Mind of the Church

The mind of the Church, faithfully rendered into English

Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Five — the state of innocence

QUESTION IV. Whether the gift of immortality which Adam had pertained to the integrity and perfection of human nature according to its own condition and degree

LatineEnglish

QUESTION IV. Whether the gift of immortality which Adam had pertained to the integrity and perfection of human nature according to its own condition and degree.1

QUAESTIO IIII. Utrum donum immortalitatis quod habuit Adam, pertineret ad integritatem & perfectionem naturae humanae secundum suam conditionem & gradum.

Restat ultima quaestio, gravis sane & nobilis, nulloque modo hic praetereunda, utrum illa primi hominis immortalitas, qualiscumque ea fuerit, esset naturaliter homini debita, hoc est ad naturalem humanae naturae integritatem & perfectionem pertinens, ut sine ea sit nunc homo mutilus atque monstrosus. Non defuerunt viri docti qui putarunt iustitiam originalem, quae continebat potentiam non moriendi & perfectam carnis & sensus sub imperium & potestatem rationis subiectionem, fuisse donum quoddam naturae humanae quodammodo debitum, hoc est, licet a solo Deo effectum & concessum homini, ad naturalem tamen hominis integritatem & perfectionem omnino perti[nens]...
There remains the final question, weighty indeed and noble, and by no means to be passed over here: whether that immortality of the first man, of whatever sort it was, was naturally owed to man—that is, pertaining to the natural integrity and perfection of human nature, so that without it man is now maimed and monstrous. There have not been lacking learned men who held that original justice, which comprised the ability not to die and the perfect subjection of flesh and sense under the command and power of reason, was a certain gift in a manner owed to human nature; that is, although effected and granted to man by God alone, yet altogether pertaining to the natural integrity and perfection of man...2
...pertinens, ut eo dono post peccatum Adae privata, hominis natura censeri debeat naturaliter imperfecta, mutila, & quasi monstrosa.
...pertaining [to it], so that, man's nature having been deprived of that gift after the sin of Adam, it ought to be reckoned naturally imperfect, maimed, and as it were monstrous.3
Hoc autem illi sic argumentantur. Illud est naturale quod ex causis naturalibus proficiscitur, sed illa immortalitas promissa Adamo ex causis naturalibus ei contigisset, videlicet propter esum fructus arboris vitae, cuius vis perpetuandi vitam usque adeo erat naturalis, ut etiam post peccatum, si Adam ex eo comedisset, in aeternum vivere potuisset. Idcirco enim, ut refert Moses extremis pene verbis capitis tertii libri Geneseos, Deus Adamum eiecit e paradiso, eiusque aditu prohibuit Adamum, Ne forte, inquit, mittat manum suam, & sumat de ligno vitae, & comedat, & vivat in aeternum. Si igitur causa vivendi in aeternum naturalis erat, etiam immortalitas qui erat effectus eius fuisset naturalis.
Now they argue this as follows. That is natural which proceeds from natural causes; but that immortality promised to Adam would have befallen him from natural causes, namely on account of the eating of the fruit of the tree of life, whose power of perpetuating life was so natural that even after sin, if Adam had eaten of it, he could have lived forever. For on this account, as Moses relates in almost the last words of the third chapter of the book of Genesis, God cast Adam out of paradise, and forbade Adam access to it, saying, 'Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever' (Gen. 3:22). If, therefore, the cause of living forever was natural, then the immortality too, which was its effect, would have been natural.4
Deinde, quod est debitum integritati naturae, ut sine eo natura sit manca & imperfecta naturaliter, id vere dici debet naturale: talis autem est immortalitas corporis. Si enim corpus humanum ab initio non fuisset a Deo factum aliquo modo incorruptibile, non fuisset convenientia & proportio inter animam incorruptibilem, & corpus corruptibile: illa enim vim haberet ad infinitum tempus informandi & vivificandi corpus; corpori vero, quia omnino corruptibile erat, repugnaret infinito tempore informari & vivificari ab anima, cum tamen secundum Aristotelem, quod est possibile ex parte formae, sit possibile quoque ex parte materiae, sicut quod est possibile ex parte potentiae activae, est possibile ex parte potentiae passivae, alioqui potentia illa frustra esset. Deus autem & natura nihil frustra in rebus faciunt, aut esse sinunt.
