Even if the Astrologers held the highest knowledge of celestial things, that they still cannot divine future events is proved by eight arguments. CHAPTER THREE — Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

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Even if the Astrologers held the highest knowledge of celestial things, that they still cannot divine future events is proved by eight arguments. CHAPTER THREE.¹

Etiamsi Astrologi summam rerum caelestium cognitionem tenerent, non posse tamen eos futura divinare, probatur octo rationibus. CAPUT TERTIUM.

SED concedamus Astrologis quod ipsi falso et impudenter sibi arrogant, perfectam videlicet astrorum et caeli scientiam: hanc ipsam nunc contendo non posse certam futurarum rerum praenotionem et divinationem efficere; idque multis et validis rationibus confirmo. PRIMA RATIO. Vera est et trita in scholis illa Philosophorum sententia, Sicut res se habet ad esse, ita quoque se habet ad cognitionem; hoc est, propter quas causas quaeque res fit et est, per eas cognosci debet, si quidem perfectam eius rei scientiam adipisci volumus. Ad generationem autem futurorum effectuum particularium non modo concurrit caelum, sed etiam causa particularis: est enim caelum causa universalis, quo fit ut eius vis et efficientia sit etiam universalis et indeterminata ad producendum quoslibet effectus particulares; determinatur autem vis caeli per causas particulares. Quamobrem verissimum est illud quod dixit Aristoteles, Sol et homo generant hominem. Quin effectus particulares, licet quod attinet ad eorum effectionem et conservationem maxime pendeant ex causis universalibus, tamen quod pertinet ad propriam cuiusque eorum naturam et ad naturales proprietates, tam specificas quam individuales, magis particularem causam quam universalem aemulantur atque imitantur. Cum igitur praeter causas caelestes, ad producendos effectus futuros, opus sit etiam causa particulari efficiente et materia idonee praeparata, quorum si desit alterutrum prorsus nullus futurus est effectus: ex his necessario concluditur ad praenotionem futurorum effectuum caelestium causarum notitiam non esse satis. Atque hoc etiam quotidianis et manifestis experimentis constat. Cernimus enim agricolas eodem tempore et sub eodem syderum aspectu varia seminum genera in terram iacere, ex quibus tamen diversa nascuntur: quae sane diversitas non ad causas caelestes, sed ad diversas tantum species et vires seminum referri potest. Ad hanc eandem sententiam, in libro secundo de Genesi ad litteram cap. 17 ita scribit Augustinus:

BUT let us grant the Astrologers that which they falsely and impudently arrogate to themselves, namely a perfect knowledge of the stars and the heaven: this very thing I now contend cannot produce a certain foreknowledge and divination of future things; and this I confirm by many and strong reasons. FIRST REASON. True and well-worn in the schools is that saying of the Philosophers, As a thing stands toward being, so also it stands toward knowledge; that is, by the causes for which each thing comes to be and is, by those it must be known, if indeed we wish to attain a perfect knowledge of that thing. Now to the generation of particular future effects there concurs not only the heaven, but also a particular cause: for the heaven is a universal cause, whence it comes about that its force and efficacy is also universal and undetermined toward producing any particular effects whatsoever; but the force of the heaven is determined by the particular causes. Wherefore most true is that which Aristotle said, The sun and a man beget a man. Nay, particular effects, although as regards their production and conservation they depend chiefly on universal causes, yet as regards the proper nature of each of them and its natural properties, both specific and individual, imitate and emulate the particular cause rather than the universal. Since therefore, besides the celestial causes, there is need also of a particular efficient cause and of suitably prepared matter for producing future effects—and if either of these be lacking there will be no effect at all—from these things it is necessarily concluded that, for the foreknowledge of future effects, the knowledge of the celestial causes is not enough. And this too is established by daily and manifest experiments. For we see husbandmen at the same time and under the same aspect of the stars cast various kinds of seeds into the earth, from which nevertheless diverse things are born: which diversity surely can be referred not to the celestial causes, but only to the diverse species and forces of the seeds. To this same opinion, in the second book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17, Augustine thus writes:²

When many bodies of diverse kinds—whether of animals, or of herbs and shrubs—are sown at one and the same point of time, and at one point of time innumerably many are born, not only in diverse but even in the same regions of the earth, so great are the varieties in their growths, in their actions, and in their passion[s]...³

Cum multa corpora diversorum generum, vel animantium vel herbarum et arbustorum, uno simul puncto temporis seminentur, unoque puncto temporis innumerabiliter multa nascantur, non tantum diversis sed etiam iisdem terrarum locis, tanta sunt varietates in progressibus, in actibus et passioni[bus eorum]...

...in their passions, so that truly such a man (as the saying goes) would lose the stars if he should consider these things. But what is more tasteless and dull than, when they are confuted by these facts, to say that the fatal reckoning of the stars pertains only to men, as to be made subject to themselves? Thus Augustine.⁴

...[passioni]bus eorum, ut vere isti (sicut dicitur) perdat sydera si ista considerent. Quid autem insulsius et hebetius quam, cum istis rebus convincuntur, dicere ad solos homines sibi subiiciendos fatalem stellarum pertinere rationem? Sic Augustinus.

Cuius extremum dictum paulo uberius tractat apud Gellium libro 14 capite primo Phauorinus: Si vita, inquit, mortisque hominum rerumque humanarum omnium tempus et ratio et causa in caelo et apud stellas foret, quid de muscis aut vermiculis aut echinis multisque aliis minutissimis terra marisque animantibus dicerent? an ista quoque iisdem quibus homines legibus nascerentur, iisdem ibidem extinguerentur? ut aut ranunculis quoque et culicibus nascendi Fata sint de caelestium syderum motibus attributa; aut si id non putarent, nulla ratio videretur cur ea syderum vis in hominibus valeret, si deficeret in ceteris.

Whose last saying Favorinus treats a little more fully in Gellius, book 14, chapter one: If the time and the reckoning and the cause, he says, of the life and death of men and of all human affairs were in the heaven and among the stars, what would they say of flies, or little worms, or sea-urchins, and many other most minute living creatures of land and sea? Would these too be born by the same laws as men, and in the same way be extinguished there? so that either to frogs also and gnats birth-fates are assigned from the motions of the celestial stars; or, if they should not think this, no reason would appear why that force of the stars should prevail in men, if it failed in the rest.⁵

SECUNDA RATIO. Si vera esset istiusmodi Astrologorum doctrina, necesse esset Geminos qui uno tempore concepti et nati sunt simillimos omnino fore: quod falsum esse satis perspicuum est; nam ut ceteram eorum dissimilitudinem taceam, evenit nonnunquam ut alter sit mas, alter vero femina. Cicero quidem in altero libro de Divinatione Proclum et Euristhenem reges Lacedaemoniorum fratresque geminos commemorat, quorum tamen et exitus vitae dissimilis et gloria rerum gestarum dispar fuit. Verum, in sacris litteris luculentissimum eius rei habemus exemplum: Iacob enim et Esau eodem concubitu (ut inquit Paulus Rom. 9) sati, eodemque tempore nati, dissimillimis tamen ingeniis, studiis, moribus et eventis fuerunt. Nec vero firmum est illud praesidium in quod refugiunt Astrologi cum hoc argumento urgentur, videlicet brevissimam illam moram quae inter Geminorum ortus intercedit, licet ea nobis perexigua videatur, in caelo tamen, ob eius vastitatem et rapidissimam conversionem, esse admodum insignem magnamque facere variationem. Hoc Nigidius Figulus declarabat exemplo rotae, quam incitatissime contortam, cum bis eodem loco signare atramento vel percutere summa celeritate conatus esset, cessante ipsius rotae circumactione, reperta sunt duo illa loca ab ipso percussa vel signata haud parvo se intervallo disiuncta. Hoc, inquam, praesidium et refugium infirmum est parumque tutum Astrologis. Etenim, licet in ortu Geminorum aliqua fuerit mora, in eorum tamen conceptu prorsus nulla fuit. Deinde, si tam brevi variatur ratio constellationis sub qua quisque nascitur, erit profecto proprium tempus ortus cuiuslibet Astrologis incomprehensibile. Denique, valebit hoc loco adversus Astrologos argumentatio illa Beati Gregorii:

SECOND REASON. If the doctrine of these Astrologers were true, it would be necessary that twins, who are conceived and born at one time, should be altogether most alike: which is clearly enough false; for, to say nothing of the rest of their unlikeness, it sometimes happens that one is male, the other female. Cicero indeed, in the second book On Divination, mentions Procles and Eurysthenes, kings of the Lacedaemonians and twin brothers, whose end of life, however, was unlike, and whose glory of deeds was unequal. But in the sacred writings we have a most brilliant example of the thing: for Jacob and Esau, begotten in one act of union (as Paul says, Romans 9), and born at one time, were nevertheless most unlike in dispositions, pursuits, morals, and fortunes. Nor indeed is that defense firm to which the Astrologers flee when they are pressed by this argument—namely, that the very brief delay which intervenes between the births of twins, although it seems to us very slight, is yet in the heaven, by reason of its vastness and most rapid revolution, very notable and makes a great variation. This Nigidius Figulus declared by the example of a wheel, which, spun about most swiftly, when he had tried at top speed to mark or strike it twice with ink in the same place, then, the wheel's turning having ceased, those two places struck or marked by him were found to be separated by no small interval. This defense, I say, and refuge is weak and not very safe for the Astrologers. For although there was some delay at the birth of the twins, yet in their conception there was none at all. Next, if the reckoning of the constellation under which each is born varies in so brief a time, then surely the proper time of anyone's birth will be incomprehensible to the Astrologers. Finally, that argument of Blessed Gregory will avail in this place against the Astrologers:⁶

If for this reason Jacob and Esau are not reckoned to have been born under the same constellation—because they were not born together, but one after the other—then surely for the same reason it must be judged that no man is born whole under the same constellation, for he does not come forth from the womb all at once, but part by part and limb by limb:⁷

Si propterea Iacob et Esau non censentur nati sub eadem constellatione, quod non simul nati sunt, sed unus post alterum; ob eandem profecto causam iudicandum erit nullum hominum sub eadem constellatione totum nasci, non enim totus simul ex utero procedit, particulatim et membratim:

for first it puts forth the head, then the neck, then the breast, last the feet. For Jacob was born next after Esau, holding with his hand the sole of his foot, just as if (as Augustine says, in book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17) one infant were born in the likeness of two, or twice as long.⁸

primo enim effert caput, tum collum, deinde pectus, postremo pedes. Iacob enim proxime natus est post Esau manu plantam pedis eius tenens, perinde quasi (sicut inquit Augustinus libr. 2 de Genesi ad litteram capit. 17) unus infans instar duorum vel duplo longior nasceretur.

VERUM, hanc rationem admodum diserte Phauorinus adversus Chaldaeos disputans exequutus est. Atqui id velim etiam, inquit, ut respondeant, si tam parvum atque rapidum est momentum temporis in quo homo nascens Fatum accipit, ut in eodem illo puncto sub illo circulo caeli plures simul ad eandem competentiam nasci non queant; et si idcirco Gemini quoque non eadem vitae sorte sunt, quoniam non eodem temporis puncto editi sunt: peto, inquit, respondeant, cursum illum temporis transvolantis qui vix cogitatione animi comprehendi potest, quonam pacto aut consulto assequi queant aut ipsi perspicere et deprehendere, cum in tam praecipiti dierum noctiumque vertigine minima momenta ingentes facere dicant mutationes? Sic Phauorinus.

BUT this argument Favorinus, disputing very eloquently against the Chaldeans, has pursued. And yet this too I would have them answer, he says: if the moment of time in which a man being born receives his Fate is so small and swift that at that same point, under that circle of the heaven, several cannot be born together to the same competence; and if for that reason twins also are not of the same lot of life, because they were not brought forth at the same point of time: I ask, he says, let them answer, by what means, whether by design they can attain, or themselves perceive and detect, that course of fleeting time which can scarcely be comprehended by the thought of the mind—when, in so headlong a whirl of days and nights, they say that the least moments make enormous changes? Thus Favorinus.⁹

Ipsum hoc argumentum de Geminis diligenter et subtiliter pertractat Augustinus libro quinto de Civitate Dei primis aliquot capitibus, atque in secundo libro de doctrina Christiana capite vigesimosecundo: et vero, maximum facessit negotium Astrologis. Si enim tam brevi temporis momento mutantur omnia, ut non diversa modo sed etiam adversa plerumque eveniant, quis de nato puero possit quicquam certi praedicere, cum illud temporis punctum quo vel conceptus vel natus est, ita uti est, nemini possit esse cognitum? Itaque, et magna in homines vi et potestate pollerent astra, quid ea tamen in singulorum hominum generatione et ortu efficerent incompertum esset nobis: quippe cum aspectus caeli et positus astrorum, qui est tempore quo quisque nascitur, certo deprehendi nequeat; incitatissimus enim caeli et astrorum motus tarditatem nostrae considerationis et observationis praetervolat et antevertit.

This very argument concerning twins Augustine treats carefully and subtly in the fifth book of the City of God, in some of the first chapters, and in the second book On Christian Doctrine, chapter twenty-two: and indeed it makes the greatest trouble for the Astrologers. For if all things are changed in so brief a moment of time that not merely diverse but even contrary things usually come to pass, who can foretell anything certain about a newborn boy, when that point of time at which he was either conceived or born, just as it is, can be known to no one? And so, even though the stars had great force and power over men, yet what they effect in the generation and birth of individual men would be unascertained by us: since the aspect of the heaven and the position of the stars, which is at the time when each one is born, cannot be certainly detected; for the most rapid motion of the heaven and the stars flies past and outstrips the slowness of our consideration and observation.¹⁰

TERTIA RATIO. Missos nunc facio Geminos, quorum interruptus partus aliquam praebuit latebram Astrologis: consideremus in praesentia quamplurimos prorsus eodem tempore et in eadem regione eodemque syderum aspectu et positura, ex diversis tamen parentibus progeneratos. De istis non potest astrologus ex observatione syderum non eadem eventa praenunciare, cum simul concepti et nati fuerint et sub eadem constellatione. At longe secus esse quotidiana demonstrat experientia: quam multi enim toto orbe simul et generantur in utero et in lucem eduntur, quorum deinde maxima est ingeniorum, studiorum, morum, religionis, casuum, denique vitae ac mortis eventorum dissimilitudo? Omnium Romanorum qui Cannensi pugna quamplurimi caesi sunt ab Annibale, idem fuit vitae exitus et interitus: quis autem existimet eodem illos omnes stellarum aspectu posituque fuisse natos? Idem dico de tot[...]

THIRD REASON. I now dismiss the twins, whose interrupted birth afforded some hiding-place to the Astrologers: let us for the present consider very many begotten at absolutely the same time, and in the same region, and under the same aspect and position of the stars, yet from different parents. Of these the astrologer cannot, from the observation of the stars, fail to foretell the same events, since they were conceived and born together and under the same constellation. But that it is far otherwise, daily experience demonstrates: for how many throughout the whole world are at the same time both begotten in the womb and brought forth into the light, of whom thereafter there is the greatest unlikeness of dispositions, pursuits, morals, religion, chances, and finally of the events of life and death? Of all the Romans who in very great numbers were slain at the battle of Cannae by Hannibal, there was the same end and destruction of life: but who would suppose that all those were born under the same aspect and position of the stars? I say the same of so many[...]¹¹

de tot millibus Turcarum, qui navali pugna ab hinc octo et decem annos, memorabili ad immortalitatem victoria, a Christiana classe profligati et internecione deleti sunt: quorum omnium eandem fuisse rationem ortus, eandemque in generatione eorum viguisse caeli constellationem, stultum est dicere. An quo tempore natus est Homerus, Hippocrates, Aristoteles et Alexander Magnus, non eodem quoque alios complures natos esse putabimus? at quis illorum similis adhuc extitit? Phauorinus sic argumentationem hanc contexebat:

the same of so many thousands of Turks, who in the naval battle eighteen years ago—by a victory memorable to immortality—were routed by the Christian fleet and destroyed in utter slaughter: of all of whom to say that there was the same reckoning of birth, and that the same constellation of heaven prevailed at their generation, is foolish. Or shall we think that, at the time when Homer, Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Alexander the Great were born, very many others were not born at the same time also? yet which of them has hitherto proved like them? Favorinus wove this argument together thus:¹²

How many men of both sexes and of all ages, brought into life under diverse motions of the stars, in regions far distant under which they were born—how many of these, nevertheless, perish either by the gaping of the earth, or by falling roofs, or by the stormings of towns, or overwhelmed by the wave in the same ship, by the same kind of death and at the same instant of time? Which surely would never happen, if the moments of birth assigned to individuals each had their own laws. But if in the death and life of men—even of those brought forth at different times—some equal and very similar things are said to be able to befall, through certain later equal conjunctions of the stars; why could not all things also sometimes turn out equal, so that through such concurrences and likenesses of the stars there arise at once a Socrates and an Antisthenes and many Platos, equal in race, form, talent, character, in all of life and in death? which, he says, can by no means happen at all. Not for this cause, therefore, can the Chaldeans rightly avail against the unequal births and equal deaths of men. Thus Favorinus.¹³

Quam multi homines utriusque sexus omnium aetatum, diversis stellarum motibus, in vitam editi regionibus sub quibus geniti sunt longe distantibus, omnes tamen isti, aut hiantibus terris, aut labentibus tectis, aut oppidorum expugnationibus, aut eadem in navi fluctu obruti, eodemque genere mortis eodemque ictu temporis intereunt? Quod scilicet nunquam eveniret, si momenta nascendi singulis attributa suas unumquodque leges haberent. Quod si quaedam in hominum morte atque vita, etiam diversis temporibus editorum, per stellarum pares quosdam postea conventus, paria nonnulla et consimilia posse dicuntur obtingere; cur non aliquando possint omnia quoque paria usu venire, ut existant per huiuscemodi stellarum concursiones et similitudines Socrates simul et Antisthenes et Platones multi, genere, forma, ingenio, moribus, vita omni et morte pari? quod nequaquam, inquit, prorsus fieri potest. Non igitur hac causa Chaldaei probe uti queunt adversus hominum impares ortus, interitus pares. Haec Phauorinus.

