GENESIS CH. 2, VERSE 7. And He breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made into a living soul — Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

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GENESIS CH. 2, VERSE 7. And He breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made into a living soul.¹

CAP. 2. GENES. VERS. 7. Et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, & factus est homo in animam viventem.

QUONIAM Moses, hac oratione figurata & metaphorica, significare voluit creationem animae rationalis & infusionem eius in corpus, quae res gravissima est & ad agnitionem animi pulcherrima, diligenter eius verba explanan-[da sunt]. Primò ait, Inspiravit: Verbum Hebraeú נפח Napach, significat inspirare, insufflare, seu flatú emittere, sive dum quis vivit, sive dum moritur: nam etiam Latinè dicimus, exhalare seu efflare animá. Cur autem creatio animae rationalis, vocabulo inspirationis seu insufflationis insinuetur, multas licet afferre causas. Primò quidem, ut placet Theodoreto, quò intelligatur tam facilem Deo esse creationem animae rationalis, quàm facile homini est flatum ex ore suo mittere. Deinde, ut appareat animam rationalem non expromi & educi ex po-[tentia...]

SINCE Moses, by this figured and metaphorical expression, wished to signify the creation of the rational soul and its infusion into the body — a matter most grave, and most beautiful for the knowledge of the soul — his words must be carefully explained. First he says, “He breathed in” (Inspiravit): the Hebrew verb נפח (Napach) signifies to breathe in, to insufflate, or to emit a breath, whether while one is living or while one is dying — for in Latin too we say “to exhale or breathe out the soul.” Now why the creation of the rational soul should be insinuated by the word of inspiration or insufflation, many causes may be adduced. First, indeed, as Theodoret holds, so that it may be understood that the creation of the rational soul is as easy for God as it is easy for a man to send a breath from his mouth. Then, so that it may appear that the rational soul is not brought out and educed from the poten-[cy of matter...] [continues]²

[...ex po]tentia materiae, sed extrinsecus advenire corpori ex nihilo scilicet à Deo creatam, atque idcirco immaterialem & immortalem esse. Posteà, ut notum esset animam simul creari & infundi in corpus, Deus enim creando eam infundit & infundendo creat, siquidem utrumque fit eodem puncto temporis: quanquam ordine naturae priùs est animam creari quàm infundi corpori. Ad extremum, ea ratione significatur, animam quodammodo prodiisse ex ore Dei, ut ex eo intelligeretur, animam rationalem eo maximè caeteris animalibus praecellere, quòd ipsa capax & particeps est vitae, gratiae, ac sapientiae Dei. Legimus enim in 24. cap. libri Ecclesiastici divinam sapientiam pro-[diisse ex ore Dei].

[...from the poten]cy of matter, but comes to the body from without, being created namely from nothing by God, and is therefore immaterial and immortal. Next, so that it might be known that the soul is at once created and infused into the body — for God, in creating it, infuses it, and in infusing creates it, since both happen at the same point of time, although in the order of nature it is prior for the soul to be created than to be infused into the body. Finally, by that reasoning it is signified that the soul somehow proceeded from the mouth of God, so that from this it might be understood that the rational soul most of all excels the other animals in this, that it is itself capable of, and a partaker in, the life, grace, and wisdom of God. For we read in chapter 24 of the book of Ecclesiasticus that the divine Wisdom proceeded from the mouth of God.³

VERUM, quia flatus provenit ex corpore flantis, propterea quidam putarunt animum hominis ex substantia Dei esse procreatum: quocirca M. Tullius Platonicorum sententiam usurpans, saepè dicere solet animos humanos ex divina natura esse libatos, haustos, tractos, & decerptos. Multi etiam Patres ob eam causam censent, cùm vellet Christus Spiritum sanctum dare Apostolis, insufflasse in eos, ut ea ratione declararet, Spiritum sanctum sibi consubstantialem esse & de sua substantia procedere. Et animum quidem hominis ex ipsa Dei natura esse productum, sensisse videtur Lactantius libro 2. Divin. Instit. Verùm ridicula & absurda haec opinio est, non tantùm falsa: non enim illa Dei inspiratio fuit corporalis, sicut nec fuit locutio corporalis, cùm Deus dixit, Fiat lux, aut Fiat firmamentum: quanquam Eugubinus & Oleaster, quos suprà refutavimus, crediderint, Deum hu-[mana forma indutum...]

