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Book Six — the temptation and fall

QUESTION III. Why Eve was not astonished on hearing the serpent speaking and disputing with her

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QUESTION III. Why Eve was not astonished on hearing the serpent speaking and disputing with her.1

QUAESTIO III. Cur Eva non obstupuerit audiens secum loquentem & disputantem serpentem.

The third question is: how did Eve not become astonished on hearing the serpent conversing with her in human fashion? There are three opinions. Rupert, in book 3 On the Trinity and its Works, chapter 3, setting forth this very question, answers it thus: Either, he says, the woman did not know that the serpent, like the other living creatures, lacks reason and speech—but it seems absurd that the first woman, in Paradise and in the state of innocence, was ignorant of what now, in the state of misery, any woman whatever is not ignorant of; or, if she knew it, how was she not astonished,2

Tertia quaestio est, quomodo Eva non obstupuerit audiens serpentem humano more secum sermocinantem. Tres sunt opiniones. Rupertus libro 3. de Trinitate & operibus eius, capite 3. hanc ipsam quaestionem ponens, ad eam ita respondet: Vel, inquit, mulier nescivit serpentem aeque ut ceteras animantes ratione & sermone carere, at videtur absurdum, quod nunc in statu miseriae qualibet mulier non ignorat, primam illam mulierem in Paradiso atque in statu innocentiae nescivisse, vel si scivit, quomodo non obstupuit,

...astonished, and suspect that guile and snares lay beneath? But she knew that the serpent could not speak except by another's spirit. Yet in this lay the immensity of the seduction, that the woman marveled, as it were, at the omnipotence of that spirit, which could form human words through an irrational animal. And if this is so—nay, because it is so—it no longer remains in doubt from what root the so vastly bitter tree of idolatry, sprouting up, spread itself into all nations, or whence it became inborn in wretched men to seek out, with such mad and foolish reverence, through innumerable images, articulate voices formed by the craft of demons, and to worship the devil for God, a lie for truth. This, I say, no longer remains in doubt—whence the fault of so great an error has clung so tenaciously to men: because, namely, our mother, the mother of all the living, Eve the first, was inwardly embittered by the gall of this wickedness, when she marveled at the eloquence of the ill-speaking serpent as if it were the divine wisdom of a diabolical spirit, and foolishly venerated it. So Rupert.3

...obstupuit, & dolum atque insidias subesse suspicata est? Verum scivit ea serpentem non nisi alieno spiritu potuisse loqui. Sed in eo fuit seductionis immensitas, quod quasi omnipotentiam eius spiritus mirata est mulier, qui per irrationale animal humana formare verba potuisset. Quod si ita est, immo quia ita est, non iam dubium remanet qua ex radice, tam vaste amara idololatriae arbor pullulans expanderit se in omnes gentes, vel unde miseris hominibus innatum fuerit, ut tam dementi & stulta reverentia voces articulatas astutia daemonum formatas, per innumera quaererent simulacra, pro Deo diabolum, pro veritate colerent mendacium. Hoc, inquam, dubium iam non remanet, unde tanti erroris vitium tam tenaciter hominibus inhaeserit: quia videlicet mater nostra, mater cunctorum viventium Eva prima, felle huius nequitiae intrinsecus amaricata est, quando in illa facundiam male diserti serpentis, quasi divinam diabolici spiritus sapientiam mirata, & stulte venerata est. Sic Rupertus.

Veruntamen secundum hanc Ruperti sententiam efficeretur, primum hominis peccatum fuisse idololatriam: quod est contra omnes Patres & Theologos, affirmantes fuisse peccatum inobedientiae vel superbiae. Deinde, cum peccatum idololatriae sit omnium gravissimum, maximeque abominatum & exosum Deo, ut ex multis divinae Scripturae locis perspicere licet, cum Deus increpavit Evam, non tam profecto eam increpasset de esu pomi vetiti, quam de impietate idololatriae: de qua tamen nullum verbum fecit, nec de ea quicquam Scriptura vel expresse, vel subobscure, vel directe, vel oblique, aut loquitur unquam, aut etiam innuit: ut satis appareat proprium istud esse Ruperti commentum.
