A DISPUTATION ON THE DOMINION of man over the animals, before and after sin — Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

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A DISPUTATION ON THE DOMINION of man over the animals, before and after sin.¹

DISPVTATIO DE IMPERIO hominis in animalia, ante et post peccatum.

VERUM enimverò, de imperio hominis in animalia subtiliùs hoc loco et accuratiùs disputandum est, illáque tractanda quaestio: Quale fuerit hoc imperium hominis in statu innocentiae ante peccatum, et quale post peccatum in eo remanserit. Sed ante omnia illa praenotanda est dominij distinctio, in ius seu potestatem dominij, atque in eius usum seu executionem. De iure et potestate dominij hominis super animantes in statu innocentiae nullo modo dubitandum est. Hoc nempe perspicuis verbis docet Scriptura hoc loco, dicens, Praesit piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli; et Psalmo octavo, Gloria et honore coronasti eum, et constituisti eum super opera manuum tuarum, omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius; et in libro Ecclesiastici capite decimoseptimo, ubi describitur qualis à Deo creatus sit homo, inter alia et hoc dicitur: Dedit illi potestatem eorum quae sunt super terram, posuit timorem illius super omnem carnem, et dominatus est bestiarum et volatilium. Hoc ipsum declarare et comprobare voluit Deus, cum adduxit cunctas

But in truth, the dominion of man over the animals must here be disputed more subtly and accurately, and that question handled: What this dominion of man was in the state of innocence before sin, and what of it remained after sin. But before all things, that distinction of dominion must be noted: into the right or power of dominion, and into the use or execution of it. Concerning the right and power of man's dominion over the animals in the state of innocence, there is no doubt at all. For this Scripture teaches in clear words in this place, saying, Let him rule over the fishes of the sea and the fowls of the air; and in the eighth Psalm, Thou hast crowned him with glory and honor, and hast set him over the works of thy hands; thou hast subjected all things under his feet; and in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter seventeen, where it is described what manner of man was created by God, among other things this too is said: He gave him power over the things that are upon the earth, he put the fear of him upon all flesh, and he had dominion over beasts and fowls. This very thing God willed to declare and confirm, when he brought all²

[adduxit] cunctas animantes ad Adamum, ut is omnibus et singulis nomina imponeret: hoc actu velut possessionem Adamo tradens eius dominij quod habebat in animalia, et quasi faciens ut cunctae animantes, suum quaeque nomen ab Adamo accipientes, ei quodammodo subiectionem, obedientiam, et servitutem spóderent. Illud quoque eius rei indicium simul et argumentum est, quod Eva non horruit aspectum, congressum, et colloquium serpentis: videlicet sciebat illa omnes animantes fuisse id temporis innoxias homini, et sub eius dominatum atque servitutem esse à Deo subiectas.

[he brought] all the living things to Adam, that he might impose names upon all and each: by this act, as it were, handing over to Adam the possession of that dominion which he had over the animals, and as it were bringing it about that all the living things, each receiving its own name from Adam, should in a manner pledge to him subjection, obedience, and servitude. This too is at once an indication and an argument of the matter: that Eve did not shrink from the sight, the meeting, and the conversation of the serpent—namely, she knew that all the living things were at that time harmless to man, and were subjected by God under his dominion and servitude.³

Accedit ad id confirmandum firma et probabilis admodum ratio. Rectitudo enim ordinis naturalis, et ratio divinae providentiae, id postulat, ut quae imperfectiora sunt subiiciantur perfectioribus, et inferiora regantur per superiora. Cernimus materiam esse propter formam, et imperfectiores formas propter alias perfectiores; Elementa ipsa propter mistum, mistáque inanimata propter animalia; idémque perspicitur in ipsarum rerum usu. Namque elementa et mista cedunt in usum alimenti stirpium, stirpes nutrimento sunt animalibus, et utraque hominibus. Adiice quòd ad dominandum atque imperandum ratione et prudentia et consilio opus est: haec in brutis vel nulla sunt, vel diminuta et adumbrata tantùm; in homine est vera, expressa, et universalis prudentia. Quemadmodum igitur inter homines, ut Aristoteles tradit primo Politicorum, aequum est eos praeesse et dominari aliis qui ratione et prudentia praestant, sic inter animalia iure debuit homini principatus et imperium demandari. Atque hanc ob causam homo procreatus à natura est nudus et inermis omniúmque rerum inops, quod ad eum vestiendum, armandum, instruendum, ornandúmque, et animalia et aliae res omnes corporales à Deo factae et comparatae sint.

There is added, to confirm this, a very firm and probable reason. For the rectitude of the natural order, and the reason of divine providence, demands that the things which are more imperfect be subjected to the more perfect, and the lower be ruled by the higher. We see that matter is for the sake of form, and the more imperfect forms for the sake of other more perfect ones; the elements themselves for the sake of the compound, and inanimate compounds for the sake of animals; and the same is perceived in the use of the things themselves. For the elements and compounds go to the use of the nourishment of plants, plants are nourishment for animals, and both for men. Add that for ruling and commanding there is need of reason and prudence and counsel: these in the brutes are either nonexistent, or only diminished and shadowy; in man there is true, express, and universal prudence. As, therefore, among men, as Aristotle teaches in the first book of the Politics, it is just that those should preside and rule over others who excel in reason and prudence, so among the animals the sovereignty and command ought by right to have been committed to man. And for this cause man was brought forth by nature naked and unarmed and destitute of all things, because for clothing, arming, equipping, and adorning him both the animals and all other corporeal things were made and provided by God.⁴

HAEC autem potestas et ius dominij remansit etiam in homine post peccatum, siquidem haec homini debetur propter naturae rationalis excellentiam; huiusmodi autem naturae dignitatem non perdidit homo propter peccatum: peccatum enim non destruit bona naturalia, nec peccando amittit homo imaginem Dei in animo eius naturaliter expressam, propter quam potissimùm cunctis animalibus praeesse et dominari dicitur. Quid? quòd etiam post diluvium dixit Deus Noë et filiis eius, Terror vester ac tremor sit super cuncta animalia terrae, et super omnes volucres caeli, cum universis quae moventur super terram: omnes pisces maris manui vestrae traditi sunt. Et verò, nisi post peccatum haberet homo potestatem in animalia, non esset licita cuique homini sylvestrium animalium venatio et occisio, sicut Aristoteles affirmat in primo Politicorum: atqui iustum et licitum est eiusmodi animalia capere et occidere, et, tanquàm id quod naturaliter est suum, prout quisque vult in usus suos convertere. Ergo [post] peccatum, potestas et imperium remansit in homine.