BUT, because a breath comes forth from the body of the one breathing, on that account some supposed the soul of man to have been procreated from the substance of God: wherefore Cicero, adopting the view of the Platonists, is often wont to say that human souls are sipped, drawn, drawn off, and plucked from the divine nature. Many Fathers too, for that reason, hold that when Christ wished to give the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, He breathed upon them, in order by that means to declare that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with Him and proceeds from His substance. And Lactantius, in book 2 of the Divine Institutes, seems to have held that the soul of man was produced from the very nature of God. But this opinion is ridiculous and absurd, not merely false: for that inspiration of God was not corporeal, just as His speech was not corporeal when God said, “Let there be light,” or “Let there be a firmament” — although Eugubinus and Oleaster, whom we refuted above, believed that God, clothed in human form, [bodily breathed and formed the body of man...] [continues]⁴

[...Deum hu]mana forma indutum corporaliter & insufflasse & formasse corpus hominis, & locutum esse, & alia fecisse ac dixisse, quae ab eo facta dictáque narrat Moses. Non esse autem animum hominis è substantia Dei, facillimú est cuivis & intelligere, & probare. Certè id à B. Thoma in 1. part. q. 90. & à Bonaventura in 2. sent. distin. 17. art. 1. quaest. 1. copiosè & accuratè tractatum est, ut supervacanea sit futura eius rei in praesens retractatio. QUOD autem proximè sequitur In faciem eius, Hebraica phrasis est, nam vox Hebraea אף Aph, ut placet Oleastro, descendit à radice אנף Anaph, & propriè significat iram, sed quia ira maximè in naso ostenditur, consequenter etiam nasum seu nares significat, ut in Psal. 113. Nares habent, & non odorabunt. Adhibetur quoque eadem vox ad significandam faciem, velut infrà capit. 19. Incurvavit se in faciem suam. Verùm non videtur significare faciem nisi propter nares quae in ea [sunt...]

[...that God,] clothed in human form, bodily both breathed upon and formed the body of man, and spoke, and did and said the other things which Moses narrates as done and said by Him. But that the soul of man is not from the substance of God is most easy for anyone both to understand and to prove. Certainly this was treated copiously and accurately by blessed Thomas in the First Part, question 90, and by Bonaventure on the second book of the Sentences, distinction 17, article 1, question 1, so that a re-treatment of the matter at present would be superfluous. As for what follows next, “into his face” (In faciem eius), it is a Hebrew idiom; for the Hebrew word אף (Aph), as Oleaster holds, descends from the root אנף (Anaph), and properly signifies anger; but because anger is shown most in the nose, it consequently also signifies the nose or the nostrils, as in Psalm 113[115]: “They have nostrils, and shall not smell.” The same word is also employed to signify the face, as below in chapter 19: “He bowed himself down to his face.” But it does not seem to signify the face except on account of the nostrils which are in it... [continues]⁵

[...quae in ea sunt]: praecipuè autem Moses nominavit faciem seu nares, quia in facie maximè apparet vita, quae per inspirationem & respirationem oris & narium fit. Deinde, quia in facie potissimum vigent sensus, tam interiores quàm exteriores. Denique, quia in facie interiores animi motus & affectus extant & innotescunt. Alij pro illo In faciem, vertunt ex Hebraeo In nares: quá lectioné secutus Caietanus, propterea putat Deú in nares insufflasse spiraculú vitae, quòd nasus sit organú respira-[tionis...]

