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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Three — Paradise

QUESTION III. Why it was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil

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QUESTION III. Why it was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.1

QUAESTIO III. Cur appellata sit arbor scientiae boni et mali.

DE CAUSA huius appellationis quatuor esse animadverto auctorum sententias. Prima sententia est Hebraeorum, quibus solenne est in exponendis Sacris litteris ridicule nugari frequentesque miscere fabulas. Similiter igitur hoc loco fingunt Adamum et Evam creatos esse simplicissimos, sine usu rationis, infantium similes...
Concerning the cause of this name, I observe that there are four opinions of authors. The first opinion is that of the Hebrews, for whom it is customary, in expounding the Sacred writings, to trifle ridiculously and frequently to mix in fables. So likewise in this place they imagine that Adam and Eve were created most simple, without the use of reason, like infants...2
...[infantium] similes. Quoniam autem arbor illa vim habebat accelerandi usum rationis et liberi arbitrii, propterea inquiunt appellatam fuisse Arborem scientiae boni et mali: nam secundum phrasim Scripturae, scire bonum et malum idem sonat atque usum habere rationis. Verum, infulsum est hoc Hebraeorum commentum: etenim Adamus et Eva facti sunt ut corpore robusto aetateque perfecta et ad generandum idonea (quippe dictum est eis, Crescite et multiplicamini), ita facti sunt perfecta ratione et iudicio, menteque ad discernendum bonum et malum et quidvis intelligendum matura. Quid enim non modo ad usum rationis, sed etiam ad rerum omnium scientiam ei potuit abesse, qui cunctis animantibus aptissima et convenientissima nomina imposuit? cum quo Deus familiares habuit sermones; cui legem sanxit, capitali poena violanti eam constituta; quem divino prophetiae spiritu implevit; quo afflatus Adam praeclarum illud ac nobile edidit vaticinium, Hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, et caro de carne mea.
...like infants. But since that tree had the power of accelerating the use of reason and of free will, therefore, they say, it was called the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil: for according to the phrasing of Scripture, to know good and evil sounds the same as to have the use of reason. But this Hebrew fabrication is insipid: for as Adam and Eve were made with a robust body, and a perfect age, and fit for generating (since it was said to them, Increase and multiply), so they were made with perfect reason and judgment, and a mind mature for discerning good and evil and for understanding anything whatever. For what could be lacking to him—not only for the use of reason, but even for the knowledge of all things—who imposed on all the animals the most apt and most fitting names? with whom God held familiar conversations; on whom He enacted a law, with a capital penalty appointed for violating it; whom He filled with the divine spirit of prophecy; inspired by which Adam uttered that splendid and noble prophecy, This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh.3
ALTERA opinio est Iosephi in primo libro Antiquitatum aientis ideo sic appellatam esse illam arborem, quod eius fructus, si ederetur ab homine, vim haberet augendi acumen ingenii et solertiam ac prudentiam cogitandi, multumque conferret ad percipiendam scientiam. Iosephum ita refellit Nicolaus de Lyra: fructum eius arboris fuisse corporeum, non igitur vim ullam habere potuisse in mentem et ingenium hominis, quod est incorporeum et immateriale. Agens namque corporeum non potest agere nisi per actionem corporalem et materialem, quae non in alio subiecto nisi corporeo recipi potest. Quinetiam certum est Philosophis decretum, eorum quae inter se agunt et patiuntur communem debere esse materiam.
The second opinion is that of Josephus, in the first book of the Antiquities, saying that the tree was so named because its fruit, if it were eaten by man, would have the power of increasing the sharpness of the wit and the cleverness and prudence of thinking, and would contribute much to acquiring knowledge. Nicholas of Lyra refutes Josephus thus: that the fruit of that tree was corporeal, and therefore could have no power over the mind and wit of man, which is incorporeal and immaterial. For a corporeal agent cannot act except by a corporeal and material action, which cannot be received in any subject except a corporeal one. Moreover it is a certain settled principle of the Philosophers, that of those things which act on and are acted on by one another the matter must be common.4
Firma esset haec ratio Nicolai de agente quod per se ac directe agit, non autem de eo quod agit indirecte. Manifestum enim est, vel ipsa experientia, cibis valde vel iuvari vel corrumpi spiritus animales et organa interiorum sensuum, quorum bona constitutio ad bonitatem actionum mentis mirifice confert. Sunt cibi qui valde prosunt, sunt etiam qui nocent plurimum memoriae et ingenio: quemadmodum etiam nati et viventes sub caelo gravi et crasso obtusioris sunt ingenii, sub tenui autem et puro et acutioris et acrioris. Auctor est Aristoteles in septimo libro Politicorum, homines qui versantur in frigidis regionibus esse quidem corpore robustiores, sed mente tamen tardiores atque hebetiores; contra vero qui in calidis sunt regionibus esse imbecilliores viribus, ingenio tamen solertiores ac sagaciores; qui autem in molli ac temperato caelo vitam agunt, utraque re pariter excellere.
