Mind of the Church

The mind of the Church, faithfully rendered into English

Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Four — the creation of the first human beings

QUESTION IV. Why God did not threaten Adam with the pains of hell

LatineEnglish

QUESTION IV. Why God did not threaten Adam with the pains of hell.1

QVAESTIO IIII. Cur Deus non sit comminatus Adae poenas inferni.

ADAM propter esum interdicti cibi, non modò corporis mortem promeruit, sed etiam aeternae mortis reus fuit, & perpetuis inferni suppliciis obnoxius. Nám si eius posteri propter peccatum originale quod ex ipso generati traxerút, nascuntur filij irae & dánationi aeternae addicti, quantò magis ipse Adam qui proprio actu peccavit, & derivádi in omnes posteros peccati auctor & causa fuit? Cú igitur poena inferni multo gravior & horribilior sit quá poena mortis corporalis, quaeritur cur non illam potius quàm hanc, ad cómovendum Adamum & ab esu illius cibi deterrendum, illi Deus comminatus fuerit; Tribus de causis id factum esse reor. Licèt enim poena inferni re ipsa gravior sit quàm mors corporis, comminatio tamen corporalis mortis acrior & vehementior est ad commovendum hominem. Etenim affectus humanus erga rem aliquam plane sequitur cognitionem eius rei: quod enim pluribus modis & certius atque evidentius nobis cognitum & persuasum est, id ad nostrum affectum movendum & incitandum maiorem vim habet.
Adam, on account of eating the forbidden food, not only deserved the death of the body, but was also guilty of eternal death, and liable to the perpetual punishments of hell. For if his posterity, on account of the original sin which, generated from him, they drew, are born sons of wrath and addicted to eternal damnation, how much more Adam himself, who sinned by his own act, and was the author and cause of the sin to be derived into all his posterity? Since, therefore, the penalty of hell is much graver and more horrible than the penalty of corporeal death, it is asked why God threatened him with this rather than that, in order to move Adam and to deter him from eating that food. I judge it was done for three causes. For although the penalty of hell is in itself graver than the death of the body, yet the threat of corporeal death is sharper and more vehement for moving man. For human affection toward a thing plainly follows the cognition of that thing: for what is known and persuaded to us in more ways, and more certainly and evidently, has greater force for moving and inciting our affection.2
Poena inferni talis nempe qualis traditur nobis in sacra Scriptura, sola fide nobis nota est & persuasa: at mors corporis, tribus viis exploratè percepta & credita nobis est, Fide, Ratione, & Sensu. Fide, quia divinis litteris testatum est: statutum esse homini semel mori: & David cecinit: Quis est homo qui vixit, & non videbit mortem? Ratione, quia cùm homo compositus sit ex materia & forma & ex rebus contrariis, non potest mortem effugere: quòd si morbi aliqui & dolores ut stomachi, vesicae, capitis & dentium, adeo nos cruciant ut vix animo consistere possimus (qui tamen non sunt cum acerbitate mortis comparandi) nónne hinc satis intelligere licet, quàm sit homini formidanda & horrenda mors? Hoc denique sensibus ipsis latè superque compertum est, quotidianis videlicet tot hominum acerbissimè morientiú experimentis. Hac igitur de causa vehémentiùs afficit hominem timor mortis corporalis, quàm metus inferni: huius enim timor perpaucos à peccando, illius quamplurimos revocare solet.
The penalty of hell — such, namely, as is handed down to us in sacred Scripture — is known and persuaded to us by faith alone; but the death of the body is clearly perceived and believed by us in three ways: by Faith, by Reason, and by Sense. By Faith, because it is attested in the divine writings: “it is appointed to man once to die”; and David sang: “Who is the man that shall live, and not see death?” By Reason, because, since man is composed of matter and form and of contrary things, he cannot escape death — and if certain diseases and pains, such as of the stomach, the bladder, the head, and the teeth, so torment us that we can scarcely keep our composure (and yet these are not to be compared with the bitterness of death), can one not from this sufficiently understand how to be dreaded and how horrible death is to man? And finally, this is amply and abundantly ascertained by the senses themselves, namely by the daily experiences of so many men dying most bitterly. For this cause, therefore, the fear of corporeal death affects man more vehemently than the dread of hell: for the dread of the latter is wont to recall very few from sinning, but the fear of the former very many.3
Deinde, eam Deus poenam voluit proponere, quam si Adam praeceptum ipsius violasset necessario subiret, nec solùm ipse sed omnes item eius posteri: tametsi postea ille resipisceret & peccati sui poenitens ad Dei gratiam rediret. Huiusmodi autem [poena fuit mors corporis...]
Then, God willed to propose that penalty which, if Adam violated His precept, he would necessarily undergo — and not only he himself, but likewise all his posterity — even if afterward he came to his senses and, repenting of his sin, returned to the grace of God. And of this kind [was the death of the body...] [continues]4
[...Huiusmodi autem] poena fuit mors corporis, quam nec Adam resipiscens, nec posteri eius etiamsi aliqui fuerint sanctissimi, effugere potuerunt: poenam autem inferni & ipsi primi parentes, & plurimi posterorum evaserunt: HIs addo tertiam causam commemoratam ab Augustino, in lib. 13. de Civit. Dei, cap. 23. expressas vel aeternae vitae ac felicitatis promissiones, vel mortis aeternae ac suppliciorum inferni comminationes, reservatas fuisse gratiae novi Testamenti. Namque in veteri Testamento, praesertim verò ante Prophetas, aut nulla aut perquàm rara, nec nisi velata & tecta mentio fit aeternae vel mortis vel vitae.
[...And of this kind] was the death of the body, which neither Adam, coming to his senses, nor his posterity — even if some of them were most holy — were able to escape; but the penalty of hell both the first parents themselves and very many of their posterity have escaped. To these I add a third cause, noted by Augustine, in book 13 of the City of God, chapter 23: that the express promises of eternal life and happiness, or the threats of eternal death and of the punishments of hell, were reserved for the grace of the New Testament. For in the Old Testament — and especially before the Prophets — either no, or very rare, and only veiled and covered, mention is made of either eternal death or eternal life.5