[...which are in it]: but Moses named the face or the nostrils especially because in the face life most appears, which comes about through the inspiration and respiration of the mouth and nostrils. Then, because in the face the senses, both inner and outer, are most vigorous. Finally, because in the face the inner motions and affections of the mind stand out and become known. Others, for that “into the face,” render from the Hebrew “into the nostrils”: which reading Cajetan followed, and on that account thinks God breathed the breath of life into the nostrils, because the nose is the organ of respira-[tion...] [continues]⁶

[...respira]tionis; & quidem longè commodius atque purius quàm ipsum os. Et huius rei duo esse ait signa, quod nasus à natura factus sit patens & apertus, os autem clausum, quo fit ut dormientes etiam clauso ore abundè, vel certè quantum satis est, per nares spiritum ducant: alterum verò signum, quòd aër in ipso ore inquinatur, vaporibus è stomacho in os exhalatis, ut manifestum est in his quibus os & anhelitus foetet: qui autem per nares trahitur spiritus, absque ulla contagione sordium & immundiciae purus ad pulmonem perlabitur, & inde purus itidem redditur.

[...of respira]tion; and indeed far more conveniently and purely than the mouth itself. And he says there are two signs of this: that the nose was made by nature patent and open, but the mouth closed — whence it comes about that sleepers, even with the mouth shut, draw breath abundantly, or at least sufficiently, through the nostrils; the other sign, that the air in the mouth itself is fouled by the vapors exhaled from the stomach into the mouth, as is manifest in those whose mouth and breath stink: but the breath that is drawn through the nostrils glides pure to the lung without any contagion of filth and uncleanness, and thence is likewise rendered pure.⁷

For “breath” (spiraculum), in Hebrew there is the word נשמה (Nessamah), signifying a breath; and there seems to be this difference between נשמה (Nessamah) and רוח (ruah) — which word signifies wind — that wind is without color and invisible, whereas a breath and a vapor is visible after the manner of smoke or cloud. And He called the rational soul the “breath of life” because man lives just so long as he breathes; and as soon as he is failed by respiration, he is likewise bereft of life and deserted by the soul: nay rather, in the three chief languages — Hebrew, Greek, and Latin — the soul is named from respiration, or from the cooling which happens through respiration: for in Hebrew it is called נפש (Nephes) from breathing and blowing; in Latin it is called Anima, from the Greek word ἄνεμος, that is, wind; in Greek ψυχή (psyche), from ψυχάζω (psychazo), to cool... [continues]⁸

PRo spiraculo Hebraicè est vox נשמה Nessamah, significans halitum, idque videtur inter נשמה Nessamah, & רוח ruah (quae vox significat ventum) interesse, quòd ventus est sine colore & invisibilis, halitus verò & spiritus ad modum fumi seu nubis est aspectabilis. Propterea verò animam rationalem appellavit spiraculú vitae, quòd tantisper vivit homo dum spirat; simulque ut deficitur respiratione, etiam vita destituitur & ab anima deseritur: quinimo, in tribus praecipuis linguis, Hebraea, Graeca & Latina, anima appellatur à respiratione seu refrigeratione quae fit per respirationem: nam Hebraicè dicitur נפש Nephes à spirando & sufflando: Latinè appellatur Anima, à Graeca voce ἄνεμος, id est, ventus: Graecè ψυχή à ψυχάζω, refrige-[ro...]

[...refrige]ro, Nam quia, inquit Plato in Cratylo, cùm anima in corpore est, causa ipsi est ut vivat, respirandi vim ei praebens: simul autem ut respiratio desinit, corpus interit & homo moritur, propterea mihi videntur animam veteres ψυχήν appellasse. ILLUD autem Spiraculum vitae, Hebraica phrasi positum est pro eo quod est, Spiraculum vitale seu vivificans: nec est in Hebraeo singulariter, Spiraculum vitae, sed pluraliter Spiraculum vitarum. Cur autem pluraliter dictum sit Spiraculum vitarum, variae sunt explanatorum coniecturae. Quidam referunt ad duas nares per quas spiritum vitalem ducimus. Alij putant ea re significari longissimam vitam quam acturus erat homo in statu innocentiae, & quam primaevi homines egerunt ante diluviú. Nonnulli denotari existimant duplicem vitam, cuius solus omnium animalium homo capax est, praesenté scilicet quae temporalis est, & futuram quae est aeterna. Nec desunt qui