Now this power and right of dominion remained in man even after sin, since it is owed to man on account of the excellence of his rational nature; and the dignity of such a nature man did not lose through sin: for sin does not destroy the natural goods, nor does man, by sinning, lose the image of God naturally expressed in his soul, on account of which especially he is said to preside over and rule all the animals. What of this, that even after the flood God said to Noah and his sons, Let the fear and dread of you be upon all the animals of the earth, and upon all the birds of the air, with all that move upon the earth: all the fishes of the sea are delivered into your hand? And indeed, unless man had power over the animals after sin, the hunting and killing of wild animals would not be lawful for any man, as Aristotle affirms in the first book of the Politics; but it is just and lawful to capture and kill such animals, and, as that which is naturally one's own, to convert them to one's own uses as each will. Therefore, [after] sin, power and command remained in man.⁵

SEQUITUR ut deinceps de possessione et usu imperij huius in ani-

It follows that we should next treat of the possession and use of this command over the ani-⁶

[de possessione et usu imperij huius] in animalia dicamus. Et quidem ante peccatum, et in beato statu illo Innocentiae, plenissimus erat et amplissimus huius dominationis usus, miniméque laboriosus aut difficilis: nam nec, quantum ad hominem, ullum erat impedimentum et difficultas, neque ulla in animalibus repugnantia. Hoc sensere et scriptis prodidere Patres quicunque hunc locum editis Commentariis interpretati sunt, et quicunque Theologi de hoc imperio et dominatu hominis disputarunt. Etenim docent fuisse homini animalia in statu innocentiae subiecta et obedientia, ut erat pars inferior hominis superiori parti, id est, rationi ac voluntati subiecta. Sicut igitur tunc ratio plenissimè atque omnino dominabatur sensibus et affectibus, ita dominabatur animalibus homo.

[let us speak of the possession and use of this command] over the animals. And indeed, before sin, and in that blessed state of Innocence, the use of this dominion was fullest and amplest, and the least laborious or difficult: for there was, on man's side, no impediment or difficulty, nor any resistance in the animals. This the Fathers held and have set forth in writing, all who have interpreted this passage in published Commentaries, and all the Theologians who have disputed about this command and dominion of man. For they teach that the animals were subject and obedient to man in the state of innocence, just as man's lower part was subject to the higher—that is, to reason and will. As, therefore, reason then most fully and entirely ruled the senses and the affections, so man ruled the animals.⁷

Ac nequando fortasse videretur hoc posteris incredibile, aliqua eius rei signa et argumenta dedit ante et post peccatum Deus. Cunctas enim animantes adducere ad Adamum, quid aliud fuit quàm significare eum principem et dominum esse animalium, illius esse dominari et imperare animantibus, illarum verò subiici et servire homini, eiúsque iussa capessere? Post peccatum etiam, cuiúsque speciei animalia ducta sunt ad Noë et in arcam illata, ubi non tantùm ei non fuere nocentia, sed etiam subiecta et obedientia. Eliseo et paruere ursi in ultionem puerorum qui eum contumeliosè appellaverant; et Daniel familiariter, nedum innoxiè, cum famelicis leonibus multos dies versatus est. Legimus S. Francisco et Antonio Patavino pisces, aves, atque alias quasdam animantes dicto fuisse audientes atque obedientes. Verùm hoc interfuit inter statum hominis ante peccatum et post peccatum, quòd haec animalium obedientia ante peccatum fuisset perpetua, et (ut vocant Theologi) ordinaria et sine miraculo, et erga cunctos homines; post peccatum autem extraordinaria est, nec fit sine magno miraculo, et ad breve tempus, et nisi apud quosdam viros sanctissimos.

And lest perhaps this should seem incredible to later generations, God gave some signs and proofs of it both before and after sin. For to bring all the living things to Adam—what was it but to signify that he was the prince and lord of the animals, that it was his to rule and command the living things, but theirs to be subject and to serve man, and to obey his commands? After sin also, animals of every kind were led to Noah and brought into the ark, where they were not only not harmful to him, but subject and obedient. To Elisha the bears obeyed, in vengeance on the boys who had insultingly mocked him; and Daniel dwelt familiarly, much less unharmed, with the hungry lions for many days. We read that to St. Francis and St. Anthony of Padua the fishes, birds, and certain other living things were attentive and obedient at their word. But this was the difference between man's state before sin and after sin: that this obedience of the animals, before sin, would have been perpetual, and (as the Theologians call it) ordinary and without miracle, and toward all men; but after sin it is extraordinary, and does not happen without a great miracle, and for a short time, and only among certain most holy men.⁸

CAETERUM, habet illud difficultatem: quomodo in statu innocentiae animalia humani imperij essent capacia, quomodo etiam quae ferocissima sunt homini tamen obedirent. Neque enim existimandum est fuisse tunc, ac futura fuisse, animalia ratione praedita, ut intelligerent et quid imperaret homo, et quemadmodum imperium eius et iussa exequi oporteret: non enim propter peccatum natura hominis, nedum animalium, ulla ex parte mutata est. Sed hic nodus dupliciter exolvi potest. Possumus enim existimare summa hominis solertia, prudentia et industria factum esse, aut fieri debuisse, in statu innocentiae, ut cunctae animantes imperio eius subiicerentur. Fuisset enim in homine excellens animi sagacitas et solertia, perfecta prudentia, summa industria, absolutissima naturae proprietatum et morum cuiusque animalium scientia: novisset utique homo ingenium et vim cuiusque animalis, percaluisset omnes vias rationésque quibus animalia etiam ferocissima atque saevissima mitigari, domari, et sub potestatem

But this has a difficulty: how, in the state of innocence, the animals were capable of human command, and how even those which are fiercest nevertheless obeyed man. For it is not to be supposed that the animals then were, or would be, endowed with reason, so as to understand both what man commanded and how his command and orders were to be carried out: for man's nature, much less the animals', was not in any part changed because of sin. But this knot can be untied in two ways. For we can suppose that by man's supreme skill, prudence, and industry it came about—or ought to have come about—in the state of innocence, that all the living things were subjected to his command. For there would have been in man an excellent acuteness and skill of mind, perfect prudence, the highest industry, and a most complete knowledge of the natural properties and habits of each of the animals: man would have known the disposition and power of each animal, and would have thoroughly understood all the ways and means by which even the fiercest and most savage animals could be soothed, tamed, and brought under his power⁹

[sub po]testatem hominis subiici possent. Certissimis enim experimentis compertum est quaedam mitigari, et nullo negotio capi atque tractari, vel per incantationes (ut serpentes, sicut de aspide traditur Psalmo 57.), vel per succos herbarum aliósve potus aut cibos medicatos: hausto enim hordei succo Elephanti ferociam demitigari, auctor est Plinius libro octavo. Hac igitur ratione homo in statu innocentiae sic imperasset cunctis animantibus, ut nunc imperat animalibus maximè domesticis et familiaribus, ut cani et equo.