QUARTA RATIO. Bardesanes Syrus, in doctrina rerum caelestium excellenter versatus, in eo dialogo quem rogatu amicorum de Fato et adversus Chaldaeos conscripsit, futilissimas esse astrologorum observationes et raro non ementientes eorum praedictiones, ad hunc fere modum (ut memorat Eusebius libro sexto de Praeparatione evangelica, capite octavo) demonstrabat:

FOURTH REASON. Bardesanes the Syrian, excellently versed in the doctrine of celestial things, in that dialogue which at the request of his friends he composed On Fate and against the Chaldeans, demonstrated that the observations of the astrologers are most futile, and their predictions seldom not lying, in about this manner (as Eusebius records in the sixth book of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter eight):¹⁴

Among the Seres there is a law forbidding to kill, to fornicate, and to worship images: whence in that region no temple is seen, no harlot woman, no adulteress, no thief, no murderer; nor did the most ardent star of Mars, set in mid-heaven, force the will of any of them to the slaying of a man; nor could Venus joined to Mars bring it about that anyone should solicit another's wife. And yet it must needs be that Mars comes to mid-heaven among them too on each several day, and it cannot be denied that in so great a region men are born at every hour. But among the Indians and Bactrians there are many thousands of men who are called Brahmins: these, both by the tradition of their fathers and by their laws, neither worship images, nor eat anything that has had life, never drink wine or beer, and finally are far from all malice, attending to God alone. But indeed all the rest of the Indians in that very same region are wrapped up in adulteries, slaughter, drunkenness, the worship of images: and there are found there some—nay rather there is a certain nation of Indians dwelling in the same climate—who devour men as they hunt and sacrifice: nor do any of the planets which they call fortunate and good, from slaughter[...]¹⁵

Apud Seras lex est prohibens occidere, fornicari et adorare simulacra: unde in illa regione nullum templum conspicitur, nulla mulier meretrix, nulla adultera, nemo fur, nemo homicida: nec voluntatem alicuius illorum ardentissima stella Martis, in medio caeli constituta, ad caedem hominis coëgit; nec Venus Marti coniuncta ut alienam quispiam solicitaret uxorem potuit efficere. Atqui singulis etiam apud eos diebus in medium caeli Martem pervenire necesse est, et in tanta regione singulis horis nasci homines non est negandum. Apud Indos autem et Bactros multa millia hominum sunt qui Brachmanes appellantur: hi tam traditione patrum quam legibus nec simulacra colunt, nec animatum aliquid comedunt, vinum aut cervisiam nunquam bibunt, ab omni demum malignitate absunt, soli Deo attendentes. At vero ceteri omnes Indi in eadem ipsa regione adulteriis, caede, temulentia, simulacrorum cultu involuuntur: inveniunturque ibi nonnulli, immo vero gens quaedam Indorum est in eodem climate habitans, qui homines venantes atque sacrificantes devorant: nec ulli planetarum quos felices ac bonos appellant a caede[...]

...restrain them from that slaughter and from those crimes: nor could the malign planets drive the Brahmins to do evil. Among the Persians there was a law to take in marriage daughters, sisters, and even mothers themselves; nor in Persia only, but whoever of the Persians went out from their homeland to other climes of the world celebrated these nefarious marriages diligently: whom other nations, abominating this crime, call Magussaeans. And there are to this present day in the midst of Egypt, Phrygia, and Galatia very many Magussaeans, defiled by these same crimes by succession of their fathers. Nor can we say that, in the bounds and house of Saturn, Saturn himself was present at the nativities of all of them, with Mars beholding Venus. The Amazons have no husbands, but, going out from their borders in the season of spring, they come together with their neighbors. Whence all of them by a natural law bring forth at the same time, and, the males being killed, they rear the females alone, and all are alike warlike, taking great care for warlike exercise. But it is foolish to suppose that all such women were begotten under exactly the same natal stars. This is made more confirmed by the argument and example of the Jews, who, wherever in the world and among whatever nations they are born or live, by an inviolable observance both circumcise their infants on the eighth day, and keep every sabbath day as a holiday and feast most religiously. But the Jews are not all procreated under the same constellation, nor can any force or power of the celestial bodies draw them away from their ancestral laws and institutions. But what shall we say of the Christians? who, innumerable, scattered throughout the whole world, keep the same kind of life and doctrine, nor can they be moved a nail's breadth from the discipline which Christ the Lord delivered to them, either by any promises, or by threats or tortures: shall they say that all the Christians were born under the same star? But this is the greatest argument: that those who, before they took up the discipline of Christ, most studiously and keenly held their ancestral laws and institutions, these, afterward made Christians, with those things deserted and cast off, lead a far different life, put on different morals, and cultivate a most different religion and doctrine. And so neither do Parthian Christians take many wives, nor do the Medes throw their dead to dogs, nor do the Indians burn their dead, nor do the Persians mingle in nefarious marriage with sisters or with daughters, nor do the Egyptians worship Apis, or a dog, or a he-goat, or a cat: but wherever they are, they live by the same laws, morals, and institutions. What more? At every hour, among all nations, men are born: but everywhere we see laws and morals prevail, because of the free power of man. Nor do the natal stars compel the Seres, unwilling, to homicide, or the Brahmins to the eating of flesh; nor remove the Persians from their wicked nuptials; nor forbid the Medes to expose the dead to dogs; nor the Parthians to take many wives. For the several nations, as they wish and when they wish, use their own liberty, obedient to their laws and morals.¹⁶

...[a] caede ac sceleribus istis eos prohibent: nec maligni Brachmanas pellere ad malefaciendum potuerunt. Apud Persas lex erat filias, sorores, matres quoque ipsas in matrimonium ducere; nec in Perside solum, verum etiam quicumque Persarum ad alia climata orbis e patria exiverunt, nefanda haec diligenter matrimonia celebrarunt: quos, aliae gentes hoc scelus abominatae, Magussaeos appellant. Suntque usque ad hodiernum diem in media Aegypto, Phrygia Galatiaque plurimi Magussaei successione patrum eisdem sceleribus contaminati. Nec dicere possumus in terminis et domo Saturni, cum Saturno ipso in nativitatibus omnium, Marte aspiciente Venerem fuisse. Amazones viros non habent, sed tempore veris fines suos egredientes cum vicinis conveniunt. Unde omnes naturali lege eodem tempore pariunt, masculisque interfectis solas feminas alunt, bellicosaeque omnes similiter sunt, magnam exercitationis bellicae curam gerentes. Stultum autem est opinari omnes istiusmodi feminas prorsus iisdem natalitiis astris esse genitas. Fit hoc confirmatius argumento exemploque Iudaeorum, qui ubicumque terrarum et gentium sint nati aut versentur, inviolabili observatione et infantes suos octavo die circumcidunt, et omnem diem sabbathi feriatum festumque religiosissime agunt. Non sunt autem Iudaei omnes sub eadem constellatione procreati, nec eos a patriis legibus et institutis ulla vis et potentia caelestium corporum abstrahere potest. Sed quid dicemus de Christianis? qui innumerabiles toto orbe sparsi idem vitae genus atque doctrinam custodiunt, nec a disciplina quam ipsis Christus Dominus tradidit, vel promissis ullis, vel minis aut suppliciis, vel latum unguem amoveri possunt: an dicturi sunt Christianos omnes eodem astro esse natos? Sed illud maximum est argumentum, qui ante susceptam Christi disciplinam patrias leges et instituta studiosissime acerrimeque tenebant, eos postea factos Christianos, illis desertis abiectisque, longe diversam vitam agere, diversos mores induere, et diversissimam religionem et doctrinam colere. Itaque nec multas Parthi Christiani ducunt uxores, nec Medi canibus mortuos obiiciunt, nec Indi mortuos suos cremant, nec Persae cum sororibus aut cum filiabus nefario matrimonio miscentur, nec Aegyptii Apin aut canem aut hircum aut felem colunt: sed ubicumque sunt, eisdem legibus, moribus et institutis vivunt. Quid plura? singulis horis apud omnes gentes homines nascuntur: ubique autem leges atque mores propter liberam hominis potestatem praevalere videmus. Nec natalitia sydera nolentes Seras ad homicidium compellunt, aut Brachmanas ad esum carnium: nec Persas a sceleratis nuptiis removent: nec Medos prohibent vita defunctos canibus exponere: nec Parthos multas ducere uxores. Singula namque gentes, ut volunt et quando volunt, libertate sua utuntur, legibus moribusque obedientes.

Hactenus sunt quae ex disputatione Bardesanis adversus Astrologos commemoranda hoc loco censuimus. QUINTA RATIO. Stante libero arbitrio hominis et immortalitate animi nostri, ars ista nullo modo stare potest; si autem ea stet, illa funditus corruere necesse est: quo intelligere licet qualis istiusmodi ars existimanda sit, quae nisi pessundata et obtrita sublataque nostro[rum]...

Thus far are the things which, from the disputation of Bardesanes against the Astrologers, we have judged worth recording in this place. FIFTH REASON. With the free will of man and the immortality of our soul standing, that art can in no way stand; but if it stands, they must necessarily collapse from the foundation: whereby one may understand what an art of this kind is to be reckoned, which, unless the liberty and immortality of our [souls] be ruined and trampled and taken away[...]¹⁷

...[nostro]rum animorum libertate atque immortalitate, nihil progredi nec ullo modo consistere queat. Quod autem, si animus noster immortalis et in agendo liber sit, divinatio astrologica nulla esse possit, his argumentis concluditur. Primo, Astrologi profitentur se futuras hominum actiones eventaque ex suae artis observationibus praesentire et praenuntiare posse; hoc autem falsum est: futura enim quae ex libera hominis voluntate proficisci debent nullo modo possunt esse nota Astrologis. Nam vel cognoscerent futura in se ipsis, quod fieri non potest, quippe quae futura sunt nondum per se actu sunt; quod autem non est, prout non est, non intelligitur, sed prout aliquo modo est, nimirum potestate in suis causis. Nec praenosci queunt futura in ipsorum causis, quae tres sunt: Deus, caelum, voluntas humana. Quae autem ex Dei proposito, consilio et absoluta voluntate eventura sunt, ea nulli mortalium vel ex caelo vel alia quacunque ratione, nisi cui Deus ea voluerit aperire, cognita esse possunt. Quis enim, inquit Scriptura, cognovit sensum Domini? aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? et ut scriptum est in nono capite libri Sapientiae, Quae in prospectu sunt invenimus cum labore; quae autem in caelis sunt quis investigabit? sensum autem tuum quis sciet, nisi tu dederis sapientiam et miseris Spiritum sanctum tuum de altissimis? Ex caelo autem futura quae pendent ex voluntate hominis non possunt cognosci: tum quia caelum est causa universalis, quare futuri effectus particulares non nisi universaliter et indeterminate in caelo contineri et cognosci possunt; tum etiam quia caelum est causa corporalis et materialis, quare animus noster, qui per se incorporeus et expers materiae est liberque in agendo, caeli efficientiae ac operationi directe et necessario minime subiacebit. Voluntas porro humana, quae est proxima causa humanarum actionum respectu futurorum quae ex ipsa proficisci debent, per se indifferens et indeterminata est: multa enim acturi sumus de quibus nihil dum cogitavimus, nedum deliberavimus. Quomodo igitur causa indeterminata et indifferens potest definitam certamque futuri effectus cognitionem parere? Confirmatur hoc: exteriores actiones hominis pendent ex interioribus, ex deliberatione dico et electione; non potest igitur futura hominis actio exterior praenosci, nisi cognita sit futurae voluntatis electio unde illa proficisci debet. At futura hominis electio non potest alteri homini esse cognita; si enim propositum animi et deliberationem quam quis in praesens habet mente conceptam nemo alius scire potest, quanto minus scire poterit consilium, propositum et voluntatem alterius hominis, quae multos post annos futura est?

...by the liberty and immortality of our souls, can in no way advance nor in any way subsist. And that, if our soul is immortal and free in acting, there can be no astrological divination, is concluded by these arguments. First, the Astrologers profess that they can foresee and foretell the future actions and events of men from the observations of their art; but this is false: for the future things which ought to proceed from the free will of man can in no way be known to the Astrologers. For either they would know the future things in themselves, which cannot be, since the things that are future are not yet in act of themselves; and that which is not, in so far as it is not, is not understood, but only in so far as it is in some way, namely in potency in its causes. Nor can future things be foreknown in their causes, which are three: God, the heaven, the human will. But the things which are to come to pass from the purpose, counsel, and absolute will of God can be known to no mortal, either from the heaven or by any other means whatsoever, except to him to whom God shall have willed to reveal them. For who, says the Scripture, has known the mind of the Lord? or who has been his counselor? and as it is written in the ninth chapter of the book of Wisdom, The things that are in sight we find with labor; but the things that are in the heavens, who shall search out? and who shall know thy thought, unless thou give wisdom and send thy Holy Spirit from on high? But from the heaven the future things which depend on the will of man cannot be known: both because the heaven is a universal cause, wherefore future particular effects can be contained and known in the heaven only universally and indeterminately; and also because the heaven is a corporeal and material cause, wherefore our soul, which of itself is incorporeal and devoid of matter and free in acting, will by no means be directly and necessarily subject to the efficacy and operation of the heaven. The human will, moreover, which is the proximate cause of human actions in respect of the future things that ought to proceed from it, is of itself indifferent and indeterminate: for we are about to do many things of which we have as yet thought nothing, much less deliberated. How then can an indeterminate and indifferent cause beget a definite and certain knowledge of a future effect? This is confirmed: the exterior actions of man depend on the interior, on deliberation, I say, and choice; therefore a man's future exterior action cannot be foreknown unless the choice of his future will, whence it ought to proceed, be known. But a man's future choice cannot be known to another man; for if no one else can know the purpose of mind and the deliberation which one presently holds conceived in his mind, how much less will he be able to know the counsel, purpose, and will of another man, which is to be many years hence?¹⁸

DEINDE, aut consideratur homo ut vivit et operatur secundum rationem, aut secundum sensum et appetitum: si secundum rationem, sic homo non pendet e caelo, est enim mens et ratio expers materiae et incorporea; nullum autem corpus per se agere potest in id quod[...]