Next, what is owed to the integrity of a nature—so that without it the nature is naturally defective and imperfect—that ought truly to be called natural; but such is the immortality of the body. For if the human body had not from the beginning been made by God incorruptible in some way, there would not have been fitness and proportion between the incorruptible soul and the corruptible body: for the soul would have the power of informing and vivifying the body for an infinite time; but to the body, because it was wholly corruptible, it would be repugnant to be informed and vivified by the soul for an infinite time—whereas, according to Aristotle, what is possible on the part of the form is also possible on the part of the matter, just as what is possible on the part of the active potency is possible on the part of the passive potency; otherwise that potency would be in vain. But God and nature do nothing in vain in things, nor allow anything to be so.5
Ad haec, cum anima rationalis sit pars substantialis hominis, secundum naturam eius est & perfectum ipsius statum esse in homine, id est, copulatam cum corpore: praeter naturam autem eius est, & ad imperfectum statum eius pertinet, esse eam extra corpus. At si corpus esset omnino corruptibile, anima rationalis ad breve tempus esset coniuncta cum ipso; quoniam autem immortalis est, infinito tempore extra ipsum esset: ex quo efficeretur, ipsam brevi tempore esse secundum naturam, infinito autem tempore praeter naturam, quod est valde absurdum. Et vero, alienissimum videtur Dei sapientia, tale compositum substantiale facere, ut una eius pars sit mortalis, altera vero immortalis, cum tamen neutra sine altera possit naturaliter esse perfecta. Praeterea, si homo non habuisset aliquo modo immortalitatem corporis, nullus fuisset hominis, ut homo est, finis ultimus naturalis. Nam vel is fuisset corruptibilis, & non potuisset animae rationali convenire, aut incorruptibilis, & corpori humano conveniens non fuisset. Cumque materia sit propter formam, non autem e contrario, necessarium fuit corpus humanum aliqua ratione donari immortalitate, ut posset esse materia idonea & congruens animae rationali. Denique, naturalis ratio exigit, ut in homine mens & ratio imperet ac regat, caro autem & sensus regantur a ratione, eique obediant. Re-
Furthermore, since the rational soul is a substantial part of man, it is according to its nature, and is its perfect state, to be in man—that is, conjoined with the body; but it is contrary to its nature, and pertains to its imperfect state, to be outside the body. But if the body were wholly corruptible, the rational soul would be joined with it for a short time; whereas, since it is immortal, it would be outside it for an infinite time: from which it would follow that it is according to nature for a short time, but contrary to nature for an infinite time—which is very absurd. And indeed, it seems most alien to the wisdom of God to make such a substantial composite that one of its parts is mortal and the other immortal, since yet neither can be naturally perfect without the other. Besides, if man had not had in some way the immortality of the body, there would have been no natural ultimate end of man as man. For either it would have been corruptible, and could not have suited the rational soul, or incorruptible, and would not have suited the human body. And since matter is for the sake of form, and not the reverse, it was necessary that the human body be endowed in some way with immortality, so that it could be a fit and congruent matter for the rational soul. Finally, natural reason demands that in man the mind and reason should command and rule, while the flesh and sense are ruled by reason and obey it. The re[bellion]...6
...bellio igitur carnis adversus rationem quam describit Paul. ad Rom. 7. & ad Gal. 5. contra naturam hominis est: ergo iustitia originalis quae hanc rebellionem prohibebat, ad naturalem hominis statum, integritatem, & perfectionem pertinebat. Haec isti acutius, quam verius pro sua opinione disputant, aut disputare possunt.