[brought under the] power of man. For by most certain experiments it is found that some are tamed, and captured and handled with no trouble, either by incantations (as serpents—as is said of the asp in Psalm 57), or by the juices of herbs or other medicated drinks or foods: for that the ferocity of the Elephant is softened by a draught of barley-juice, Pliny is the author, in book eight. By this means, therefore, man in the state of innocence would have commanded all the living things, just as he now commands the animals that are most domestic and familiar, like the dog and the horse.¹⁰

SCIENDUM autem est quatuor modis effici posse, ut animal quantumvis saevum et truculentum cicuretur et sub potestatem et usum hominis redigatur. Primò, ut diximus, per arcanos quosdam modos, qui certis quibusdam verbis et carminibus constant et appellantur incantationes, ut patet in serpentibus. Deinde, commutatione caeli et variatione consueti victus: si enim leones in regiones praefrigidas transferantur, et molliori melioríque cibatu alantur atque saginentur, paulatim ferocia leonini ingenij remittetur, roburque et ardor animi minuetur, fiétque pigrior in dies et ignavior atque invalidior. Praeterea, rabiem suam et ferociam exuunt adversus eos à quibus curantur, aluntur, et benignè tractantur, quibus non modò nihil nocent, sed cum illis etiam ludunt familiariter eísque blandiuntur: quinimo ab illis se verberari patiuntur, cuius rei exempla in leonibus et elephantis permulta miráque commemorat Plinius libro octavo. Et cùm nullum sit genus animalis infestius magísque inimicum homini serpentibus, et in his et aspide (de qua scriptum est in cantico Mosis Deuteronomij 32., Venenum aspidum insanabile), nihilominus tamen narrat Plinius, libro 10. capite 74., miram de quadam aspide familiarissimè apud quendam vivente historiam. Sic ille scribit:

Now it is to be known that in four ways it can be brought about that an animal, however savage and truculent, be tamed and reduced under the power and use of man. First, as we said, by certain occult means, which consist of certain words and chants and are called incantations, as is evident in serpents. Second, by a change of climate and a variation of the accustomed food: for if lions be transferred to very cold regions, and be fed and fattened on softer and better food, little by little the ferocity of the leonine temper is relaxed, and its strength and ardor of spirit are diminished, and it becomes day by day lazier and more cowardly and weaker. Moreover, they put off their rage and ferocity toward those by whom they are cared for, fed, and kindly treated, to whom not only do they do no harm, but with them they even play familiarly and fawn upon them; nay, they suffer themselves to be beaten by them—of which thing Pliny recounts very many and wonderful examples in lions and elephants, in book eight. And although no kind of animal is more hostile and inimical to man than serpents, and among these the asp (of which it is written in the song of Moses, Deuteronomy 32, The venom of asps is incurable), nevertheless Pliny relates, in book 10, chapter 74, a wonderful story about a certain asp living most familiarly at someone's house. Thus he writes:¹¹

Let the marvel of the asp be credited to Phylarchus. For he is the author that, when an asp, coming to a certain man's table in Egypt, was regularly fed, it brought forth young, of which one killed the son of the host; and that the asp, having returned to its accustomed meal, understood the fault, and inflicted death on that young one, and never afterward returned beneath that roof. Thus Pliny.¹²

De aspide miraculum Philarcho reddatur. Is enim auctor est, cùm ad mensam cuiusdam veniens in Aegypto aleretur assiduè, enixam catulos, quorum ab uno filium hospitis interemptum; illam, reversam ad consuetudinem cibi, intellexisse culpam, et necem intulisse catulo, nec postea in tectum id reversam. Ita Plinius.

Postremò, tantùm potest ars, industria, et consuetudo, ut non solùm animalia cogantur parere homini, sed ei quoque ad verba singulósque nutus morem gerere, et imperata facere condocefiant: quinimo etiam picas et psittacos docuimus humana verba loqui. ALTERA ratio, qua existimari potest fuisse in statu innocentiae animalia homini subiecta, tota sumitur et pendet ex singulari quadam erga hominem (in statu innocentiae constitutum) Dei providentia et cura, qua mirabiliter factum esset ut animalia non solùm homini non nocerent, sed subiecta essent atque obedirent. Quemadmodum enim, quod homini tunc nulla res quicquam vel detrimento vel molestiae afferre posset, id referendum est ad specialem quandam Dei custodiam et protectionem, ita quoque de subiectione et obedientia cunctarum animantium sentire oportet. Hanc autem tam singularem provi-

Lastly, art, industry, and habituation can do so much that not only are the animals compelled to obey man, but they are also trained to comply with his words and every nod, and to do his bidding: nay, we have even taught magpies and parrots to speak human words. The second reason, by which it can be supposed that the animals were subject to man in the state of innocence, is wholly drawn from and depends on a certain singular providence and care of God toward man (set in the state of innocence), by which it would wonderfully have come about that the animals not only did man no harm, but were subject and obedient. For just as the fact that no thing could then bring man any detriment or trouble is to be referred to a certain special custody and protection of God, so too must we think of the subjection and obedience of all the living things. And this so singular provi-¹³

[provi]dentiam circa animalia exercebat Deus per Angelos, quorum ministerio fiebat ut hominis voluntati et imperio, quantum opus erat, sine impedimento, sine difficultate, et sine repugnantia subessent atque obtemperarent animalia. Per Angelos enim credimus animantes adductas esse ad Adamum, ut singulis ipse nomina imponeret, et ad Noë, ut eas in arcam illatas ab exitio diluvij vindicaret atque conservaret. Et quod, ad illustrandam servorum suorum sanctitatem, cum ingenti miraculo nonnunquam fecit Deus, ut illis ad voluntatem et ad nutum obedirent animalia, id fuisset in statu innocentiae erga omnes homines factitatum atque usitatum.