Let me set down here the words of Augustine: “Therefore, when God threatened Adam with death, He said nothing of the second death, because He willed it to be hidden, on account of the dispensation of the New Testament, where the second death is most openly declared — so that first this first death, which is common to all, might be disclosed as having come from that sin which, committed in one, was made common to all; but the second death is not indeed common to all, on account of those who, according to His purpose, are called holy, whom He foreknew and predestined beforehand (as the Apostle says) to be made conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren — whom, from the second death, through the Mediator, the grace of God has freed.” Thus far are the words of Saint Augustine.6

Poná hic Augustini verba, Propterea, inquit, cóminatus Adamo Deus mortem, de secunda morte nihil dixit, quia occultam esse voluit propter dispensationem Testamenti novi, ubi secunda mors apertissimè declaratur: ut prius ista mors prima quae communis est omnibus proderetur ex illo venisse peccato, quod in uno commune factum est omnibus: mors verò secunda non utique communis est omnibus, propter eos qui secundùm propositú vocati sunt sancti, quos ante praescivit & praedestinavit, sicut ait Apostolus, conformes fieri imaginis Filij sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus, quos à secunda morte per mediatorem, Dei gratia liberavit. Hactenus verba sunt S. Augustini.

Translator’s notes

  1. Fourth question of the disputation (rule above). ↩
  2. Large decorated initial 'A'. Adam deserved hell, not only death; why threaten the lesser? First cause: the threat of bodily death moves more, because affection follows the certainty of knowledge. Marginal gloss: 'Cur non poenam inferni, sed mortis Deus comminatus est Adamo, tres causae.' ↩
  3. Bodily death is known three ways — faith (Heb 9:27 'appointed once to die'; Ps 88[89]:49), reason (a body of contraries must dissolve; cf. lesser pains), and sense (daily deaths) — whereas hell is known by faith alone; hence death's threat moves more. Marginal glosses: 'Necessitatem moriendi tribus viis esse nobis persuasam'; 'Hebra 9. Psal. 88.' ↩
  4. Second cause: God named the penalty Adam would unavoidably suffer even after repentance — bodily death (whereas hell could be escaped by penance). Sentence breaks at the catchword 'autem'. ↩
  5. Third cause: explicit promises/threats of eternal life and the second death were reserved to the New Testament's revelation (Augustine, Civ. Dei 13.23) — the Old Testament's mention is veiled. ↩
  6. Augustine, Civ. Dei 13.23 (block-quote, 'Hactenus verba sunt S. Augustini'): the second death was left hidden (Rom 8:29 'conformed to the image of His Son... firstborn among many brethren') — common death revealed first, the second death reserved to the Gospel. Closes the disputation on the penalty of death (rule below). ↩