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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Six — the temptation and fall

A DISPUTATION ON WHAT KIND the serpent was that tempted the first human beings

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A DISPUTATION ON WHAT KIND the serpent was that tempted the first human beings.1

DISPUTATIO, QUALIS FUERIT Serpens qui tentavit primos homines.

Quinque possunt de illo serpente cogitari: unde quinque de eo Doctorum opiniones natae sunt. Primo, cogitare possumus fuisse verum & naturalem serpentem, cui eo tempore naturale fuerit & loqui & intelligere. Deinde, cogitari potest fuisse quidem naturalem serpentem, facultatem tamen loquendi & intelligendi non fuisse ei naturaliter inditam, sed a Deo ad tentandum & probandum primum hominem ad tempus concessam. Postea, non fuisse verum serpentem, sed simulatum modo, id est, solam speciem & simulachrum serpentis, sub quo tamen latens daemon humanum finxit sermonem, struxit insidias, tentationem peregit. Ad haec, nec fuisse verum, nec simulatum serpentem, totamque narrationem Mosis esse metaphoricam: qua scilicet vocabulo serpentis significetur, & intelligi debeat diabolus, qui primos homines decepit. Postremo, cogitari potest & fuisse verum serpentem, & simul ei affuisse daemonem, qui per illum serpentem tanquam per idoneum malitiae suae organum, totum id transegerit, quod de serpente narrat Moses. Ex his quinque modis cogitandi de illo serpente, quinque, ut dixi, inter Patres & Theologos opiniones, & Mosaicae narrationis interpretationes proseminatae sunt.
Five things can be thought concerning that serpent: whence five opinions of the learned about it have arisen. First, we can think it was a true and natural serpent, to which at that time it was natural both to speak and to understand. Second, it can be thought that it was indeed a natural serpent, but that the faculty of speaking and understanding was not naturally implanted in it, but granted to it by God for a time, to tempt and test the first man. Third, that it was not a true serpent, but only a feigned one—that is, merely the appearance and likeness of a serpent, under which, however, a hidden demon framed human speech, contrived snares, and carried through the temptation. Fourth, that it was neither a true nor a feigned serpent, and that the whole narration of Moses is metaphorical: namely, that by the word 'serpent' is signified, and ought to be understood, the devil, who deceived the first human beings. Lastly, it can be thought that there was both a true serpent, and at the same time a demon present to it, who through that serpent, as through a fit instrument of his malice, carried out the whole of what Moses narrates about the serpent. From these five ways of thinking about that serpent, five opinions, as I said, and interpretations of the Mosaic narration, have been disseminated among the Fathers and Theologians.2
Prima sententia est Iosephi, qui primo libro Antiquitatum capite primo significare videtur (certe hoc sensisse eum, affirmate tradit Tostatus, quaest. 429. in caput Geneseos) serpentem illum fuisse verum & naturalem, cui tunc naturale fuerit intelligendi & loquendi facultate praeditum esse, & pedibus uti ad ingrediendum, ac veneno carere: eum vero invidia humanae felicitatis, ad fallendum hominem esse instigatum. Ponam hic verba Iosephi: Per id tempus, inquit, nullum erat inter animalia dissidium, & serpens familiariter cum Adamo & uxore eius degebat: invidebat tamen eis felicitatem venturam, si iussis Dei parere perseverarent: & ratus eos in calamitatem casuros, si mandata Dei neglexissent, malitiose persuasit mulieri ut de arbore scientiae gustaret. Et sub finem capitis sic ait: Quin & serpenti vocem ademit Deus, iratus ob malitiam qua erga Adamum est usus: venenumque linguae eius indidit: ad haec pedibus privatum trahi per terram ac serpere fecit. Haec Iosephus.
The first opinion is that of Josephus, who in the first book of the Antiquities, chapter one, seems to signify (and that he certainly held this, Tostatus affirmatively reports, question 429, on the chapter of Genesis) that that serpent was true and natural, to which it was then natural to be endowed with the faculty of understanding and speaking, and to use feet for walking, and to be without venom; but that, out of envy of human felicity, it was instigated to deceive man. I will set down here the words of Josephus: At that time, he says, there was no discord among the animals, and the serpent lived familiarly with Adam and his wife; yet it envied them the felicity to come, if they should persevere in obeying God's commands; and reckoning that they would fall into calamity if they neglected God's mandates, it maliciously persuaded the woman to taste of the tree of knowledge. And toward the end of the chapter he says thus: Moreover, God took away the serpent's voice, angry at the malice it had used toward Adam; and put venom into its tongue; and besides, deprived of feet, made it to be dragged along the ground and to creep. Thus Josephus.3
Simile quidpiam videtur Basilius dicere in homilia quae est de Paradiso scribens, omnia animalia fuisse ante peccatum Adami mansueta, & inter se concorditer viventia; quaeque audirent inter se, & loquerentur sensate, nec serpentem tunc abiectum in terram reptasse, sed sublimen erectumque pedibus suis incessisse.
Something similar Basil seems to say, in the homily which is on Paradise, writing that all the animals before Adam's sin were tame, and lived harmoniously among themselves; and that they heard one another, and spoke intelligibly; and that the serpent did not then creep, cast down upon the earth, but went on high and erect upon its feet.4
Plato in Politico ait, saeculo aureo, regnante Saturno, non homines modo cum hominibus, sed cum bestiis etiam sermocinari potuisse, & si quid ex illis vellent cognoscere, solitos interrogare, & vicissim ab ipsis responsum accipere; qua tamen illi sermonis communicatione, non, ut par erat, ad comparandam philosophiam & perfectam omnium rerum scientiam utebantur. Hanc Platonis sententiam Eusebius lib. 12. de Praeparatione Evangelica, cap. 9. ita commemorat: Prudentiorem omnibus bestiis terrae serpentem fuisse, & sermonem eius vicissim cum muliere habitum, Moses scribit: quam rem quemadmodum Plato narravit, non est alienum audire. Qui Saturni temporibus erant, inquit, tanta virtute pollebant, ut non cum hominibus solum, verum etiam cum bestiis oratione uti possent. Sed non ad philosophiam & inter se & cum bestiis hac virtute utebantur, diligenter scrutantes de singulorum natura ad accumulationem prudentiae, sed cibo & potui tanquam helluones continue inhaerentes, fabulas secum & cum bestiis tales conferebant, quales modo de ipsis narrantur. Sic Eusebius.
Plato in the Statesman says that in the golden age, when Saturn reigned, not only could men converse with men, but even with beasts; and that, if they wished to learn anything from them, they were accustomed to ask, and in turn to receive an answer from them; yet this sharing of speech they did not use, as would have been fitting, for acquiring philosophy and a perfect knowledge of all things. This opinion of Plato, Eusebius, in book 12 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 9, recalls thus: Moses writes that the serpent was more prudent than all the beasts of the earth, and that it held converse in turn with the woman; and it is not amiss to hear how Plato narrated this thing. Those who lived in the times of Saturn, he says, were endowed with such great power that they could use speech not only with men, but even with beasts. But they did not use this power for philosophy, both among themselves and with the beasts, diligently inquiring about the nature of each toward the accumulation of prudence; but, clinging continually to food and drink like gluttons, they exchanged among themselves and with the beasts such tales as are now told about them. Thus Eusebius.5
Sed revertamur ad opinionem Iosephi, qua nihil profecto dici cogitarive potest incredibilius & absurdius. Facultas enim intelligendi, praesertim res universas atque immateriales, unius omnium animantium hominis propria est: quippe definitio eius est, Animal rationale. Facultas item loquendi & sermocinandi solius est hominis, ut tradit Aristoteles lib. 4. de Historia animalium, cap. 9. nam quaedam animalia quae ab homine condocefacta similes humanis voces fingunt, id nec faciunt naturaliter, nec cum intellectu eorum quae loquuntur.
But let us return to the opinion of Josephus, than which assuredly nothing more incredible and absurd can be said or thought. For the faculty of understanding, especially of things universal and immaterial, is proper to man alone of all living creatures: since his definition is, A rational animal. Likewise the faculty of speaking and conversing belongs to man alone, as Aristotle hands down in book 4 of the History of Animals, chapter 9; for certain animals which, trained by man, fashion sounds similar to human ones, do this neither naturally nor with understanding of what they speak.6
Dicere autem, serpentem & intellectu & sermone pedibusque, propter fallaciam quam Evae machinatus fuerat, a Deo fuisse mulctatum ac privatum, simile est fabulis & figmentis Poetarum. Si enim Deus propter peccatum, nec Angelis nec homini quicquam ademit, quod eis naturale esset; cur serpenti naturalem intelligendi, loquendi, & ingrediendi potestatem ademisset? Et vero, nec ista mutari possunt, nisi natura & essentia rei mutata. Quamvis porro serpens qui seduxit Evam, hisce rebus mulctatus esset, alii tamen eiusdem speciei serpentes, qui eius criminis participes non fuerant nec ab illo serpente progenerati, vim illam intelligendi & loquendi si naturalis fuisset conservassent, eandemque ad eorum prolem, & sic deinceps in totam speciem derivari necesse erat. Quid quod serpens ille tametsi pedibus & sermone privatus fuisset, attamen genuisset serpentes, tales nempe, qualis ipse prius fuerat se-