[provi]dence over the animals God exercised through the Angels, by whose ministry it came about that, as far as was needful, the animals were subject and obedient to man's will and command, without impediment, without difficulty, and without resistance. For through the Angels we believe that the living things were brought to Adam, that he might impose names on each, and to Noah, that he might rescue and preserve them, brought into the ark, from the destruction of the flood. And that which God sometimes did with a vast miracle, to set off the holiness of his servants—that the animals obeyed them at their will and nod—this would, in the state of innocence, have been done and customary toward all men.¹⁴

CAETERUM, post lapsum Adae, et naturam humanam illius primaevae innocentiae et iustitiae originalis gratia spoliatam, maiorem in modum hoc imperium hominis in animalia, quantùm ad eius usum et executionem, diminutum atque coangustatum est: nam et paucis animalium imperare possumus, nec his sine magno labore. Hugo de S. Victore in suis Annotationibus super Genesim annotavit propter peccatum amisisse hominem dominium in duo genera animalium: in maxima scilicet animalia, uti sunt Leones, Tigres, Pantherae (quo videlicet intelligeret se illa excellenti potestate dominationis quam à Deo acceperat fuisse privatum); deinde etiam in minima et vilissima animalia, veluti sunt muscae, pulices et culices, quae minus quàm maiora illa et ferociora domari possunt et imperio nostro submitti: ut hinc agnosceremus quantam in vilitatem propter peccatum delapsus et abiectus esset homo. Quocirca Deus, ut puniret Aegyptios, non misit adversus eos Leones aut Tigres, sed muscas, cyniphes, et locustas.

But after the fall of Adam, and human nature despoiled of the grace of that primeval innocence and original justice, this command of man over the animals was, as regards its use and execution, greatly diminished and narrowed: for we can command but few of the animals, and these not without great labor. Hugh of St. Victor, in his Annotations on Genesis, noted that through sin man lost dominion over two kinds of animals: namely over the largest animals, such as Lions, Tigers, Panthers (that he might thereby understand that he had been deprived of that excellent power of dominion which he had received from God); and then also over the smallest and vilest animals, such as flies, fleas, and gnats, which can be tamed and subjected to our command less than those larger and fiercer ones: that from this we might recognize into how great vileness man had fallen and been cast down through sin. Wherefore God, in order to punish the Egyptians, sent against them not Lions or Tigers, but flies, gnats, and locusts.¹⁵

Elucet nihilominus tamen in hac ipsa Dei animadversione et abiectione hominis mira quaedam eius erga hominem bonitas ac benignitas. Namque, ut rectè animadvertit Chrysostomus homilia 12. in Genesim, ita Deus hominis imperio subtraxit animalia, ut quae ad declarandam magis hominis excellentiam potestatis quam ad utilitatem eius pertinebant (ut sunt magna et saeva animalia) obedientiae eius subduceret, relinqueret autem ea quae homini vel emolumento, vel adiumento, vel ornamento, vel etiam oblectamento esse poterant: cuiusmodi sunt oves et boves, canes et equi, simiae et psittaci, atque alia id genus quàm plurima. Caietanus, ex eo quod refert Moses Deum dixisse de homine, Praesit universae terrae, argumentatur nullam esse partem terrae non subiectam hominis dominationi; non ex eo tamen concludi posse vult omnem partem terrae esse habitabilem vel habitandam esse ab homine. Non enim universa terra, cuius aliquis dicitur esse dominus, ab eo habitatur, sed partem ipse habitat, partem relinquit serendis frugibus, vineis, arboribus, oleribus, partem pascuis, partem habitationi animalium, partem denique nemoribus et sylvis ad rem lignariam. Apud Ciceronem libro secundo de Natura deorum, bene longa, docta, et eleganti oratione probat Balbus cunctas animantes propter homi-

Nevertheless, in this very chastisement and abasement of man by God there shines a certain wonderful goodness and kindness of his toward man. For, as Chrysostom rightly notes, in the 12th homily on Genesis, God withdrew the animals from man's command in such wise that those which pertained more to declaring the excellence of man's power than to his utility (such as the great and savage animals) he withdrew from his obedience, but left those which could be of profit, or aid, or ornament, or even of delight to man: such as are sheep and oxen, dogs and horses, apes and parrots, and very many other things of that kind. Cajetan, from the fact that Moses relates that God said of man, Let him rule over all the earth, argues that there is no part of the earth not subject to man's dominion; yet he does not wish it to be concluded from this that every part of the earth is habitable, or to be inhabited, by man. For the whole land, of which someone is said to be lord, is not inhabited by him, but part he inhabits, part he leaves for sowing crops, vines, trees, vegetables, part for pastures, part for the dwelling of animals, and part, finally, for groves and woods for timber. In Cicero, in the second book On the Nature of the Gods, Balbus proves, in a discourse goodly long, learned, and elegant, that all the living things are generated for man's¹⁶

[propter homi]nem esse generatas, earúmque complures sine hominis rectione et curatione aut nullo modo esse, aut bene esse non posse.