...the rebellion, therefore, of the flesh against reason, which Paul describes in Romans 7 and Galatians 5, is contrary to the nature of man: therefore original justice, which prevented this rebellion, pertained to man's natural state, integrity, and perfection. These things these men argue for their opinion more acutely than truly, or than they can argue.7
Verum nos contra sentimus, certum enim nobis est donum illud immortalitatis fuisse supernaturale, nec ad naturalem humanae naturae per se consideratae integritatem pertinuisse, nec ei iure naturali fuisse debitum. Nam ut istorum doctorum vestigiis adversus ipsos in-
But we think the contrary, for it is certain to us that that gift of immortality was supernatural, and pertained neither to the natural integrity of human nature considered in itself, nor was owed to it by natural right. For, that we may follow the footsteps of these learned men against themselves, in[sisting]...8
...sistamus, illa immortalitas Adami non efficiebatur, ut putant ipsi, ex causis naturalibus. Quinimo cum Adamus ex materia quae habet potentiam contradictionis, & ex quatuor elementis constaret, ex his naturali consequentia existebat naturalis potentia & necessitas aliquando moriendi. Fructus autem arboris vitae habuisset vim servandi homines ab interitu, non tamen in perpetuum, sed ad certum quoddam tempus, longissimum sane, quamobrem phrasi Hebraea, & consuetudine Scripturae appellatur aeternum, sed finitum tamen, usque ad quod scilicet tempus constituerat Deus ut homo vitam animalem ageret in terris, exinde vero transferretur in coelum, vitam spiritalem & coelestem sempiterno aevo acturus. Quod si contendant isti fructum illum habuisse vim largiendi vitam immortalem, equidem non dubitaverim dicere, vim illam non fuisse naturalem sed supernaturalem: id quod Augustino, Bedae, Bonaventurae, & aliis primae classis Theologis quos lib. 3. commemoravimus, videtur placuisse.
...insisting, that immortality of Adam was not effected, as they think, from natural causes. Nay rather, since Adam was constituted of matter that has the potency of contradiction, and of the four elements, from these by natural consequence there existed a natural potency and necessity of dying at some time. But the fruit of the tree of life would have had the power of preserving men from destruction—yet not forever, but for a certain definite time, very long indeed, on which account, by Hebrew idiom and the custom of Scripture, it is called 'eternal,' but is nonetheless finite: namely, up to the time at which God had determined that man should lead an animal life on earth, and thence be transferred to heaven, to lead a spiritual and heavenly life for everlasting ages. But if they should contend that that fruit had the power of bestowing immortal life, I for my part would not hesitate to say that that power was not natural but supernatural: which seems to have pleased Augustine, Bede, Bonaventure, and other first-class Theologians whom I mentioned in book 3.9
Quid quod immortalitas Adami non omnino, nec ex toto, sed aliqua tantum ex parte pendebat ex fructu illius arboris: multis autem, & praecipuis aliis nominibus pendebat ex supernaturalibus & divinis privilegiis concessis homini vel concedendis, quae uno vocabulo specialis Dei assistentiae & protectionis comprehendi & enunciari possunt?
What of this—that Adam's immortality did not depend on the fruit of that tree wholly, nor entirely, but only in some part; and on many other, and chief, accounts depended on supernatural and divine privileges granted, or to be granted, to man, which by a single term can be comprised and expressed as God's special assistance and protection?10
Non fuisse autem illam, qualiscumque ea fuit, immortalitatem naturae humanae debitam, nec ad naturalem eius integritatem constituendam necessario requisitam, his argumentis, nec, ut opinor, invalidis concluditur. Principio, si naturalis integritas hominis exigit immortalitatem corporis, aut eam immortalitatem exigit qua intrinsecus sit immortale corpus, aut qua extrinsecus tantum, nimirum propter singularem Dei curam & providentiam ab omni corruptione hominem servantis; sed priorem immortalitatem non potest exigere natura humana. Si enim corpus hominis intrinsecus esset immorta-
But that that immortality, of whatever kind it was, was not owed to human nature, nor necessarily required for constituting its natural integrity, is concluded by these arguments—and, as I think, not invalid ones. First, if the natural integrity of man requires the immortality of the body, it requires either that immortality by which the body is immortal intrinsically, or that by which it is so only extrinsically—namely, on account of God's singular care and providence preserving man from all corruption; but human nature cannot require the former immortality. For if the body of man were intrinsically immor[tal]...11
...le, non esset compositum ex elementis, neque capax animae vegetativae & sensitivae: quamobrem nec idoneum esset animae rationalis domicilium, immo neque capax eius ullo modo esse posset. Nec vero posteriorem immortalitatis rationem deposcit aut exigit naturalis integritas & perfectio hominis: nimirum eiusmodi immortalitas non naturali modo, sed praeter naturalem ordinem & speciali quadam atque extraordinaria ratione contigisset homini: quid autem minus conveniens rationi dici potest, quam id esse necessarium ad naturalem integritatem hominis, quod ei non naturali, sed via supernaturali tantum possit accidere?