Nevertheless, according to this opinion of Rupert, it would follow that the first sin of man was idolatry: which is against all the Fathers and Theologians, who affirm that it was a sin of disobedience or pride. Next, since the sin of idolatry is the gravest of all, and most abominated and hateful to God, as may be perceived from many places of divine Scripture, when God rebuked Eve, he would assuredly not so much have rebuked her for eating the forbidden apple as for the impiety of idolatry: of which, however, he made no word, nor does Scripture either ever speak or even hint anything of it, whether expressly, or somewhat obscurely, or directly, or obliquely—so that it sufficiently appears that this is Rupert's own invention.4
Quaerit praeterea idem Rupertus, capite secundo eiusdem libri, quomodo serpens accesserit ad Evam, utrum intra Paradisum, an extra fuerit. Respondet ipse, serpentem extra Paradisum fuisse: erat enim Paradisus propria hominis habitatio ei pro magna gratia Creatoris data, boni operis & diligentissimae custodiae conditione interposita. Nam si serpentibus communis erat Paradisus, sequitur ut & lupis atque leonibus, ceterisque bestiis non caruerit ille deliciarum locus: & ideo non tanta beatitudinis existimandus fuerit, ut merito Paradisus voluptatis appellaretur, & ab ipso Deo plantatus fuisse diceretur. Non igitur serpens, praesertim a diabolo corporaliter invadente possessus, in Paradiso fuit: sed mulier corpore & oculis vaga, dum incontinenter deambulat, forte prospectans qualis extra Paradisum mundus esset, & dum serpens utpote astutus, dulcedini terrae illius propius & ambitiosius inhiat, locus diabolo datus est & occasio breviter porrecta unde tentaret Evam. Haec Rupertus.
The same Rupert asks, besides, in the second chapter of the same book, how the serpent approached Eve—whether it was within Paradise or outside. He himself answers that the serpent was outside Paradise: for Paradise was man's proper dwelling, given to him as a great grace of the Creator, with the condition of good work and most diligent keeping attached. For if Paradise was common to serpents, it follows that that place of delights would not have lacked wolves and lions and the other beasts; and therefore it would not be reckoned of such beatitude that it should rightly be called the Paradise of pleasure, and be said to have been planted by God himself. Therefore the serpent—especially as possessed by the devil bodily invading it—was not in Paradise; but the woman, wandering in body and eyes, while she walks about incontinently, perhaps looking out at what the world outside Paradise was like, and while the serpent, being cunning, gapes more closely and more ambitiously after the sweetness of that land, a place was given to the devil and an occasion briefly held out whence he might tempt Eve. Thus Rupert.5
Sed profecto serpentem illum fuisse intra locum Paradisi, fere Patrum ac Theologorum sententia est, idque satis aperte indicat narratio Mosis, si quis ad eam animum diligenter advertat. Altera sententia est Bonaventurae & S. Thomae in secundo senten. distinct. 21. qui aiunt, Evam non putasse solum esse serpentem qui loqueretur secum, sed existimasse per serpentem aliquem spiritum ange-
But surely that that serpent was within the place of Paradise is nearly the opinion of the Fathers and Theologians, and the narration of Moses indicates this clearly enough, if one diligently turns his mind to it. The second opinion is that of Bonaventure and St. Thomas, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 21, who say that Eve did not think that it was a serpent alone that was speaking with her, but reckoned that through the serpent some angel[ic] spirit...6
...angelicum loqui: ideo autem non obstupuisse, quia sciebat id facere posse spiritus angelicos. Et Bonaventura quidem scribit, Evam credidisse spiritum illum esse bonum, certe sibi esse benevolum, suaeque utilitati bene consulentem, vel, ut inquit S. Thomas, Eva non diiudicavit utrum bonus esset spiritus an malus, toto animo & aviditate tam magnificis eius promissis intenta. Et hoc significavit etiam S. Thomas in prima part. quaest. 94 art. ultimo. Nam cum secundo loco hanc ex verbis Augustini posuisset obiectionem, propterea Evam, auctore Magistro sententiarum, non horruisse serpentem secum loquentem, quia officium loquendi accepisse eum a Deo putasset: solvens ipse postea eam obiectionem sic ait: Ad secundum dicendum est, quod mulier putavit serpentem accepisse loquendi officium, non per naturam, sed aliqua supernaturali operatione, quamvis non sit necessarium, auctoritatem Magistri sententiarum sequi in hac parte.