[for man's] sake to be generated, and that very many of them, without man's governance and care, either cannot exist at all, or cannot exist well.¹⁷

AT enim, quaeret fortasse quispiam, An in statu innocentiae non tantùm homo brutis, sed homo etiam homini dominaturus fuerit? Videtur enim ex hoc loco duci posse argumentum ad probandum hominem in eo statu non imperaturum alij homini, propterea quòd Deus, declarans imperium quod habiturus esset homo, dixit eum imperaturum piscibus, avibus, et terrestribus animalibus; de imperio autem quod habiturus esset in homines nullum verbum fecit, haud dubiè dicturus, si quod futurum esset in eo statu hominis in hominem imperium. Deinde, ratio cur homo dominatur brutis ea est (ut suprà ostendimus) quod homo sit rationalis et ad imaginem Dei factus: at hoc in cunctis hominibus aequaliter inerat; nulla igitur ratio erat cur homo homini imperaret. Ad haec, subiici aliorum imperio, et ex alieno iudicio et voluntate pendere, cùm sit contra naturalem libertatis appetitum, non potest non esse homini involuntarium, violentum, acerbum, atque odiosum: procul igitur fuisset ab illo felicissimo statu. His accedit, quòd servitus inter homines nata videtur ex peccato: namque, ut scriptum est capite nono libri Geneseos, primus omnium Noë, propter peccatum filij sui Cham, posteros eius poena servitutis punivit; et Evae in poenam peccati dictum est, Sub viri potestate eris, et ipse dominabitur tui. Videtur etiam in hac sententia fuisse Augustinus, quippe qui libro 19. de Civitate Dei capite 15. hoc modo scribit:

But someone may perhaps ask whether in the state of innocence not only man would rule over the brutes, but man also over man? For an argument seems drawable from this place to prove that man in that state would not command another man, because God, declaring the command that man was to have, said that he would command the fishes, the birds, and the land animals; but of any command that he was to have over men he said not a word—he who would doubtless have said so, if there were to be in that state any command of man over man. Next, the reason why man rules the brutes is (as we showed above) that man is rational and made to the image of God; but this was equally present in all men; there was therefore no reason why man should command man. Besides, to be subjected to the command of others, and to depend on another's judgment and will, since it is against the natural appetite for liberty, cannot but be to man involuntary, violent, bitter, and hateful: it would therefore have been far from that most happy state. To this is added that servitude among men seems to have been born of sin: for, as it is written in the ninth chapter of the book of Genesis, Noah, first of all, on account of the sin of his son Ham, punished his descendants with the penalty of servitude; and to Eve, as a penalty for sin, it was said, Thou shalt be under the power of the man, and he shall have dominion over thee. Augustine too seems to have been of this opinion, who, in book 19 of the City of God, chapter 15, writes in this manner:¹⁸

He willed that the rational creature, made to his own image, should rule over none but the irrational—not man over man, but man over the beast. Hence the first just men were made shepherds of flocks rather than kings of men: that even thus God might intimate what the order of creatures demanded, and what the desert of sins exacts. For the condition of servitude is rightly understood to be imposed on the sinner. Accordingly, nowhere in the Scriptures do we read of a 'servant' before Noah the just punished his son's sin with this word; and so that name was earned by fault, not by nature. Thus from Augustine.¹⁹

Rationalem factum ad imaginem suam noluit nisi irrationalibus dominari, non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori. Inde primi iusti pastores pecudum magis quàm reges hominum constituti sunt: ut etiam sic insinuaret Deus quid postularet ordo creaturarum, et quid exigat meritum peccatorum. Conditio quippe servitutis iure intelligitur imposita peccatori. Proinde nusquam Scripturarum legimus servum, antequam hoc vocabulo Noë iustus peccatum filij vindicaret; nomen itaque istud culpa meruit, non natura. Sic ex Augustino.

VERUMTAMEN futurum in illo statu innocentiae fuisse quorundam hominum in alios homines imperium, nec paucis nec infirmis rationibus persuaderi potest. Principiò, cùm in statu illo numerosè multiplicandum esset genus humanum, cumque natura sua homo sit animal sociabile (id est, gaudens societate hominum, amánsque humanum convictum et consuetudinem), meliúsque sit homini ad omnem vitae usum cultúmque ac iucunditatem vivere in societate quàm in solitudine, proculdubio futura erat tunc hominum cum hominibus congregatio et consociatio; et ne qua perturbatio et confusio in tanta hominum multitudine inesset, aliquem in ea ordinem superiorum et inferiorum, regentium alio et ab aliis rectorum, denique imperantium et imperata facientium esse oportebat: praesertim verò cùm in illo etiam statu futuri essent alij prudentia et probitate praestantiores aliis aptiorésque ad regendum; ergo consentaneum

Nevertheless, that in that state of innocence some men would have had command over others can be persuaded by reasons neither few nor weak. First, since in that state the human race was to be multiplied numerously, and since by his nature man is a sociable animal (that is, rejoicing in the society of men, and loving human fellowship and intercourse), and since it is better for man, for every use and cultivation and pleasantness of life, to live in society than in solitude, there would doubtless then have been a gathering and association of men with men; and lest any disturbance and confusion should be in so great a multitude of men, there had to be in it some order of superiors and inferiors—of some ruling, and being ruled by others, in short of some commanding and others doing the commands: especially since in that state too some would have been more excellent than others in prudence and probity, and more fit for ruling; therefore it was fitting²⁰

[ergo consentaneum] erat ut illi potius praeessent et dominarentur aliis. Deinde, in Angelis sanctissimis, sapientissimis et beatissimis constat esse alios superiores et alios inferiores, et illos quae agenda sunt imperare, hos iussa eorum exequi. Siquidem inter ordines Angelorum quatuor à principatus et dominatus excellentia nomen acceperunt, Archangelos dico, Principatus, Potestates et Dominationes. Daniel praeterea capite octavo, et Zacharias capite secundo, inducunt Angelos alios imperantes aliis. Et verò, negari non potest quin eo in statu patres potestatem et imperium habituri fuerint in filios; hoc enim natura ipsa postulat: mariti quoque in uxores suas, affirmante Paulo virum esse caput mulieris, et mulierem ex viro et propter virum esse factam. Status autem innocentiae non destruebat aut funditus evertebat statum et ordinem naturae.

[it was therefore fitting] that those should rather preside and rule over the others. Next, among the most holy, most wise, and most blessed Angels it is certain that some are superior and some inferior, and that those command what is to be done, while these carry out their orders. For among the orders of Angels, four took their name from the excellence of sovereignty and dominion—I mean the Archangels, Principalities, Powers, and Dominations. Daniel, moreover, in chapter eight, and Zechariah in chapter two, introduce Angels, some commanding others. And indeed it cannot be denied that in that state fathers would have had power and command over their sons; for nature itself demands this: husbands too over their wives, since Paul affirms that the man is the head of the woman, and that the woman was made from the man and for the man's sake. And the state of innocence did not destroy or utterly overturn the state and order of nature.²¹