But to say that the serpent was punished and deprived by God of understanding, speech, and feet, on account of the deceit it had contrived against Eve, is like the fables and fictions of the Poets. For if God, on account of sin, took nothing away from either the Angels or man that was natural to them, why would he have taken from the serpent the natural power of understanding, speaking, and walking? And indeed, these things cannot be changed unless the nature and essence of the thing is changed. Moreover, although the serpent which seduced Eve had been punished with these losses, yet other serpents of the same species, which had not shared in its crime nor been begotten by that serpent, would—if that power of understanding and speaking had been natural—have retained it, and it would necessarily have been transmitted to their offspring, and so on to the whole species. What of this—that that serpent, even though deprived of feet and speech, would nonetheless have begotten serpents such as it itself had previously been ac-7
...cundum naturam? Non enim si quispiam inter homines sit caecus, aut mutus, aut pedibus mutilus, filiosque genuerit, necesse est eisdem rebus privatos eos generari. Certe Plinius, lib. 8. cap. 41. inter prodigia & portenta prodidit, eo anno quo Tarquinius Superbus regno pulsus est, latrasse serpentem: & Valerius Maximus lib. 1. inter portenta & miracula recenset, bestias nonnunquam humanas voces edidisse; quo licet intelligere, nulli animalium esse posse natu-
...cording to nature? For if anyone among men is blind, or mute, or maimed in his feet, and has begotten sons, it is not necessary that they be born deprived of the same things. Certainly Pliny, in book 8, chapter 41, reported among prodigies and portents that, in the year in which Tarquinius Superbus was driven from his kingdom, a serpent barked; and Valerius Maximus, in book 1, reckons among portents and miracles that beasts have sometimes uttered human voices; from which one may understand that to no animal can it be natu-8
...rale humano modo & more loqui, nedum intelligere.
...natural to speak in a human manner and fashion, much less to understand.9
Altera sententia est B. Ephraem Syri, aequalis Basilii ac familiaris, qui, ut refert Moses Barcepha in libro de Paradiso, cap. 27. existimavit, serpentem illum qui cum Eva colloquebatur fuisse corporatum verumque animal. Satanam enim a Deo petiisse, ut serpenti sermonis facultatem concederet ad tempus, ad tentandum Adamum, sicut opes Iob sibi quoque permitti postulavit, quo patientiae eius periculum faceret. Itaque serpenti illi corporeo ea ratione ut asinae Balaam sermonis usum esse datum, intelligere oportet. Nec vero locutionem solam, sed etiam intellectum illi serpenti esse indi-
The second opinion is that of Blessed Ephraem the Syrian, a contemporary and intimate of Basil, who, as Moses Bar Cepha relates in the book on Paradise, chapter 27, judged that the serpent which conversed with Eve was a bodily and true animal. For he held that Satan asked God to grant the serpent the faculty of speech for a time, to tempt Adam—just as he also demanded that Job's wealth be permitted to him, that he might make trial of his patience. And so we must understand that to that bodily serpent the use of speech was given in the same way as to Balaam's ass. And that not only speech, but also understanding, was im-10
...tum, affirmat Ephraem: siquidem Deus ipsum, ut intelligentem, est affatus his maledictis perstringens, Pulverem edes, & super ventrem tuum ambulabis. Verum haec sententia omni caret fide. Quid enim minus credibile est, quam serpentem loqui, cui nulla sunt instrumenta naturalia, idonea & necessaria ad formandas voces humanas? Frustra igitur ei daretur facultas loquendi, quae nullo modo in usum proferri & expediri posset. Nam sermonem humanum quem edidit asina Balaam, non ipsa formavit, sed Angelus in ore eius. Si quis dicat, Deum simul dedisse facultatem loquendi, & instrumenta naturalia ad eam facultatem explicandam idonea, dicam ego id fieri non potuisse, nisi mutaretur constitutio corporis, & figura serpentis, & conformatio totius oris: id quod si factum esset, proculdubio advertisset Eva, quae antea figuram serpentis bene perspectam & notam habebat.
...planted in that serpent, Ephraem affirms: since God addressed it as understanding, censuring it with these curses, You shall eat dust, and upon your belly you shall walk. But this opinion is wholly devoid of credibility. For what is less credible than that a serpent should speak, which has no natural instruments fit and necessary for forming human voices? In vain, then, would the faculty of speaking be given to it, which could in no way be brought into use and exercised. For the human speech which Balaam's ass uttered, the ass itself did not form, but the Angel in its mouth. If someone should say that God at once gave both the faculty of speaking and natural instruments fit for exercising that faculty, I would say that this could not be done unless the constitution of the body, and the figure of the serpent, and the conformation of the whole mouth were changed; and if that had been done, Eve would undoubtedly have noticed it, who beforehand had the figure of the serpent well examined and known.11
Deinde, nihil absurdius, quam putare serpenti facultatem intelligendi dari, & inesse potuisse: nimirum, non magis serpens potuit esse intelligens, quam esse homo: intellectus enim cum re ipsa non differat ab anima intelligente, ab ea minime separari potest. Et ut demus facultatem intelligendi rem esse diversam ab anima rationali, nihilominus tamen ab ea separari non potest. Est enim potentia vitalis, & intelligere est actio vitalis, quae nullo modo potest effici nisi ab eo qui vivit vita intellectiva, & cuius natura constituta est & determinata per gradum intellectivum. Tertia opinio est Cyrilli (quae praeter ceteras placuit Eugubino in sua Cosmopoeia) in lib. 3. adversus Iulianum Apostatam. Affirmat Cyrillus non fuisse serpentem illum verum & animatum, sed speciem duntaxat & simulachrum serpentis sub quo daemon allocutus est mulierem, & idcirco is quoque sub serpentis nomine Dei est maledictis percussus. Arbitratus est enim B. Cyrillus, & sic est, daemonem arbitratu suo, & serpentis & cuiusvis aliorum animalium speciem & simulachrum, quod verum animal metiatur, posse fingere, & per id, quodcumque velit aut loqui aut agere. Verum non assentior Cyrillo. Etenim si non fuisset ille verus serpens, daemon peracta tentatione speciem illam & imaginem serpentis deposuisset: quemadmodum Angeli ad obeundum aliquod inter homines ministerium human-
Next, nothing is more absurd than to think that the faculty of understanding could be given to, and reside in, a serpent: for a serpent could no more be understanding than be a man; for since the intellect does not in reality differ from the understanding soul, it can by no means be separated from it. And even granting that the faculty of understanding is a thing distinct from the rational soul, nevertheless it cannot be separated from it. For it is a vital power, and to understand is a vital action, which can in no way be effected except by one who lives an intellective life, and whose nature is constituted and determined through the intellective grade. The third opinion is that of Cyril (which, beyond the others, pleased Steuchus Eugubinus in his Cosmopoeia), in book 3 Against Julian the Apostate. Cyril affirms that that serpent was not a true and animate one, but only the appearance and likeness of a serpent, under which a demon addressed the woman; and therefore he too, under the name of the serpent, was struck by God's curses. For Blessed Cyril judged—and so it is—that a demon can, at his own discretion, fashion the appearance and likeness both of a serpent and of any other animals, such as one would take for a true animal, and through it either say or do whatever he wishes. But I do not assent to Cyril. For if that had not been a true serpent, the demon, the temptation accomplished, would have laid aside that appearance and image of the serpent: just as the Angels, to perform some ministry among men, [lay aside] the hu-12
...humana specie induti, confecto ministerio, protinus speciem humani corporis exuunt: at serpens ille transacta etiam tentatione, & patrato primorum hominum peccato, mansit in Paradiso. Nam cum Eva a Deo increpata quod edisset ex arbore vetita, respondisset, Serpens decepit me, conversus Dominus ad serpentem, dixit ei, Quia fecisti hoc maledictus eris, &c. eumque ingrediendi super pectus suum, & comedendi terram poena mulctavit: haec autem poena adumbrato tantum & simulato serpenti inepte infligeretur: nec Moses de non vero serpente, aut de solo simulachro serpentis dixisset, Serpens erat callidior cunctis animantibus terrae.
...having put on a human appearance, when the ministry is accomplished, at once lay aside the appearance of a human body; but that serpent, even after the temptation was carried through and the sin of the first human beings committed, remained in Paradise. For when Eve, rebuked by God for having eaten of the forbidden tree, had answered, 'The serpent deceived me,' the Lord, turning to the serpent, said to it, 'Because you have done this, you shall be cursed,' etc., and punished it with the penalty of going upon its breast and eating earth: but this penalty would have been ineptly inflicted on a merely shadowy and feigned serpent; nor would Moses, of a non-real serpent, or of the mere likeness of a serpent, have said, 'The serpent was more cunning than all the living creatures of the earth.'13
Quarta sententia est Caietani, qui in Commentariis in Genesim super his ipsis verbis quae nunc tractamus, censet vocabulo serpentis nec verum serpentem, nec eius simulachrum & spectrum intelligi debere, sed solum daemonem, qui quod callidissimus & insidiosissimus sit, & hominibus nocendi cupidissimus, metaphorice serpens in Scriptura crebro appellatur. Nec illam tentationem & sermonem daemonis cum Eva, externum & sensibilem fuisse putat, sed interno tantum suasu suggestuque peractum. Hanc autem opinionem, quod videret Caietanus esse novam & ab omnium Patrum & Theologorum sententia abhorrentem, multis rationibus fulcire ac stabilire conatus est.
The fourth opinion is that of Cajetan, who in his Commentaries on Genesis, upon these very words which we are now treating, judges that by the word 'serpent' neither a true serpent, nor its likeness and specter, ought to be understood, but only the demon, who—because he is most cunning and most insidious, and most desirous of harming men—is in Scripture frequently called metaphorically a serpent. Nor does he think that that temptation and conversation of the demon with Eve was external and sensible, but carried out only by internal persuasion and suggestion. And since Cajetan saw that this opinion was novel and abhorrent from the opinion of all the Fathers and Theologians, he tried to prop and stabilize it with many arguments.14

