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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Four — the creation of the first human beings

QUESTION VIII. Whether the things that lack reason bear the image of God, or can be said to have been made to the image of God

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QUESTION VIII. Whether the things that lack reason bear the image of God, or can be said to have been made to the image of God.1

QUAESTIO VIII. An quae ratione carent gerant imaginem Dei, aut dici queant ad imaginem Dei esse facta.

RESPONDENDUM est negando rem ullam praeter Angelum et hominem, si propriè loqui velimus, esse ad imaginem Dei: non enim quaelibet similitudo, etiam si expressa sit ex alio, sufficit ad rationem imaginis constituendam. Si enim similitudo ea sit secundùm genus tantùm, aut secundùm accidens aliquod commune, non constituet ea similitudo rationem imaginis: non enim vermis ex homine natus, et secundùm genericam naturam animalis ei similis, dicetur imago hominis; nec si quid fiat album ad similitudinem alterius quod sit album, propterea dici poterit esse imago illius, vel ad illius imaginem. Necesse igitur est, quò verè dicatur aliquid esse imago alterius, ut gerat in se illius similitudinem ex ipso expressam: similitudinem dico vel secundùm speciem, quemadmodum imago regis est in filio eius, vel certè secundùm aliquod accidens proprium illius speciei, praesertim verò secundùm figuram, quemadmodum imago regis dicitur esse vel in tabula depicta, vel in argento, vel alia quavis materia expressa. Similitudo autem speciei spectari debet secundùm ultimum gradum et differentiam rei. Res igitur rationis et intelligentiae expertes assimilari quidem Deo possunt secundum existentiam, vitam, et infimum cognoscendi modum, qui est per sensus: supremum autem gradum mentis et intelligentiae nequaquam attingunt, in quo tamen gradu, ut suprà dictum est, propriè consistit ratio similitudinis quae est inter Deum atque hominem.
The answer is to be made by denying that anything, except the Angel and man, is (if we wish to speak properly) 'to the image of God': for not any likeness whatever, even if it be derived from another, suffices to constitute the nature of an image. For if that likeness be only according to genus, or according to some common accident, that likeness will not constitute the nature of an image: for a worm born from a man, and like to him according to the generic nature of an animal, will not be called the image of a man; nor, if something be made white to match another thing that is white, can it on that account be said to be the image of it, or 'to its image.' It is necessary, therefore, that, for something to be truly said to be the image of another, it should bear in itself a likeness of that other expressed from it—a likeness, I say, either according to species (as the image of a king is in his son), or at least according to some accident proper to that species, but especially according to figure (as the image of a king is said to be either painted in a picture, or expressed in silver, or in any other material). And the likeness of species must be regarded according to the ultimate grade and differentia of the thing. Things, therefore, devoid of reason and intelligence can indeed be assimilated to God according to existence, life, and the lowest mode of knowing, which is through the senses; but the supreme grade of mind and intelligence they by no means attain—in which grade, however (as was said above), properly consists the nature of the likeness which is between God and man.2
EX QUO licet intelligere quae vim intelligendi non habent, in iis non esse imaginem Dei: ea tamen dicuntur habere vestigium Dei, sic enim in scholis loquuntur Theologi. Namque hoc discriminis putant illi esse inter imaginem et vestigium, quod imago repraesentat rem secundùm similitudinem speciei, vestigium autem repraesentat per modum effectus, qui sic refert causam suam ut eius tamen similitudinem speciei minimè assequatur. Impressiones enim quae ex motu animalium relinquuntur in arena vel pulvere vestigia eorum appellantur; et vastitas ac desolatio alicuius regionis vestigium est hostilis exercitus qui eam devastavit. Homo igitur, quia non solùm est, vivit et sentit, sed etiam, ut Deus, intelligit et sapit, gradum divinae naturae attingens, propterea imago Dei iure appellatur. Animalia verò, cunctaeque res praeter hominem corporatae, quia vim non habent intelligendi, non gerunt imaginem Dei, sed cernitur in eis quasi vestigium quoddam divinitatis: earum enim dispositionem, determinationem, et mirabilem omnium inter se consocia-
From which it may be understood that in the things that have not the power of understanding there is not the image of God; yet they are said to have the vestige of God, for so the Theologians speak in the schools. For they think this is the difference between image and vestige: that the image represents a thing according to the likeness of species, but the vestige represents by way of effect, which so refers to its cause that it nevertheless by no means attains a likeness of its species. For the imprints left in the sand or dust by the movement of animals are called their vestiges; and the devastation and desolation of some region is the vestige of the hostile army that ravaged it. Man, therefore, because he not only exists, lives, and feels, but also, like God, understands and is wise, reaching the grade of the divine nature, is on that account rightly called the image of God. But the animals, and all corporeal things except man, because they have not the power of understanding, do not bear the image of God, but there is discerned in them a kind of vestige of divinity: for their arrangement, determination, and the wonderful associa-3
[consocia]tionem contemplantibus manifestum fit, eas divina ratione, intelligentia, et sapientia ab initio esse constitutas, et perpetuò contineri atque gubernari. Mentem enim, eámque sapientissimam, fuisse necesse est, quae tot tantásque et inter se tam diversas res (è quibus hic mundus mirabiliter coagmentatus existit) in pondere et numero et mensura condiderit, et admirabili quodam foedere, velut providentiae suae fraeno astrictas tenens, suo arbitrio regat atque moderetur.
[the wonderful associa]tion of all things among themselves becomes manifest to those who contemplate it: namely, that they were established from the beginning by divine reason, intelligence, and wisdom, and are perpetually contained and governed. For there must have been a Mind, and that a most wise one, which founded so many and so great things, and things so diverse among themselves (out of which this world stands wonderfully compacted), in weight and number and measure, and which, holding them bound by a certain admirable covenant, as by the bridle of its providence, rules and moderates them at its own will.4

Translator’s notes

  1. Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 386.' Eighth question of the disputation, set centered beneath a rule. ↩
  2. Margin: 'Quid constituat veram rationem imaginis.' The criterion of a true image: a likeness of species (or proper accident, esp. figure), regarded by the ultimate differentia. ↩
  3. Margin: 'Quid sit vestigium Dei.' The scholastic image/vestige distinction (image = likeness of species; vestige = the trace of an effect): animal tracks, an army's devastation. Page breaks at 'consocia-' (consociationem). ↩
  4. Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 387.' Conclusion of Quaestio VIII (the world's order as the vestige of divine wisdom; 'in pondere et numero et mensura' = Wisdom 11:21). A rule closes the question. ↩