...tal, it would not be composed of elements, nor capable of a vegetative and sensitive soul; on which account it would neither be a fit dwelling for the rational soul—nay, it could not be capable of it in any way at all. Nor indeed does the natural integrity and perfection of man demand or require the latter kind of immortality: for an immortality of this sort would have befallen man not in a natural manner, but beyond the natural order and by a certain special and extraordinary means; and what can be said to be less consonant with reason than that that should be necessary for the natural integrity of man which can befall him only by a supernatural, not a natural, way?12
Deinde, si immortalitas corporis fuisset debita naturae humanae, ergo fuisset incongruum eam promitti homini, uti est a Deo promissa tanquam praemium eius obedientiae, eiusque privationem homini velut iustam inobedientiae poenam infligi. Etenim propter peccatum quae naturalia sunt homini, nec ablata, nec diminuta sunt: siquidem etiam daemonibus naturalia eorum integra remanserunt. Nec ratio erat ulla, cur Deus propter peccatum Adami, cum cetera omnia quae ad integritatem naturae humanae pertinent intacta reliquisset, unam homini duntaxat corporis immortalitatem (siquidem ea quoque ad integritatem naturae humanae pertinebat) adimeret.
Next, if the immortality of the body had been owed to human nature, then it would have been incongruous for it to be promised to man—as it was promised by God as the reward of his obedience—and for its privation to be inflicted on man as the just penalty of his disobedience. For on account of sin the things that are natural to man were neither taken away nor diminished: since even to the demons their natural endowments remained intact. Nor was there any reason why God, on account of Adam's sin—when he had left intact all the other things that pertain to the integrity of human nature—should take away from man the one immortality of the body alone (granted that this too pertained to the integrity of human nature).13
Adiice, quod non est debitum naturae hominis, quod est praeter naturam eius, & praeter naturalem & intrinsecam eius potentiam: sed immortalitas corporis non est secundum naturam hominis: est enim homo secundum naturam corpus mixtum, vivens & sentiens: quod autem tale est, etiam secundum naturam habet ut sit corruptibile: id vero quod naturaliter est corruptibile, secundum naturam necesse est aliquando corrumpi. Nunquam autem corrumpi, non est secundum naturam rei corruptibilis: nunquam igitur mori, non est secundum naturam hominis: nec illa potentia non moriendi naturaliter debita homini, vel ad naturalem eius integritatem pertinens esse poterat.
Add that what is beyond his nature, and beyond his natural and intrinsic potency, is not owed to the nature of man; but the immortality of the body is not according to the nature of man: for man is by nature a mixed body, living and sentient; and what is such has, also according to nature, that it be corruptible; and that which is naturally corruptible, it is according to nature necessary that it be corrupted at some time. But never to be corrupted is not according to the nature of a corruptible thing; therefore never to die is not according to the nature of man; nor could that ability not to die be naturally owed to man, or pertaining to his natural integrity.14
Ad haec, si propter eam proportionem quae esse debet inter formam & materiam, quia rationalis anima sit immortalis, propterea necessario concludi putant etiam corpus hominis immortale aliquomodo esse oportere: profecto ea ratione conficeretur, corpus humanum etiam intrinsecus & substantialiter immortale esse debere: quod isti tamen nolunt, & vero implicat contradictionem. Siquidem proportio quae est inter materiam & formam, naturalis est, interna, & essentialis, non autem adventitia, externa, & accidentalis. Cum igitur anima rationalis intrinsecus & substantialiter immortalis sit, nec tantum habeat potentiam non moriendi, sed etiam impotentiam moriendi: pari sane ratione, ut rite servetur proportio inter materiam & formam, corpus humanum intrinsecus & substantialiter incorruptibile deberet esse, nec tantum potens non moriendi, sed etiam moriendi prorsus impotens.