First, he says, it is customary in Sacred Letters to use the names of animals to signify rational and intelligent creatures. Hence are those phrases: 'Behold the Lamb of God'; 'The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered'; and in the Apocalypse the devil is named by a perpetual allegory 'dragon' and 'serpent'; just as in Job, chapters 40 and 41, very many and weighty Authors—though the Jews protest—have thought that under the name and likeness of Behemoth and Leviathan the devil is insinuated, whose proper name, however, is not even once expressed in that place. Wherefore, just as in that place the devil is not understood under the bodily appearance of Leviathan and Behemoth, by like reasoning neither in this place ought he to be understood under the bodily appearance of a serpent. Next, here the serpent is reported to have been more cunning than all the living creatures of the earth: which, of a true serpent, if faith be given to the Philosophers who have investigated the natures and properties of animals, is established to be false. Nay rather, Moses said it for this reason, to indicate that he was not speaking of a true serpent, but figuratively and metaphorically of the devil, reproducing the manners and disposition of a serpent: namely, by creeping through the inner senses of man, so as to infect and corrupt him with the venom of his persuasion. Then, for this reason Moses attributed speech to the serpent—which it is agreed cannot belong to a true serpent—so that, by the speech attributed to that serpent, the reader might understand that Moses was speaking of an intellectual serpent.15