NEXT, man is considered either as he lives and acts according to reason, or according to sense and appetite: if according to reason, thus man does not depend on the heaven, for mind and reason are devoid of matter and incorporeal; but no body can of itself act upon that which[...]¹⁹

...[in id] quod est incorporeum. Ratio item libera est, suarumque actionum domina, et suo arbitratu ac voluntate potest ad hoc vel illud agendum seipsa applicare. Nam quamvis vel a caelo, vel ex naturali constitutione et temperatione sui corporis, vel aliunde instigetur ad male agendum, potest ea tamen reniti, et vi sua omnes instinctus, impulsus et irritamenta extrinsecus ei obiecta comprimere et irrita facere: quoniam contra quam incitatur agere. Hoc manifestum fit vel unius Socratis exemplo, qui ex naturali corporis affectione et comparatione et bardus et mulierosus erat; sed eiusmodi vitiosas naturae propensiones adeo animi robore et diligentiae magnitudine emendavit, ut omnium sui temporis prudentissimus et continentissimus sit habitus. Homo autem vivens secundum sensum et appetitum carnalem tam variabilem et incertam viam agit, ut qualis futurus sit nullo modo praedici queat. Quamobrem Salomon (quod est in trigesimo capite libri Proverbiorum) dixit alia quaedam sibi esse cognitu difficilia, illud autem esse prorsus ignotum, qualis sit via adolescentis in adolescentia sua. Est enim ea aetas adeo mollis et flexibilis in omnes partes, adeo vagans et errans per omnia et nulla in re diu perseverans, ut nulla certa ratione modoque regi et duci, sed quocunque impellit cupiditas illuc inconsulte et temere rapi videatur: quo fit ut facilius sit divinare quid acturus sit qui vivit secundum rationem et virtutem, quam quid sit acturus qui rationis et virtutum regula et lege posthabita suas duntaxat cupiditates sectatur. Sicut etiam facilius est divinare quid facturus sit Rex qui secundum rectam rationem iustasque leges imperat, quam quid facturus sit Tyrannus qui omnia pro suo commodo et libidine administrat. Qua ratione igitur Astrologi certa scientia consequi possunt ea quae nihil ratum, firmum, fixumque et certum habent?

...upon that which is incorporeal. Reason, likewise, is free, and the mistress of its own actions, and by its own judgment and will can apply itself to doing this or that. For although it be instigated to do evil, whether by the heaven, or by the natural constitution and temperament of its body, or from elsewhere, it can yet resist, and by its own force suppress and render void all the instincts, impulses, and incitements thrown upon it from without: since it can act contrary to that to which it is incited. This becomes manifest even by the single example of Socrates, who, from the natural affection and composition of his body, was both dull and prone to women; but he so amended such vicious propensities of nature, by the strength of his mind and the greatness of his diligence, that he was held the most prudent and most continent of all in his time. But the man living according to sense and carnal appetite pursues so variable and uncertain a way that what he is to become can in no way be predicted. Wherefore Solomon (which is in the thirtieth chapter of the book of Proverbs) said that certain other things were difficult for him to know, but that this was wholly unknown—what is the way of a young man in his youth. For that age is so soft and flexible in all directions, so wandering and straying through all things and persevering long in nothing, that it seems to be ruled and led by no fixed reason or measure, but to be snatched, inconsiderately and rashly, wherever desire impels it: whence it comes about that it is easier to divine what he will do who lives according to reason and virtue, than what he will do who, the rule and law of reason and the virtues being set aside, follows only his own desires. Just as it is also easier to divine what a King will do who rules according to right reason and just laws, than what a Tyrant will do who administers all things for his own advantage and lust. By what reasoning, then, can the Astrologers attain by certain knowledge those things which have nothing settled, firm, fixed, and certain?²⁰

AD HAEC, aut istud Fatum caeleste et potentia syderum potest ab homine impediri, ita ut effectus eius non eveniat, aut nullo modo impediri potest. Si potest impediri et non evenire: ergo, sicut effectus est incertus, ita praedictio eius certa esse non potest. Si non potest impediri: ergo nullum est liberum arbitrium, et ex eo conficitur animum nostrum esse materialem atque mortalem, utpote syderum potestati necessario subiectum. Nec vero, si ita res haberet, quicquam prodessent hominibus praedictiones Astrologorum: quid enim iuvaret nosse tanto ante futura, si ea nullo modo declinari et caveri possent? quin, ut ego censeo, plus mali quam boni afferrent nobis, quos necesse esset non solum praesentibus malis torqueri, sed etiam tam longinqua et inevitabili eorum expectatione acerbissime cruciari. Probe hoc intellexit Seneca, licet non minorem quam Astrologi syderibus in homines vim et potentiam tribueret: in libro enim 13 Epistolarum, octogesima nona epistola, ita scri[psit]...

BESIDES, either that celestial Fate and power of the stars can be impeded by man, so that its effect does not come to pass, or it can in no way be impeded. If it can be impeded and not come to pass: therefore, just as the effect is uncertain, so its prediction cannot be certain. If it cannot be impeded: therefore there is no free will, and from this it is concluded that our soul is material and mortal, as being necessarily subject to the power of the stars. Nor indeed, if the matter stood thus, would the predictions of the Astrologers profit men anything: for what would it help to know the future so long beforehand, if these things could in no way be turned aside and guarded against? nay, as I judge, they would bring us more of evil than of good, since we should needs be tormented not only by present evils, but also be most bitterly racked by so distant and inevitable an expectation of them. Seneca well understood this, although he attributed to the stars no less force and power over men than the Astrologers do: for in the thirteenth book of the Epistles, the eighty-ninth letter, he wrote thus[...]²¹

...wrote: I come now to that man who glories in the knowledge of celestial things. Into what sign the cold star of Saturn betakes itself, through what orbs the Cyllenian fire wanders. What will it profit to know this? that I should be anxious when Saturn and Mars stand opposed, or when Mercury makes its evening setting while Saturn looks on? Rather let me learn this: that, wherever those stars are, they are propitious and cannot be changed. A continuous order of the Fates drives them, and an inevitable course. They return in fixed turns; they either cause the effects of all things, or they mark them: but whether they bring about whatever happens, what will the knowledge of an unchangeable thing profit? or whether they signify it, what does it matter to foresee what you cannot escape? whether you know these things or do not know them: they will come to pass. Thus Seneca.²²

...[scri]psit: Venio nunc ad illum qui caelestium notitia gloriatur. Frigida Saturni quo se se stella receptet, Quos ignis caeli Cyllenius erret in orbes. Hoc scire quid proderit? ut solicitus sim cum Saturnus et Mars ex contrario stabunt, aut cum Mercurius vespertinum faciet occasum vidente Saturno? Potius hoc discam, ubicunque sunt ista, propitia esse nec posse mutari. Agit illa continuus ordo Fatorum, et inevitabilis cursus. Per statas vices remeant, effectus rerum omnium aut movent sydera aut notant: sed sive quicquid eventi faciunt, quid immutabilis rei notitia proficiet? sive significant, quid refert providere quod effugere non possis? scias ista, nescias: fient. Haec Seneca.

Sed vide quam argute ac philosophice hanc ipsam sententiam brevissimis verbis conclusit Phauorinus:

But see how wittily and philosophically Favorinus concluded this very thought in the briefest words:²³

Either, he says, they foretell adverse things, or prosperous. If they say prosperous and deceive, you will be made wretched by waiting in vain. If they say adverse and lie, you will be made wretched by fearing in vain. If they answer truly, and the things are not prosperous, you will already be made wretched in your mind before you are made so by Fate. If they promise happy things, and these are to come to pass, then there will plainly be two disadvantages: both expectation will weary you, kept in suspense by hope, and hope will already have deflowered for you the fruit of the future joy. In no way, therefore, are men of this kind, who presage future things, to be employed. Thus Favorinus.²⁴

Aut adversa, inquit, eventura dicunt, aut prospera. Si dicunt prospera et fallunt, miser fies frustra expectando. Si adversa dicunt et mentiuntur, miser fies frustra timendo. Si vera respondent, eaque sunt non prospera, iam inde ex animo miser fies antequam e Fato fias. Si felicia promittunt, eaque eventura sunt, tum plane duo erunt incommoda: et expectatio te spe suspensum fatigabit, et futurum gaudii fructum spes tibi iam defloraverit. Nullo igitur pacto utendum est istiusmodi hominibus res futuras praesagientibus. Sic Phauorinus.

VERUM, illud maxime arguit praedictionum astrologicarum vanitatem: etenim audent etiam Astrologi praedicere et promittere aliquem futurum, verbi gratia, summum Pontificem. Atqui provectio alicuius ad summum Pontificatum non ex ipsius vel alterius unius hominis voluntate aut potestate pendet, sed ex voluntate atque suffragiis plurimorum Cardinalium, quorum munus est creare summum Pontificem. Quapropter ut certo praenunciari possit Petrum, verbi causa, fore Papam, non satis est nosse compositionem astrorum quae in caelo fuit nascente Petro; sed simul etiam opus esset Astrologo perspectos et cognitos esse omnes syderum positus et constellationes sub quibus nati sunt quorumcumque voluntatum et suffragiorum concursus ad creandum illum Papam futurus est necessarius. Quare, si verum est quod narrat in Augusto Suetonius, Nigidium Figulum, in eiusmodi astrologia nobilissimum apud Romanos, accepta hora partus Augusti observatisque natalitiis eius astris exclamasse Dominum orbis esse natum: profecto existimandum est id eum nec scienter nec certa aliqua ratione, sed temere ac fortuito dixisse, et casu factum esse ut ita contigerit sicut ille praedixerat. Promotio namque Augusti per multos honorum gradus ad summum usque principatum[...]

BUT this most of all proves the vanity of astrological predictions: for the Astrologers dare even to predict and promise that someone will be, for example, Supreme Pontiff. And yet the advancement of anyone to the supreme Pontificate depends not on his own or any one other man's will or power, but on the will and votes of very many Cardinals, whose office it is to create the Supreme Pontiff. Wherefore, that it may be certainly foretold that Peter, for example, will be Pope, it is not enough to know the composition of the stars which was in the heaven when Peter was born; but at the same time it would be necessary for the Astrologer to have examined and known all the positions and constellations of the stars under which were born all those whose concurrence of wills and votes will be necessary for creating that Pope. Wherefore, if what Suetonius relates in his Augustus is true—that Nigidius Figulus, most noted among the Romans in this kind of astrology, when the hour of Augustus's birth had been received and his natal stars observed, exclaimed that the master of the world had been born—it must surely be reckoned that he said it neither knowingly nor by any certain reasoning, but rashly and by chance, and that it happened by accident that it turned out as he had predicted. For the promotion of Augustus, through many degrees of honor up to the supreme principate[...]²⁵

...[ad summum usque principatum] et Monarchiam, ex multorum hominum studio, gratia et opera pendebat, ut ad tantum Augusti dominatum et imperium certo praenoscendum atque praenunciandum solius Augusti generationis et ortus consideratio satis esse nequaquam potuerit. Neque enim natalitia Augusti sydera vim ullam habere potuerunt in eos qui fuere Augusti suffragatores adiutoresque ad consequendum principatum: scilicet multi eorum compluribus annis vel ante vel post Augustum nati fuerant. SEXTA RATIO. Omnis scientia et ars versatur in iis rebus quae aut semper aut certe frequenter ita contingunt ut ab ea doceantur; quae autem extra haec sunt et rarissime accidunt, ea quia nihil habent fixum et certum propterea nullam possunt scientiam vel artem efficere. Cum igitur praedictiones Astrologorum fere sint falsae, nec nisi perquam raro veridicae sint, satis liquet eas non ex arte aliqua et certis observationibus proficisci, sed inscienter et inconsulte ac temere ab illis effutiri. Quamobrem Phauorinus identidem commonebat ut caverent homines ne qua ipsis Chaldaei ad faciendam fidem irreperent, quod viderentur quaedam interdum vera effutire aut spargere:

...and the Monarchy, depended on the zeal, favor, and effort of many men, so that, for so great a dominion and empire of Augustus to be certainly foreknown and foretold, the consideration of Augustus's generation and birth alone could by no means have been enough. For the natal stars of Augustus could have no force over those who were the supporters and helpers of Augustus for attaining the principate: namely, many of them had been born several years either before or after Augustus. SIXTH REASON. Every science and art is occupied with those things which either always, or at least frequently, so come to pass that they may be taught by it; but the things which are outside these and happen most rarely, because they have nothing fixed and certain, can on that account constitute no science or art. Since therefore the predictions of the Astrologers are mostly false, and are truthful only very rarely, it is plain enough that they proceed not from any art and sure observations, but are blabbed by them ignorantly, inconsiderately, and rashly. Wherefore Favorinus repeatedly warned that men should beware lest the Chaldeans by some means creep into their confidence, because they seemed sometimes to blab or scatter some true things:²⁶

For they speak, he said, things neither grasped, nor defined, nor perceived, but, leaning on slippery and roundabout guesswork, they go advancing step by step, as if through darkness, between false things and true: and either by much trying they suddenly fall, unaware, upon the truth, or, the great credulity of those who consult them leading the way, they cunningly arrive at the things which are true: and for that reason they seem to imitate the truth more easily in past things than in future. Yet all those things which they say truly, whether rashly or cunningly, compared with the others, he says, which they lie about, are not a thousandth part. Thus Favorinus in Gellius.²⁷

Non enim comprehensa, aiebat, neque definita neque percepta dicunt, sed lubrica atque ambagiosa coniectatione nitentes, inter falsa atque vera pedetentim quasi per tenebras ingredientes eunt: et aut multa tentando incidunt repente imprudentes in veritatem, aut ipsorum qui eos consulunt multa credulitate ducente perveniunt callide ad ea quae vera sunt: et idcirco videntur in praeteritis rebus quam futuris veritatem facilius imitari. Ista tamen omnia quae aut temere aut astute vera dicunt, prae ceteris, inquit, quae mentiuntur, pars ea non sit millesima. Haec Phauorinus apud Gellium.

Sed audi quid in eandem sententiam libro 2 de Divinatione scriptum sit apud Ciceronem. Quid plura, inquit, quotidie refelluntur Chaldaei? quam multa ego Pompeio, quam multa Crasso, quam multa huic ipsi Caesari a Chaldaeis dicta memini—neminem eorum nisi senectute, nisi domi, nisi cum claritate esse moriturum—ut mihi permirum videatur quenquam extare qui etiam nunc credat iis quorum praedicta quotidie videat re et eventis refelli. Seneca in eo libello cuius inscriptio est Ludus in mortem Claudii Caesaris, initio introducit Mercurium apud Parcas mortem Claudii procurantem; et ut obiter Chaldaeorum illudat vanitati, inter alias rationes quibus conatur Mercurius Parcas inducere ad necem Claudii hanc affert, ne toties videlicet miseri Chaldaei mentiantur: Patere, inquit, Mathematicos aliquando verum dicere, qui illum postquam princeps factus est omnibus annis omnibus mensibus efferunt. Praedicebant enim illi Mathematici Claudium singulis annis et mensibus moriturum: quod etiam nostri temporis Astrologis contingit, a quibus mortes summorum Pontificum in singulos annos atque adeo menses praenuntiari audimus et ridemus. B. Ambrosius libro 4 in Hexameron capite 7:

But hear what was written to the same effect in the second book On Divination in Cicero. What more, he says? the Chaldeans are refuted daily. How many things I remember said by the Chaldeans to Pompey, how many to Crassus, how many to this very Caesar—that none of them would die except in old age, except at home, except in glory—so that it seems to me most strange that anyone still exists who even now believes those whose predictions he sees daily refuted by fact and outcomes. Seneca, in that little book whose title is The Game on the Death of Claudius Caesar, at the beginning brings in Mercury procuring the death of Claudius before the Fates; and, to mock in passing the vanity of the Chaldeans, among the other reasons by which Mercury tries to induce the Fates to the slaying of Claudius, he brings forward this—that the wretched Chaldeans, namely, may not so often lie: Allow, he says, the astrologers at last to speak truth, who, ever since he was made prince, every year, every month, carry him out to burial. For those astrologers used to predict that Claudius would die in each several year and month: which befalls the astrologers of our time also, by whom we hear the deaths of the Supreme Pontiffs foretold for each several year and even month—and we laugh. Saint Ambrose, in the fourth book on the Hexameron, chapter seven:²⁸

When, he says, a few days before, there was talk of rain, which was said to be going to be useful, a certain man said, Behold, the New Moon will give it; and although we were desirous of showers, yet I did not want assertions of this kind to be true. In short, I was delighted that no rain was poured out, until, granted to the prayers of the Church, it might make manifest that one must hope not from the beginnings of the Moon, but from the providence and mercy of the Creato[r]...²⁹

Cum, inquit, ante dies paucos esset sermo de pluvia, quae fore utilis diceretur, ait quidam, Ecce Neomenia dabit eam; et quamvis cupidi essemus imbrium, tamen eiusmodi assertiones veras esse nolebam. Denique delectatus sum quod nullus imber offusus est, donec precibus Ecclesiae datus, manifestaret non de initiis Lunae sperandum esse, sed de providentia et misericordia Creato[ris]...

...of the Creator: by which example both the vanity of that astrology was confuted, and the efficacy of Christian piety and the power of religious prayers was proved in very fact.³⁰

...[Creato]ris: quo exemplo et vanitas istius astrologiae confutata est, et efficacia Christianae pietatis visque religiosarum precum re ipsa comprobata.