...that some angelic spirit was speaking; and that therefore she was not astonished, because she knew that angelic spirits could do this. And Bonaventure indeed writes that Eve believed that spirit to be good, certainly well-disposed to her, and consulting well for her advantage; or, as St. Thomas says, Eve did not judge whether the spirit was good or evil, being with her whole mind and eagerness intent upon its so magnificent promises. And St. Thomas indicated this too in the First Part, question 94, article last. For when, in the second place, he had set forth this objection from the words of Augustine—that Eve, on the authority of the Master of the Sentences, did not shudder at the serpent speaking with her, because she had thought it had received the office of speaking from God—he himself, afterward resolving that objection, says thus: To the second it must be said that the woman thought the serpent had received the office of speaking, not by nature, but by some supernatural operation; although it is not necessary to follow the authority of the Master of the Sentences in this part.7
Verum tria officere videntur huic sententiae. Primum, vel eo ipso debuisset mulier serpentis locutionem perhorrescere: secum enim reputasset cur spiritus ille angelicus voluisset per serpentem loqui, ac non potius per seipsum sub specie & figura hominis, qua scilicet specie Deus & Angeli, sibi & marito suo non semel apparuissent: itaque commota fuisset ac perturbata, & aliquem dolum atque fallaciam subesse suspicata esset. Deinde, si mulier putasset fuisse spiritum angelicum qui secum locutus esset, & a quo fuisset ipsa decepta: cum postea est a Deo reprehensa, non in serpentem sed in illum spiritum culpam coniecisset: respondit enim Deo, Serpens decepit me, & comedi, at dixisset potius, spiritus ille malus decepit me. Denique, cum Deus vellet punire eum a quo Eva fuerat decepta, non utique serpentem, sed illum spiritum impostorem ac deceptorem Evae punivisset.
But three things seem to stand against this opinion. First, by that very fact the woman ought to have shuddered at the serpent's speech: for she would have reflected with herself why that angelic spirit had wished to speak through a serpent, and not rather through itself under the appearance and figure of a man—in which appearance, namely, God and the Angels had more than once appeared to her and to her husband; and so she would have been moved and disturbed, and would have suspected that some guile and deceit lay beneath. Next, if the woman had thought that it was an angelic spirit that had spoken with her, and by which she had been deceived, when she was afterward reproved by God, she would have cast the blame not on the serpent but on that spirit: for she answered God, 'The serpent deceived me, and I ate,' whereas she would rather have said, 'That evil spirit deceived me.' Finally, when God wished to punish the one by whom Eve had been deceived, he would assuredly have punished not the serpent, but that impostor and deceiver spirit of Eve.8
Tertia sententia est Cyrilli, Magistri sententiarum & Tostati, quae nobis ad veritatem propensior videtur, propterea non obstupuisse Evam, quia nesciebat facultatem loquendi nulli animali naturaliter esse datam: nam & novitas rerum, & inexperientia ipsius, & quod perfectio conditionis muliebris perfectam omnium rerum naturalium scientiam minime deposceret, eius ignorationis Evae causa fuit.
The third opinion is that of Cyril, the Master of the Sentences, and Tostatus, which seems to us more inclined toward the truth: that Eve was not astonished because she did not know that the faculty of speaking is naturally given to no animal; for both the novelty of things, and her own inexperience, and the fact that the perfection of the womanly condition by no means required a perfect knowledge of all natural things, were the cause of that ignorance of Eve.9
Verum sententiam Auctorum quos nominavi, enucleatius hoc loco declarare oportet. Iulianus Apostata Christianae disciplinae, ut Cyrillus refert tertio libro eorum decem quos adversus eum scripsit, irridebat hanc historiam Mosis de collocutione serpentis cum Eva. Quonam, aiebat ille, idiomate serpentem cum Eva usum dicemus? nunquid humano? & quid differunt hae fabulae ab iis quas poetae Graeci finxerunt? Ad hoc respondet Cyrillus: cum tunc non esset aliud rationale animal, Evam quae admodum simplex erat, existimasse forsitan aliis quoque animalibus potestatem humana voce loquendi esse datam. Revera tamen, inquit, sermonem illum inter Evam & serpentem, daemonis operatione serpente velamentum malignitatis illius obumbrante, esse factum.