Primo, inquit, solenne est in Sacris litteris, vocabulis animalium uti ad significandas creaturas rationales & intelligentes. Hinc sunt illa: Ecce agnus Dei: Vicit leo de tribu Iuda: & in Apocalypsi diabolus & draco & serpens perpetua allegoria nominatur: sicut apud Iob, cap. 40. & 41. permulti & graves Auctores, Iudaeis licet reclamantibus, sub nomine & similitudine Behemoth & Leviathan insinuari diabolum putaverunt, cuius tamen proprium nomen ne semel quidem eo loci expressum est. Quocirca sicut eo loco non intelligitur diabolus sub corporea specie Leviathan & Behemoth, simili ratione neque hoc loco sub corporea specie serpentis intelligi debet. Postea, hic traditur serpentem calidiorem fuisse cunctis animantibus terrae: quod de vero serpente, si fides habeatur Philosophis qui naturas & proprietates animalium scrutati sunt, falsum esse constat. Quinimo propterea id Moses dixit, ut indicaret se non loqui de vero serpente, sed figurate ac metaphorice de diabolo mores & ingenium serpentis referente: serpendo videlicet per interiores hominis sensus, ut eum veneno suae persuasionis inficiat atque corrumpat. Deinde, ob eam causam serpenti locutionem, quam vero serpenti in confesso est non posse convenire, Moses attribuit, ut per eum sermonem ei serpenti tributum, intelligeret lector Mosen de intellectuali serpente loqui.

But if someone, meeting this reasoning, should say that that serpent was a true animal, yet spoke by the work of the devil—just as Balaam's ass is reported, in the book of Numbers, chapter 22, to have spoken by the ministry of an Angel—Cajetan, refuting this, says that there is a great dissimilarity, and that it is not a fitting example. For in the book of Numbers, where the speech of that ass is narrated, the efficient cause of that speech is also at the same time set forth, for it is said that the Lord opened the mouth of the ass, and so...16

Si quis autem huic rationi occurrens, dicat serpentem illum fuisse verum animal, opera tamen diaboli locutum esse, similiter ut asinam Balaam ministerio Angeli locutam esse in libro Numerorum, capite 22. est proditum: hoc refellens Caietanus, Magnam esse, ait, dissimilitudinem, nec idoneum esse exemplum. In libro namque Numerorum, ubi asinae illius locutio narratur, simul etiam causa efficiens illius locutionis exponitur, dicitur enim Dominum aperuisse os asinae, & sic...

...and so it [the ass] spoke; but in this place Moses gives no cause of the serpent's speech, but states precisely that the serpent spoke with the woman, and indicates that no miracle concurred to it, nor any ministry of a devil—signifying not obscurely that he is speaking of the devil, by whose will human speech can be feigned without a miracle. To this, the same becomes manifest to one who considers the penalty inflicted by God on the serpent: for it fits a true serpent not at all, but a figurative one—that is, the devil—most of all; for to go upon the breast and to eat dust was not a penalty for the serpent, since the serpent had this even before the temptation of man naturally; nor is it fitting to think that serpents were then converted and changed into another nature, property, and manners than they had before.17

...& sic esse locutam: hoc autem loco Moses nullam locutionis serpentis causam reddit, sed praecise dicit serpentem locutum esse cum muliere, nullumque ad id concurrisse miraculum, aut diaboli ministerium indicat, non obscure significans loqui se de diabolo cuius arbitrio humanus sermo fingi potest sine miraculo. Ad haec, idem fit manifestum consideranti poenam quae a Deo inflicta serpenti est: ea namque in verum serpentem minime, in figuratum autem, id est, diabolum, maxime quadrat, neque enim super pectus ingredi, & pulverem comedere, serpentis poena fuit, cum id etiam ante tentationem hominis serpens naturaliter haberet: neque enim tunc serpentes in aliam naturam, proprietatem & mores quam prius haberent, esse conversos & mutatos existimare convenit.

It also pertains to the confirmation of this opinion, that Moses wrote nothing of the serpent's approach to the woman, nothing of the woman's fear and horror at the serpent's presence—although Moses himself, as is written in Exodus 4, terrified by the presence of a serpent, fled away: it is only written that the serpent was more cunning than the other living creatures, and addressed the woman, and that she, without any disturbance, familiarly answered the serpent. And indeed, the devil is a sufficiently domestic and familiar interlocutor, beating upon our inner parts with serpentine suggestions and counsels.18

Ad huius etiam sententiae confirmationem pertinet, quod nihil Moses scripserit de accessu serpentis ad mulierem, nihil de pavore atque horrore mulieris ad praesentiam serpentis: cum tamen Moses, ut scriptum est Exodi 4. serpentis praesentia territus aufugerit: tantum scribitur serpentem fuisse callidiorem ceteris animantibus, & allocutum esse mulierem, eamque sine ulla perturbatione familiariter respondisse serpenti. Et vero, satis domesticus & familiaris collocutor est diabolus, serpentinis suggestionibus & consiliis interiora nostra pulsans.

Nor does it stand against this interpretation, says Cajetan, that the serpent is called more cunning than the beasts of the earth, since he is far more cunning and crafty than men too, and the devil does not seem able to be rightly compared with the beasts of the earth. For the devil, on account of his sin, was cast down into the order of beasts, deposed from the order of intelligent creatures: and therefore he is rightly named by the word 'serpent,' and rightly compared with the beasts. For this is the difference between rational and irrational creatures, that the former were created for their own sake—that is, for their own felicity; but the latter, since they are not capable of true felicity, were established for the use and benefit of the rational ones. Since, therefore, the demon was cast down from the attainment of his own felicity, he was at the same time deposed from the order of rational beings, and reduced to the order of irrational ones, so that he exists, namely, not for his own felicity—which he can by no means recover—but for the benefit and glory of the elect.19

Nec officit huic interpretationi, ait Caietanus, quod serpens dicatur callidior bestiis terrae, cum sit etiam hominibus longe callidior, & astutior, neque cum bestiis terrae diabolus recte comparari posse videatur. Etenim diabolus propter suum peccatum deiectus est in ordinem bestiarum, ex ordine intelligentium creaturarum deturbatus: & idcirco serpentis vocabulo rite nominatur, & cum bestiis rite comparatur. Hoc enim interest inter creaturas rationales & irrationales, quod illa propter seipsas, hoc est, propter propriam felicitatem creata sunt: hae autem, cum verae felicitatis capaces non sint, in usum & utilitatem rationalium condita sunt. Quoniam igitur daemon a propria felicitatis consecutione deiectus est, simul etiam deturbatus est ex ordine rationalium, & redactus in ordinem irrationalium, ut sit nimirum non propter suam felicitatem, quippe quam recuperare nullo modo potest, sed propter electorum utilitatem atque gloriam.