This argument of Nicholas would be firm concerning an agent which acts of itself and directly, but not concerning one which acts indirectly. For it is manifest, even by experience itself, that by foods the animal spirits and the organs of the interior senses are greatly either helped or corrupted, whose good constitution contributes wonderfully to the goodness of the mind's actions. There are foods which greatly profit, there are also those which harm very much the memory and the wit: just as also those born and living under a heavy and thick sky are of a duller wit, but under a thin and pure one, of a sharper and keener one. Aristotle is the authority, in the seventh book of the Politics, that men who dwell in cold regions are indeed more robust in body, but nevertheless slower and more sluggish in mind; on the contrary, that those who are in hot regions are weaker in their powers, but yet cleverer and more sagacious in wit; but that those who lead their life in a mild and temperate climate excel equally in both.5
Denique, Isaias capite 7 de Messia loquens, Butyrum, inquit, et mel comedet, ut sciat reprobare malum et eligere bonum. Salomon item in libro Ecclesiastae capite secundo ait cogitasse se carnem suam abstrahere a vino, quo liberius sapientiae studere ac vacare posset. Nihil igitur prohibet quin esus illius ligni ad boni[tatem]...
Finally, Isaiah in chapter 7, speaking of the Messiah, says: He shall eat butter and honey, that he may know to refuse the evil and choose the good. Solomon likewise, in the book of Ecclesiastes, chapter two, says that he thought to withdraw his flesh from wine, that he might more freely study and have leisure for wisdom. Nothing, therefore, prevents that the eating of that tree could profit man to the good[ness and excellence of wit]...6
...[ad boni]tatem et praestantiam ingenii potuerit homini proficere. QUOCIRCA Iosephus aliter confutandus est: nempe, si fructus illius arboris ad ingenii acumen et perceptionem scientiae profuisset, nunquam Deus eius usum homini interdixisset. Non enim bonis nostris invidet, nec quae ad perfectionem hominis pertinent (praesertim spiritualem et intellectualem) prohibere aut impedire vult. Et vero, si talis fuisset fructus illius arboris, fuisset profecto lex Dei eam interdicens homini gravissima ac durissima: siquidem nihil est quod natura duce ardentius expetant homines, et ad quod maiori naturae impetu rapiantur, quam ad consecutionem et perceptionem scientiae. Ad hoc, si ita res haberet, promissum serpentis datum Evae fuisset verum: illud dico promissum, In quocunque die comederitis ex eo, eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum: quod tamen promissum mendax fuisse ac fallax sententia est omnium Patrum. Quod si eiusmodi effectum illius arboris fuissent primi homines in seipsis experti, non tantopere doluissent propter esum eius, scilicet tanto ingenii bono aucti et locupletati.
