Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Four — the creation of the first human beings

QUESTION III. How, in the state of innocence, women could have been generated

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QUESTION III. How, in the state of innocence, women could have been generated.1

QVAESTIO III. Quomodo in statu innocentiae foeminae generari potuissent.

ILLVD tamen magnam habet difficultatem, qua ratione in statu innocentiae foemina generari potuisset. Námque foemina, vt auctor est Aristoteles in 2. lib. de Generatione Animalium, fit praeter intentionem agentis particularis, propter defectum scilicet virtutis quae est in semine virili. Etenim omne agens intendit generare sibi simile, nisi impediatur: in generatione autem hominis vir est agens, foemina autem patiens: ergo vir semper generabit virum, nisi obstet vel imbecillitas virtutis eius, vel aliquod vitium & impedimentum in muliere quae subministrat materiam generationi, & in cuius vtero fit conceptus, & per nouem menses vsque ad partum continetur. Cum igitur in statu innocentiae nullum futurum esset vitiú, nullus defectus, nulla infirmitas virtutis generatricis tam virilis quàm foemineae, nulla videtur tunc generandi foeminam ratio & causa esse potuisse. Quod [autem...]
But this has a great difficulty: by what reason a woman could have been generated in the state of innocence. For the female, as Aristotle is the author (in the second book On the Generation of Animals), comes about beyond the intention of the particular agent — namely, on account of a defect of the power which is in the virile seed. For every agent intends to generate its like, unless it be impeded: but in the generation of man the man is the agent, and the woman the patient; therefore the man will always generate a man, unless either the weakness of his power obstruct, or some vice and impediment in the woman who supplies the matter for generation, and in whose womb conception occurs and is contained for nine months until birth. Since, therefore, in the state of innocence there would be no vice, no defect, no infirmity of the generative power, whether virile or feminine, no reason and cause seems then to have been able to exist for generating a female. But [what...] [continues]2

But what we said, from Aristotle's opinion, that the female is something imperfect and procreated beyond the intention of the generator, as it were by occasion — it pleases me to make more known and attested to the reader by the Prince of Philosophers' own words here set down. Thus he writes (book 2 On the Generation of Animals, chapter 3): “The female is, as it were, a damaged male.” And (book 4, chapter 2), when he had said that the male is a perfect animal but the female imperfect, he subjoins: “The indications,” he says, “are furnished by the things that happen. For a youthful and a senescent age generate females more than the flourishing age, for in the one the heat is not yet perfect, in the other it fails. More humid and effeminate bodies also generate females rather, and moist seeds rather than thick do the same. For all these things come about from a natural lack of heat.” And in the following chapter he teaches that nature, in the generation of a woman, fails and degenerates, writing thus: “But the first beginning of degenerating is for a female to be generated, not a male; yet this is necessary to nature, for the kind must be preserved of those which are distinguished into female and [male...] [continues]3

Quod autem diximus ex sententia Aristotelis, foeminam esse quiddam imperfectum & praeter intentionem generantis velut ex occasione procreatum, libet Principis Philosophorú propriis verbis hic appositis lectori notius & testatius facere. Sic ille scribit lib. 2. de Generatione Animalium, cap. 3. Foemina quasi mas laesus est. Et lib. 4. cap. 2. cú dixisset marem esse animal perfectum, foeminam verò imperfectum, subdit, Indicia, inquit, faciunt res quae accidút. Nouella enim & senescens aetas magis quàm florens foeminas generat, in altera enim calor nondum perfectus est, in altera deficit. Humidiora etiam effoeminatioraq́ corpora foeminá potius gignunt, & semina humida magis quàm spissa hoc idem faciunt. Haec enim omnia eueniunt caloris inopia naturalis. Et capite sequéti docet naturam in generatione mulieris deficere ac degenerare, ita scribens, Sed initium primum degenerádi est foeminam generari non marem; verùm hoc necessarium est naturae, genus enim seruari oportet eorum quae foemina & [mare...]

[...for the kind must be preserved of those which are distinguished into female and male]. But since it can happen that sometimes the seed of the male does not prevail — whether on account of a youthful or senile age, or on account of some other cause of this kind — a female must, for that reason, be begotten.” Finally, in chapter 6 of the same book: “Females,” he says, “are by their nature weaker and colder, and the female sex is to be thought, as it were, a natural injury and detriment.” Thus far Aristotle: who indeed, in the seventh book of the Politics, chapter 16, seems to hand down things not unlike these.4

[...genus enim seruari oportet eorum quae foemina & mare] distinguuntur. Sed cum fieri possit ne aliquando semen superet maris, aut ob aetatem iuuenilem senilémue, aut ob aliam eiusmodi causam, foeminam ob eam rem gigni necesse est. Denique in eiusdem libri cap. 6. Sunt, inquit, foeminae sua natura debiliores frigidioresq́, & sexum foemineum quasi laesionem naturalem & detrimentum esse putandum est. Hactenus Aristoteles: qui quidem & in libro septimo Politicorum, cap. 16. his non dissimilia tradere videtur.