ALBUMAZAR, princeps huiusce superstitionis Astrologicae, ex observatione et praeceptis huius artis praedixit Christianam legem duraturam non plus annos mille quadringentos sexaginta: sed bene habet, quod post id temporis, exacti iam anni 128, falsam esse illius praedictionem aperte demonstrat. Abraham Iudaeus praenunciavit ex observationibus astrologicis expectatum a Iudaeis Messiam venturum anno post Domini nostri ortum millesimo quadringentesimo sexagesimoquarto: quod nimirum tum futura esset eadem astrorum compositio quae fuerat olim cum Moses ex Aegypto populum Hebraeum eduxit: cuius praedictionis vanitatem dies ipsa redarguit. Petrus de Aliaco scriptum relinquit, quo anno generale Concilium celebratum est Constantiae ad tollendum schisma quod multos annos afflixerat Ecclesiam, praedixisse Astrologos eius temporis nullam fore in Ecclesia pacem et concordiam, sed habitu caeli et conformatione astrorum praesignificari maximas fore dissensiones, ingenti cum religionis Christianae detrimento et exitio. Atqui per illud Concilium Constantiense diuturnum illud et perniciosum schisma eo anno extinctum est, pace ac tranquillitate Ecclesiae reddita. Qui eventus plane contrarius praedictionibus Astrologorum sane multum movere debuerat Petrum Aliacensem, ut is nullam deinceps isti Astrologiae fidem haberet: praesertim vero cum ipsemet, vel suis deceptus observationibus vel alienis occupatus et circumventus opinionibus, veritus fuerit ne illud tam grave et odiosum schisma brevi Antichristum mundo pareret.

Albumasar, the prince of this astrological superstition, from the observation and precepts of this art predicted that the Christian law would last no more than one thousand four hundred and sixty years: but it is well, that, after that time, 128 years now being completed, it plainly demonstrates his prediction to be false. Abraham the Jew foretold from astrological observations that the Messiah awaited by the Jews would come in the year one thousand four hundred sixty-four after the birth of our Lord: because, namely, there would then be the same composition of the stars which there had been of old, when Moses led the Hebrew people out of Egypt: the vanity of which prediction the very day has refuted. Pierre d'Ailly leaves it in writing that, in the year in which the General Council was held at Constance to take away the schism which had afflicted the Church for many years, the Astrologers of that time predicted that there would be no peace and concord in the Church, but that, by the disposition of the heaven and the configuration of the stars, the greatest dissensions were foresignified, with vast detriment and ruin to the Christian religion. And yet, through that Council of Constance, that long and pernicious schism was extinguished in that very year, peace and tranquillity being restored to the Church. Which outcome, plainly contrary to the predictions of the Astrologers, ought surely to have moved Pierre d'Ailly much, to have no faith thereafter in that astrology: but especially, since he himself—whether deceived by his own observations, or preoccupied and circumvented by others' opinions—had feared that so grave and hateful a schism would shortly bring forth Antichrist into the world.³¹

Albumazar, istorum Astrologorum coryphaeus, nescio quas Saturni revolutiones dilaudat: affirmat enim, quoties Saturnus denas sui orbis conversiones perfecerit, hoc est expletis annis trecentis, semper magnas quasdam res et admodum insignes evenire. Post Alexandrum enim, inquit, annis trecentis apparuit Arelafor filius Bel, qui Persas contrivit; et proxime post, transactis aliis trecentis annis, apparuit Iesus magister et dux Christianorum. O turpe ἀνιστορησίαν! O incredibilem temporum inscitiam! Nam nec tunc fuit iste filius Bel qui Persas fregerit et afflixerit, et Christus Dominus noster non sexcentis annis post Alexandrum (ut iste mentitur) sed trecentis dumtaxat et viginti annis post Alexandri mortem natus est. Quanquam quis miretur in hoc lapsum Albumazarem, cum tam insigniter erraverit in Ptolomeo Mathematico, quem facit unum de Ptolomaeis Aegypti regibus qui post Alexandrum Magnum Aegyptiis imperarunt? cum in confesso sit nec Ptolomaeum Mathematicum fuisse regem, et cum Hadriano Imperatore floruisse, novissimo Ptolomaeorum Aegypti regum plus centum et sexaginta annis posteriorem.

Albumasar, the coryphaeus of those Astrologers, praises certain revolutions of Saturn (I know not what): for he affirms that, as often as Saturn has completed ten circuits of its orb—that is, three hundred years being completed—always certain great and very notable things come to pass. For three hundred years after Alexander, he says, there appeared Arelafor son of Bel, who crushed the Persians; and next after, three hundred more years having passed, there appeared Jesus, the master and leader of the Christians. O shameful ignorance of history (ἀνιστορησίαν)! O incredible ignorance of the times! For neither was there then that son of Bel who broke and afflicted the Persians, and Christ our Lord was born not six hundred years after Alexander (as this man lies), but only three hundred and twenty years after the death of Alexander. Although, who would wonder at Albumasar's slip in this, when he erred so notably about Ptolemy the Mathematician, whom he makes one of the Ptolemies, kings of Egypt, who ruled the Egyptians after Alexander the Great? when it is in confession that Ptolemy the Mathematician was no king, and flourished under the emperor Hadrian, more than one hundred and sixty years later than the last of the Ptolemy kings of Egypt.³²

Iactant item Astrologi nullam fuisse apud homines ullo tempore mutationem legum, nullius Prophetae nobilis adventu, nullam novae relig[ionis]...

The Astrologers likewise boast that there was never among men, at any time, a change of laws, by the coming of any noble Prophet, nor any introduction of a new relig[ion]...³³

...[novae] religionis introductionem, nullam magnorum regnorum conversionem, denique nullum insignem et memorabilem casum aut eventum, quin magna aliqua coniunctio syderum, praecipue vero Saturni et Iovis, praecesserit. Haec, inquiunt, constellatio nascentem orbem initiavit; illa praeparavit diluvium; alia Abraham vel Mosem genuit; illa Iesu adventum praenuntiavit; alia Mahumeti legem antecessit: quae quam sint futilia, commentitia et erroris plena, vel uno hoc argumento constare potest.

...introduction of a new religion, nor any conversion of great kingdoms, nor finally any notable and memorable accident or event, but that some great conjunction of the stars—especially, indeed, of Saturn and Jupiter—went before. This constellation, they say, inaugurated the nascent world; that one prepared the flood; another begot Abraham or Moses; that one foretold the coming of Jesus; another preceded the law of Mahomet: which things, how futile, fabricated, and full of error they are, can be established even by this one argument.³⁴

PETRUS Aliacensis, istiusmodi figmentis stultissime credens ac vanissime gaudens, in libro suo de Concordia historiae et astrologiae, ad id quod ex sensu Astrologorum proxime docuimus probandum, hoc quasi fundamentum supponit: Ab initio mundi usque ad diluvium fluxisse annos bis mille ducentos quadraginta duos; a diluvio autem ad Christi Domini adventum et ortum, ter mille centum et duos annos. Hoc posito, probare nititur quicquid in orbe terrarum valde memorandum et insigne quodcumque tempore acciderit, eodem tempore magnam aliquam constellationem in caelo apparuisse. At enimvero, cum perspicue falsa sit computatio annorum qua velut fundamento illorum ratio et doctrina fulcitur, nonne consequens est quae ducuntur et pendent ex illa computatione esse falsa? Etenim ab Adamo ad diluvium non plus mille sexcentos quinquaginta sex annos praeteriisse constat ex sacris litteris, pauciores nempe quam illi numerant annis prope sexcentis: quo fit ut constellationem quam aiunt isti fuisse in exordio mundi sexcentis annis mundum praecessisse necesse sit. Deinde, tempus quod inter diluvium interfuit et Christi Domini adventum, ne numerum quidem bis mille quadringentorum annorum implevit. Ex quo efficitur ut coniunctio astrorum quam aiunt ducentis annis antegressam diluvium, non nisi sexcentis octoginta quattuor annis post diluvium potuerit existere.

Pierre d'Ailly, most foolishly believing and most vainly rejoicing in such fictions, in his book On the Concord of History and Astrology, for proving that which we have just now taught from the sense of the Astrologers, lays down this as a kind of foundation: that from the beginning of the world up to the flood there flowed two thousand two hundred forty-two years; but from the flood to the coming and birth of Christ the Lord, three thousand one hundred and two years. This being laid down, he strives to prove that whatever very memorable and notable thing happened anywhere on earth at any time, at that same time some great constellation appeared in the heaven. But in truth, since the computation of years on which, as on a foundation, their reasoning and doctrine is propped up, is plainly false, is it not consequent that the things drawn and depending from that computation are false? For from Adam to the flood it is established from the sacred writings that no more than one thousand six hundred fifty-six years passed—fewer, namely, than they reckon by nearly six hundred years: whence it comes about that the constellation which these men say was at the beginning of the world must have preceded the world by six hundred years. Next, the time which intervened between the flood and the coming of Christ the Lord did not even fill the number of two thousand four hundred years. From which it is effected that the conjunction of the stars which they say preceded the flood by two hundred years could have existed only six hundred eighty-four years after the flood.³⁵

Praeterea dicunt quartam coniunctionem maximam fuisse annis nongentis quadraginta duobus post diluvium, sexdecim nimirum annis ante natum Abraham: quem tamen liquet ex sacra Chronologia ducentis nonaginta duobus annis natum esse post diluvium: quare necesse est quartam illam coniunctionem sexcentis triginta annis post Abrahae ortum contigisse. Ad haec, notarunt illi sextam coniunctionem magnam ducentos vigintiquinque annos fuisse ante Christum, nimirum falso: nituntur enim supradicta computatione annorum a diluvio ad Christi adventum, quam nos mendosam esse ostendimus; quin si veram sequamur Chronologiam, necesse esset sextam illam coniunctionem sexcentis ferme annis post Christi Domini ortum contigisse. Postremo, quam fuerit Petrus Aliacensis verae Christianae Chronographiae rudis et prorsus expers, vel hoc uno indicio manifestum esse potest: affirmat anno ab ortu Christi septingentesimo, ad quod[...]

Besides, they say the fourth great conjunction was nine hundred forty-two years after the flood, namely sixteen years before Abraham was born: whom, however, it is clear from the sacred Chronology was born two hundred ninety-two years after the flood: wherefore it is necessary that that fourth conjunction happened six hundred thirty years after the birth of Abraham. To these things, they noted the sixth great conjunction to have been two hundred twenty-five years before Christ—falsely, of course: for they rely on the aforesaid computation of years from the flood to the coming of Christ, which we have shown to be faulty; nay, if we follow the true Chronology, it would be necessary that that sixth conjunction happened nearly six hundred years after the birth of Christ the Lord. Lastly, how rude and utterly inexperienced Pierre d'Ailly was in true Christian Chronography can be made manifest even by this one indication: he affirms that in the seven hundredth year from the birth of Christ, at which[...]³⁶

...[ad quod] tempus septimam coniunctionem magnam refert, natam esse in Ecclesia pestem Haereticorum, maxime vero eam quae fuit Arrianorum: quorum tamen haeresis circa annum Domini trecentesimum exorta, ante sexcentesimum extincta est. Quid igitur tam multas istorum praedictiones nixas mendacissimis Chronologis inanes et mendaces esse dubitet? SED quid ego falsarum praedictionum exempla colligo, quorum plena est et Historia omnium temporum et referta vita communis? Equidem reor, quam difficile est praedictiones aliquas Astrologorum de futuris rerum humanarum eventis (etiam casu ac fortuito) veras invenire, tam facile reperiri posse innumera eorum praedicta perspicue falsa et rebus ipsis eventisque confutata. Scite dixit Cato, mirari se quod non rideret Aruspex Aruspicem cum vidisset: quota enim quaeque res evenit praedicta ab his? aut si evenit quidpiam, quid afferri potest cur non casu id evenerit? Quod de Aruspicibus Cato dixit, id profecto perquam belle quadrat in astrologos: ut mirum videri debeat, cum mendaci homini ne verum quidem dicenti credere soleamus, quo modo illis, si vel unum eorum praedictum verum evasit, simpliciter credamus, et non ex multis potius falsis uni fidem derogemus, quam ex uno quod casu verum evenit velimus innumerabilia falsa confirmare.

...to which time he refers the seventh great conjunction, [saying] that there was born in the Church a plague of Heretics, but especially that which was of the Arians: whose heresy, however, having arisen about the three hundredth year of the Lord, was extinguished before the six hundredth. Who therefore would doubt that so many of these men's predictions, propped on most lying chronologies, are empty and false? But why do I gather examples of false predictions, of which both the History of all ages is full and common life is crammed? Indeed I think that, as difficult as it is to find any predictions of the Astrologers about the future events of human affairs true—even by chance and accident—so easy is it to find innumerable of their predictions plainly false and confuted by the very facts and outcomes. Cato wittily said that he wondered the soothsayer did not laugh when he had seen another soothsayer: for how few of the things predicted by these men come to pass? or if anything does happen, what can be brought forward why it did not happen by chance? What Cato said of the soothsayers fits the astrologers most aptly: so that it ought to seem strange, since we are not wont to believe a lying man even when he tells the truth, how we should simply believe them, if even one of their predictions has turned out true—and should not rather deny credit to the one on account of the many false ones, than wish to confirm innumerable falsehoods by the one that turned out true by chance.³⁷

Verum dicet aliquis Astrologos nonnunquam esse veridicos, et ea praedicere quae rei confirmet eventus. Praedicunt sane, sed inconsulte, inscienter, temere: quis enim est qui totam diem iaculans non aliquando collimet? Verissime dici potest de Astrologis quod olim dixit quidam de oraculis Apollinis, quae vera fuissent memoria teneri et praedicari, quae autem falsa, neminem recordari aut taceri ab omnibus: nam qui veritatem illorum oraculorum defendebant, pauca quaedam vera crebro sermone usurpabant, pleraque falsa silentio premebant; qui autem omnia contemnebant, nec vera nec falsa curabant. Sed causas cur praedicta Chaldaeorum saepe vera esse videantur, extrema hac disputatione aperiemus. SEPTIMA RATIO. Si haec divinatrix Astrologia vera esset et certa, sine dubitatione ulla pars esset Philosophiae omnium nobilissima et hominibus optatissima atque honoratissima: tum propter materiae quam tractat (caelum dico et sydera) dignitatem atque praestantiam, tum propter futurarum rerum, potissime autem vitae hominum et mortis et casuum et eventorum praenotionem; quas res noscendi avidissimi sunt et curiosissimi mortales. At cum ea doctrina omni tempore a praestantissimis quibusque Philosophis, quinetiam Astrologis, contempta, derisa et damnata fuerit: maximum profecto argumentum est eam futilem et inanem et ab omni ratione, fide ac probitate vacuam ab illis esse iudicatam. Xenophon, in libro de dictis Socratis (quod etiam refert Eusebius libro[...]