[...to cool]. “For, because” (says Plato in the Cratylus), “when the soul is in the body, it is the cause for it to live, furnishing it the power of breathing; but as soon as respiration ceases, the body perishes and the man dies — on that account the ancients seem to me to have called the soul ψυχήν.” Now that “breath of life” (Spiraculum vitae) is put, by a Hebrew idiom, for that which is “a vital or vivifying breath”: nor is it in the Hebrew in the singular, “breath of life,” but in the plural, “breath of lives” (Spiraculum vitarum). Why it is said in the plural, “breath of lives,” there are various conjectures of the expositors. Some refer it to the two nostrils through which we draw the vital breath. Others think that by it is signified the very long life which man was to have led in the state of innocence, and which the primeval men led before the Flood. Some judge that a double life is denoted, of which man alone of all animals is capable — the present, namely, which is temporal, and the future, which is eternal. Nor are there lacking those who⁹

opinentur Mosen his verbis voluisse indicare duplicem vivendi modum, quem habet anima rationalis, unum prout ipsa est in corpore, ipsum informans, animans, vivificans, & ad operandum movens: alterum pro ut ipsa à corpore seiuncta per se subsistit, & sine corporis adminiculo actiones suas perficit. Illud quoque placet quibusdam, insinuari hoc loco duplicem hominis vitam, unam corporalem & naturalem, alteram spiritualem & supernaturalem. Illam praestat anima [naturali...]

think that Moses by these words wished to indicate the double mode of living which the rational soul has: one as it is in the body, informing it, animating, vivifying it, and moving it to operate; the other as, severed from the body, it subsists by itself and accomplishes its actions without the body's aid. This too pleases some: that here is insinuated the double life of man — the one corporeal and natural, the other spiritual and supernatural. The former the soul provides by its [natural...] [continues]¹⁰

[...Illam praestat anima] naturali vi & potestate sua, hanc non nisi singulari gratia & auxilio Dei instructa & adiuta.

[...The former the soul provides] by its natural force and power; the latter only when instructed and aided by the singular grace and help of God.¹¹

CAIETANUS subtiliùs haec scrutatus atque commentatus, significari putat triplicem vitam quam anima rationalis tribuit homini, nam licèt ea sit una tantùm secundùm substantiam, potétia tamen & ipso effectus triplex est. Siquidem praestat homini vitam vegetativam, sensitivam, & intellectivam: ad easque vitas tuendas & exercendas triplici utitur spiritu velut instrumento, Spiritum dico vitalem in corde, naturalem in iecore, animalem in capite generatum atque in universum corpus permanantem.

CAJETAN, examining and commenting on these things more subtly, thinks that a triple life is signified which the rational soul confers on man; for although it is one only according to substance, yet in potency and in effect it is triple. Indeed it confers on man the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective life; and to maintain and exercise these lives it uses, as an instrument, a triple spirit — I mean the vital spirit, generated in the heart, the natural in the liver, the animal in the head, and permeating into the whole body.¹²