Furthermore, if, on account of that proportion which ought to be between form and matter, they think it must necessarily be concluded that the body of man too ought to be immortal in some way—because the rational soul is immortal—then assuredly by that reasoning it would be brought about that the human body too ought to be intrinsically and substantially immortal: which, however, these men do not want, and which indeed involves a contradiction. For the proportion which is between matter and form is natural, internal, and essential, not adventitious, external, and accidental. Since, then, the rational soul is intrinsically and substantially immortal, and has not only the ability not to die but also the inability to die: by a like reasoning, in truth, in order that the proportion between matter and form be duly preserved, the human body ought to be intrinsically and substantially incorruptible, and not only able not to die, but also utterly unable to die.15
Apparet igitur, hanc istorum doctorum argumentationem quam putabant ipsi validissimam, plane infirmam & nullam esse. Denique, si omne id censeri debet naturale & naturaliter debitum homini, sine quo non potest homo naturaliter esse omnino perfectus: profecto & resurrectionem ex mortuis naturaliter esse homini debitam, & ultimum finem qui est clara & beatifica divinae essentiae visio naturaliter homini convenientem & debitum esse, ista ratione concludi posset; siquidem nec anima rationalis sine corpore subs-
It appears, therefore, that this argumentation of these learned men, which they themselves thought most valid, is plainly weak and null. Finally, if everything must be reckoned natural and naturally owed to man, without which man cannot be naturally perfect altogether, then assuredly by that reasoning it could be concluded both that resurrection from the dead is naturally owed to man, and that the ultimate end—which is the clear and beatific vision of the divine essence—is naturally fitting and owed to man; since neither is the rational soul perfect without the body in its sub[stance]...16
...stantialiter est perfecta, & humanus appetitus cum sit infiniti boni capax, nullius boni adeptione praeter claram Dei visionem & fruitionem, ita satiari & expleri potest, ut sit omnino contentus & quietus.
...is substantially perfect, and the human appetite, since it is capable of an infinite good, can be so sated and filled by the attainment of no good except the clear vision and enjoyment of God, that it is altogether content and at rest.17
Nec erit operosum, duo praecipua contrariae sententiae auctorum argumenta dissolvere. Et illud quidem argumentum sumptum ex convenientia quae esse debet inter animam rationalem & corpus humanum, licet isti firmissimum putent, parvo tamen negocio labefactari & everti potest, vel ea tantum ratione qua dissolvitur a B. Thoma in prima parte, quaestione 76. art. 5. Nam cum initio eius articuli posuisset hoc argumentum: Materia debet esse proportionata formae, sed anima intellectiva est forma incorruptibilis, ergo non convenienter unitur corpori corruptibili: ad hoc sic ipse respondet:
Nor will it be laborious to dissolve the two chief arguments of the authors of the contrary opinion. And that argument indeed, taken from the fitness which ought to be between the rational soul and the human body—although these men think it most firm—can nevertheless be shaken and overturned with little trouble, or by that very reasoning by which it is dissolved by Blessed Thomas in the First Part, question 76, article 5. For when, at the beginning of that article, he had laid down this argument: Matter ought to be proportioned to form; but the intellective soul is an incorruptible form; therefore it is not fittingly united to a corruptible body—to this he himself responds thus:18

Someone perhaps, wishing to escape this objection, would say that the body of man before sin was incorruptible. But this response does not seem sufficient: for the body of man before sin was not incorruptible by nature—otherwise that immortality would have remained even after sin, as the immortality of the demons remained—but it was immortal through the gift of divine grace. Wherefore it is better answered that in matter which is chosen for the sake of some form, a twofold condition is found: one which is chosen per se, namely that by which the matter is suitable for receiving the form, and fit so that the form can carry out its proper actions; and another which is not chosen per se, but which, because it naturally follows from the prior condition by the necessity of matter, cannot be cast off and