VERUM, quò breviùs et faciliùs argumenta initio proposita et huic nostrae opinioni contraria diluamus, scire convenit duplex esse dominium hominis: alterum in servos, alterum verò in liberos qui sponte sua unum aliquem vel multos elegerunt, à quo vel à quibus secundum praescriptas leges regerentur atque gubernarentur. Duplex autem inter haec duo genera dominandi animadvertere licet discrimen. Siquidem imperium in servos coactum et violentum est, atque idcirco involuntarium et acerbum; in liberos autem voluntarium et iucundum est, utpote ab illis utilitatis suae causa ultro electum et assumptum. Imperium praeterea in servos totum planè refertur ad bonum et emolumentum dominantis, quapropter non potest non esse onerosum et odiosum subditis: est enim contra naturalem hominis appetitum ut quicquid agit et laborat non in suam sed in alterius utilitatem cedat; imperium verò in liberos refertur non ad bonum dominantis sed subditorum, vel potiùs ad bonum publicum et commune. In statu igitur innocentiae alij praefuissent aliis, non dominatione servili sed civili, quae scilicet nihil violenti, involuntarij, et acerbi mistum habuisset. Ad eum nempe modum tunc imperassent homines, quo modo iustos viros imperare aliis docet Augustinus libro decimonono de Civitate Dei capite decimoquarto:

But, that we may more briefly and easily dissolve the arguments proposed at the start, contrary to this our opinion, it is fitting to know that the dominion of man is twofold: one over slaves, the other over free men who of their own accord have chosen someone, or several, by whom they may be ruled and governed according to prescribed laws. And between these two kinds of ruling two differences may be noted. For command over slaves is coerced and violent, and therefore involuntary and bitter; but over free men it is voluntary and pleasant, as being chosen and assumed by them of their own accord for their own benefit. Moreover, command over slaves is referred wholly to the good and profit of the ruler, wherefore it cannot but be burdensome and hateful to the subjects: for it is against the natural appetite of man that whatever he does and labors at should go not to his own but to another's benefit; but command over free men is referred not to the good of the ruler but of the subjects, or rather to the public and common good. In the state of innocence, therefore, some would have presided over others, not by a servile but by a civil dominion—one, namely, that would have had nothing of the violent, the involuntary, and the bitter mixed in. They would have commanded then in that manner in which Augustine teaches that the just command others, in book nineteen of the City of God, chapter fourteen:²²

For the just command not from a lust of ruling, but from a duty of taking counsel for others; not from the pride of presiding, but from the mercy of providing for others. This the natural order prescribes; thus God made man.²³

Non enim iusti dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi; nec principandi superbia, sed providendi misericordia. Hoc naturalis ordo praescribit; ita Deus hominem condidit.

Cur igitur (nam et hoc roget aliquis) non dixit Deus, Dominamini hominibus, sed animalibus? Hoc videlicet imperium in animalia convenit cuilibet homini ea ratione qua homo ad imaginem Dei creatus est, cunctísque hominibus aequaliter competit. At verò imperium aliorum hominum in alios homines non cuique homini convenit, sed quibusdam tantùm certis hominibus; nec illis convenit quà homines sunt, sed propter eorum vel dignitatis, vel potentiae, vel prudentiae, vel probitatis excellentiam. SED cur subiectio mulieris sub potestatem viri irrogata est ei à Deo

Why, then (for this too someone may ask), did God not say, Have dominion over men, but over the animals? Because, namely, this command over the animals belongs to every man by that very reason whereby man was created to the image of God, and pertains equally to all men. But the command of some men over others does not belong to every man, but only to certain particular men; nor does it belong to them as they are men, but on account of their excellence either of dignity, or of power, or of prudence, or of probity. But why was the subjection of the woman under the power of the man imposed on her by God²⁴

[à] Deo in poenam peccati, si etiam in statu innocentiae sub imperio viri mulier fuisset? Ad hoc ita breviter respondendum est: Subiectio mulieris sub viri potestatem in statu innocentiae fuisset mulieri voluntaria et iucunda, atque omnis expers molestiae: tum quod vir nihil imperasset mulieri nisi rectum et honestum, idque magna cum aequitate et benevolentia; mulier autem sua sponte amasset quicquid rectum et aequum esset, et quicquid à se fieri ratio postulasset id fecisset ipsa voluntariè, libenter, atque gaudenter. Fuisset enim in utroque natura integra, ratio recta, atque ad bonum valdè propensa voluntas, quò factum esset ut imperium viri mulieri molestum et odiosum nequaquam accideret. Post peccatum autem evenit ut haec subiectio sit mulieri involuntaria et acerba, et in peccati poenam ei acciderit; idque duabus de causis contingit: tum quòd saepenumero mariti inhumaniùs et durius quàm par est tractant uxores, eis praeter aequum et bonum imperantes; tum etiam quòd mulieres, corrupta natura depravatáque voluntate, vel propter naturalem quandam levitatem ingenij et iracundiam animi, aegrè ferunt regi se à viro eiúsque imperio esse subiectas. Haec autem pravitas et perversitas, tam imperantis viri quàm mulieris obedientis, ex peccato nata est; et molestia quam habet adiunctam poena est peccati inflicta mulieri; et de hoc genere subiectionis locutus est Dominus cùm dixit Evae, Sub viri potestate eris, et ipse dominabitur tui.

[by] God as a penalty for sin, if the woman would have been under the man's command even in the state of innocence? To this it must be briefly answered thus: The subjection of the woman under the man's power, in the state of innocence, would have been to the woman voluntary and pleasant, and free of all trouble: both because the man would have commanded the woman nothing but what was right and honorable, and that with great equity and benevolence; and the woman of her own accord would have loved whatever was right and fair, and whatever reason demanded to be done by her she would have done voluntarily, gladly, and joyfully. For in each there would have been an unimpaired nature, right reason, and a will strongly inclined to the good, so that it would have come about that the command of the man would by no means have been troublesome and hateful to the woman. But after sin it came to pass that this subjection is involuntary and bitter to the woman, and befell her as a penalty for sin; and this happens for two causes: both because very often husbands treat their wives more inhumanly and harshly than is fitting, commanding them beyond what is fair and good; and also because women, by corrupt nature and depraved will, or on account of a certain natural levity of disposition and irascibility of mind, bear ill being ruled by the man and being subject to his command. And this depravity and perversity, both of the commanding man and of the obedient woman, was born of sin; and the trouble it has attached to it is the penalty of sin inflicted on the woman; and of this kind of subjection the Lord spoke when he said to Eve, Thou shalt be under the man's power, and he shall have dominion over thee.²⁵