But the opinion of the Authors whom I have named must be more thoroughly explained in this place. Julian the Apostate from Christian teaching, as Cyril relates in the third of those ten books which he wrote against him, mocked this history of Moses about the conversation of the serpent with Eve. 'In what language,' he used to say, 'shall we say the serpent conversed with Eve? Surely not the human one? And how do these fables differ from those which the Greek poets invented?' To this Cyril answers: since there was then no other rational animal, Eve, who was very simple, perhaps supposed that the power of speaking with a human voice had been given to other animals as well. Yet in truth, he says, that conversation between Eve and the serpent came about by the operation of the demon, the serpent veiling the malignity of that one.10
Hoc quod diximus, efficere ac praestare daemonibus esse facillimum, confirmat ipse clarissimorum apud ipsos Gentiles tum Poetarum tum Philosophorum testimoniis. Etenim Homerus prodidit Achillis equum indita sibi a Iunone loquendi facultate, praedixisse Achilli mortem. Porphyrius item vitam describens Pythagorae, narrat, cum Pythagoras multis comitatus flumen Causum transiret, audientibus cunctis, flumen ei locutum esse, & salutantium more dixisse: Salve Pythagora. Philostratus qui Apollonii nomen, diserte scripta eius vita & factis, nobilitare & illustrare voluit, in lib. 6. ca. 5. narrat, cum Apollonius venisset ad Gymnosophistas, principis eorum Thespesionis iussu, arborem ulmum, propter quam consederant, humana voce salutasse Apollonium: & vocem quidem fuisse articulatam & distinctam, tenuem tamen & exilem ac muliebri similem. Traditum praeterea est, Dodonaeam quercum, per quam olim reddebantur oracula, humanas voces edere solitam. Quin etiam Isigonus Cithiensis in Rhodo insula dicit, Iovis taurum humani sermonis expertem non fuisse. Si daemon igitur per equum, taurum, flumen, & arbores, humanas voces fingere potuit: cur incredibile Iuliano visum est, potuisse eum per serpentem cum Eva loqui? Hactenus ex Cyrillo.
This which we have said—that it is most easy for demons to effect and perform—Cyril himself confirms by the testimonies of the most celebrated, among the Gentiles themselves, both Poets and Philosophers. For Homer reported that the horse of Achilles, the faculty of speaking having been imparted to it by Juno, foretold death to Achilles. Porphyry likewise, describing the life of Pythagoras, narrates that, when Pythagoras, accompanied by many, was crossing the river Causus, in the hearing of all the river spoke to him, and in the manner of those who greet said: 'Hail, Pythagoras.' Philostratus, who wished to ennoble and illustrate the name of Apollonius by eloquently writing of his life and deeds, in book 6, chapter 5, narrates that, when Apollonius had come to the Gymnosophists, by order of their chief Thespesion, the elm tree near which they had sat down greeted Apollonius with a human voice; and that the voice was indeed articulate and distinct, yet thin and slight, and like a woman's. It is moreover handed down that the Dodonaean oak, through which oracles were once given, was wont to utter human voices. Nay, Isigonus of Cithium says that on the island of Rhodes the bull of Jove was not without human speech. If, therefore, a demon could form human voices through a horse, a bull, a river, and trees, why did it seem incredible to Julian that he could speak through a serpent with Eve? Thus far from Cyril.11
Magister sententiarum in secundo distin. 21. ita scribit: Hic quaeri solet quare mulier non horruit serpentem, & respondet ipse, quia cum Eva novisset serpentem a Deo creatum esse, ipsum quoque officium loquendi a Deo accepisse putavit. Tostatus super 13. caput Geneseos, quaest. 457. existimat Evam credidisse, facultate loquendi praeditum naturaliter fuisse serpentem: hoc autem accidisse ei propter rerum novitatem recens creatarum, & inexperientiam eius.