But someone will say that the Astrologers are sometimes truthful, and predict things which the outcome of the matter confirms. They predict, certainly, but inconsiderately, ignorantly, rashly: for who is there that, hurling all day long, does not sometimes hit the mark? It can be most truly said of the Astrologers what someone once said of the oracles of Apollo: that the ones which had been true were held in memory and proclaimed, but the false ones no one remembered, or they were passed over in silence by all: for those who defended the truth of those oracles harped in frequent talk on the few true ones, and pressed down the many false ones in silence; while those who despised them all cared neither for the true nor the false. But the causes why the predictions of the Chaldeans often seem to be true, we shall disclose at the end of this disputation. SEVENTH REASON. If this divinatory Astrology were true and certain, it would without any doubt be the noblest part of all Philosophy, and the most desired and most honored by men: both on account of the dignity and excellence of the subject which it treats (the heaven, I mean, and the stars), and on account of the foreknowledge of future things—but especially of the life and death and chances and events of men; things which mortals are most eager and curious to know. But since that doctrine has, in every age, been despised, derided, and condemned by all the most excellent Philosophers—nay, even by Astrologers—it is surely the greatest argument that it has been judged by them futile and empty, and void of all reason, faith, and honesty. Xenophon, in his book on the sayings of Socrates (which Eusebius also reports in book[...]³⁸

...[Eusebius] libro decimoquarto de Praeparatione Evangelica capite quarto, tradit Socratem dicere solitum cognitionem futurarum rerum quae in potestate Dei sunt non esse hominibus procurandam: neque enim posse homines eas res cognoscere, nec Deo gratum esse si, quae ille occultavit, ea mortales velint nimis studiose curioseque rimari. Pythagoras, Democritus et Plato, longissimis peregrinationibus susceptis, Persarum magos, sapientes Chaldaeorum Aegyptiorumque sacerdotes adierunt, a quibus occultiora quaedam vel ad disciplinas Mathematicas vel ad religionem cultumque Deorum pertinentia cognoverunt: divinatricem autem Astrologiam vel discere ab illis neglexerunt, vel si eam quoque didicerunt, certe nunquam ea usos esse ipsos ex eorum scriptis manifeste perspicitur. ARISTOTELES, qui vir et quantus? quam solers, quam subtilis et copiosus in doctrina rerum Caelestium? quam, cum aliquot libris diligenter explicuerit, nusquam tamen de istiusmodi Astrologia verbum ullum fecit. Cum autem in libris Meteororum et de Partibus atque Generatione animalium, praesertim autem in libro Problematum, multarum rerum obscurarum et admirabilium causas perquirat, ad nullius quaestionis enodationem vel admirandi cuiusquam effectus explicationem istius Astrologiae opera et praesidio est usus. Quin, multa sunt in eius scriptis quae istam Astrologorum doctrinam omnino convellant, veluti est illud:

...[Eusebius] in the fourteenth book of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter four, relates that Socrates was wont to say that the knowledge of future things which are in the power of God is not to be procured by men: for men cannot know those things, nor is it pleasing to God if mortals wish too studiously and curiously to pry into the things which He has hidden. Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato, having undertaken very long travels, went to the Magi of the Persians, the wise men of the Chaldeans, and the priests of the Egyptians, from whom they learned certain more hidden things pertaining either to the Mathematical disciplines or to the religion and worship of the Gods: but divinatory Astrology they either neglected to learn from them, or, if they did learn it also, it is clearly seen from their writings that they certainly never used it. Aristotle—what a man, and how great! how skillful, how subtle and copious in the doctrine of Celestial things!—how, although he expounded these diligently in several books, yet nowhere made any mention at all of astrology of this kind. And although in the books of the Meteorologica, and On the Parts and Generation of Animals, but especially in the book of Problems, he investigates the causes of many obscure and wonderful things, for the unraveling of no question or the explanation of any wonderful effect did he use the help and aid of this Astrology. Nay, there are many things in his writings which wholly overthrow that doctrine of the Astrologers, such as this:³⁹

futurorum contingentium non esse certam et definitam veritatem; quae per accidens quaeque raro vel ad utrumlibet contingunt non posse scientia comprehendi; versari in rebus humanis casum et fortunam quae fugiant certam hominis intelligentiam; particularium et corruptibilium effectuum causas proximas et proprias esse particulares atque corruptibiles, ob idque ad perfectam eorum cognitionem non satis esse caelestes et universales causas contemplari; caelum non aliter agere in ea quae sunt infra lunam nisi per motum et lumen. Nec usquam fere indicavit Aristoteles, praeter solem et lunam, vim et efficientiam aliorum syderum. Illud quoque docuit decretis Astrologorum valde contrarium: caelestia signa etiam corporeorum et sensibilium effectuum per alias causas averti et impediri posse. CICERO libro secundo de Divinatione laudat Eudoxum, aetate Platonis et Aristotelis Principem Astrologorum; item Panaetium Stoicum, Archelaum etiam et Cassandrum ac Scylacem Halicarnasseum, Astrologorum sui temporis nobilissimos, qui totam hanc rationem Astrologiae repudiarunt. Avicenna, qui post Hippocratem et Galenum Principatum Medicinae obtinet, libro ultimo primae Philosophiae negat Astrologis esse credendum in divinatione futurorum, quia ipse nec puncta caelestia[...]

that there is no certain and determinate truth of future contingents; that the things which happen by accident, and which happen rarely or in either of two ways, cannot be grasped by science; that chance and fortune are at work in human affairs, which escape the certain understanding of man; that the proximate and proper causes of particular and corruptible effects are themselves particular and corruptible, and that on that account, for the perfect knowledge of them, it is not enough to contemplate the celestial and universal causes; that the heaven acts upon the things which are beneath the moon in no other way than by motion and light. Nor did Aristotle almost anywhere indicate, besides the sun and the moon, the force and efficacy of the other stars. He also taught this, very contrary to the tenets of the Astrologers: that the celestial signs even of corporeal and sensible effects can be averted and impeded by other causes. Cicero, in the second book On Divination, praises Eudoxus, in the age of Plato and Aristotle the Prince of Astrologers; likewise Panaetius the Stoic, and Archelaus too, and Cassander and Scylax of Halicarnassus, the most noted astrologers of their time, who repudiated this whole scheme of Astrology. Avicenna, who after Hippocrates and Galen holds the Princedom of Medicine, in the last book of the First Philosophy denies that the Astrologers are to be believed in the divination of future things, because they neither hold the celestial points[...]⁴⁰

...[puncta] caelestia teneant, neque naturas rerum inferiorum plane necessarias ad faciendum iudicium de rebus futuris perspectas habeant, neque nitantur demonstrationibus sed probationibus oratoriis et poëticis. Ptolemaeus, quem isti huius artis principem et ducem sequi se dicunt, in libro primo de Iudiciis cap. 3, Non est, inquit, putandum omnia a supernis causis directo derivari necessitate quadam inviolabili, ut nulla alia vis, quin ita operentur, obsistere valeat. Idem tractatu suo quem vulgo appellant Centiloquium, hoc est centum sententiarum, prima eius sententia sic habet, Soli nomine divino afflati praedicunt futura particularia. Quinta vero sententia huiusmodi est, Potest is qui sciens est multos stellarum effectus avertere quando naturam earum noverit, ac seipsum ante illorum eventum rite praeparaverit: unde manavit illa multorum sermonibus trita sententia, Sapiens dominabitur astris. Porphyrius in libro de Oraculis confessus est exquisitam rerum futurarum scientiam ex inspectione syderum non mortalibus modo, sed multis etiam deorum esse incomprehensibilem. Idem in vita Plotini scribit eum, cum in ista Astrologia satis multum temporis, studii et operae posuisset, deprehendisse tandem Astrologorum iudiciis et divinationi futurarum rerum non esse credendum; eamque divinationem tum sermonibus, tum scriptis confutavisse: quod manifestum est cuivis legenti eius libros de Fato et Providentia, maxime vero eum qui inscriptus est, An stellae aliquid agant.

...the celestial points, nor have a clear view of the natures of the inferior things, fully necessary for making a judgment about future matters; nor do they rely on demonstrations, but on oratorical and poetical proofs. Ptolemy, whom these men say they follow as the prince and leader of this art, in the first book On Judgments, chapter 3, says: One must not think that all things are derived directly from the higher causes by a certain inviolable necessity, such that no other force is able to resist their so operating. The same man, in his treatise which they commonly call the Centiloquium—that is, of a hundred sayings—his first saying runs thus: Only those inspired by a divine name foretell particular future things. And the fifth saying is of this kind: He who is knowing can avert many effects of the stars when he has known their nature, and has duly prepared himself before their event: whence flowed that saying worn smooth in the talk of many, The wise man will rule the stars. Porphyry, in his book On Oracles, confessed that exact knowledge of future things from the inspection of the stars is incomprehensible not only to mortals, but even to many of the gods. The same man, in the Life of Plotinus, writes that Plotinus, when he had spent a good deal of time, study, and labor on this Astrology, at last discovered that the judgments and divination of future things of the Astrologers are not to be believed; and that he confuted that divination both in speech and in writings: which is manifest to anyone reading his books On Fate and Providence, but especially that one which is entitled, Whether the Stars Do Anything.⁴¹

Si haec porro Astrologia vera esset et certa, plurimum sane adiumenti afferret provisione futurorum ad bene regendam et administrandam rempublicam, ob eamque causam magno in honore et gloria fuissent Astrologi apud Reges et rerum publicarum Principes: at contra prorsus evenit. Nam severissimis multorum Principum decretis et edictis explosam et damnatam et gravissimis suppliciis addictam eam artem invenimus. Quoties Astrologi seu Chaldaei Roma eiecti sunt principe Diocletiano, Constantino, Theodosio, Valentiniano, praesertim autem Iustiniano! quibus huius artis studium et exercitatio non solum ut inanis et veritatis expers iudicata est, sed etiam ut civitatibus et societati hominum noxia et pestilens semper visa est detestabilis. Sed quid attinet in re manifesta, quae turbam testium non desiderat, longiorem orationem ponere? Audeo dicere, post hominum memoriam vix fuisse quemquam ullo tempore vel magnitudine ingenii, vel praestantia doctrinae, vel pru[dentiae civilis excellentia]...

If, further, this Astrology were true and certain, it would surely bring very much help, by the provision of future things, toward well ruling and administering the commonwealth, and for that reason the Astrologers would have been in great honor and glory among Kings and the Princes of commonwealths: but quite the contrary has happened. For we find that art exploded and condemned by the severest decrees and edicts of many Princes, and subjected to the gravest punishments. How often were the Astrologers, or Chaldeans, cast out of Rome under the prince Diocletian, Constantine, Theodosius, Valentinian, but especially Justinian! by whom the study and practice of this art was not only judged empty and void of truth, but was even always seen as detestable, as harmful and pestilent to cities and to the society of men. But what need is there, in a manifest matter which requires no crowd of witnesses, to set down a longer speech? I dare to say that, within the memory of men, there has scarcely been anyone at any time, whether by greatness of genius, or excellence of learning, or pru[dence...]⁴²

...[pru]dentiae civilis excellentia, vel eximia morum integritate, vel denique insigni aliquo nobilem ac memorabilem virum, qui natalitia Chaldaeorum praedicta non quasi meras nugas et quisquilias flocci fecerit penitusque contempserit. Vulgus modo stolidum, ad intelligendum hebes, infirmum ad iudicandum, facile credulum, et nova miraque audiendi et noscendi curiosum, istis nugatoribus et aures et fidem libenter adhibet. Gaudent etiam hisce commentis levissima quaedam ingenia, lucri magis quam veritatis cupida, in republica litterarum turbulenta ac seditiosa, et sapientiae optimatibus semper infensa, rerumque utilium et aliis notarum fastidiosa, novarum autem et ignotarum atque adeo etiam incomprehensibilium avidissima: denique quibus non tam cordi et curae est vera nosse, quam videri vulgo ea ipsos scire quae summi philosophiae antistites nescire se confitentur. Hanc rationem egregio sancti Ambrosii dicto concludam. Ita scribit Ambrosius libr. 4 in Hexameron capit. 4:

...by excellence of civil prudence, or by remarkable integrity of morals, or finally by some notable distinction—a noble and memorable man, who did not count the predicted nativities of the Chaldeans as mere trifles and refuse, and utterly despise them. Only the stupid crowd—dull of understanding, weak in judging, easily credulous, and curious to hear and learn new and marvelous things—willingly lends both its ears and its faith to those triflers. Certain very light minds too delight in these fictions—minds greedy of gain rather than of truth, turbulent and seditious in the commonwealth of letters, always hostile to the nobles of wisdom, fastidious of useful things and of things known to others, but most avid of new and unknown things, and even of incomprehensible ones: minds, in short, to which it is not so much at heart and a care to know true things, as to seem to the crowd to know themselves those things which the highest masters of philosophy confess that they do not know. I shall conclude this argument with an excellent saying of Saint Ambrose. Thus writes Ambrose, in the fourth book on the Hexameron, chapter 4:⁴³

The wisdom of the Chaldeans is compared to a spider's web, into which, if a gnat or a fly has fallen, it cannot extricate itself. But if any kind of stronger living creature has been seen to run into it, it has passed through and broken the toils, and scattered the weak and empty snares. Such are the nets of the Chaldeans, that in them the weak stick fast, while the stronger in mind can take no hurt. And so you, who are stronger, when you have seen the mathematicians, say: They weave a spider's web, which can have neither any use nor any binding-force—unless you, like a gnat or a fly, by the slip of your own weakness run into it; but, like a sparrow or a dove, by the swiftness of your soaring flight you dissolve their feeble snares.⁴⁴

Sapientia Chaldaeorum telae araneae comparatur, in quam si culex aut musca inciderit, exuere se non potest. Si vero validiorum animantium ullum genus incurrisse visum est, pertransivit et casses rupit, infirmos atque inanes laqueos dissipavit. Talia sunt retia Chaldaeorum, ut in his infirmi haereant, validiores sensu offensionem habere non possint. Itaque vos qui validiores estis, cum videritis mathematicos, dicite, Telam araneae texunt, quae nec usum aliquem potest habere nec vincula, si tu non quasi culex aut musca lapsu tuae infirmitatis incurras, sed quasi passer aut columba casses invalidos praepetis volatus celeritate dissolvas.

OCTAVA RATIO. Fundamenta et firmamenta huius artis aut nulla sunt aut certe infirmissima et fragilissima: haec igitur ars nulla ratione firma et stabili utitur ad divinandum; quamobrem nullam quoque apud homines auctoritatem, fidem ac probabilitatem habere debet. Primum fundamentum istius doctrinae est astra habere qualitates omnes elementorum: partim enim esse frigida, partim humida et sicca, si non formaliter saltem virtualiter, hoc est si non actu saltem effectu, si non in se habendo eas qualitates certe habendo facultates earum qualitatum effectrices: Saturnum aiunt esse frigidum, Martem siccum, Lunam humidam. Verum hoc et ratio confutat et experientia. Ratio quidem, quoniam sicut astra omnia sunt lucida et ex se lucem fundunt, ita quoque calida esse omnia et calefacere necesse est: lux enim, non sicut omnis per se calefacit, ita frigefacere aut per se humectare vel exsiccare potest. Stemus decretis Astrologorum aientium, ut Lunam, itidem cetera sydera a sole mutuata fulgere. Si igitur omnium astrorum una est eademque lucis origo et ratio, qui potest esse tam multiplex, dissimilis atque discrepans ratio et potestas agendi? Experientia item hoc ipsum redarguit: in plenilunio enim, cum est lumen Lunae plenissimum, noctes quoque (Aristotele et experientia teste) calidiores existunt. Sed Astrologi praeter lucem alias in caelo et syderibus vires atque facultates, et a luce et inter se multum diversas, mirandorumque operum causas, quas influentias appellant, commenti sunt. Novitium sane inventum, nulli veterum vel philosophorum vel Astrologorum unquam probatum, ac si licet ex eorum scriptis coniecturam facere, ne notum quidem illis. Postquam vero a recentioribus Astrologis influentiae inventae et palam probatae, ab aliis quoque doce[ri]...

EIGHTH REASON. The foundations and supports of this art are either none, or certainly most weak and fragile: this art, therefore, uses no firm and stable reasoning for divining; wherefore it ought also to have no authority, faith, or probability among men. The first foundation of that doctrine is that the stars have all the qualities of the elements: for some, they say, are cold, some humid and dry—if not formally, at least virtually; that is, if not in act, at least in effect; if not by having those qualities in themselves, certainly by having the faculties productive of those qualities: they say Saturn is cold, Mars dry, the Moon humid. But both reason and experience confute this. Reason, indeed, because, just as all the stars are luminous and pour out light from themselves, so it is also necessary that they all be hot and heat-giving: for light, just as all of it heats of itself, cannot in the same way cool, or of itself moisten or dry. Let us stand by the tenets of the Astrologers, who say that the other stars, like the Moon, shine with light borrowed from the sun. If, then, the origin and principle of the light of all the stars is one and the same, how can the principle and power of acting be so manifold, dissimilar, and discrepant? Experience too refutes this very thing: for at the full moon, when the light of the Moon is fullest, the nights also (by the witness of Aristotle and of experience) turn out warmer. But the Astrologers have invented, besides light, other forces and faculties in the heaven and the stars—much diverse both from light and among themselves—and causes of wondrous works, which they call influences. A novel invention indeed, never approved by any of the ancient philosophers or Astrologers, and—if one may make a conjecture from their writings—not even known to them. But after influences had been invented and openly maintained by the more recent Astrologers, by others too they are taug[ht]...⁴⁵

...[doce]ri et defendi coeptae sunt, qui ex Lycaeo paulo gravior et probatior Philosophus non eas repudiavit atque damnavit? Festive quidam Asylum ignorantiae eas appellavit: ad influentias enim quasi ad unicum perfugium sese recipiunt, et hanc se in latebram coniiciunt quicumque mirabilium effectuum proprias et naturales causas (vulgaribus ingeniis nec in philosophia exercitatis occultas) solerter investigare ac reperire non possunt. Et vero, si admittuntur influentiae, vix dici potest quantopere debilitetur robur Philosophiae, deteratur eius dignitas, auctoritas elevetur, minuatur existimatio, denique studium eius apud homines cultusque languescat. Quid enim attinet in occultis rerum causis perquirendis et eruendis praeclara ingenia Philosophorum tanto studio et conatu laborare, cum in proclivi sit cuiuslibet effectus ex caelestibus influentiis rationem petere et afferre? quis enim effectus est, cuius naturalis et vera causa paulo obscurior et abstrusior est, quem non per istiusmodi influentias nullo negocio liceat explicare? Cur magnes ferrum ad se rapit? confestim respondebitur, quia propria eius influentia caelestis eam illi virtutem indidit. Unde Remora tantulus piscis vim habet sistendi incitatissimum navigium? in promptu est responsio, nimirum a caelesti quadam influentia, quae tanta pisciculum illum vi ac potestate roboravit. Quid moror? nullum erit problema, nihil in natura rerum adeo reconditum et ab intelligentia nostra remotum, denique nihil de his quorum pervestigatio summorum Philosophorum ingenia fatigavit et torsit, quod non quivis e circulo Astrologorum indoctorum hominum uno verbo (scilicet per istas influentias) expedire queat.