Moses, therefore, according to the order of grace, and relatively to the things of the heavenly homeland, in speaking of the demon, aptly named him a beast, and compared his prudence with the prudence of beasts. The speech, then, held between the serpent and Eve was not vocal, but of internal suggestion, by which the devil began to creep with venomous thought; and of the same kind of speech the whole dialogue which is described was conducted, between the serpent and the woman. Discourses of this kind, taken metaphorically, are not only sober according to Scripture, but also not a little useful to the profession of the Christian faith, especially among the Wise of this age, who—understanding that the things here narrated by Moses are to be taken not as the letter sounds, but metaphorically—do not shrink from believing them and laugh at them as little fables, but venerate them as mysteries, and more easily embrace the things that belong to our faith. Nor indeed is a handle hence given for interpreting all the rest metaphorically: since other things do not, like these, have testimonies from the text itself, that they...20

Moses igitur secundum ordinem gratiae, & relative ad ea quae sunt coelestis patriae, loquendo de daemone, apte nominavit ipsum bestiam, prudentiam eius cum bestiarum prudentia comparavit. Sermo igitur inter serpentem & Evam habitus, non fuit vocalis, internae suggestionis, quo diabolus serpere venenosa cogitatione coepit: eodemque genere sermonis universus qui describitur dialogus, inter serpentem & mulierem actus est. Cuius generis sermones metaphorice sumpti, non sobrii modo sunt secundum Scripturam, sed etiam non parum utiles fidei Christianae professioni, praesertim autem apud Sapientes huius saeculi, qui intelligentes quae hic narrantur a Mose, non ut littera sonat, sed metaphorice accipienda esse, non ea credere horrent & quasi fabellas rident: sed ut mysteria venerantur, & facilius quae fidei nostrae sunt amplectuntur. Neque vero hinc datur ansa interpretandi cetera omnia metaphorice: quoniam alia non ita ut haec, habent ex ipso textu testimonia, ut me...

...should be understood metaphorically. Thus Cajetan, whose opinion we have recounted almost just as it was put forth and explained by him.21

...ut metaphorice intelligantur. Haec Caietanus, cuius opinionem ita propemodum, ut ab ipso prodita & explicata est, commemoravimus.

Verum opinio Caietani non ut falsa modo, sed ut erronea & temeraria ab omnibus qui sapiunt, & convenienter divinae Scripturae & Catholicae doctrinae sentiunt, repudiari & abiici debet, est enim contra doctrinam omnium Patrum & Theologorum, contra sensum populi Christiani & Ecclesiae: infixum enim est in animis mentibusque omnium Christianorum, idque publice docetur in Ecclesia Dei, Evam corporali & sensibili tentatione a diabolo per serpentem fuisse deceptam. Pervertit etiam Caietanus fidem historiae Mosaicae, totam eius narrationem faciens figuratam & metaphoricam: quam ob causam in sexta Synodo generali damnatus est Origenes.
But the opinion of Cajetan ought to be repudiated and rejected by all who are wise and who think in accordance with divine Scripture and Catholic doctrine, not only as false, but as erroneous and rash; for it is against the doctrine of all the Fathers and Theologians, against the sense of the Christian people and of the Church: for it is fixed in the souls and minds of all Christians, and is publicly taught in the Church of God, that Eve was deceived by the devil through a serpent, by a bodily and sensible temptation. Cajetan also perverts the trustworthiness of the Mosaic history, making its whole narration figurative and metaphorical: for which cause Origen was condemned in the Sixth General Synod.22
Nec ratio ulla satis idonea & probabilis afferri potest, si quae scribit Moses de serpente, ea non historice, sed figurate intelligenda sunt: cur non similiter quae supra de Paradiso, de arbore vitae, & de arbore scientiae boni & mali, de quatuor fluminibus, denique de formatione Adae ex pulvere terrae, & Evae ex costa Adami, interpretanda sunt? non enim magis illa quam haec, ut non historice sed metaphorice intelligantur, ex ipso textu Scripturae testimonium habent.
Nor can any sufficiently fit and probable reason be brought forward why, if the things Moses writes about the serpent are to be understood not historically but figuratively, the things above about Paradise, about the tree of life, and about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, about the four rivers, and finally about the formation of Adam from the dust of the earth and of Eve from Adam's rib, should not similarly be interpreted [figuratively]; for the former have no more testimony from the text of Scripture itself than the latter that they should be understood not historically but metaphorically.23
Quid quod tentationem illam Evae fuisse interiorem & spiritualem, non autem exteriorem & corporalem, sed intrinsecus in phantasia & animo Evae factam, ut censet Caietanus, adversatur doctrinae Augustini & Gregorii, atque iis quae Theologi tradunt de statu innocentiae? nimirum, docent illi ante peccatum non potuisse hominem interius tentari a diabolo, sed tantum exterius. Etenim dupliciter tantum diabolus hominem interius tentare potest: vel per appetitum sensitivum, concitando passiones eius ad res illicitas: vel per phantasiam, fingendo in ea phantasmata quae hominem moveant ad malum. Neutrum autem in homine ante peccatum eius daemon facere potuit: videlicet, dum pars superior hominis subdita erat Deo, pariter quoque pars inferior subiecta erat rationi, nec a diabolo perverti & inordinate commoveri poterat: non igitur potuit in ea esse motus ullus inordinatus, vel in appetitu vel in phantasia mulieris, per quam ipsa tentaretur intrinsecus a diabolo, sed tota ea tentatio extrinsecus modo fieri potuit. Quemadmodum enim ante peccatum nihil detrimenti aut molestiae potuit daemon corpori hominis afferre: ita nec animum eius per interiores tentationes infe-
What of this—that to hold that that temptation of Eve was interior and spiritual, not exterior and corporeal, but made within, in Eve's phantasy and mind, as Cajetan judges, is opposed to the doctrine of Augustine and Gregory, and to the things which the Theologians hand down concerning the state of innocence? For they teach that before sin man could not be tempted inwardly by the devil, but only outwardly. For the devil can tempt man inwardly in only two ways: either through the sensitive appetite, by stirring up his passions toward unlawful things; or through the phantasy, by forming in it phantasms that move the man to evil. But neither of these could the demon do in man before his sin: namely, while the higher part of man was subject to God, the lower part too was equally subject to reason, and could not be perverted and disorderedly moved by the devil; therefore there could be in her no disordered motion, either in the appetite or in the phantasy of the woman, through which she might be tempted inwardly by the devil; but that whole temptation could come about only from without. For just as before sin the demon could bring no harm or trouble to the body of man, so neither could he in[fest]...24
...stare ac perturbare. Quinta & ultima sententia est, quam nos solam approbamus & amplectimur, fuisse in ea tentatione verum & naturalem serpentem, in quem tamen sese diabolus insinuavit, & per eum quasi per organum suum formavit humanas voces, & sermonem cum Eva miscens, callida & malitiosa tentatione eam decepit. Haec sententia est probata fere...
...fest and disturb [his soul through inner temptations]. The fifth and final opinion, which we alone approve and embrace, is that in that temptation there was a true and natural serpent, into which, however, the devil insinuated himself, and through it, as through his own instrument, he formed human voices, and, mingling speech with Eve, deceived her by a cunning and malicious temptation. This opinion has been approved by nearly...25
...fere Patribus, ut videre licet apud Basilium, Chrysostomum, & Theodoretum, Bedam, & Rupertum in suis vel Homiliis, vel Quaestionibus, vel Commentariis in Genesim; apud Damascenum item libro secundo, de Fide orthodoxa capite 10. & apud Magistrum sententiarum libro secundo, distinct. 21. & ibidem Scholasticos Theologos: quam sententiam plurimis & disertissimis verbis explicat tueturque Augustinus, tam in libris de Civitate Dei, quam de Genesi ad litteram. In libro enim 14. de Civitate Dei, capite undecimo, hoc modo scribit: Diabolus colubrum in Paradiso corporali, ubi cum duobus illis hominibus masculo & femina, animalia etiam terrestria cetera subdita & innoxia versabantur, animal scilicet lubricum, & tortuosis anfractibus mobile, & operi suo congruum, per quem loqueretur elegit: eoque per angelicam praesentiam, praestantioremque naturam spiritali nequitiae sibi subiecto, & tanquam instrumento abutens, fallaciam sermocinatus est feminae.
...nearly all the Fathers, as one may see in Basil, Chrysostom, and Theodoret, Bede, and Rupert, in their Homilies, or Questions, or Commentaries on Genesis; likewise in Damascene, in book two On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 10; and in the Master of the Sentences, book two, distinction 21, and there in the Scholastic Theologians; which opinion Augustine explains and defends in very many and most eloquent words, both in the books On the City of God and On Genesis according to the Letter. For in book 14 of the City of God, chapter eleven, he writes in this manner: The devil chose, to speak through it, a snake in the corporeal Paradise, where, with those two human beings, the male and the female, the other earthly animals also dwelt, subject and harmless—a slippery animal, namely, mobile in tortuous windings, and suited to his work: and abusing it, by his angelic presence and more excellent nature subjected to his spiritual wickedness, as an instrument, he spoke deceitfully to the woman.26