The Master of the Sentences, in the second book, distinction 21, writes thus: Here it is usually asked why the woman did not shudder at the serpent, and he himself answers, because, since Eve had known that the serpent was created by God, she thought that it had also received the office of speaking from God. Tostatus, on the 13th chapter of Genesis, question 457, judges that Eve believed the serpent was naturally endowed with the faculty of speaking; and that this happened to her because of the novelty of recently created things, and her inexperience.12
Nam licet creata sit a Deo tantam iudicii rectitudinem tantamque rerum cognitionem habens, quantam haberet nunc quaecumque femina iam aetate matura dummodo non sit circa aliquod doctrinae genus ab alio erudita, non tamen a Deo accepit Eva perfectam sapientiam. Si enim eam habuisset, non potuisset decipi: deceptam tamen se esse, ipsamet confessa est: non igitur habuit certam cognitionem eorum quorum nullam tenebat experientiam: qua cum circa animalia careret, poterat de illis quicquid occurrebat credere. Vel igitur mulier antea non noverat animalia, siquidem Eva creata est postquam animalia ducta sunt ad Adamum: & idcirco nesciebat, utrum loqui naturale esset serpenti necne: vel si antea viderat, quamvis non audivisset serpentem loqui, tamen quia parvo illo tempore non poterat omnes cunctorum animalium proprietates & facultates exploratas & perceptas habere, nesciebat utrum facultas loquendi naturalis esset serpenti, licet parvo illo tempore serpentem ea facultate usum non vidisset.
For although she was created by God having such rectitude of judgment and such knowledge of things as any woman now of mature age would have—provided she is not instructed by another in some branch of learning—yet Eve did not receive from God a perfect wisdom. For if she had had it, she could not have been deceived; yet she herself confessed that she had been deceived: she did not, therefore, have a certain knowledge of those things of which she held no experience; and since she lacked it concerning the animals, she could believe about them whatever occurred to her. Either, then, the woman had not previously known the animals—since Eve was created after the animals had been led to Adam—and therefore did not know whether speaking was natural to a serpent or not; or, if she had previously seen them, although she had not heard the serpent speak, yet because in that short time she could not have explored and grasped all the properties and faculties of all the animals, she did not know whether the faculty of speaking was natural to the serpent, even though in that short time she had not seen the serpent use that faculty.13
Ad id autem quod Rupertus opponit huic sententiae, absurdum videri Evam in Paradiso & in perfecto illo statu innocentiae ignorasse, utrum serpens ille loqui posset, quod in statu naturae corruptae cuilibet mulierculae notum sit, respondet Tostatus, dissimilem esse rationem Evae ac mulierum quae nunc sunt. Etenim nunc innumerabilibus experimentis & exemplis compertum & comprobatum est, & apud omnes pervulgatum, naturali facultate loquendi serpentes carere, ut mirum non sit etiam mulierculis id esse notum: tunc autem nulla eius rei praecesserant expe-
But to that which Rupert objects against this opinion—that it seems absurd that Eve, in Paradise and in that perfect state of innocence, was ignorant whether that serpent could speak, which in the state of corrupt nature is known to any little woman—Tostatus answers that the case of Eve and of the women who now exist is dissimilar. For now it has been ascertained and proved by innumerable experiences and examples, and is commonly known among all, that serpents lack the natural faculty of speaking, so that it is no wonder that even little women know it; but at that time no expe[riences] of that matter had preceded...14
...experimenta, nulla vigebat fama. Perfectio autem illius status innocentiae, arguit Evam creatam esse perfectam: non quidem absolute & simpliciter, sed prout conditio muliebris poscebat: nemo enim negaverit, minorem multo fuisse in Eva quam in Adamo perfectionem. Ad perfectionem igitur conditionis muliebris non pertinebat, habere certissimam & perfectissimam omnium animalium, omniumque proprietatum, virtutum, & facultatum eorum scientiam, sed habere cognitionem rerum agendarum, & eorum quae spectant ad rei familiaris administrationem, & ad officia omnia quae erga maritum & liberos tractanda & perficienda erant. Sic Tostatus.
...experiences, no report was current. But the perfection of that state of innocence argues that Eve was created perfect—not indeed absolutely and simply, but as the womanly condition demanded; for no one would deny that the perfection in Eve was much less than in Adam. To the perfection of the womanly condition, therefore, it did not pertain to have a most certain and most perfect knowledge of all animals, and of all their properties, virtues, and faculties, but to have knowledge of the things to be done, and of those which pertain to the administration of the household and to all the offices which were to be handled and accomplished toward husband and children. Thus Tostatus.15
Ad hanc equidem sententiam Cyrilli, Magistri, & Tostati, quam ad ceteras, proniori feror assensu. Nam praeter illorum Doctorum auctoritatem, ducor ea ratione, quod per hanc interpretationem tota Mosis narratio secundum expositionem & intellectum historicum belle constat: ceterae ante interpretationes, nec satis apte cum Mosis narratione congruunt, & magnis urgentur ac praemuntur incommodis. Verum adversus hanc sententiam illa videtur esse validissima obiectio, quam ponit S. Thomas, in 1. parte quaest. 94. art. ult. Status enim innocentiae vacabat omni malo tam animi quam corporis: sed error & deceptio mentis non est minus vitium & malum, quam sit foeditas corporis, aut dolor, aut morbus: putare autem serpentem loqui posse, insignis est mentis error & deceptio, non igitur in tanto errore fuisse Evam ante peccatum, existimare convenit.