removed from the matter. For example: a craftsman, to make a saw, chooses iron as matter fit for it, namely because by its hardness it is apt for cutting; but that the teeth of an iron saw can be blunted and affected by rust follows from the necessity of the matter. So to the intellective soul there is owed per se a body of balanced complexion, and capable of the vegetative and sensitive soul; but corruptibility follows upon such a body from the necessity of the matter. But if someone should say that this necessity of matter could have been avoided by God, and that, notwithstanding it, incorruption could be given to the human body, it must be answered that in the constitution of natural things one does not consider what God can do, but what it is fitting that the nature of things become—as Augustine says, in book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 1. God indeed, when he first created man, gave him immortality, yet not as owed to his nature, but as a supernatural gift of his grace, granted to him gratuitously. Thus far Saint Thomas; and he holds the same opinion in 1-2, question 85, article 6, and 2-2, question 164, article 1, and on the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.19

Quidam forte volens evadere hanc obiectionem, diceret corpus hominis ante peccatum fuisse incorruptibile. Sed haec responsio non videtur sufficiens: Corpus enim hominis ante peccatum, non fuit incorruptibile per naturam, alioquin ea immortalitas mansisset etiam post peccatum, sicut mansit immortalitas daemonum: sed fuit immortale per gratiae divinae donum. Quare melius respondetur, in materia quae alicuius formae causa eligitur, duplicem inveniri conditionem: alteram quae per se eligitur, ut per quam materia sit conveniens ad recipiendam formam, & idonea ut forma proprias actiones obire queat: alteram vero quae per se non eligitur, sed quod ea priorem conditionem ex necessitate materia naturaliter consequitur, non potest abici & removeri a materia. Exempli causa: artifex ad fabricandam serram eligit ferrum quasi idoneam ad id materiam quae, scilicet, duritia sua apta est ad secandum: quod autem dentes serrae ferreae possint hebetari & rubigine affici, id sequitur ex necessitate materiae. Sic anima intellectiva per se debetur corpus aequalis complexionis, & animae vegetativae ac sensitivae capax: tale autem corpus ex necessitate materiae consequitur corruptibilitas. Siquis autem dicat potuisse a Deo hanc necessitatem materiae vitari, & ea non obstante dari incorruptionem corpori humano: responderi debet, in constitutione rerum naturalium non considerari quid Deus facere possit, sed quid natura rerum conveniens sit fieri, ut Augustinus, inquit, lib. 2 de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. Deus quidem cum primum hominem condidit, ei dedit immortalitatem, non tamen ut naturae eius debitam, sed ut supernaturale donum gratiae suae, gratuito ei concessum. Haec ibi Sanctus Thomas: eandemque sententiam habet in 1.2. quaest. 85. articul. 6. & 2.2. quaest. 164. articul. 1. & super quintum caput Epistol. ad Romanos.

Posterius autem istorum argumentum, quod rebellio carnis adversus rationem sit contra naturam hominis, & idcirco iustitiam originalem, quae non sinebat eiusmodi rebellionem existere, fuisse debitam naturali hominis integritati & perfectioni: ad hunc modum solvitur. Duplex est rebellio carnis adversus rationem: una quae vincit rationem, eam trahens ad consentiendum & obsequendum cupiditatibus suis: & haec contra naturam hominis est. Sed ea tolli potest per virtutem moralem temperantiae: haec nempe domans cupidita-
But the latter argument of these men—that the rebellion of the flesh against reason is contrary to the nature of man, and therefore that original justice, which did not allow such a rebellion to exist, was owed to man's natural integrity and perfection—is solved in this manner. The rebellion of the flesh against reason is twofold: one that conquers reason, dragging it to consent to and comply with its own desires—and this is contrary to the nature of man. But it can be removed through the moral virtue of temperance: this, namely, taming the desires...20
...tes carnis, cogit eas obedire rationi, facitque hominem secundum rectam rationem temperanter vivere. Nec obstat, quod fieri non possit quin aliquando labatur in aliquam intemperantiam: id enim non est contra naturalem & moralem perfectionem hominis. Hoc enim commune est omnium rerum corruptibilium & defectibilium, ut ad naturalem earum perfectionem non sit necesse eas semper bene se habere, sed satis sit, ut fere & plurimum bene sese habeant.