...could profit man to the goodness and excellence of wit. Wherefore Josephus must be refuted otherwise: namely, if the fruit of that tree had profited the sharpness of the wit and the perception of knowledge, God would never have forbidden the use of it to man. For He does not envy our goods, nor wish to forbid or hinder the things which pertain to the perfection of man (especially the spiritual and intellectual). And indeed, if the fruit of that tree had been such, the law of God forbidding it would surely have been most grievous and most hard for man: since there is nothing which, by the leading of nature, men more ardently desire, and to which they are carried by a greater impulse of nature, than the attainment and perception of knowledge. To this, if the matter were so, the promise of the serpent given to Eve would have been true: I mean that promise, In whatever day you eat of it, you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil: which promise, however, all the Fathers hold to have been lying and deceptive. And if the first men had experienced in themselves such an effect of that tree, they would not have grieved so much over the eating of it—namely, being increased and enriched with so great a good of wit.7
TERTIA sententia est fere Theologorum communis et per omnes scholas pervagata: sic dictam esse illam arborem ab eventu, et ex eo quod esum ipsius consecutum est. Accidit enim homini ut tunc experiendo cognosceret discrimen inter bonum quo ante peccatum fruebatur et malum in quod peccando incurrit; ideoque scientiam haberet boni et mali, videlicet (ut vocant Theologi) experimentalem. Nam licet antea speculative nosset Adam discrimen boni et mali, post peccatum tamen practice et per experientiam id magis cognovit. Sicut medicus scientia medicinae cognitam habet differentiam sanitatis et aegritudinis; eam tamen ipse, amissa sanitate et in morbum delapsus, nova quadam ratione (scilicet per experientiam) melius agnoscit. Haec est sententia Augustini in lib. 14 de Civitate Dei cap. 17 et lib. 8 de Genesi ad litteram cap. 6 et 15, eademque est Magistri sententiarum et Theologorum scholasticorum in 2 lib. sentent. dist. 17.
The third opinion is almost the common one of the Theologians, and spread abroad through all the schools: that that tree was so named from the event, and from that which followed its eating. For it befell man that he then, by experiencing, knew the difference between the good which he enjoyed before sin, and the evil into which he ran by sinning; and therefore he had a knowledge of good and evil—namely (as the Theologians call it) experimental. For although Adam knew the difference of good and evil before, speculatively, yet after sin he knew it more practically and by experience. Just as a physician, by the science of medicine, has known the difference of health and sickness; yet he himself, having lost his health and fallen into illness, recognizes it better by a certain new way—namely, by experience. This is the opinion of Augustine in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 17, and book 8 On Genesis according to the letter, chapters 6 and 15; and the same is the opinion of the Master of the Sentences and of the scholastic Theologians, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 17.8
Quemadmodum igitur ab eventu appellatus est Puteus iurgii seu calumniae, et Puteus iuramenti, et Tumulus testis seu Acervus testimonii, Castra quoque Dei, et Domus Dei, ut videre est in libro Geneseos: sic ab eventu Arbor scientiae boni et mali appellata est. Alii scientiam experimentalem referunt non ad Adamum sed ad Deum, quem inquiunt imposuisse Adamo illud praeceptum ut experiretur et probaret Adamum de bono et malo, id est de obedientia et inobedientia: utrum scilicet futurus esset obediens (quod ei magno bono fuisset) an inobediens (quod malorum omnium futurum ei erat seminarium).
As, therefore, from the event there was named the Well of strife or calumny, and the Well of the oath, and the Mound of the witness or Heap of testimony, the Camp of God also, and the House of God, as may be seen in the book of Genesis: so from the event the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil was named. Others refer the experimental knowledge not to Adam but to God, who, they say, imposed on Adam that precept in order to test and prove Adam concerning good and evil, that is, concerning obedience and disobedience: namely, whether he would be obedient (which would have been a great good for him) or disobedient (which was to be the seedbed of all evils for him).9
SED non fuisse illam arborem sic appellatam ab eventu, et ab eo quod esum ipsius consecutum est, non desunt argumenta quibus probari queat. Primum enim, si ex eventis sumenda erat appellatio, simili ratione nominari potuisset Arbor apertionis oculorum, vel cognitionis propriae nuditatis, vel confectionis subligaculorum: haec enim omnia...
But that that tree was not so named from the event, and from that which followed its eating, there are not lacking arguments by which it can be proved. For first, if the name was to be taken from events, by a like reasoning it could have been named the Tree of the opening of the eyes, or of the knowledge of one's own nakedness, or of the making of aprons: for all these things...10
...[vel confectionis subligaculorum: haec enim] omnia similiter, ut experimentalis scientia boni et mali, esum illius arboris sunt consecuta. Narrat enim Scriptura, cum primum Adam et Eva ex ea arbore comederunt, apertos fuisse illis oculos, et se nudos esse magno cum pudore cognovisse, et ad operiendam nuditatem fecisse sibi subligacula. Deinde, quo serpens Evam alliceret ad esum illius arboris, promisit fore ut, si ex ea comederent, efficerentur tanquam dii scientes bonum et malum. Nec serpens significabat scientiam boni et mali experimentalem: cum enim ea mala sit et fugienda, non eam instar maximi boni maximeque expetendi promisisset. Consensu etiam Patrum liquet serpentem in illo suo promisso esse mentitum: non esset autem mentitus, si de scientia boni et mali per experientiam locutus esset; eam namque scientiam re vera primi homines post peccatum satis superque adepti sunt; nec talis scientia congruit ipsis diis, quorum similes eos fore promisit. Ad extremum, cum Adam eiiciendus erat ex Paradiso, dictum est de ipso per ironiam (vel ab aliquo Angelo cum aliis Angelis loquente, vel ab una aliqua persona Divina cum aliis duabus sermonem habente), Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis factus est, sciens bonum et malum. Manifestum est autem in hac sententia per scientiam boni et mali non posse intelligi scientiam experimentalem: haec enim, cum sit mala nec sine detrimento contingat ipsam habenti, non potest convenire in Angelos bonos, nedum in Divinas personas.
