isaiam 13, on Isaiah 45:12): God's ‘commanding’ the host of heaven gave occasion to error—but He also commanded the burning wind and the worm (Jonah 4:8, 4:7), and the Savior rebuked the winds and sea (Luke 8:24). Pererius notes Jerome may condemn only Origen's reason (the stars ensouled for prior sins), and that the Ecclesiastes text does not assert the sun's animation. ↩
  14. Marginal gloss: "Si astra essent animata, praecipuo quodam cultu honore colenda venerandaque essent." Bonaventure (In II Sent. d.14) rightly calls the animate-stars view false and erroneous (else we must worship the stars). Augustine, Enchiridion 28 (and 58, doubtful). God forbids any worship of the stars (Deuteronomy 4:19): they are inferior to us, made for man's service. ↩
  15. The dilemma: the souls of the heavenly bodies are either naturally blessed (impossible) or blessed by God's gift; either created blessed (against the common view, granted to no creature but Christ's soul) or able to merit/lose blessedness, hence able to sin—from which absurdities follow. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘sciuisse’; signature F). ↩
  16. A hypothetical reply (continuing from p.225): God foreknew the souls of the heavens would not sin and gave them efficacious grace; they are not yet blessed but in a state of meriting until the Judgment, like Enoch and Elijah. But the argument assumes the souls were not made before they animated the heavens (as the rational soul is not made before it informs the body; Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, text 16). ↩
  17. The stronger objection: if the Angel is the soul of the heaven, circular motion belongs to the Angel-soul's perfection (animate bodies are perfected in motion); so the post-Judgment cessation of motion would be violent to both heaven and Angel. ↩
  18. Marginal gloss: "Notabilis B. Thomae argumentatio." Aquinas, ST I q.70 a.3 (correcting his earlier view that the heaven is animate): the form-matter union is for the form's sake; but the Angel that moves the heaven needs no body for understanding, and for moving needs only to be present as mover to movable (by application of power and contact), not as form to matter. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘interno’). ↩
  19. Some objected that an internally-moved heaven would be nobler (Aristotle, Physics 8: the self-moved is nobler than the externally moved). But even if better for the heaven, it would be far worse for the Angel, which would become an imperfect form inseparable from the heaven. We must not exalt the heaven at the cost of the Angel's dignity. ↩
  20. Marginal gloss: "Aristoteli intelligentiae non sunt, proprie loquendo, animae et formae substantiales caelorum." Aristotle (Physics 8; Metaphysics 12): the intelligences are perfect, indivisible, magnitude-less, unmoved (per se or per accidens), pure acts void of potency, the subject of Metaphysics—none of which fits if they are natural forms and true souls of the heavens. ↩