...began to be taught and defended, what graver and more approved Philosopher from the Lyceum did not repudiate and condemn them? Someone wittily called them the Asylum of Ignorance: for to influences, as to their one refuge, they betake themselves, and cast themselves into this hiding-place, whoever cannot skillfully investigate and find the proper and natural causes of wonderful effects (hidden to vulgar minds not exercised in philosophy). And indeed, if influences are admitted, it can scarcely be told how greatly the strength of Philosophy is weakened, its dignity worn away, its authority lessened, its esteem diminished, and finally how the study and cultivation of it among men languishes. For what is the use of the illustrious minds of the Philosophers laboring with so much zeal and effort in searching out and digging up the hidden causes of things, when it is downhill work to seek and supply the reason of any effect from celestial influences? for what effect is there, whose natural and true cause is a little more obscure and abstruse, which it is not permitted to explain with no trouble through influences of this kind? Why does the magnet draw iron to itself? it will at once be answered: because its proper celestial influence has implanted that power in it. Whence has the Remora, so tiny a fish, the power to stop a most rapid ship? the answer is ready: namely, from a certain celestial influence, which has strengthened that little fish with so much force and power. Why do I delay? there will be no problem, nothing in the nature of things so recondite and remote from our understanding—nothing, in short, of those things whose investigation has wearied and racked the minds of the greatest Philosophers—which anyone from the circle of unlearned astrologer-men cannot dispatch with one word, namely by these influences.⁴⁶

VERUM labor equidem longius: revertar igitur ad propositum. Si Saturnus, quia lucidus est, per lucem calefacit, quomodo idem per influentiam frigefacit? nonne absurdum est in eodem astro duas esse facultates, unam calefaciendi alteram frigefaciendi, non diversas modo sed etiam adversas et contrarias? Cernimus ita esse natura comparatum ut omnibus in rebus, in quibus duae insunt differentiae vel proprietates (ut more philosophico loquar)—una generalis et quae uni rei communis est cum aliis multis, altera specialis et propria eius rei (cuiusmodi sunt in homine sentientem esse et rationalem)—ut semper differentia et proprietas specialis nobilior et perfectior sit generali, ut quae illam contrahit et determinat, novae perfectionis gradum et rationem ipsi adiungens; sicut patet in praedicto exemplo hominis, in quo rationale nobilius est quam sentiens. At contra omnino se habet res in hac mirabili Astrologorum doctrina. Etenim docent ipsi in Saturno (exempli causa) duas esse proprietates seu facultates agendi: unam generalem et communem ei cum omnibus astris, quae est vis illuminandi et per illuminationem calefaciendi; alteram[...]

But I labor too long: I will therefore return to my purpose. If Saturn, because it is luminous, heats by light, how does the same star cool by influence? is it not absurd that in the same star there are two faculties, one of heating, the other of cooling, not merely diverse but even opposite and contrary? We see it so arranged by nature that, in all things in which there are two differences or properties (to speak in the philosophical manner)—one general, which is common to one thing with many others, the other special and proper to that thing (such as, in man, to be sentient and to be rational)—the special difference and property is always nobler and more perfect than the general, as that which contracts and determines it, adjoining to it a new degree and rationale of perfection; as is clear in the aforesaid example of man, in whom the rational is nobler than the sentient. But quite the opposite holds in this marvelous doctrine of the Astrologers. For they teach that in Saturn (for example) there are two properties or faculties of acting: one general and common to it with all the stars, which is the power of illuminating and, through illumination, of heating; the other[...]⁴⁷

...[alte]ram specialem et propriam Saturni, qua ratione differt ab aliis astris, quae est facultas frigefaciendi vel aliqua alia vis alicuius influentiae. Certum autem est lucem caelestem multo nobiliorem esse quacumque alia qualitate caelesti, et facultatem calefaciendi praestantiorem esse facultate refrigerandi. Praeterea, duas esse in re quapiam facultates et proprietates ei rei naturales, quarum altera (ut diximus) sit generalis, altera particularis, inter se contrarias (quales sunt in Saturno secundum istos, potestas calefaciendi per lucem et refrigerandi per influentiam), nec fert natura rerum, et id fieri non posse ratio ipsa decernit. Nam ut in corpore multiformi et quod Graeci vocant Heterogeneum, secundum diversas partes inesse queant contrariae qualitates et facultates—quemadmodum contingit corpori humano in cerebro et in corde—id tamen convenire non potest in astrum Saturni, quod est secundum omnes partes unius formae ac naturae: neque enim una pars eius habet lucem, altera vero influentiam, sed ut totum est praeditum luce, ita convenit in eo toto esse influentiam. Ne multa (non enim consentaneum est alieno loco de influentiis adversus Astrologos subtiliter disputare), satis argumenti est ad tollendas influentias omnium quae in natura rerum efficiuntur, tametsi nova, singularia et mirabilia videantur: veras, naturales et proprias causas atque rationes ex duobus principiis caelestibus, quae omnibus sunt conspicua experimentis quotidianis explorata (motum dico et lucem), plene cumulateque ac probabilissime peti et duci posse. Figuras porro et effigies stellarum, quas designant Astrologi in Zodiaco, similitudinem reddentes quorundam animalium vel hominum, magnam vim habere in ortu cuiusque censent Astrologi: cum tamen per se ac natura sua non sint tales, sed sola eorum imaginatione constent, ab ipsis eo modo confictae et figuratae; possent enim fingi etiam ad similitudinem aliorum animalium, domuum, turrium, mensarum aliarumve rerum; quare valde frivolum et ridiculum est in eiusmodi figuris quicquam momenti ad divinandum esse positum existimare.

...the other special and proper to Saturn, by which principle it differs from the other stars, which is the faculty of cooling, or some other force of some influence. But it is certain that celestial light is far nobler than any other celestial quality, and that the faculty of heating is more excellent than the faculty of cooling. Moreover, that there should be in any thing two faculties and properties natural to that thing, of which one (as we said) is general, the other particular, and contrary to one another (such as in Saturn, according to these men, are the power of heating by light and of cooling by influence)—neither does the nature of things bear it, and reason itself decides that it cannot happen. For although in a multiform body, and one which the Greeks call Heterogeneous, contrary qualities and faculties can reside in different parts—as happens in the human body, in the brain and in the heart—yet this cannot suit the star of Saturn, which is, in all its parts, of one form and nature: for one part of it does not have light and another influence, but as the whole is endowed with light, so it is fitting that in the whole there be influence. In short (for it is not suitable, in a place foreign to it, to dispute subtly of influences against the Astrologers), there is argument enough to do away with influences: that the true, natural, and proper causes and rationales of all things which are produced in the nature of things—though they seem new, singular, and wonderful—can be fully, abundantly, and most probably sought and drawn from two celestial principles, which are conspicuous to all, explored by daily experiments: I mean motion and light. Furthermore, the figures and effigies of the stars which the Astrologers mark out in the Zodiac, rendering the likeness of certain animals or men, the Astrologers reckon to have great force at the birth of each: although in themselves and by their own nature they are not such, but consist only in the imagination of those men, so feigned and figured by them; for they could also be feigned to the likeness of other animals, of houses, towers, tables, or other things. Wherefore it is very frivolous and ridiculous to think that any weight for divining is placed in figures of this kind.⁴⁸

SECUNDUM fundamentum Astrologorum est natalitia cuiusque astra esse observanda: ex his enim omnes vitae casus et eventus provideri et praenotari posse. Sed quis non videt fundamentum hoc esse infirmissimum? cur enim Astrologi non potius observent tempus et caeli atque syderum statum quo quisque in utero conceptus, formatus et animatus est? cum in eo plus momenti esse videatur ad divinandum: quippe tunc primum existit homo, et tunc primum vis caelestis in homine recipitur et imprimitur. Etenim ante (eorum per novem menses quisque fuit in utero) potestati et actioni caelorum subiectus. Cur item non considerant[...]

The SECOND foundation of the Astrologers is that the natal stars of each one are to be observed: for from these all the chances and events of life can be foreseen and foreknown. But who does not see that this foundation is most weak? for why do the Astrologers not rather observe the time, and the state of the heaven and the stars, in which each one was conceived, formed, and animated in the womb? since in that there seems to be more weight for divining: for then first the man exists, and then first the celestial force is received and impressed in the man. For before (for nine months each one was in the womb) he was subject to the power and action of the heavens. Why, likewise, do they not consider[...]⁴⁹

...[Astro]logi alias constellationes et defluxus caelestes qui contingunt homini saepius post ortum? Cum plerumque usu veniat ut illae virtutes caelestes insigniores sint effectu et valentiores ad immutandum hominem quam quae tempore ortus eius fuerunt: effectum enim illum et defluxum astrorum nascenti homini impressum necesse est variari, commutata saepius humani corporis temperatione, vel ob alias potentes constellationes, vel ob educationem, vel ob variam vivendi consuetudinem et rationem, vel ob leges patrias, ad quarum normam cogitur quisque vitam, mores, studia et actiones conformare. Quid quod fortasse nihil illius materiae primigeniae, quam quisque in ortu habuit, reliquum sit in extrema aetate? hoc enim visum est et magnis et multis Philosophis: nec Sanctus Thomas in prima parte, quaestione ultima, articulo primo, abnuere videtur. Quo concesso, vis illius primi defluxus et effectus caelestis, in ortu hominis ei indita et impressa, necessario tandem evanescit tota: nisi fingat quispiam eiusmodi virtutem caelestem migrare ex subiecto in subiectum, tanquam ex domo in domum mutando domicilia; aut, cum praesentit interitum suum, aliam pro se sui similem et quasi vicariam virtutem substituere.

...the Astrologers the other constellations and celestial influxes which befall a man more often after birth? Since it usually comes about that those celestial powers are more notable in effect, and more potent to change a man, than those which existed at the time of his birth: for that effect and influx of the stars, impressed on the man as he is born, must necessarily be varied, the temperament of the human body being often changed—whether on account of other powerful constellations, or on account of education, or on account of a varied custom and manner of living, or on account of the ancestral laws, to whose norm each one is compelled to conform his life, morals, pursuits, and actions. What of this, that perhaps nothing of that primal matter, which each one had at birth, remains in extreme old age? for this has seemed so to great and many Philosophers: nor does Saint Thomas, in the first part, the last question, the first article, seem to deny it. This being granted, the force of that first celestial influx and effect, implanted and impressed on the man at his birth, must necessarily at last vanish entirely: unless someone imagines that a celestial power of this kind migrates from subject to subject, as if changing dwellings from house to house; or, when it foresees its own destruction, substitutes in its place another power like itself and, as it were, vicarious.⁵⁰

PLUS autem esse ponderis, aut certe non minus, in conceptu hominis quam in ortu, magister istorum Ptolemaeus locuples testis est. Is enim in tertio Apotelesmatum ita scribit:

But that there is more weight, or at least no less, in the conception of a man than in his birth, their master Ptolemy is a rich witness. For in the third book of the Apotelesmata he writes thus:⁵¹

When some temporal beginning of a man is to be established, that will indeed by nature and of itself be the beginning when the seed is admitted into the genital womb; but in potency and by accident, when at the hour of birth the infant comes forth. Whoever therefore has detected the hour of the admitted seed, whether by chance or by observation, ought rather to follow it in discerning the properties of body and soul, considering what the configurations of the stars are at that time: for since once, from the beginning, the seed is disposed to a certain quality by the condition of the surrounding air, although it be varied through the times of the consequent formation, yet, because it naturally draws to itself its own kindred matter, it will be assimilated still more to the disposition of its first quality. Thus far Ptolemy in that place.⁵²

Cum principium temporale hominis aliquod statuatur, natura quidem et per se illud erit principium cum semen utero genitali admittitur; potentia vero et secundum accidens, cum hora partus infans egreditur. Qui igitur horam admissi seminis vel casu vel observatione deprehenderit, illam sequi potius debet in proprietatibus corporis et animi dignoscendis, considerando quae sint eo tempore stellarum configurationes: cum enim semel a principio semen ex ambientis aëris affectione certa qualitate disponitur, licet per consequentis conformationis tempora varietur, quoniam tamen propriam cognatamque materiam naturaliter sibi asciscit, magis etiam primae suae qualitatis dispositioni assimilabitur. Haec inibi Ptolemaeus.

Quibus verbis non obscure docet primum et naturale atque efficacissimum hominis principium esse seminis admissionem hominisque conceptum, atque huic principio potissime insistendum et inhaerendum esse ad praenoscendas hominum affectiones et eventus, tam qui ad corpus quam qui ad animam pertinent. Sed quia bene noverat Ptolemaeus punctum illud temporis vel admissi seminis vel conceptus vix cognosci posse ab Astrologis, ne illorum iudicia et divinationes quas ipsi ducunt ex ortu hominis infirmare videretur, mox subiecit, Qui autem horam ignorant principii seminalis, eos necesse est sequi principium nativitatis. Haly nobilis Astrologus in eo libro quem scripsit de Electionibus ingenue fatetur efficaciam decernendi Fatum ho[minis]...

By which words he teaches not obscurely that the first and natural and most efficacious beginning of a man is the admission of the seed and the conception of the man, and that one must chiefly insist and adhere to this beginning for foreknowing the affections and events of men, both those which pertain to the body and those which pertain to the soul. But because Ptolemy well knew that that point of time, whether of the admitted seed or of the conception, can scarcely be known by the Astrologers, lest he should seem to undermine their judgments and divinations which they draw from the birth of a man, he at once added: But those who are ignorant of the hour of the seminal beginning, it is necessary for them to follow the beginning of nativity. Haly, a noble Astrologer, in that book which he wrote On Elections, frankly confesses that the efficacy of deciding the Fate of a m[an]...⁵³

...[ho]minis esse in hora conceptionis: sed quia haec nescitur ab Astrologis, propterea eos ad horam nativitatis confugisse. Quin, cum Astrologi praemuntur argumento geminorum (quorum cum idem sit ortus, dispar tamen eventus et exitus est), respondere solent diversitatem eventuum qui sunt in Geminis ex diversitate conceptus eorum esse profectam.

...of a man is in the hour of conception: but because this is not known by the Astrologers, therefore they have taken refuge in the hour of nativity. Nay, when the Astrologers are pressed by the argument of twins (whose birth, though it be the same, yet their outcome and end is different), they are wont to answer that the diversity of the events which are in twins arose from the diversity of their conception.⁵⁴

SED vide quousque progressa sit istorum audacia et impudentia: etiam urbium, non hominum modo, fata profitentur hac arte posse praenosci et praenunciari; observata enim astrorum compositione quae fuit cum urbes conderentur, posse earum casus eventusque omnes prospici ac praenotari. Fecit hoc in urbe Roma, rogatu Varronis, quidam Tarutius Mathematicus, ut in Romulo tradit Plutarchus: quam historiam libro 2 de Divinatione his verbis Cicero enarrat:

But see how far the audacity and impudence of these men has gone: they profess that even the fates of cities, not of men only, can be foreknown and foretold by this art; for, the composition of the stars which existed when the cities were founded being observed, all their chances and events can be foreseen and foreknown. A certain Tarutius the Mathematician did this for the city of Rome, at the request of Varro, as Plutarch relates in his Romulus: which history Cicero, in the second book On Divination, narrates in these words:⁵⁵

A certain Lucius Tarutius Firmanus, our friend, deeply learned in Chaldean reckonings, traced back the birthday even of our own city to that feast of Pales on which we have received that it was founded by Romulus, and said that Rome was born when it was in the yoke of the Moon, and did not hesitate to chant its fates. O the greatest power of error! did even a city's birthday pertain to the force of the stars and of the moon? Grant that it matters, in a child, from what condition of the sky he drew his first breath: could this have had any force in the brick or mortar of which the city was made? Thus Cicero.⁵⁶

Quidam L. Tarutius Firmanus, familiaris noster, in primis Chaldaicis rationibus eruditus, urbis etiam nostrae natalem diem repetebat ab iis Parilibus quibus eam a Romulo conditam accepimus, Romamque, cum esset in iugo Lunae, natam esse dicebat, nec eius fata canere dubitabat. O vim maximam erroris! etiamne urbis natalis dies ad vim stellarum et lunae pertinebat? Fac in puero referre, ex qua affectione caeli primum spiritum duxerit: num hoc in latere aut camento, ex quibus urbs effecta, potuit valere? Ita Cicero.