...[or of the making of aprons: for] all these things likewise, just as the experimental knowledge of good and evil, followed the eating of that tree. For Scripture relates that, as soon as Adam and Eve ate of that tree, their eyes were opened, and they knew with great shame that they were naked, and made themselves aprons to cover their nakedness. Then, in order that the serpent might allure Eve to the eating of that tree, he promised that, if they ate of it, they would be made like gods, knowing good and evil. Nor did the serpent signify the experimental knowledge of good and evil: for since that is evil and to be fled, he would not have promised it as the greatest good and most to be desired. By the consensus of the Fathers too it is clear that the serpent lied in that promise of his; but he would not have lied, if he had spoken of the knowledge of good and evil through experience—for that knowledge the first men in truth acquired more than enough after sin; nor does such knowledge befit those gods, whose likes he promised they would be. Lastly, when Adam was to be cast out of Paradise, it was said of him by irony (whether by some Angel speaking with the other Angels, or by some one Divine Person holding discourse with the other two), Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil. But it is manifest that in this sentence, by the knowledge of good and evil, the experimental knowledge cannot be understood: for this, since it is an evil and does not befall its possessor without detriment, cannot be fitting in the good Angels, much less in the Divine Persons.11
QUARTA sententia, cui equidem plus ceteris assentior, est Ruperti in libro secundo de Trinitate et operibus eius cap. 27, et Tostati super caput decimumtertium libri Geneseos quaestione centesima quinquagesimaquarta et quinquagesimaquinta: affirmantium nomen illud Scientiae boni et mali inditum fuisse ei arbori propter mendacia verba et fallacia promissa serpentis, qui primos illos homines ad edendum ex ea arbore pellexit et impulit mendacissimis verbis et fallacissimis promissis, pollicitus eos fore deorum similes scientes bonum et malum. Hoc lignum, inquit Rupertus, ironice appellatum est scientiae boni et mali, ut ipso nomine suo monumentum legentibus repraesentet diabolici mendacii. Ex eo igitur quod illo falso promisso decepisset primos homines, impositum est ei arbori nomen scientiae boni et mali, vel ab ipso Adamo vel a Mose: ac licet in historia Mosis ante congressum serpentis cum Eva bis ea arbor appelletur eo nomine (videlicet scientiae boni et mali), id facit tamen scriptor historiae Moses per anticipationem; revera enim anteà non habuerat id nominis, sed cum Deus dixit Adae ne ex ea arbore comederet, vel alio nomine eam appellavit, vel quasi digito speciem et locum eius demonstrando eam indicavit.
The fourth opinion, to which for my part I assent more than to the others, is that of Rupert, in the second book On the Trinity and its Works, chapter 27, and of Tostatus, on the thirteenth chapter of the book of Genesis, question one hundred fifty-fourth and fifty-fifth: who affirm that that name, Of the knowledge of good and evil, was put upon that tree on account of the lying words and deceptive promises of the serpent, who lured and impelled those first men to eat of that tree by most lying words and most deceptive promises, promising that they would be like gods, knowing good and evil. This tree, says Rupert, was ironically called of the knowledge of good and evil, that by its very name it might present to readers a monument of the diabolical lie. From the fact, therefore, that he had deceived the first men by that false promise, the name of the knowledge of good and evil was imposed on that tree, either by Adam himself or by Moses: and although in Moses's narrative, before the encounter of the serpent with Eve, that tree is twice called by that name (namely, of the knowledge of good and evil), yet Moses the writer of the narrative does this by anticipation; for in truth it had not had that name before, but when God said to Adam that he should not eat of that tree, He either called it by another name, or pointed it out as with a finger, demonstrating its kind and place.12
Augustinus libro 8 de Genesi ad litteram capite 15 vult ante sermocinationem serpentis cum Eva fuisse nomen hoc ei arbori impositum a Deo: quia per illam arborem denunciavit Deus futurum ut manifestaretur bonum et malum hominis, hoc est obedientia eius aut inobedientia; vel quia Deus denunciavit Adamo (quo magis eum ab esu arboris deterreret) fore ut, si ex ea come[deret]...