VERVM quaestioné propositá ad hunc modú non difficulter expediri [posse arbitror...]
But the question proposed can, in this manner, be resolved not with difficulty [I think...] [continues]5
[...VERVM quaestioné propositá ad hunc modú non difficulter ex]pediri posse arbitror. Generationem foeminae puto equidem non tantùm ex imbecillitate seminis virilis, aut ex vitio aliquo & impediméto quod sit in sanguine menstruo aut in vtero mulieris, sed aliis etiam ex rebus proficisci. Nam inter alia quae ad generationem maris vel foeminae conferunt, Aristoteles numerat ventos: multum enim refert quo vento flante fiat generatio. Siquidem Aquilo plurimum generationem maris adiuuat, Auster verò foeminae. Id quod non vno loco docet & confirmat Aristoteles. Etenim in capite secundo libri quarti de generatione animalium, Flatibus, inquit, Aquilonis magis [quàm Austrinis...]
[...But the question proposed can, in this manner, be re]solved not with difficulty, I think. The generation of a female I indeed think proceeds not only from the weakness of the virile seed, or from some vice and impediment that is in the menstrual blood or in the woman's womb, but also from other things. For among the other things which contribute to the generation of male or female, Aristotle counts the winds: for it matters much by what wind blowing the generation occurs. Since the North wind (Aquilo) most aids the generation of a male, but the South wind (Auster), of a female. Which Aristotle teaches and confirms in more than one place. For in the second chapter of the fourth book On the Generation of Animals: “By the blasts,” he says, “of the North wind more [than the South...] [continues]6

[...By the blasts of the North wind more than the South], males are begotten.” And a little below: “Shepherds say that it matters to the breeding of male and female cattle, not only if it happens that the coupling occurs by North or South winds, but also if, when the herd mates, it faces toward the North or the South. Thus sometimes, by the smallest moment, a cause of heat or cold is given, and these complete the cause of generation.” And in the sixth book On the History of Animals, chapter nineteen, Aristotle writes in these words: “Males or females are generated by the force both of waters and of the studs. For waters too cause females or males to be conceived. Besides, by the blast of the North wind males are rather conceived, by the South, females. So great is the force of the North wind, that it even changes those which bring forth only females to the procreation of male offspring. They ought to face the North when the females couple.” Thus Aristotle. And let this be the first cause of generating a male or a female.7

[...Flatibus Aquilonis magis quàm Austrinis], mares gignuntur. Et paulò infra: Pastores aiunt interesse ad maris ac foeminae pecoris foeturam, non solùm si ita accidit vt initus Aquilonis Austrinísue flatibus fiat, sed etiam si cum pecus coit, spectat ad Aquilonem aut Austrum. Ita minimo interdum momento causa datur caliditatis aut frigiditatis, haec verò causam complent generationis. In libro autem sexto de Historia animalium, capite decimonono, his verbis scribit Aristoteles: Mares aut foeminae generantur vi tum aquarum, tum admissariorum. Nam & aquae faciunt vt foeminae marésue concipiantur. Adhaec, Aquilonis flatu mares potius concipiuntur, Austri foeminae. Vis tantú est Aquilonis, vt vel ea quae non nisi foeminas pariant immutet ad prolis masculae procreationem. Spectare ad Aquilonem oportet, cum coeunt foeminae. Sic Aristoteles. Atque haec sit prima causa generandi marem aut foeminam.