Caietanus porrò argumentatur ex hoc loco Mosis, unam duntaxat in homine animam esse secundùm substantiam, nempe rationalem, quae tamen eminenter & virtualiter, ut in scholis loquimur, duas reliquas animas vegetativam & sensitivam continet. Quod auté in homine virtus vegetativa distincta non sit à sensitiva eo patet argumento, quòd virtus vegetativa efficit organa sensitiva, hoc autem opus excedit omnem vim animae vegetativae: quocirca necesse est vires vegetativas revera esse ipsius animae sensitivae, & eius virtute operari. Sensitivas praeterea vires in homine non esse ipsius animae sensitivae sed rationalis eo manifestú fit, quòd suprema facultas sensitiva in homine, quam in scholis appellamus, Cogitativam, iam est aliqua ex parte rationalis: per hanc enim homo reminiscitur & ratiocinatur circa res singulares, ex uno singulari discurrens ad aliud singulare. Idem quoque cernitur in altera parte animae sensitivae quam vocamus Appetitivá, appetitus enim sensitivus in homine est quodammodo rationalis, ut confirmat Aristoteles in extremo primo Ethicorum libro, potest enim ei accommodari ad praescriptum rationis, eíque subiectus & obediens fieri, quamobrem etiam capax esse virtutum moralium: namque temperantia & fortitudo, illa in concupiscibili, haec in irascibili parte suas habent sedes.

Cajetan argues further, from this passage of Moses, that there is in man only one soul according to substance, namely the rational, which however eminently and virtually (as we say in the schools) contains the two remaining souls, the vegetative and the sensitive. That in man the vegetative power is not distinct from the sensitive is clear by this argument: that the vegetative power produces the sensitive organs, but this work exceeds all the power of a vegetative soul; wherefore it is necessary that the vegetative powers be in reality of the sensitive soul itself, and operate by its power. And that the sensitive powers in man are not of the sensitive soul but of the rational becomes manifest from this: that the supreme sensitive faculty in man, which in the schools we call the Cogitative, is already in some part rational — for through it man remembers and reasons about singular things, discoursing from one singular to another. The same is seen also in the other part of the sensitive soul, which we call the Appetitive; for the sensitive appetite in man is somehow rational, as Aristotle confirms at the end of the first book of the Ethics, since it can be accommodated to the prescript of reason, and become subject and obedient to it — for which reason it is also capable of the moral virtues; for temperance and fortitude have their seats, the former in the concupiscible, the latter in the irascible part.¹³

ILLUD porrò: Et factus est homo in animam viventem: Hebraismum continet qui sic explicari debet: Factus est homo habens animá facientem ipsum vivere: vel animae vocabulo significatur hic, ut saepè aliàs in Scriptura, ipse homo, ut sensus sit: Per illá Dei inspiratione qua anima est infusa corpori, factus est Adam in hominem viventé, id est, homo vivens. Chaldaeus paraphrastes vertit: In Spiritum loquenté: quo loquédi modo tria significantur. Primò id ipsum quod diximus Adam scilicet factú esse hominem viventem: nam loqui & sermocinari, manifestú est signum vitae humanae. Deinde, significat Adamum accepisse tunc animá non quamlibet sed rationalem, cuius nempe proprium est humanum sermonem & orationem fingere. Ad hoc, indicat hominé creatum esse aetate perfecta, siquidem aptè ac prudenter loqui, non cuiuslibet aetatis est. Atque hoc velut typum quendam praetulit eius quod postea evenit in die Pentecostes, quo die Ecclesia Christi quasi per Spiritum sanctum regenerata, facta est in Spiritum vivificantem, & fideles coeperunt loqui variis linguis magnalia Dei.

Furthermore, that phrase, “And man was made into a living soul,” contains a Hebraism which ought to be explained thus: “The man was made having a soul making him to live”; or by the word “soul” there is signified here, as often elsewhere in Scripture, the man himself, so that the sense is: “By that inspiration of God by which the soul was infused into the body, Adam was made into a living man,” that is, a living man. The Chaldee paraphrast renders it: “Into a speaking spirit”: by which manner of speaking three things are signified. First, that very thing we said, namely that Adam was made a living man — for to speak and to converse is a manifest sign of human life. Then, it signifies that Adam received then a soul not just any one but a rational one, whose property, namely, is to frame human speech and discourse. To this, it indicates that man was created at a perfect age, since to speak aptly and prudently belongs not to just any age. And this presented, as it were, a certain type of what afterward came to pass on the day of Pentecost — on which day the Church of Christ, regenerated as it were through the Holy Spirit, was made into a vivifying Spirit, and the faithful began to speak in various tongues the great works of God.¹⁴

