LatineEnglish
QUESTION II. Whether the image of God is in the World in a more perfect manner than in man.1
QUAESTIO II. Utrum in Mundo, perfectiori modo, sit imago Dei quàm in homine.
ALTERA quaestio quae hoc loco tractari potest illa est: Utrum Mundus perfectiori ratione habeat in se imaginem Dei quàm homo, sicut existimavit Philo in exordio eius libri quem de Opificio sex dierum edidit. Ad hanc quaestionem B. Thomas in 1. part. q. 93. artic. 3. hoc modo respondet: Divinam imaginem dupliciter posse considerari. Aut secundum extensionem et diffusionem, qua ratione Mundus divinae bonitatis imaginem magis quàm homo repraesentat, quòd ambitu suo complectatur omnem illam rerum creatarum multitudinem, de qua dictum est à Mose, Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Aut secundùm intensionem et perfectionis collectionem: quo quidem modo magis divinae maiestatis imaginem refert homo quàm mundus, quòd divinae felicitatis capax sit homo, et quòd in eo, tanquam in brevi compendio et in parvo quodam mundo, omnia maioris mundi miracula inclusa contentáque cernantur.
Another question which can be treated in this place is this: Whether the World has in itself the image of God in a more perfect way than man, as Philo thought at the opening of the book he published On the Making of the Six Days. To this question the blessed Thomas, in the first part, q. 93, art. 3, responds in this manner: that the divine image can be considered in two ways. Either according to extension and diffusion, in which respect the World represents the image of the divine goodness more than man, because it embraces in its compass that whole multitude of created things, of which Moses said, God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. Or according to intension and the gathering-together of perfection: in which way man bears the image of the divine majesty more than the world, because man is capable of divine happiness, and because in him, as in a brief epitome and in a kind of little world, all the marvels of the greater world are seen enclosed and contained.2
RESPONDERI etiam potest, vel mundi vocabulo comprehendi hominem et Angelum, vel non comprehendi. Si dixeris non comprehendi, dicam ego mundum non habere in se imaginem Dei: siquidem, remoto Angelo et homine, non remanet in mundo natura aliqua intelligens, in qua tamen sola (ut diximus) propria imaginis ratio fundatur ac nititur. Sin autem dixeris vocabulo mundi etiam hominem et Angelum comprehendi, sanè inepta erit comparatio: non enim rectè totum cum parte aliqua sua comparatur. Et tunc quidem, si licet extensivè et secundùm aliquam suam partem mundus illustriorem habeat in se Dei imaginem quàm homo, eo tamen nomine vincitur ab homine, quòd mundus non est una aliqua natura sicut est homo, sed est (ut loquuntur Scholastici Philosophi et Theologi) aggregatum quoddam ex multis diversísque naturis. Quòd si vera esset opinio Stoicorum et Platonicorum, affirmantium mundum esse unum quoddam animal, cuius corpus sit ex elementis globísque caelestibus coagmen-
It can also be answered that by the word 'world' either man and Angel are included, or they are not. If you say they are not included, I shall say that the world does not have in itself the image of God: since, with Angel and man removed, there remains in the world no intelligent nature, in which alone (as we said) the proper nature of the image is founded and rests. But if you say that by the word 'world' man and Angel too are included, the comparison will indeed be inept: for a whole is not rightly compared with some part of itself. And then, even if by extension and according to some part of itself the world should have in itself a more illustrious image of God than man, yet on this score it is surpassed by man, because the world is not some one nature, as man is, but is (as the Scholastic Philosophers and Theologians say) a kind of aggregate of many and diverse natures. But if the opinion of the Stoics and Platonists were true, who affirm that the world is a certain single living being, whose body is composed of the elements and the heavenly globes joined to-3
[coagmen]tatum, animus vero sit à quo totus mundus vivificatur, movetur ac regitur, quem mundi animam appellavere Platonici: si haec, inquam, opinio vera esset (quam esse tamen falsam suprà libro secundo ostendimus), nequaquam à veritate Philo aberrasset.
[joined to]gether, while the soul is that by which the whole world is vivified, moved, and governed—which the Platonists called the soul of the world: if this opinion, I say, were true (which, however, we showed above in the second book to be false), Philo would by no means have erred from the truth.4
Translator’s notes
- Second question of the disputation, set centered beneath a rule. ↩
- Margin: 'Philonis sententia.' Philo, De opificio mundi (the world as the more perfect image); Aquinas, ST I q.93 a.3 (image by extension vs. by intension). 'Vidit Deus cuncta...valde bona' = Gen 1:31. The microcosm motif again. ↩
- Margin: 'Opinio Stoicorum et Platonicorum de mundo.' Pererius's twofold reply (does 'world' include man/angel?). Page breaks at 'coagmen-' (coagmentatum). ↩
- Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 379.' Conclusion of Quaestio II (the world-soul of the Stoics/Platonists, refuted in Pererius's book 2). A rule closes the question. ↩