DEINDE, vehementer facit ad variandam generationem qua cogitatione & phantasia generationi vacantium animi pulsentur premanturque. Magnam enim vim habet imaginatio ad efficiendam prolem quae generatur: cuius rei in animalibus quidem clarissimum habemus exemplum simul & argumentum, id quod in hoc libro Geneseos capite 30. de ouibus Iacob memoriae proditum est. Cur autem tanta sit imaginationis potentia & efficacitas ad variandam generationem, & cur tam varios mirósque effectus habeat, elegantissimis verbis indicat Plinius in capite 12. libri 7. Similitudinum, inquit, in mente reputatio est, & in qua credantur multa fortuita pollere, visus, auditus, memoria, haustaeque imagines sub ipso conceptu. Cogitatio etiam vtriuslibet animum subito transuolans, effingere similitudinem aut miscere existimatur. Ideoque plures in homine quàm in caeteris omnibus animalibus differentiae, quoniam velocitas cogitationum animíque celeritas & ingenij varietas multiformes notas imprimit: cùm caeteris animantibus immobiles sint animi, & similes omnibus singulísq́ in suo cuíque genere. Haec Pli-[nius...]
Secondly, it greatly contributes to varying the generation by what thought and fantasy the minds of those engaged in generation are struck and pressed. For the imagination has great force to effect the offspring that is generated: of which thing we have, in animals, a most clear example and argument — that which is recorded in this book of Genesis, chapter 30, about the sheep of Jacob. But why the power and efficacy of the imagination is so great for varying generation, and why it has such various and wonderful effects, Pliny indicates in most elegant words (chapter 12 of book 7): “There is in the mind a reckoning of likenesses, and in it many chance things are believed to prevail — sight, hearing, memory, and images drawn in at the very moment of conception. The thought, too, of either parent, suddenly flying across the mind, is thought to fashion or to mingle the likeness. And so there are more differences in man than in all the other animals, since the speed of thoughts, the quickness of mind, and the variety of talent imprint manifold marks: whereas in the other animals the minds are immobile, and alike in all, and each in its own kind.” Thus Pli[ny...] [continues]8
[...Haec Plinius]. In statu autem innocentiae, vis & facultas generandi ipséque actus generationis in voluntate & potestate hominis erat, non modò quantum ad affectionem & vsum eius, sed etiam quantum ad modum & mensuram, necnon & quantum ad eiusdem actus intentionem aut remissionem. Ergo, cùm voluisset homo generare marem, intensiori animo & vehementiori imaginatione in actu generationis fuisset, maiorémque conatum adhibuisset, ideoque plus caloris, [spiritus...]
[...Thus Pliny]. But in the state of innocence, the power and faculty of generating, and the very act of generation, was in the will and power of man — not only as to its affection and use, but also as to its manner and measure, and also as to the intention or remission of that same act. Therefore, when a man would have willed to generate a male, he would have been in the act of generation with a more intense mind and a more vehement imagination, and would have applied a greater effort, and therefore more heat, [spirit...] [continues]9
[...ideoque plus caloris,] spiritus genitalis & vigoris in ipsum semen contullisset; quod factum esset, vt mas potius quàm foemina generaretur. Contrà verò, cum generanda erat foemina, remissiori animo ad actum generationis accessisset: vnde minorem etiam vim semen eius habuisset, adiuncta praesertim intentissima cogitatione vehementíque imaginatione ac desiderio generandi foeminam potius quàm marem. Atque huic nostrae opinioni suffragatur S. Bonauentura, in secundo Sentent. distinct. 20. quaest. sexta.
[...and therefore more heat,] genital spirit, and vigor he would have conferred upon the seed itself; which being done, a male rather than a female would be generated. But contrariwise, when a female was to be generated, he would have approached the act of generation with a more remiss mind: whence his seed too would have had less force — especially with a most intent thought, and a vehement imagination and desire, of generating a female rather than a male, being joined. And to this our opinion St. Bonaventure gives his support, in the second [book] of the Sentences, distinction 20, question six.10

Translator’s notes

  1. Third question of the disputation.
  2. Decorated initial 'I.' The difficulty: on Aristotle's view (de Gen. Anim. 2) the female results from a defect of the male seed (man = agent, woman = patient; the agent would always make its like, a male, but for some impediment). So in defect-free innocence, no female would ever be generated — which must be answered.
  3. Aristotle block-quote (reporting his biology, set down to attest Pererius' point): the female is 'a damaged/maimed male' (de Gen. Anim. 2.3, 4.2-3); females are produced more in youth/old age, by humid bodies and moist seed, all 'from a lack of natural heat'; a female is the 'first degeneration,' yet necessary to preserve the kind. Marginal gloss: 'Foeminá esse quid imperfectum & degenerans, secundùm Aristotelis doctrinam.'
  4. End of the Aristotle block-quote: when the male seed fails to dominate (youth, old age, etc.) a female is begotten — necessary to preserve the species; 'females are by nature weaker and colder, the sex a natural injury and detriment' (de Gen. Anim. 4.6; cf. Politics 7.16).
  5. Pererius begins his own resolution of how females would be generated in innocence (continues on the next page). Page breaks at catchword 'pediri' (ex-pediri).
  6. Pererius' answer: a female's generation has causes beyond a defective seed/womb — among them the winds. Per Aristotle, the North wind favors males, the South favors females (de Gen. Anim. 4.2). Marginal glosses: 'Vndé prouenisset in statu innocentiae generatio foeminarum.'; 'Diuersitas venti variat generationem.'
  7. Aristotle block-quote (de Gen. Anim. 4.2; Hist. Anim. 6.19): wind-direction at coupling, and the waters, tip generation toward male or female; the North wind even turns female-only breeders to males. This is Pererius' 'first cause' of either sex.
  8. The 'second cause': the imagination of the parents shapes the offspring (the classic proof: Jacob's peeled rods and the sheep, Gen 30). Pliny (NH 7.12) on how mental images at conception imprint likeness — and why human variety so exceeds the animals'. Marginal gloss: 'Vehemens imaginatio generantium magnam vim ad variandam generationem habet.'
  9. The resolution: in innocence the generative power and act were fully under man's will — its manner, measure, and intensity. So to beget a male he would generate with intenser mind and imagination and greater effort, producing more heat and [spirit] (the male-tending factors). Page breaks at catchword 'spiri' (signature RR). RESUME PDF 539 with '...plus caloris, [spiri]tus...'.
  10. Pererius' resolution completed: to beget a male, more heat/spirit/vigor in the seed; for a female, a slacker effort and weaker seed, with the will and imagination bent on a female — so in innocence the will would freely determine the offspring's sex. St Bonaventure (Sent. II d.20 q.6) supports this.