...the desires of the flesh, compels them to obey reason, and makes man live temperately according to right reason. Nor is it an obstacle that it cannot but happen that he sometimes slips into some intemperance: for that is not contrary to the natural and moral perfection of man. For this is common to all corruptible and defectible things, that for their natural perfection it is not necessary that they always be in good condition, but it is enough that they be in good condition generally and for the most part.21
Altera est rebellio partis inferioris adversus partem superiorem, quae non facit rationem consentire appetitui sensitivo, sed tantum excitat in membris & in ipso appetitu indecentes & inordinatos motus praeter iudicium & voluntatem partis superioris. Nam & praeveniunt iudicium rationis, nec sedantur & tranquillantur statim ut ratio iubet, & homo vellet. Atque haec quidem rebellio carnis non est contra naturam hominis, sed potius est secundum naturam eius, per se & absque divina gratia considerati. Oritur enim ex naturali constitutione hominis, qui naturaliter compositus est ex duplici appetitu admodum diverso, intellectivo & sensitivo. Et appetitus quidem sensitivus cum sit naturalis, & naturaliter feratur in suum obiectum, praesenti obiecto sibi convenienti & delectabili, naturaliter ac toto impetu fertur in ipsum. Et licet coerceri & retrahi possit a ratione, non tamen sine difficultate rationis, & ipsius appetitus repugnantia & tristitia.
The other is the rebellion of the lower part against the higher, which does not make reason consent to the sensitive appetite, but only stirs up in the members and in the appetite itself unseemly and disordered motions, beyond the judgment and will of the higher part. For they both anticipate the judgment of reason, and are not settled and calmed at once as reason commands and as the man would wish. And this rebellion of the flesh is indeed not contrary to the nature of man, but rather is according to his nature, considered in itself and apart from divine grace. For it arises from the natural constitution of man, who is naturally composed of a twofold and very diverse appetite, the intellective and the sensitive. And the sensitive appetite, since it is natural and naturally borne toward its object, is, when an object suitable and delightful to it is present, naturally and with full impetus borne toward it. And although it can be checked and drawn back by reason, yet not without difficulty on reason's part, and without the resistance and distress of the appetite itself.22
Profecto, haec rebellio qualis est in nobis, talis omnino esset in homine, si is in puris naturalibus crearetur, sed in illo non esset poena aut vitium, sed conditio naturae: in nobis autem est; quia primus omnium nostrum parens creatus est cum iustitia originali, cuius propter peccatum amissae, poena est quam patimur carnis rebellio.
Assuredly, this rebellion, such as it is in us, would be altogether such in man, if he were created in pure naturals; but in him it would not be a penalty or a fault, but the condition of nature: in us, however, it is a penalty; because the first parent of us all was created with original justice, and because of his sin in losing it, the rebellion of the flesh which we suffer is a penalty.23

Translator’s notes

  1. Fourth (and final) question of the disputation on immortality. The roman numeral is printed 'IIII.' ↩
  2. Marginal gloss: 'Opinio quorundam, donum illud immortalitatis pertinuisse ad naturalem hominis integritatem' (The opinion of certain men, that that gift of immortality pertained to man's natural integrity). Running footer on this page: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. FFF'. The question opens by reporting the view that original justice/immortality was a gift owed to human nature; sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'perti' = pertinens). ↩
  3. Continuation (catchword 'perti' = pertinens) of the opinion reported at the end of the previous page: that immortality was owed to human nature, so that without it man is now 'maimed and monstrous.' ↩
  4. First argument of the opposing view: immortality came from a natural cause (the tree of life), therefore was itself natural. Citation: Gen. 3:22-24 (the expulsion from Eden). ↩
  5. Second argument: the proportion between incorruptible soul and corruptible body requires the body too to be somehow incorruptible (with the Aristotelian principle that active and passive potencies must correspond, since nature does nothing in vain). ↩
  6. Third argument (soul-body composite): an immortal soul united to a corruptible body would be 'according to nature' only briefly and 'against nature' forever (absurd); and matter being for the sake of form, the body must somehow share immortality. The sentence runs into the rebellion-of-the-flesh argument (catchword 'Re' = Rebellio), continued on the next page. ↩