VERUM, quaererem equidem ex istis Astromanticis num velint eorum divinationem etiam in animantibus et stirpibus valere ut in homine. Si negent, prodent scilicet suam inscitiam et suae artis infirmitatem, inanitatem atque fallaciam. Cur enim non aequaliter valeat in stirpibus atque in homine? immo cur non plus valeat? stirpes namque multo magis quam homo a caelestium corporum potestate et efficientia naturali necessitate pendent. Et cum minus multa et varia atque incerta stirpibus quam homini soleant accidere, facilior profecto esse deberet eorum divinatio quae stirpibus quam quae homini sunt eventura. Sin vero annuunt similiter in stirpibus ut in hominibus valere Astrologicam divinationem, amice rogarem ipsos ut diligentissime observarent statum caeli et astrorum, eo videlicet tempore quo vel prunus vel cerasus vel pyrus sereretur, aut cum sementis tritici fieret, et ex illa caeli observatione promerent etiam prognostica de illis arboribus: scilicet, ut divinarent quantam illae arbores prunorum, cerasorum et pyrorum copiam essent laturae; quantus item, ex illa tritici semente, spicarum, et in singulis spicis quantus granorum numerus esset proventurus. Haec si negent a se posse praenosci, fateantur etiam necesse est non posse ab ipsis futuros hominum casus eventusque provideri.

But I would indeed ask of these Astromancers whether they want their divination to avail also in living creatures and plants, as in man. If they deny it, they will of course betray their ignorance, and the weakness, emptiness, and fallacy of their art. For why should it not avail equally in plants as in man? nay, why should it not avail more? for plants depend much more than man, by natural necessity, on the power and efficacy of the celestial bodies. And since fewer and less varied and less uncertain things are wont to happen to plants than to man, the divination of the things that are to befall plants ought surely to be easier than of those that are to befall man. But if they grant that Astrological divination avails in plants similarly as in men, I would amicably ask them to observe most diligently the state of the heaven and the stars, namely at that time when a plum, or cherry, or pear tree is planted, or when a sowing of wheat is made, and from that observation of the heaven to bring forth also prognostics about those trees: namely, to divine how great an abundance of plums, cherries, and pears those trees would bear; likewise how great a number of ears, from that sowing of wheat, and in each ear how great a number of grains, would come forth. If they deny that these can be foreknown by them, they must also of necessity confess that the future chances and events of men cannot be foreseen by them.⁵⁷

TERTIUM fundamentum eorundem Astrologorum est artem hanc suam certissimis innumerabilium saeculorum experimentis et constantissimis observationibus esse comprobatam: aiunt enim hanc disciplinam profectam esse ab Aegyptiis et Babyloniis seu Chaldaeis, morta[libus]...

The THIRD foundation of the same Astrologers is that this art of theirs has been confirmed by the most certain experiments of innumerable ages, and by the most constant observations: for they say that this discipline went forth from the Egyptians and the Babylonians, or Chaldeans, mort[als]...⁵⁸

...[morta]lium omnium antiquissimis. Tradit enim Aristoteles in lib. 2 de Caelo textu 60, et extremo libro 1 Meteororum, Aegyptios omnium hominum vetustissimos haberi; et in principio operis Metaphysicorum affirmat Aegyptios, omnium hominum vetustissimos, Mathematica studia tractare et colere coepisse. Iactabant etiam olim Astrologi Chaldaeos quadringenta et septuaginta annorum millia in periclitandis experiendisque pueris, quicumque nascerentur, posuisse. Verum adeo in aperto et in promptu sunt omnibus istorum mendacia, ut a nobis ea vel confutari vel etiam indicari non sit opus. Etenim ab exordio mundi ad hanc diem necdum sex millia annorum effluxerunt. Ab origine vero gentis Chaldaeae (hoc est, post eversionem turris Babel, facta nempe linguarum divisione) non sunt adhuc quatuor millia annorum completa. Picus Mirandulanus in cap. 2 lib. 12 adversus astrologos, testes ad redarguendam Astrologorum mentitam vetustatem adhibet Hypparchum et Ptolemaeum, principes sane Astronomiae: qui ubi pro dogmate aliquo constituendo veterum observationes afferunt, nullas profecto afferunt vetustiores iis quae sub Nabuchodonosor Chaldaeorum rege apud Aegyptios et Babylonios fuere; ab initio autem imperii regis Nabuchodonosori ad praesentem annum, qui ab ortu Domini nostri agitur millesimus quingentesimus octogesimus octavus, non plus bis mille ducentos et triginta duos annos praeteriisse constat. Porro commentitiam Aegyptiacarum observationum antiquitatem perbelle ridet et redarguit Augustinus in cap. 40 lib. 18 de Civitate Dei: ita enim scribit:

...the most ancient of all mortals. For Aristotle relates, in the second book On the Heaven, text 60, and at the end of the first book of the Meteorologica, that the Egyptians are held the oldest of all men; and at the beginning of the Metaphysics he affirms that the Egyptians, the oldest of all men, began to treat and cultivate the Mathematical studies. The Astrologers also once boasted that the Chaldeans had spent four hundred and seventy thousand years in testing and experimenting on children, whoever were born. But the falsehoods of these men are so open and obvious to all that there is no need for them to be confuted, or even pointed out, by us. For from the beginning of the world to this day not yet six thousand years have flowed by. And from the origin of the Chaldean nation (that is, after the overthrow of the tower of Babel, when the division of tongues was made) not yet four thousand years are complete. Pico della Mirandola, in chapter 2 of book 12 against the astrologers, brings forward, to refute the lying antiquity of the Astrologers, Hipparchus and Ptolemy, princes indeed of Astronomy: who, when they bring forward the observations of the ancients for establishing some doctrine, bring forward none older than those which were under Nebuchadnezzar, king of the Chaldeans, among the Egyptians and Babylonians; and from the beginning of the reign of King Nebuchadnezzar to the present year—which from the birth of our Lord is reckoned the one thousand five hundred and eighty-eighth—it is established that not more than two thousand two hundred and thirty-two years have passed. Furthermore, the fictitious antiquity of the Egyptian observations Augustine very wittily ridicules and refutes in chapter 40 of the eighteenth book of the City of God: for he writes thus:⁵⁹

In vain do some chatter, with a most vain presumption, saying that, from the time when Egypt grasped the science of the stars, more than a hundred thousand years are reckoned. For in what books did they gather that number—they who, not much before two thousand years ago, learned letters with Isis for their mistress? for no small authority in history is Varro, who reported this. Thus Augustine.⁶⁰

Frustra vanissima praesumptione garriunt quidam dicentes, ex quo rationem syderum comprehendit Aegyptus, amplius quam centum annorum millia numerari. In quibus enim libris istum numerum collegerunt, qui non multum ante annorum duo millia litteras magistra Iside didicerunt? non enim parvus auctor est in historia Varro qui hoc prodidit. Sic Augustinus.

Sed huic disputationi, in qua octo rationibus probare voluimus divinationem Astrologicam esse contrariam verae Philosophiae, finem hoc loco statuemus.

But to this disputation, in which by eight arguments we have wished to prove that astrological divination is contrary to true Philosophy, we shall here set an end.⁶¹