And in book eleven On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter twenty-seven: The devil, he says, spoke in the serpent, using it as an instrument, and moving its nature in the way in which he truly could move it and it could be moved, to express the sounds of words and bodily signs through which the woman might understand the will of the persuader. The serpent therefore did not understand the sounds of the words which were made through it to the woman; nor is its soul to be believed converted into a rational nature, since not even men themselves, whose nature is rational, when a demon speaks in them—in that affliction for whose driving-out an exorcist is required—know what he says. For as to the common belief that serpents hear and understand the words of charmers, so that at their incantations they often leap forth from their hiding-places, there too a diabolical power operates. And it comes about by divine counsel that custom has this rather—that serpents are moved by charms rather than any other kind of living creature. For this is no small testimony that human nature was first seduced by the conversation of a serpent: for the demons rejoice that this power is given to them, to move serpents at men's incantations, that they may by any means deceive whom they can. And they are permitted to do this to commend to memory the first deed, because there is for them a certain familiarity with this kind of animal. Thus far, nearly, are the words of Augustine.27

Et libro undecimo de Genesi ad litteram capite vigesimoseptimo: Diabolus, ait, in serpente locutus est, utens eo velut organo, movensque eius naturam eo modo quo modo vere ille movere & moveri illa potuit ad exprimendos verborum sonos & signa corporalia per quae mulier suadentis intelligeret voluntatem. Non itaque serpens verborum sonos intelligebat qui ex illo fiebant ad mulierem: neque conversa credenda est anima eius in naturam rationalem, quandoquidem nec ipsi homines, quorum rationalis natura est, cum daemon in eis loquitur, ea passione cui profliganda exorcista requiritur, sciunt quid loquatur. Nam quod vulgo putantur serpentes audire & intelligere verba incantantium, ut eis incantibus prosiliant plerumque de latebris, etiam illic diabolica vis operatur. Divino autem consilio fit, ut hoc magis habeat usus, serpentes moveri carminibus potius quam aliud ullum genus animantium. Etenim hoc non parva testificatio est, naturam humanam primitus serpentis seductam esse colloquio: Gaudent enim daemones hanc sibi potestatem dari, ut ad incantationes hominum serpentes moveant, ut quolibet modo fallant quos possunt. Hoc autem facere permittuntur ad primi facti memoriam commendandam, quod sit eis quaedam cum hoc genere animalium familiaritas. Hactenus fere sunt verba Augustini.