  7. Conclusion of the fourth argument (rebellion of the flesh = contra naturam, so original justice that prevented it was natural). Citations: Rom. 7; Gal. 5. Pererius's verdict: 'more acutely than truly.' ↩
  8. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur praedicta opinio, & ostenditur immortalitatem corporis non exigi ad naturalem integritatem hominis' (The aforesaid opinion is refuted, and it is shown that the body's immortality is not required for man's natural integrity). Pererius's thesis: immortality was supernatural and not owed by natural right. Sentence continues on the next paragraph. ↩
  9. Reply to the first argument: Adam, made of matter with the potency of contradiction and of the four elements, had a natural necessity of eventual death; the tree of life preserved life only for a long-but-finite span (the 'eternal' of Hebrew idiom = indefinitely long, not strictly infinite); if it conferred true immortality, that power was supernatural (per Augustine, Bede, Bonaventure; cf. Pererius's own book 3, De Paradiso). ↩
  10. Adam's immortality rested only partly on the tree of life and chiefly on God's special assistance and protection. ↩
  11. Pererius's counter-arguments begin: a dilemma—natural integrity would require either intrinsic or extrinsic immortality; it cannot require the intrinsic kind (argued in the next paragraph). Sentence continues on the next page. ↩
  12. Completion of the dilemma: intrinsic immortality would make the body non-elemental and unable to house the soul; and the extrinsic kind is praeter naturam (beyond the natural order), so cannot be required for natural integrity. Hence neither horn holds. ↩
  13. Second counter-argument: immortality was promised as a reward and removed as a penalty, which would be incongruous if it were merely owed to nature; sin does not strip away what is truly natural (even demons keep their natural endowments). ↩
  14. Third counter-argument: man is by nature a mixed (hence corruptible) body; never-dying is praeter naturam, so cannot be owed to him naturally. ↩
  15. Refutation of the proportion-argument: since the matter-form proportion is internal and essential, the argument would force the body to be intrinsically/substantially incorruptible (matching the soul)—which the opponents themselves deny, so the argument is self-contradictory. ↩
  16. Reductio: the opponents' principle ('whatever man cannot be perfect without is naturally owed') would absurdly make even the resurrection and the beatific vision 'naturally owed.' Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'stantia'). ↩
  17. Completion of the reductio: the rational soul is not perfect without the body, and the human appetite rests only in the beatific vision—yet no one calls these 'naturally owed'; so the opponents' principle proves too much. ↩
  18. Marginal glosses: 'Solutio argumentorum contrariae opinionis' (Solution of the arguments of the contrary opinion); 'An corpus humanum, quod est corruptibile, sit idonea materia rationalis animae, quae est incorruptibilis' (Whether the human body, which is corruptible, is fit matter for the rational soul, which is incorruptible). Citation: Aquinas, ST I q.76 a.5, quoted in the following paragraph. ↩
  19. Verbatim quotation of Aquinas, ST I q.76 a.5, with the craftsman/saw analogy: corruptibility follows ex necessitate materiae and cannot be separated from a body fit to house the soul. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram II.1, is quoted within. Closing cross-references: ST 1-2 q.85 a.6; 2-2 q.164 a.1; Aquinas's commentary on Romans 5. ↩
  20. Marginal gloss: 'An rebellio sensitivi appetitus adversus rationem sit secundum naturam, an contra naturam hominis' (Whether the rebellion of the sensitive appetite against reason is according to, or contrary to, the nature of man). Reply to the fourth argument: of the twofold rebellion, the conquering kind is contra naturam but removable by temperance. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'tes' = cupiditates). ↩
  21. Continuation (catchword 'tes' = cupiditates) of the reply to the fourth argument: the conquering rebellion of the flesh is removed by temperance, and occasional lapses do not destroy man's natural/moral perfection. ↩
  22. The second kind of rebellion (disordered motions that merely anticipate reason without conquering it) is according to man's nature considered in pure nature, arising from his composition of two appetites (intellective and sensitive). ↩
  23. Conclusion: in pure nature such rebellion would be a mere natural condition, not a penalty; in us it is a penalty, because we descend from Adam created with original justice and forfeiting it by sin. ↩