Translator’s notes

The third chapter of the anti-astrology disputation, which marshals eight proofs. ↩
Marginal glosses: "Rationes octo, quibus probatur ex cognitione astrorum etiam perfecta, non posse divinari omnia quae futura sunt"; "Prima ratio"; and a long note: "Sicut ad generationem rerum futurarum non tantum concurrit caelum sed etiam causae particulares, ita ad certam earundem rerum praenotionem, non solius caeli notitia satis esse posse." Granting (for argument) the astrologers' claimed perfect knowledge of the heavens, Pererius argues that even so it cannot yield certain foreknowledge. FIRST REASON: a thing is known through its causes; but particular future effects require not only the heaven (a universal, indeterminate cause) but a particular cause and prepared matter (Aristotle: ‘the sun and a man beget a man’). So knowledge of the heavens alone does not suffice—as shown when farmers sow diverse seeds under the same sky and diverse plants grow (a diversity from the seeds, not the stars). Augustine agrees (De Gen. ad litt. 2.17): ↩
Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.17. The block quote spans printed pp. 251–252. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘passioni’). ↩
Conclusion of Augustine's quote (De Gen. ad litt. 2.17): when many bodies of diverse kinds are sown and born at one point of time (even in the same regions), there is such variety in their growth and behavior that anyone who considered it truly ‘loses the stars’; how dull, then, to claim—when refuted by these facts—that the stars' fatal influence pertains only to men. ↩
Favorinus (in Gellius, Noctes Atticae 14.1) develops Augustine's last point: if the cause of all human life and death lay in the stars, what of flies, worms, sea-urchins, and countless tiny creatures? Either frogs and gnats too have astral birth-fates, or there is no reason the stars' force should work in men but fail in everything else. ↩
Marginal glosses: "Secunda ratio ex dissimilitudine Geminorum"; "Similitudo Nigidii Figuli"; "B. Gregorius hom. 10 super Evang." SECOND REASON (the unlikeness of twins): if the doctrine were true, twins would be wholly alike—but sometimes one is male, the other female. Cicero (De Div. 2) on the unlike twin Spartan kings Procles and Eurysthenes; Scripture's clearest case, Jacob and Esau (Rom 9:10), conceived in one act, born together, yet utterly unlike. The astrologers' refuge—that the tiny interval between twins' births is magnified in the vast, swift heaven (illustrated by Nigidius Figulus's potter's-wheel struck twice at ‘the same’ spot)—fails: there is no interval at conception; and if the constellation varies so fast, each one's exact birth-time is incomprehensible to them. Gregory's argument: ↩
Gregory the Great, Homily 10 on the Gospels. The block quote spans printed pp. 252–253. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘primo’). ↩
Conclusion of Gregory's argument (Homily 10 on the Gospels): since a man is born not all at once but limb by limb (head first, then neck, breast, feet), no one is born ‘whole’ under a single constellation. Jacob, born right after Esau holding his heel, is as if (Augustine, De Gen. ad litt. 2.17) one infant born like two, or twice as long. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Phauorinus apud Aulum Gellium libro 14 cap. 1." Favorinus (Gellius 14.1) presses the same point: if the birth-instant is so small and swift that two cannot share it to the same lot (and twins differ because not born at the very same point), how can the astrologers ever catch—by design or observation—that fleeting instant scarcely graspable in thought, when they themselves say the least moments make enormous changes amid the headlong whirl of day and night? ↩
Augustine treats the twins-argument carefully (City of God bk 5, first chapters; De doctrina Christiana 2.22), and it gravely troubles the astrologers: if all changes in so brief a moment that even contrary outcomes usually follow, no one can predict anything certain about a newborn, since the exact point of his conception or birth can be known to no one. Even if the stars had great power, what they do at each birth would stay unknown, for the heaven's swift motion outstrips our slow observation. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Tertia ratio." THIRD REASON: setting twins aside (whose interrupted birth gave the astrologers a hiding-place), consider the very many begotten at the same time, in the same region, under the same star-aspect, but of different parents—the astrologer must foretell the same events for them, yet daily experience shows the opposite: countless people conceived and born together differ greatly in character, pursuits, morals, religion, fortunes, and the events of life and death. All the Romans slain at Cannae by Hannibal had the same end of life—yet who would think they were all born under the same star-aspect? Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘de tot’; signature I 3). ↩
Continuation of the Third Reason. The reference to ‘the naval battle eighteen years ago’ in which the Christian fleet annihilated the Turks is the Battle of Lepanto (7 Oct 1571)—dating the composition of this part to c. 1589. Many were born at the same hour as Homer, Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Alexander, yet none turned out like them. Pererius now quotes Favorinus. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Phauorinus apud Aulum Gellium libro 14 cap. 1." Favorinus (Gellius, Noctes Atticae 14.1): so many people, born under diverse stars in far-distant regions, perish together at one instant and by one kind of death (earthquake, falling roof, town-storming, shipwreck)—impossible if each birth-moment had its own laws. And if equal outcomes can befall men born at different times via later star-conjunctions, then everything could turn out equal—a second Socrates, Antisthenes, many Platos all alike—which is impossible. So the Chaldeans cannot fairly argue from men's unequal births and equal deaths. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Quarta ratio. Bardesanis disputatio adversus Astrologos." FOURTH REASON: Bardesanes the Syrian (Bardaisan of Edessa), in his dialogue On Fate against the Chaldeans, showed the astrologers' observations futile and their predictions lying—as recorded by Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.8 (the so-called ‘Book of the Laws of Countries’): ↩
Bardesanes, On Fate (in Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.8). The block quote refutes astral determinism from the fixed laws of whole peoples. The Seres (Chinese/Far-Eastern) forbid murder, fornication, and idolatry—so none of these crimes occur there, though Mars reaches mid-heaven daily and people are born at every hour. The Brahmins of India and Bactria worship no idols, eat nothing that lived, drink no wine or beer, attend to God alone—while the rest of the Indians in the same region wallow in adultery, slaughter, drunkenness, and idolatry (one nation even devours men). The block quote spans printed pp. 254–256. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘caede’). ↩
Conclusion of Bardesanes' argument (Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.8): whole nations keep fixed customs against what the stars would supposedly compel. The Persians married daughters, sisters, even mothers (their émigré ‘Magussaeans’ still do so in Egypt, Phrygia, Galatia); the Amazons keep no husbands, bear at one season, rear only daughters, all warlike. The Jews everywhere circumcise on the eighth day and keep the sabbath—not all born under one star. The Christians, innumerable worldwide, keep one life and doctrine, immovable by promises, threats, or tortures; and converts abandon their fierce ancestral customs entirely. So free human power, not the stars, prevails over custom everywhere. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Quinta ratio." Closing the Bardesanes citation. FIFTH REASON: free will and the soul's immortality cannot coexist with astrology—if the art stands, they collapse; so one sees what to think of an art that can subsist only by overthrowing the liberty and immortality of our souls. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘rum’). ↩
Marginal gloss: "Rom. 11. et Isaia 40." The core of the Fifth Reason: if the soul is immortal and free, astrology is impossible. Futures from free will can't be known in themselves (not yet in act), only in their causes; and the three causes of futures are God, heaven, and human will. (a) What depends on God's absolute will is known to no mortal but by revelation—Rom 11:34 / Isa 40:13 ‘Who has known the mind of the Lord?’; Wisdom 9:16–17. (b) From heaven, will-dependent futures can't be known: heaven is a universal cause (containing particulars only indeterminately) and corporeal (whereas the soul is incorporeal, free, not subject to it). (c) The will, the proximate cause, is indifferent and indeterminate; external acts depend on inner choice, and no one can foreknow another's future choice when no one can even know the resolve another presently holds. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Hominem, ut operatur secundum rationem, non e caelo, nec alia ex causa ulla praeter Deum, per se necessario pendere." Man considered as living by reason vs. by sense/appetite: if by reason, he does not depend on the heaven, for mind and reason are immaterial and incorporeal—and no body can of itself act on the incorporeal. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘id quod’). ↩
Marginal gloss: "Quam sit instabilis vita et actiones hominis viventis non secundum rationem, sed secundum sensum." Reason is free, mistress of its own acts; though instigated to evil by the heaven or bodily temperament, it can resist and nullify all external impulses. Witness Socrates—by nature dull and lustful, yet by strength of mind made the most prudent and continent of his age. But the man living by sense and carnal appetite is so variable that what he'll become can't be predicted: Solomon (Prov 30:18–19) found ‘the way of a young man in his youth’ utterly unknown. So it is easier to divine what a man of reason (or a just King) will do than what a lust-driven man (or a Tyrant) will do. How then can astrologers have certain knowledge of what has nothing fixed? ↩
Marginal glosses: "Pulchrum dilemma adversus Astrologos"; "Si Astrologorum praedictiones verae et certae essent, profecto inutiles et damnosae essent hominibus." A neat dilemma: either this celestial Fate can be impeded by man (so its effect fails to occur), or it cannot. If it can, the effect is uncertain and so the prediction cannot be certain. If it cannot, there is no free will, and the soul is material and mortal, necessarily subject to the stars. And even so, true predictions would profit men nothing—indeed bring more harm than good, racking us with the inevitable expectation of foreseen evils. Seneca grasped this (though granting the stars great power), in the Epistles bk 13, letter 89. Sentence breaks at ‘ita scri[psit]’ (catchword ‘psit’; signature K). ↩
Conclusion of the Seneca quotation begun on the previous page (Epistles—Ep. 88 in modern numbering, on the liberal arts). The verse couplet (‘Frigida Saturni... Cyllenius erret in orbes’) is carried with line breaks; ‘Cyllenian fire’ = Mercury. Seneca's point: whether the stars cause or merely signify events, foreknowledge of the unavoidable is useless. The ‘[scri]psit’ completes ‘scripsit’ from the catchword of the prior page. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Phauorinus apud Aulum Gellium libr. 14 cap. 1." Lead-in to Favorinus's celebrated dilemma against consulting astrologers. ↩
Favorinus's dilemma (Gellius, Noctes Atticae 14.1): every astrological prediction makes you wretched—a false prosperous one (vain waiting), a false adverse one (vain fearing), a true adverse one (anticipated grief), and even a true prosperous one (anxious suspense, and joy spoiled in advance by hope). So such men should never be consulted. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Inanis praedictio Nigidii Figuli de futuro Augusti dominatu." The papal-election argument: to predict a man will be Pope, one must know not only his nativity but the nativities of all the Cardinals who will elect him—impossible. So Nigidius Figulus's reported exclamation at Augustus's birth (Suetonius, Aug. 94, ‘the master of the world is born’) was a lucky guess, not knowledge. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘multi’). ↩
Marginal glosses: "Sexta ratio. Ars et scientia in his versantur quae semper aut plurimum eveniunt; non est Astromantia"; "Phauorinus apud Aulum Gellium libro 14 cap. 1." Augustus's rise depended on many men's help (born years before/after him), so his nativity alone could not foretell it. SIXTH REASON: every science treats of what happens always or usually; astrology's predictions, mostly false and only rarely true, come from no art but rash blabbing. Favorinus warns against trusting the Chaldeans' occasional lucky truths: ↩
Favorinus (Gellius 14.1): the Chaldeans grasp, define, and perceive nothing, but grope between true and false ‘as if through darkness’—stumbling on truth by trial, or led to it by their clients' credulity; so they hit the truth more easily about the past than the future. Yet their occasional truths are not a thousandth part of their lies. ↩
Cicero (De Divinatione 2): the Chaldeans told Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar each would die old, at home, in glory—all refuted by events. Seneca's satire Ludus in mortem Claudii Caesaris (the Apocolocyntosis): Mercury urges the Fates to kill Claudius so ‘the astrologers may for once tell the truth,’ since they had ‘buried’ him every year and month since his accession. The same with our astrologers, who foretell popes' deaths yearly—and are laughed at. (Leads into the Ambrose quote that follows.) ↩
Ambrose, Hexameron 4 (cap. 7). The block quote spans printed pp. 259–260. A few days before, someone predicted useful rain ‘at the New Moon’; though longing for showers, Ambrose did not want the astrological assertion to come true—and was glad no rain fell until it was granted to the Church's prayers. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘Creato’). ↩
Conclusion of Ambrose's quote (Hexameron 4): the rain came only when granted to the Church's prayers, showing one must hope from the Creator's providence, not the Moon's phases—thereby refuting astrology's vanity and proving the power of Christian prayer. ↩
A catalogue of failed astrological predictions. Albumasar (Abu Maʿshar) predicted the Christian law would last no more than 1,460 years—refuted, 128 years now past that term. Abraham Judaeus (Abraham ibn Ezra) predicted the Jews' Messiah would come in A.D. 1464 (when the astral configuration of the Exodus would recur)—refuted by the day itself. Pierre d'Ailly records that astrologers predicted no peace at the Council of Constance—yet that Council ended the Great Western Schism that very year; an outcome that should have shaken d'Ailly's faith in astrology (he had even feared the schism would soon bring forth Antichrist). ↩
Albumasar's ‘great Saturn-revolutions’ (every 300 years a great event): he claimed that 300 years after Alexander appeared ‘Arelafor son of Bel’ who crushed the Persians, and 300 years after that, Jesus. Pererius retorts with the Greek ἀνιστορησίαν (anistorēsian, ‘want of historical knowledge’): no such ‘son of Bel’ existed then, and Christ was born only 320 years after Alexander's death, not 600. Albumasar also confused Ptolemy the astronomer (who flourished under Hadrian, no king) with the Ptolemy kings of Egypt—an error of 160+ years. ↩
Marginal gloss (overleaf): "Aliquot errata circa Chronologiam Albumazaris." The astrologers' boast that no great event ever occurred without a great conjunction of stars preceding. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘relig’). ↩
The great-conjunction theory: the astrologers assign every world-historical event (the creation, the flood, Abraham/Moses, Christ's coming, Mahomet's law) to a great conjunction of stars, especially Saturn and Jupiter. Pererius will refute it from a single argument (the false chronology underlying it). ↩
Marginal gloss: "Quam multa peccaverit contra veram Chronographiam Petrus Aliacensis in suis rationibus Astrologicis." Pierre d'Ailly, in De Concordia astronomiae cum historica narratione, posits 2,242 years from creation to the flood, and 3,102 from the flood to Christ. Pererius refutes both from Scripture's chronology: only 1,656 years from Adam to the flood (nearly 600 fewer), so the supposed creation-conjunction would precede the world by 600 years; and fewer than 2,400 years from flood to Christ, so the conjunction said to precede the flood by 200 years would actually fall 684 years after it. ↩
More chronological refutation: d'Ailly's ‘fourth great conjunction’ (942 years after the flood, 16 before Abraham) is wrong, since Scripture puts Abraham's birth 292 years after the flood—so it falls 630 years after Abraham. The ‘sixth great conjunction’ (225 years before Christ) is likewise false (resting on the bad flood-to-Christ count); on true chronology it would fall ~600 years after Christ. A final proof of d'Ailly's ignorance of chronography is coming. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘tempus’; signature K 3). ↩
Marginal gloss: "Lepidum Catonis dictum, ut refert Cicer. lib. 2 de Divinatione, in Astrologos belle competens." Pierre d'Ailly's seventh great conjunction supposedly produced the heresies, chiefly Arianism—yet Arianism arose c. A.D. 300 and died before 600. History and daily life teem with such failed predictions. Cato's famous quip (Cicero, De Div. 2.51) that he wondered one haruspex did not laugh on seeing another fits the astrologers: since we disbelieve a liar even when truthful, one true prediction should not win them credit against their countless false ones. ↩
Marginal glosses: "Nos et hos. Lector."; "Septima ratio. Astromantiam omni tempore a viris sapientibus, prudentibus, quin etiam Astrologis esse contemptam, damnatam." Objection: astrologers are sometimes truthful. Answer: yes, but rashly—who, hurling all day, never hits the mark? Like Apollo's oracles, the true ones are remembered, the false hushed up. (The causes of their apparent successes will be given at the disputation's end.) SEVENTH REASON: were astrology true, it would be the noblest, most-honored part of philosophy; yet it has in every age been despised even by philosophers and astrologers—proof it is futile. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘libro’). ↩
Socrates (Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1; via Eusebius, Praep. ev. 14.4) said knowledge of the future in God's power is not to be sought—men cannot know it, nor does God like such prying into what He hid. Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato visited the Persian Magi, Chaldean sages, and Egyptian priests, learning hidden mathematics or religion—but neglected or never used divinatory astrology. Aristotle, so subtle in celestial doctrine, never mentions this astrology in the Meteorologica, De Partibus/Generatione animalium, or Problemata; indeed his teachings overthrow it. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Sententia Aristotelis, qua Astromantiam e medio tollunt." Aristotle's anti-astrology tenets: future contingents have no determinate truth; the accidental/rare/either-way can't be grasped by science; chance and fortune escape certain knowledge; particular corruptible effects have particular corruptible proximate causes (so universal celestial causes don't suffice); heaven acts on sublunars only by motion and light; he names no star-force besides sun and moon; and celestial signs can be averted by other causes. Cicero (De Div. 2) names astrologers who rejected the art—Eudoxus, Panaetius, Archelaus, Cassander, Scylax of Halicarnassus. Avicenna (Metaphysics, last book) denies the astrologers should be believed. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘caelestia’). ↩
Avicenna concludes: astrologers grasp neither the celestial points nor the natures of inferior things, and rely on rhetorical/poetic, not demonstrative, proofs. Ptolemy himself (Tetrabiblos/‘De Iudiciis’ 1.3) denies an inviolable astral necessity; his Centiloquium, saying 1 (‘only the divinely inspired foretell particulars’) and saying 5 (the knowing man can avert star-effects) yield the proverb ‘Sapiens dominabitur astris’ (‘the wise man will rule the stars’). Porphyry (De Oraculis) confessed exact star-divination is incomprehensible even to many gods; his Life of Plotinus reports Plotinus rejected and refuted astrology (esp. in his treatise ‘Whether the Stars Do Anything,’ Enneads 2.3). ↩
Marginal glosses: "Professores divinandi futura ex astris, publicis multorum Principum decretis esse civitatibus eiectos"; "Cui generi hominum praedictiones Astrologorum arrideat et probentur, cui autem minime." Were astrology true it would aid governing the state, so kings would honor astrologers—yet the opposite: severe imperial decrees condemned it. The Chaldeans were repeatedly expelled from Rome under Diocletian, Constantine, Theodosius, Valentinian, and especially Justinian, the art judged empty and pestilent to society. Pererius adds that scarcely any truly great man ever valued it. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘dentiae’). ↩
Scarcely any truly great man (of genius, learning, civic prudence, or integrity) ever valued the Chaldeans' predictions but utterly despised them as trifles. Only the dull, credulous crowd—and certain light minds, greedy for gain and novelty, hostile to true wisdom, eager to seem to know what the greatest philosophers confess they do not—give ear to these triflers. Pererius concludes the Seventh Reason with Ambrose (Hexameron 4.4): ↩
Ambrose, Hexameron 4 (cap. 4): astrology is a spider's web—gnats and flies (the weak) stick fast, but stronger creatures break through and scatter the snares. So the strong-minded, seeing the astrologers, should say they weave a useless web, harmless to the soaring sparrow or dove who passes through by sheer swiftness of flight. ↩
Marginal glosses: "Octava ratio. Tria fundamenta Astromantiae convelluntur"; "Non esse ponendas in caelo influentias." EIGHTH REASON: the art's foundations are none or fragile. The FIRST foundation—that the stars have all the elemental qualities (Saturn cold, Mars dry, Moon humid)—is refuted by reason (all stars shine, so all must be hot; light heats but cannot of itself cool/moisten/dry; if all share one borrowed solar light, their powers cannot be so diverse) and by experience (nights are warmer at the full moon). The astrologers' answer—‘influences’ (influentiae), hidden powers besides light—is a recent invention unknown to the ancients. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘doce’; signature L). ↩
Once ‘influences’ were taught, the graver Peripatetic philosophers rejected them; someone wittily called them ‘the Asylum of Ignorance’ (Asylum ignorantiae)—the refuge of those who cannot find true natural causes. Admitting them saps philosophy: why labor for hidden causes when any effect can be ascribed to a celestial influence? Why does the magnet draw iron, or the tiny Remora stop a ship? ‘A celestial influence.’ No problem is so deep that an unlearned astrologer cannot dispatch it with one word: ‘influences.’ ↩
Marginal gloss: "Argumentatio contra influentias." The argument against ‘influences’: if Saturn heats by light, how does it also cool by influence?—two contrary faculties in one star is absurd. By nature, where a thing has a general and a special property, the special is always nobler (as rational over sentient in man). But the astrologers reverse this: in Saturn the general faculty (illuminating + heating) and a special faculty (cooling)... Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘alteram’). ↩
The influences-argument concluded: Saturn's special faculty (cooling) would be contrary to its general one (heating by light)—but light is nobler than any other celestial quality, and two contrary natural faculties cannot coexist in a uniform body (unlike a ‘heterogeneous’ body, e.g. the human, with contrary qualities in brain and heart). So ‘influences’ should be discarded: all natural effects can be derived from two principles known by daily experience—motion and light. Likewise the zodiac figures (animal/human shapes) have no real power: they exist only in the astrologers' imagination and could as well be figured as houses or tables. ↩
Marginal glosses: "Alterum Astromantiae fundamentum"; "Quam inane sit natalitia cuiusque hominis astra observare ad divinandum." The SECOND foundation: each one's natal stars are to be observed. But this is most weak: why not rather observe conception (when one is formed and animated in the womb), which seems weightier for divining—for then the man first exists and first receives the celestial force, having been subject to the heavens for the nine months in the womb? Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘Astro’). ↩
Marginal gloss: "An aliquid primigeniae materiae hominis maneat per totam vitam." Why don't the astrologers consider the constellations befalling a man after birth—often more potent to change him than those at birth? The birth-impression must vary as the body's temperament changes (by other constellations, education, custom, ancestral laws). And perhaps nothing of one's primal birth-matter remains in old age (so great philosophers held, and Aquinas, Summa I, q. 119, a. 1, seems not to deny)—in which case the birth-influx vanishes entirely, unless one absurdly imagines it migrating from body to body or substituting a vicarious power. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Plus esse momenti in conceptu hominis quam in eius ortu. Ptolemaeus." Pererius now turns the astrologers' own master against them: Ptolemy himself (Tetrabiblos/Apotelesmata, bk 3) testifies that conception weighs more than (or at least as much as) birth: ↩
Ptolemy, Apotelesmatica (Tetrabiblos) 3.1: the natural, essential beginning of a man is conception (when the seed is admitted to the womb); birth is only a potential, accidental beginning. So whoever knows the hour of conception should follow it in judging the body and soul; for the seed, once given a quality by the surrounding air, keeps assimilating to that first disposition as it draws its kindred matter. ↩
Pererius's gloss: Ptolemy plainly makes conception the first, natural, most efficacious principle—but, knowing that exact point can scarcely be known, he added the dodge that those ignorant of the conception-hour must follow the birth-hour. Haly (Ali ibn Ridwan), in his book On Elections, likewise admits the power to decide a man's Fate lies in conception. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘minis’). ↩
Conclusion of the Haly citation: the power to decide a man's Fate lies in conception, but since astrologers cannot know it, they fall back on the birth-hour. And when pressed by the twins-argument (same birth, different outcomes), they answer that the difference came from a difference of conception—conveniently appealing to a conception they admit they cannot determine. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Tarutius mathematicus, qui omnia quae urbi Romae contigerunt, ex constellatione sub qua ea urbs a Romulo condita est, ad vim Astrorum referebat." The astrologers' audacity extends to predicting the fates of cities from their founding-horoscope. Tarutius the Mathematician cast Rome's nativity at Varro's request (Plutarch, Romulus 12); Cicero (De Div. 2) tells the story: ↩
Cicero, De Divinatione 2.98: L. Tarutius Firmanus, learned in Chaldean astrology, cast a horoscope for Rome itself—dating its founding to the Parilia (feast of Pales) and saying it was ‘born with the Moon in the yoke,’ and chanting its fates. Cicero's scorn: even if a child's first breath under a given sky mattered, what force could the stars have on the brick and mortar of a city? ↩
Marginal gloss: "Cur observatio astrologica non valeat aeque in stirpibus et animalibus quam in hominibus?" The animals-and-plants argument: does astrology work for plants and animals too? If not, the astrologers betray their art's emptiness—for plants depend even more than man on the heavens, and fewer things befall them, so divining about them should be easier. If yes, let them observe the sky when a plum/cherry/pear tree is planted or wheat sown, and predict the exact crop—how many plums, ears, and grains. Since they cannot, they must admit they cannot foresee men's futures either. ↩
Marginal gloss: "Tertium fundamentum Astromantiae." The THIRD foundation: that the art is confirmed by the most certain experiments of countless ages and constant observations, the discipline having come from the Egyptians and Babylonians (Chaldeans). Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘morta’; signature L 3). ↩
Marginal gloss: "De vetustate Astrologiae apud Aegyptios et Chaldaeos." Refuting the Third Foundation (immemorial observations). The astrologers claim vast antiquity—Aristotle holds the Egyptians the oldest and first mathematicians, and they boast of 470,000 years of Chaldean infant-testing. But from creation to now is not yet 6,000 years; from the Chaldean nation's origin (after Babel) not yet 4,000. Pico (Disputationes 12.2) cites Hipparchus and Ptolemy: the oldest observations are those under Nebuchadnezzar, and from his reign to the present year—A.D. 1588 (which dates Pererius's composition)—only 2,232 years. Augustine (City of God 18.40): ↩
Augustine, City of God 18.40: the Egyptian boast of 100,000 years of star-knowledge is absurd—in what books was it recorded, when the Egyptians learned letters (from Isis) less than 2,000 years before? (citing Varro). ↩
Pererius closes the disputation of the eight reasons (Caput Tertium) that judicial astrology is contrary to true philosophy. ↩