Augustine, in the eighth book On Genesis according to the letter, chapter 15, holds that before the talk of the serpent with Eve this name had been imposed on that tree by God: because through that tree God announced that it would come to pass that the good and evil of man—that is, his obedience or disobedience—should be made manifest; or because God announced to Adam (the more to deter him from the eating of the tree) that it would come to pass that, if he ate of it...13
...[si ex ea] comederet, differentiam boni et mali experientia cognosceret; vel denique quia cogniturus erat discrimen boni et mali, tam si ex ea arbore comederet quam si ab esu eius abstineret, ratione tamen longe diversa. Sed haec plenius apud Augustinum in supradicto loco legi et considerari possunt.
...if he ate of it, he would know the difference of good and evil by experience; or finally because he was going to know the distinction of good and evil, both if he ate of that tree and if he abstained from the eating of it, but by a far different reasoning. But these things can be read and considered more fully in Augustine, in the aforesaid place.14

Translator’s notes

  1. The third question on the tree of knowledge: why it bears the name "of the knowledge of good and evil." Pererius will survey four opinions. ↩
  2. Marginal gloss: "Figmentum Hebraeorum." Pererius notes **four opinions** on the name. The **FIRST** is the Hebrews' (who, he says, customarily trifle absurdly and mix fables into their exegesis): here they imagine Adam and Eve were created utterly simple, without use of reason, like infants... Continues onto next page (catchword "similes"). ↩
  3. The Hebrew fable, continued and refuted: they say the tree had power to *accelerate* the use of reason and free will, so it was called the tree of knowledge—"to know good and evil" (Scripture's idiom) meaning "to have the use of reason." Pererius: an *insipid* fiction. Adam and Eve were made with mature bodies, perfect age, fit to generate ("Increase and multiply"), and likewise with perfect reason, judgment, and a mind to discern good and evil. What could be lacking—of reason or of universal knowledge—to him who named all the animals, conversed familiarly with God, received a law under capital penalty, was filled with the prophetic spirit, and uttered "This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh" (Gen 2:23)? ↩
  4. Marginal gloss: "Iosephi opinio." The **SECOND** opinion (Josephus, Antiquities bk. 1): it was so named because its fruit, eaten, would sharpen the wit and aid the acquiring of knowledge. **Nicholas of Lyra** refutes him: the fruit was corporeal, so could have no power over man's mind and wit, which are incorporeal—for a corporeal agent acts only by corporeal action received in a corporeal subject, and (a settled philosophical principle) agent and patient must share a common matter. ↩
  5. Marginal gloss: "Pro varietate alimenti et caeli, variari etiam hominum ingenia et mores." Pererius nuances Lyra: his argument holds for an agent acting *directly*, not *indirectly*. Experience shows food greatly helps or harms the animal spirits and inner-sense organs, whose good state much aids the mind; some foods help, others harm memory and wit—as those under a heavy sky are duller, under a pure one sharper. **Aristotle** (Politics bk. 7): cold-region men are stronger in body but slower in mind; hot-region men weaker but cleverer; those in a temperate climate excel in both. ↩
  6. Scriptural support that food can affect mind: Isaiah 7 (of the Messiah) "He shall eat butter and honey, that he may know to refuse evil and choose good"; and Solomon (Ecclesiastes 2) thought to withdraw his flesh from wine, to study wisdom more freely. So nothing prevents that eating the tree could have profited man's wit. Continues onto next page (catchword "boni"). ↩
  7. Marginal gloss: "Refellitur Iosephi sententia." Pererius refutes Josephus differently: had the fruit profited the wit and knowledge, God would never have forbidden it—He does not envy our goods nor forbid what perfects man (especially intellectually); and such a prohibition would have been a most grievous law, since men most ardently desire knowledge above all. Besides, then the serpent's promise ("you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," Gen 3:5) would have been *true*—which all the Fathers hold was lying. And had the first parents felt such an enriching of wit, they would not have grieved so over eating it. ↩