Sub specie autem serpentis, sicut primos homines decepit daemon, ita & Graecam & Romanam prudentiam ludificavit atque circumvenit. Plena est admirationis, vel horroris potius serpentis Aesculapii in urbem Romam triennali pestilentia liberandam, missa nobili Epidaurum Romanorum principum legatione, advectio, & in templo ei velut numini dicato collocatio. Legenda est historia huius rei apud Valerium Maximum, libro primo, capite octavo.
And under the appearance of a serpent, just as the demon deceived the first human beings, so too he mocked and circumvented Greek and Roman prudence. Full of wonder, or rather of horror, is the conveyance of the serpent of Aesculapius into the city of Rome—to be freed from a three-year pestilence, a noble embassy of the Roman leaders having been sent to Epidaurus—and its placing in a temple dedicated to it as to a deity. The history of this matter is to be read in Valerius Maximus, book one, chapter eight.28
Pherecides Syrus dixisse fertur daemones a Iove deturbatos e coelo, eorumque principem cognominatum esse Ophionaeum, id est, serpentinum. Mira sunt quae in extremo capite libri Danielis narrantur de dracone, quem ut Deum Chaldaei venerabantur. Suetonius in Tiberio scripsit, fuisse Tiberio serpentem in deliciis, quem ille condocefecerat de manu sua cibum petere. Etiam post adventum Christi fuisse qui serpentem, quasi auctorem scientiae boni & mali, divino cultu hono-
Pherecydes the Syrian is reported to have said that the demons were cast down from heaven by Jove, and that their prince was surnamed Ophioneus—that is, serpentine. Marvelous are the things narrated in the last chapter of the book of Daniel concerning the dragon, which the Chaldeans venerated as a god. Suetonius, in his Tiberius, wrote that Tiberius had a serpent among his delights, which he had trained to take food from his hand. There were also, even after the coming of Christ, those who hono[red] the serpent with divine worship, as the author of the knowledge of good and evil...29
...norarent, fuse tractat Epiphanius disputans adversus 37. haeresim. Caeterum duo illa quae in hac nostra sententia posuimus, & fuisse verum serpentem, & simul ei adfuisse daemonem, facile est cuivis minime contumaci probare ac persuadere. Nam & Moses eum appellat simpliciter serpente, & genus poenae qua eum mulctavit Deus, declarat fuisse verum serpentem: & ita sentiunt Patres, idque confirmatur iis ipsis argumentis quibus tertiam opinionem, quae Cyrilli est, refutavimus; denique sententia haec servat integram historiae fidem, & secundum eam omnia quae Moses de serpente narrat, licet commode de vero serpente interpretari.
...should honor [the serpent with divine worship], Epiphanius treats at length, disputing against the 37th heresy. But those two things which we have laid down in this our opinion—both that there was a true serpent, and that at the same time a demon was present to it—are easy to prove and persuade to anyone not at all obstinate. For both Moses calls it simply a 'serpent,' and the kind of penalty with which God punished it declares it to have been a true serpent; and so the Fathers think; and this is confirmed by those very arguments with which we refuted the third opinion, which is Cyril's; finally, this opinion preserves the trustworthiness of the history intact, and according to it all that Moses narrates about the serpent may be conveniently interpreted of a true serpent.30
Praeter serpentem autem fuisse ibi daemonem, manifeste ostendit & humanus sermo, & disputatio seu ratiocinatio serpentis cum Eva; quae duae res omnium animalium vim, naturam, & facultatem excedunt, nec effici possunt nisi a natura intelligente, quae quadruplex est: Homo, Deus, Angelus bonus, & Daemon. Tunc autem praeter Evam & Adamum nullus erat alius homo; & si fuisset, aspectabilis & cognitus Evae fuisset: Deus autem, aut bonus Angelus, eius tentationis auctor esse non potuit: fuit enim malitiose ad decipiendum hominem & a divinae legis obedientia retrahendum adhibita: relinquitur igitur eam fuisse a daemone concinnatam & confectam.
But that besides the serpent there was a demon there, both the human speech and the disputation or reasoning of the serpent with Eve clearly show; which two things exceed the power, nature, and faculty of all animals, and cannot be effected except by an intelligent nature, which is fourfold: Man, God, a good Angel, and a Demon. But at that time, besides Eve and Adam, there was no other man; and if there had been, he would have been visible and known to Eve. God, however, or a good Angel, could not have been the author of that temptation, for it was applied maliciously, to deceive man and to draw him back from obedience to the divine law: it remains, therefore, that it was contrived and accomplished by a demon.31
Atque hoc ipsum manifestis verbis confirmat divina Scriptura, quae libri Sapientiae capite secundo ait, Invidia diaboli mortem introiisse in orbem terrarum: & apud Ioannem capite octavo Dominus noster dixit, diabolum fuisse ab initio homicidam: quia nimirum per hanc tentationem decipiens hominem, occidit eum spiritualiter, & reum fecit etiam mortis corporalis: quam etiam ob causam in Apocalypsi diabolus appellatur serpens antiquus; & 2. ad Corinthios 11. Timeo, inquit Paulus, ne sicut serpens Evam seduxit astutia sua, &c. Liquet autem, non fuisse Evam a serpente animali, sed a diabolo per serpentem deceptam.
And divine Scripture confirms this very thing in manifest words: in the book of Wisdom, chapter two, it says that 'by the envy of the devil death entered into the world'; and in John, chapter eight, our Lord said that the devil was 'a murderer from the beginning'—because, namely, by this temptation, deceiving man, he killed him spiritually and made him guilty also of bodily death; for which cause also, in the Apocalypse, the devil is called 'the ancient serpent'; and in 2 Corinthians 11, 'I fear,' says Paul, 'lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his cunning,' etc. It is clear, then, that Eve was deceived not by an animal serpent, but by the devil through a serpent.32
Posita igitur hac sententia, quam non modo ceteris probabiliorem, sed multo verissimam iudicamus, fuisse diabolum, qui per serpentem insidias Evae struxerit, fallaciam intenderit, peccatum persuaserit; deinceps nonnulla quae difficultatem habent, partim de illo serpente, partim de diabolo qui eo usus est velut organo, disputanda sunt. De serpente quatuor tractandae sunt quaestiones. Prima quaestio, quomodo intelligendum sit quod dixit Moses, serpentem fuisse callidiorem omnibus bestiis terrae, utrum de vero serpente, an de diabolo id sit intelligendum. Secunda quaestio, quomodo Eva non exhorruit aspectum & congressum serpentis. Tertia, quomodo non obstupuit serpentem humano sermone & intelligentia secum loqui. Quarta, quomodo maledictio illa qua punitus a Deo serpens est, Super pectus tuum gradieris, & terram comedes, &c. fuerit poena serpentis.
This opinion being laid down, therefore—which we judge not only more probable than the others, but by far the truest—namely that it was the devil who, through the serpent, contrived snares for Eve, aimed deceit, and persuaded sin: thereafter certain things that involve difficulty, partly about that serpent, partly about the devil who used it as an instrument, must be disputed. Concerning the serpent, four questions are to be treated. The first question: how is what Moses said—that the serpent was more cunning than all the beasts of the earth—to be understood, whether it is to be understood of a true serpent, or of the devil. The second question: how Eve did not shudder at the sight and meeting of the serpent. The third: how she was not astonished that the serpent spoke with her with human speech and intelligence. The fourth: how that curse by which the serpent was punished by God—'Upon your breast you shall go, and you shall eat earth,' etc.—was a penalty for the serpent.33