VERUM concludamus hanc Mosis de imperio hominis in bruta doctrinam, adiuncta brevi quadam tropologica interpretatione, nec inepta nec iniucunda (opinor) futura lectori. Quemadmodum homini, quia rationalis est, propterea datum est imperium in bruta, ita pars superior hominis (in qua mens et ratio, quae propria hominis est, viget) praeesse et dominari debet parti inferiori, id est, sensibus et affectibus carnalibus, quos cum aliis animantibus communes habemus. Et sicut Moses quatuor genera animalium exposuit quibus homo praeesse debebat, dicens, Praesit piscibus et volatilibus, et bestiis, et reptilibus, denique etiam universae terrae: ita scire oportet quatuor esse in parte hominis inferiori affectus vitiosos et quasi ferinos, quos ratio in potestate sua habere debet, et velut quodam suae dominationis fraeno astrictos tenere et arbitratu suo regere. Ac per Pisces quidem, qui demersi aquis perpetuò vivunt, significatur mollities carnis et aestus libidinum; per Aves, immodica gloriae et honoris cupido; per Reptilia, nimium coacervandi divitias bonáque terrena studium; per Bestias et feras, ardens vindictae et ultionis appetitus et implacabilis ira atque odium adversus eos qui re aliqua nos laeserunt. Illud autem, Universaeque terrae, denotat omnem sensum et affectum carnalem terrenásque cupiditates domare ac rationi subiicere oportere, sicut rectè monet Paulus ad Coloss. 3., Mortificate, inquit, membra vestra quae sunt

But let us conclude this teaching of Moses on man's dominion over the brutes, adding a brief tropological interpretation, which (I think) will be to the reader neither inept nor unpleasant. Just as command over the brutes was given to man because he is rational, so the superior part of man (in which mind and reason, which is proper to man, flourish) ought to preside over and rule the inferior part—that is, the senses and the carnal affections, which we have in common with the other animals. And just as Moses set forth four kinds of animals over which man was to preside, saying, Let him rule over the fishes and the fowls, and the beasts, and the creeping things, and finally over all the earth: so it must be known that there are in man's lower part four vicious and, as it were, bestial affections, which reason ought to hold in its power and, bound as by a kind of bridle of its dominion, to keep and rule at its will. And by the Fishes, which live perpetually submerged in the waters, is signified the softness of the flesh and the heat of lusts; by the Birds, the immoderate desire of glory and honor; by the Creeping things, the excessive zeal of heaping up riches and earthly goods; by the Beasts and wild animals, the burning appetite of revenge and retaliation, and implacable anger and hatred against those who have injured us in anything. And that, And all the earth, denotes that every carnal sense and affection and earthly desire must be tamed and subjected to reason, as Paul rightly admonishes, to the Colossians 3, Mortify, he says, your members which are²⁶

[quae] sunt super terram. Haec autem seu castigatio seu mortificatio affectuum, post peccatum Adae facta est homini laboriosa, acerba, et odiosa; ante peccatum autem facillima erat, quòd in statu innocentiae affectus hominis erant in potestate eius tripliciter. Primò quidem quantum ad excitationem eorum: non enim commovebantur nisi quando et ubi volebat et imperabat animus hominis. Deinde, quantum ad eorum durationem: tandiu enim durabant quandiu homo volebat. Denique, quantum ad intensionem et remissionem: namque remissio et intensio eorum ex praescripto et iudicio rationis atque ex imperio voluntatis pendebat. Et quia his tribus modis desiere affectus et passiones hominis esse in potestate eius post peccatum, idcirco arduum est magníque laboris eos imperio rationis regere et sub voluntatis potestatem subiicere: pro magno enim habetur si voluntas eis repugnet, et quantum potest reprimere eos ac restringere conetur.

[which] are upon the earth. But this castigation or mortification of the affections, after the sin of Adam, became to man laborious, bitter, and hateful; whereas before sin it was very easy, because in the state of innocence the affections of man were in his power in three respects. First, as to their arousal: for they were not stirred except when and where the mind of man willed and commanded. Next, as to their duration: for they lasted just so long as man willed. Finally, as to their intensification and remission: for their remission and intensification depended on the prescript and judgment of reason and on the command of the will. And because in these three ways the affections and passions of man ceased to be in his power after sin, it is therefore arduous and of great labor to rule them by the command of reason and to subject them to the power of the will: for it is reckoned a great thing if the will resists them and, as far as it can, tries to repress and restrain them.²⁷

Placet mihi similitudo illa qua Aristoteles usus est in extremo 1. lib. Ethicorum, ostendens ita sese habere huiusmodi affectus vitiosos ad imperium rationis et voluntatis ut se habent membra paralytica ad voluntatem hominis ea movere cupientis: non enim ea quando vult, vel quomodo et quantum vult, movere potest. Et ne lector Aristotelis verba desideret, adscribam ea hoc loco:

I like that simile which Aristotle used at the end of the first book of the Ethics, showing that these vicious affections stand to the command of reason and will as paralytic limbs stand to the will of a man desiring to move them: for he cannot move them when he wills, or in what way and how much he wills. And lest the reader miss Aristotle's words, I will set them down here:²⁸

Plainly, he says, just as the paralyzed limbs of the body, if you should wish to move them to the right, are on the contrary carried to the left, so too it happens in the soul: for the appetites of the incontinent are borne toward contrary parts. But in bodies, indeed, we see what is carried against the will; in the soul we do not so see it. Yet perhaps it must nonetheless be supposed that there is in the soul too something besides reason, which opposes and resists it; which, however, can itself also be capable of reason—as we see it is in the continent man, and even more in the temperate and brave man, in whom such affections are consenting and obedient to reason. Thus Aristotle.²⁹

Planè, inquit, quemadmodum resoluta corporis membra, si ad dexteram movere volueris, è contrario in sinistram deferuntur, sic quoque in anima contingit: in contrarias enim partes incontinentium appetitiones feruntur. Sed in corporibus quidem quod praeter voluntatem fertur videmus; in anima non ita videmus. Fortasse autem nihilominus in anima esse quoque aliquid praeter rationem existimandum est, quod ei adversetur ac resistat; quod tamen etiam ipsum rationis capax esse potest, velut esse cernimus in viro continenti, atque etiam magis in temperanti ac forti, in quibus eiusmodi affectus rationi consentientes et obedientes sunt. Sic Aristoteles.