Translator’s notes

Scripture lemma (set in the margin as CAP. 2. GENES. VERS. 7., the verse in italic) opening the next stretch of commentary. ↩
Large decorated initial 'Q'. Hebrew נפח (Napach, 'to breathe/blow') glossed. Theodoret: the insufflation marks the ease of the soul's creation. Marginal gloss: 'Cur creatio animae rationalis: & infusio in corpus appelletur insufflatio' (why the creation of the rational soul and its infusion into the body is called an insufflation). Sentence breaks at the catchword 'tentia'. ↩
Three reasons for the 'insufflation' metaphor concluded: the soul created ex nihilo from without (immaterial/immortal); created and infused at once; proceeding 'from God's mouth' as partaker of God's life. Sir 24:5 cited. ↩
The 'soul from God's substance' error (Cicero's Platonism; some Fathers on John 20:22; Lactantius Div. Inst. 2) rejected as absurd: God's inspiration, like His fiat, is not corporeal. Marginal gloss: 'An humanus animus sit ex substantia Dei' (whether the human soul is from the substance of God). ↩
Hebrew אף (Aph) from root אנף (Anaph, 'to be angry'): 'anger' → 'nose/nostrils' → 'face' (Ps 115:6; Gen 19:1). Aquinas ST I q.90 and Bonaventure Sent. II d.17 already settle that the soul is not of God's substance. ↩
Why 'face/nostrils': life, the senses, and the affections appear there. Cajetan reads 'into the nostrils' (nose = organ of breathing). Marginal gloss: 'Caietanus in Genes.' (Cajetan on Genesis). Page ends at catchword 'tionis' (signature GG 2). ↩
Cajetan's two 'signs' that the nose is the proper organ of breathing (concluding the point begun on PDF 460). ↩
Large decorated initial 'P'. Hebrew נשמה (neshamah, breath) vs רוח (ruach, wind: invisible) vs נפש (nephesh, soul from breathing); Latin anima from Greek ἄνεμος (wind); Greek ψυχή from ψυχάζω (to cool). Marginal gloss: 'Cur anima hominis dicta sit spiraculū' with the Hebrew phrase נשמת חיים (nishmath chaiim, 'breath of lives' = spiraculum vitarum). ↩
Plato, Cratylus, on psyche from breathing/cooling. The plural 'breath of lives' (Heb. nishmath chaiim) explained variously: the two nostrils; the long antediluvian life; the double (temporal/eternal) life. Marginal gloss: 'Cur Hebraicè dictum sit spiraculū vitarum' (why in Hebrew it is called the breath of lives). ↩
Two further readings of 'lives': the soul's double mode (in-body / separated); man's double life (natural / supernatural). Sentence breaks at 'anima'; completed on PDF 462 ('naturali vi & potestate sua'). ↩
Completes the sentence carried over from PDF 461: the natural life from the soul's own power, the supernatural only by grace. ↩
Cajetan: the one rational soul yields a triple life (vegetative/sensitive/intellective), served by the three medical 'spirits' (vital/natural/animal). Marginal gloss: 'Caietanus in Genes.' ↩
Cajetan's argument for the unicity of the substantial form: one rational soul containing the lower powers virtually (the vegetative makes the sensitive organs; the Cogitative and the sensitive appetite are already 'in part rational' — Arist. EN 1.13). Marginal gloss: 'unam duntaxat in homine esse animam, quomodo argumentetur Caietanus' (how Cajetan argues that there is in man only one soul). ↩
Gen 2:7b 'in animam viventem' as Hebraism (= a living man); the Targum's 'speaking spirit' yields three points: living man, a rational soul (speech), a perfect age; the type of Pentecost (Acts 2). Marginal gloss: 'Act. 2.' Page ends at catchword 'DISPV' (signature GG 3) — a new DISPUTATIO opens on PDF 463. RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 463, new DISPUTATIO. ↩