Translator’s notes

  1. Heading of the first disputation of Book VI. ↩
  2. Marginal gloss: 'Quinque opiniones de illo serpente' (Five opinions about that serpent). The five views: (1) a real serpent naturally speaking/understanding; (2) a real serpent temporarily given speech by God; (3) a phantom serpent masking a demon; (4) a wholly metaphorical serpent = the devil; (5) a real serpent used as the demon's instrument. ↩
  3. Marginal gloss: 'Prima opinio Iosephi, serpentem habuisse tunc naturalem facultatem loquendi' (The first opinion, of Josephus, that the serpent then had a natural faculty of speaking). Citations: Josephus, Antiquities I.1; Tostatus (Alonso de Madrigal), quaestio 429 on Genesis. ↩
  4. Basil of Caesarea (Homily on Paradise) is cited as holding a similar view: that before the Fall animals were tame and spoke, and the serpent walked upright. (The text then turns to Plato—catchword 'PLATO'.) ↩
  5. Plato, Statesman (Politicus), on the golden age of Saturn when men spoke with beasts, recalled via Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica XII.9 (cited as supporting the first opinion). ↩
  6. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur opinio Iosephi' (The opinion of Josephus is refuted). Understanding and speech are proper to man alone (man = 'rational animal'); cf. Aristotle, Historia Animalium IV.9. Trained animals' imitative sounds are neither natural nor understood. ↩
  7. Refutation continued: God does not strip away the natural for sin's sake (cf. Angels, man); to remove speech would require changing the serpent's very nature; and other, innocent serpents of the species would have kept the trait by heredity. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'se' = secundum naturam). ↩
  8. Refutation continued: a defect is not heritable as such (a blind man begets sighted sons). Pliny (Naturalis Historia VIII.41, a barking serpent the year Tarquin was expelled) and Valerius Maximus (book 1) list talking beasts among portents—showing such speech is preternatural, not natural. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'rale' = naturale). ↩
  9. Completion of the refutation of Josephus (catchword 'rale' = naturale): no animal can naturally speak humanly, still less understand. ↩
  10. Marginal gloss: 'Secunda sententia B. Ephraem, datam fuisse ad tempus serpenti vim loquendi. Iob 1. seq.' (The second opinion, of Blessed Ephraem, that the power of speaking was given to the serpent for a time. Job 1ff.). Source: Moses Bar Cepha, De Paradiso, c. 27. Satan obtained speech for the serpent (cf. Job 1; Balaam's ass, Num. 22). Sentence continues (catchword 'indi' = inditum). ↩
  11. Ephraem's grounds (God addresses the serpent as understanding: 'You shall eat dust...'), then Pererius's refutation: a serpent lacks vocal organs; Balaam's ass spoke by the Angel, not itself; giving real organs would have visibly transformed the serpent, which Eve would have noticed. ↩
  12. Marginal glosses: 'Facultatem intelligendi, & ipsum intelligere nullo modo cum animalibus communicari posse' (That the faculty of understanding, and understanding itself, can in no way be shared with animals); 'Tertia opinio Cyrilli, & Eugubini. Non fuisse verum serpentem, sed diabolum sub specie & imagine serpentis.' Citations: Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Julianum III; Agostino Steuco (Eugubinus), Cosmopoeia. Pererius's objection (the demon would have dropped the phantom afterward) continues on the next page (catchword 'human' = humanam [formam]). ↩
  13. Completion of the refutation of Cyril (opinion 3): unlike Angels who shed their assumed bodies after their task, the serpent remained, was cursed, and is called 'more cunning'—all unfitting for a mere phantom. (Cf. the angelic-form analogy from the previous page, catchword 'human'.) ↩
  14. Marginal gloss: 'Quarta sententia Caietani. Narrationem Mosis de serpente, non esse historicam, sed parabolicam' (The fourth opinion, of Cajetan: that the Mosaic narration about the serpent is not historical but parabolic). Opinion 4: the serpent = the devil metaphorically; the temptation purely internal. ↩
  15. Marginal glosses: 'Ioan. 1.' (John 1:36, 'Behold the Lamb of God'); 'Apoc. 1.' (Apocalypse); 'Infra. 23' (cross-reference). Cajetan's reasons: Scripture uses animal-names for rational beings (Lamb, Lion of Judah, dragon/serpent of the devil, Behemoth/Leviathan in Job 40-41); 'more cunning' is false of a real snake; speech cannot belong to a real serpent—so the 'serpent' is the devil. ↩
  16. Cajetan's reply to the Balaam's-ass objection (Numbers 22): unlike the ass, where Scripture states the cause ('the Lord opened the mouth of the ass'), the serpent's speech has no such stated cause. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword '& sic'). ↩
  17. Cajetan continued: Moses states no cause for the serpent's speech (unlike the ass), implying the devil; and the curse (crawling, eating dust) fits the devil, not a real snake, which already crawled by nature. ↩
  18. Cajetan continued: Moses records no fright in Eve (unlike Moses' own fear of the serpent, Exod. 4:3), which suits an inward, familiar tempter—the devil. ↩
  19. Marginal gloss: 'Cur secundum Caietanum, daemon comparetur cum bestiis terrae' (Why, according to Cajetan, the demon is compared with the beasts of the earth). The devil, cast down from the rational order into the irrational, is rightly called and compared to a beast. ↩
  20. Cajetan's conclusion: the whole serpent-Eve dialogue was internal suggestion; reading it metaphorically aids faith among the learned, without licensing a metaphorical reading of everything. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'ut me' = ut metaphorice). ↩
  21. Close of the long Cajetan quotation (catchword 'ut me' from the previous page). ↩
  22. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur opinio Caietani' (The opinion of Cajetan is refuted). Pererius judges it erroneous and rash, against all the Fathers and the Church's public teaching; allegorizing the whole narrative is the error for which Origen was condemned (Third Council of Constantinople, 680-681). ↩
  23. The slippery-slope objection: allegorizing the serpent would equally allegorize Paradise, the trees, the four rivers, and the formations of Adam and Eve—none of which the text marks as metaphor. ↩
  24. Marginal gloss: 'Duobus tantum modis diabolus hominem interius tentare potest' (In only two ways can the devil tempt man inwardly). Against Cajetan's internal-only temptation: per Augustine and Gregory, before the Fall man could be tempted only externally, since the lower powers were wholly subject to reason. The devil's two inner modes (sensitive appetite; phantasy) were both impossible then. Sentence continues (catchword 'infe' = infestare). ↩
  25. Marginal gloss: 'Quinta sententia, quam Auctor sequitur' (The fifth opinion, which the Author follows). Pererius's adopted view (opinion 5): a real, natural serpent into which the devil insinuated himself, using it as his instrument to speak and tempt. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'fere' = fere Patribus). ↩
  26. Marginal glosses: 'Theodoretus, q.31. & 32.'; 'Rupertus lib. de Operibus Trinitatis.' The fifth opinion's patristic support: Basil, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Bede, Rupert; John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa II.10; Peter Lombard, Sentences II d.21; and Augustine, quoted from De Civitate Dei XIV.11. ↩
  27. Marginal gloss: 'Cur potius serpentes, quam aliud ullum animal, afficiantur & moveantur verbis incantantium, secundum Augustinum' (Why serpents rather than any other animal are affected and moved by charmers' words, according to Augustine). Verbatim quotation of Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI.27: the devil used the serpent as an instrument; the serpent did not understand; snake-charming itself works by diabolical power, in memory of the first seduction. ↩
  28. Marginal gloss: 'Serpens Aesculapii Epidauro transvectus Romam' (The serpent of Aesculapius conveyed from Epidaurus to Rome). The demon worked through serpents in pagan religion too: the serpent of Aesculapius brought from Epidaurus to Rome to end a plague (Valerius Maximus I.8). ↩
  29. Marginal gloss: 'Serpens Tyberio in deliciis habitus' (A serpent kept by Tiberius among his delights). Further serpent-cult examples: Pherecydes of Syros on the fallen demons' prince 'Ophioneus' (serpentine); the dragon worshipped by the Chaldeans (Bel and the Dragon, Daniel 14); Tiberius's pet serpent (Suetonius); and post-Christian serpent-worshippers (the Ophite gnostics). Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'nora' = honorarent/honorabant). Running footer: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. HHH'. ↩
  30. Completion (catchword 'nora' = honorarent) of the serpent-worship examples (Epiphanius, Panarion / Adv. haereses 37, on the Ophites). Then the first half of the fifth opinion (a real serpent) confirmed: Moses' plain word and the literal punishment fit a real serpent. ↩
  31. Marginal gloss: 'Quadruplex natura intelligens' (The fourfold intelligent nature). Argument that a demon was present: speech and reasoning require an intelligent nature (Man, God, good Angel, Demon); by elimination, only a demon fits. ↩
  32. Scriptural confirmation that the devil was the agent: Wisdom 2:24; John 8:44 ('a murderer from the beginning'); Apoc. 12/20 ('the ancient serpent'); 2 Cor. 11:3. ↩
  33. Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor quaestiones de illo serpente' (Four questions about that serpent). The four questions of the disputation are set out: (1) sense of 'more cunning'; (2) Eve's lack of fear at the serpent; (3) her lack of astonishment at its speech; (4) how the curse was a penalty for a serpent. ↩