Translator’s notes

Title of the new disputation, set centered beneath a rule. ↩
Margin: 'Ius hominis super animantes in statu innocentiae.' The disputation's plan and the right/use distinction; the right of dominion in innocence proved from Gen 1:26; Ps 8:6–7; Ecclus 17:2–3. Page breaks; catchword 'cunctas' (cunctas animantes, on p. 393). ↩
Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 393.' The naming of the animals (Gen 2:19–20) as a taking of possession; Eve's fearlessness of the serpent as a sign of the animals' subjection in innocence. ↩
The natural-order argument (the more perfect rules the less; matter→form, elements→compound, plants→animals→man); Aristotle, Politics 1 (the rational should rule); man born naked so that all things serve him. ↩
Margins: 'Ius dominij in Animalia remansit in homine etiam post peccatum'; 'Genes. 9.' The right of dominion survives sin (it follows on the rational nature, undestroyed by sin); Gen 9:2; Aristotle, Politics 1 (the natural lawfulness of hunting). The printed 'Ergo peccatum' apparently drops 'post' (bracketed). ↩
Transition to the question of the possession and use (as distinct from the right) of dominion. Page breaks at 'ani-' (animalia); catchword 'in ani'; signature 'DD'. RESUME next batch at PDF 435 with 'de possessione et usu imperij huius in ani[malia]...'. ↩
Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 394.' Turns from the right of dominion to its use; in innocence the use was full and effortless, mirroring reason's full rule over the passions. ↩
Margin: '4. Reg. 2. Da. 6. et 14.' Signs of the dominion: the naming of the animals; the ark; Elisha's bears (2 Kings 2:24); Daniel's lions (Dan 6; 14 [Bel and the Dragon]); SS. Francis and Anthony of Padua. The before/after-sin difference: ordinary vs. miraculous obedience. ↩
Margin: 'Quomodo animalia omnia erant subiecta et obedientia homini ante peccatum.' The difficulty (the fierce animals were not rational) and the first solution: man's perfect knowledge of every animal's nature. Page breaks; catchword 'testatem' (= potestatem). ↩
Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 395.' Margin: 'Elephantum quomodo mitigari tradat Plinius.' The serpent-charming of Ps 58:5 (Vulg. 57); the elephant calmed by barley-juice (Pliny, NH 8). ↩
Margin: '...dis posse animalia etiam saevissima mitigari et subiici homini.' The four modes of taming (incantation, climate/diet, kindness, art); the incurable asp-venom (Deut 32:33). Introduces the Pliny (NH 10.74) asp-story. ↩
Pliny, Naturalis historia 10.74 (96), citing Phylarchus: the asp that punished its own offspring for killing the host's son. ↩
The fourth mode (art/training; talking magpies and parrots) and the second, providential solution (a special divine custody in innocence). Page breaks at 'provi-' (providentiam). ↩
Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 396.' The providential solution worked through the ministry of Angels (the naming of the animals; the gathering to the ark). ↩
Margin: 'Quomodo post peccatum diminutum sit hominis imperium in animalia.' The diminished dominion after sin (Hugh of St. Victor: loss of the largest and the smallest); the plagues of Egypt (flies, gnats, locusts) as instruments of God. ↩
Margin: 'Caietanus in Genesim.' God's kindness even in the loss (Chrysostom, Hom. 12: the useful animals left to man); Cajetan on 'over all the earth' (dominion ≠ habitability); Cicero, De natura deorum 2 (Balbus, the Stoic teleology). Page breaks; catchword 'nem' (= hominem). ↩
Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 397.' Conclusion of the Ciceronian (Balbus) argument that the animals exist for man and need man's care. ↩
Margin: 'An in statu innocentiae homo homini dominaretur.' The case against rule of man over man in innocence: Scripture names only dominion over animals; the equal rational nature; servitude as against the appetite for liberty; servitude born of sin (Gen 9:25, Ham; Gen 3:16, Eve). Introduces the Augustine (De civitate Dei 19.15) quote. ↩
Augustine, De civitate Dei 19.15 (that by nature God set man over beasts only, not man over man; 'servant' first appears at Gen 9:25). ↩
Margin: 'Etiam in statu innocentiae alios aliis imperaturos fuisse.' The affirmative case begins (against the foregoing): man is a social animal, a multitude needs order, and the more prudent are fit to rule even in innocence. Page breaks at 'consentaneum'; catchword 'erat'; signature 'DD 3'. RESUME next batch at PDF 439 with 'ergo consentaneum erat...'. ↩
Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 398.' The affirmative case for man's rule over man in innocence: the angelic hierarchy (Archangels, Principalities, Powers, Dominations; Dan 8; Zech 2); fatherly and marital authority (1 Cor 11:3); nature unimpaired by innocence. ↩
Margin: 'Duplex dominium hominis in homines, unum servile, alterum civile ac liberale.' The servile/civil distinction: rule in innocence would have been civil (for the common good), not servile. Introduces Augustine, De civitate Dei 19.14. ↩
Augustine, De civitate Dei 19.14 (the just rule by service, not domination). ↩
Why Scripture names dominion over animals (common to all, from the image) and not over men (proper to some, by excellence). Begins the new sub-question on the woman's subjection. Page breaks; catchword 'Deo'. ↩
Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 399.' Margin: 'An in statu innocentiae Mulier fuisset sub viri potestate.' The woman's subjection: voluntary and pleasant in innocence, involuntary and bitter (a penalty) after sin (Gen 3:16). ↩
Margin: 'Digressio Moralis de hominis principatu, et imperio in animalia.' The tropological reading: the four animal-kinds = four vicious affections reason must master (lust; ambition; avarice; vindictiveness); 'all the earth' = all carnal desire. Col 3:5. Page breaks; catchword 'sunt' (= quae sunt super terram). ↩
Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 400.' Margin: 'In statu innocentiae etiam affectus humani erant in potestate hominis tripliciter.' The threefold subjection of the passions in innocence (arousal, duration, intensity), lost by sin. ↩
Margin: 'Pulchra similitudo Aristotelis.' Introduces the Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 1.13) quotation on the paralytic limbs. ↩
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13 (1102b). The paralyzed-limbs simile for the irrational part of the soul that yet can obey reason. ↩