  8. Marginal gloss: "Cur dicta sit arbor Scientiae boni et mali secundum communem opinionem." The **THIRD** opinion (almost the common one, spread through all the schools): the tree was named **from the event**, from what followed its eating. Man then knew *by experience* the difference between the good he had before sin and the evil he incurred by sinning—an *experimental* knowledge of good and evil (theologians' term). Adam knew the difference *speculatively* before, but after sin knew it more *practically, by experience*—as a physician knows health and sickness by his art, but knows them better once he himself falls ill. So **Augustine** (City of God 14.17; de Genesi ad litteram 8.6 & 15), **Peter Lombard the Master**, and the scholastics (Sentences 2 d.17). ↩
  9. Marginal Scripture refs: "a Genes. 26; b Infra 46; c Genes. 31; d Infra 32; e Supra 28." The analogy: as Genesis names places *from the event*—the Well of Strife/Calumny (Gen 26, Esek/Sitnah), the Well of the Oath (Beersheba, Gen 46:1), the Mound of the Witness / Heap of Testimony (Gen 31, Galeed/Jegar-sahadutha), the Camp of God (Mahanaim, Gen 32), the House of God (Bethel, Gen 28)—so the tree was named from the event "of the knowledge of good and evil." **Others** refer the experimental knowledge not to Adam but to *God*, who imposed the precept to test Adam concerning good and evil (obedience or disobedience)—whether he would obey (a great good) or disobey (the seedbed of all evils). ↩
  10. Marginal gloss: "Reijcitur praedicta opinio." **Pererius begins rejecting the common ("from the event") view.** First argument: if the name were taken from events, it could just as well have been called the Tree of the *opening of the eyes*, or of the *knowledge of one's nakedness*, or of the *making of aprons*—for all these also followed the eating. Breaks mid-sentence (catchword "omnia"; signature T). Resume PDF 371 with "...omnia..." continuing the rejection. ↩
  11. Continuation of Pererius's rejection of the common ("from the event") view. **1st argument** (from p.329): by that logic the tree could equally be named the Tree of the opening of the eyes, of the knowledge of nakedness, or of the making of aprons—all of which followed too. Further: the serpent did NOT mean *experimental* knowledge in "you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil" (Gen 3:5)—that knowledge is an evil to flee, not the supreme good he promised. The Fathers agree the serpent *lied*; but he wouldn't have lied had he meant experimental knowledge (which the first parents really did gain), nor does it befit "gods." And "Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil" (Gen 3:22)—spoken ironically by an Angel or a Divine Person—cannot mean *experimental* knowledge, which (an evil, harmful to its holder) cannot apply to good Angels, much less the Divine Persons. ↩
  12. Marginal glosses: "Probabilior ratio, cur fuerit dicta arbor scientiae boni et mali." / "Rupertus. Tostatus." The **FOURTH** opinion, which **Pererius prefers**: Rupert (de Trinitate et operibus eius 2.27) and Tostatus (Gen 13 qq.154–155)—the name was given to the tree because of the serpent's *lying words and deceptive promises* (he lured the first parents by promising they would be like gods, knowing good and evil). **Rupert:** "This tree was ironically called 'of the knowledge of good and evil,' that by its very name it might present to readers a *monument of the diabolical lie.*" So the name came from the serpent's deceiving them by that false promise—imposed by Adam or by Moses; and though Moses's text names it so twice *before* the serpent's encounter with Eve, he does this *by anticipation*: it had no such name before, and when God forbade it to Adam He called it by another name or pointed it out "as with a finger." ↩
  13. Marginal gloss: "Augustinus." Augustine's variant (de Genesi ad litteram 8.15): the name was imposed by God *before* the serpent's talk with Eve—because through that tree God announced that man's good and evil (his obedience or disobedience) would be made manifest; or because God warned Adam (to deter him from eating) that, if he ate of it... Continues onto next page (catchword "come"). ↩
  14. Conclusion of Augustine's variant (de Genesi ad litteram 8.15): God named the tree because man would know good and evil by experience if he ate; or because he would know the distinction *whether* he ate or abstained, but in far different ways. (Fuller in Augustine's text.) This closes Question III. ↩