To this opinion of Cyril, the Master, and Tostatus I for my part am carried with a readier assent than to the others. For besides the authority of those learned men, I am led by this reason, that by this interpretation the whole narration of Moses holds together well according to the historical exposition and sense; whereas the other interpretations neither agree aptly enough with the narration of Moses, and are pressed and constrained by great difficulties. But against this opinion there seems to be that most forcible objection which St. Thomas sets, in the First Part, question 94, article last. For the state of innocence was free from all evil, both of soul and of body; but error and deception of mind is no less a fault and evil than is foulness of body, or pain, or disease; and to think that a serpent could speak is a notable error and deception of mind; therefore it is not fitting to suppose that Eve was in so great an error before sin.16
Sed hanc obiectionem licet ita repellere. Duplicem faciunt Theologi ignorantiam, unam purae negationis, alteram pravae dispositionis. Et haec quidem repugnabat statui innocentiae, illa vero minime: pueri namque in eo statu diu fuissent multarum rerum ignorantes, quas scilicet processu temporis didicissent. Firmo autem assensu falsa pro veris, aut vera pro falsis approbare, magnum fuisset vitium, magnumque malum, perfectionique eius status omnino contrarium. Eva igitur habuit ignorantiam purae negationis, nesciens utrum serpens loqui posset, nec ne: quam ignorantiam brevi abiecisset interrogato viro suo, & ab eo docta. Nec ipsa credidit firmo assensu serpentem posse naturaliter loqui, sed dubio tantum & quasi suspenso. Mota est autem ad eum audiendum, eiusque verbis credendum, illecta promissis eius, quae visa ei sunt amplissima, Pulcherrima, maximeque optanda.
But this objection may be repelled thus. The Theologians make a twofold ignorance, one of pure negation, the other of an evil disposition. And this latter was indeed repugnant to the state of innocence, but the former not at all: for children in that state would have been for a long time ignorant of many things, which, namely, they would have learned in the course of time. But to approve, with firm assent, falsehoods for truths, or truths for falsehoods, would have been a great fault and a great evil, and altogether contrary to the perfection of that state. Eve, therefore, had an ignorance of pure negation, not knowing whether the serpent could speak or not—which ignorance she would soon have shed by asking her husband and being taught by him. Nor did she believe with firm assent that the serpent could naturally speak, but only with a doubtful and, as it were, suspended assent. But she was moved to listen to it, and to believe its words, enticed by its promises, which seemed to her most ample, most beautiful, and most to be desired.17

Translator’s notes

  1. Third question of the disputation on the serpent. ↩
  2. Marginal gloss: 'Prima opinio Ruperti' (First opinion, of Rupert). Rupert of Deutz (De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius III.3) poses the dilemma; his answer continues on the next page (catchword 'obstupuit'). ↩
  3. Conclusion of Rupert's quotation: Eve's marveling at the serpent-spirit's quasi-omnipotence is made the root of all later idolatry. (Note: this page's running number is misprinted '607'; the true printed page is 617, since the offset of 41 holds—PDF 658 − 41 = 617.) ↩
  4. Pererius's refutation of Rupert: his view makes the first sin idolatry (against all who say it was disobedience/pride), and God's rebuke of Eve says nothing of idolatry—so it is Rupert's invention. ↩
  5. Marginal gloss: 'Verum serpens qui tentavit Evam, extra Paradisum fuerit. Rupertus' (Whether the serpent that tempted Eve was outside Paradise. Rupert). Rupert's further claim—the serpent was outside Paradise, Eve wandering out and meeting it at the boundary. ↩
  6. Marginal gloss: 'Secunda opinio Bonaventurae & Sancti Thomae' (Second opinion, of Bonaventure and St. Thomas). Pererius rejects Rupert's 'outside Paradise' claim (the Fathers and Moses place the serpent within); then begins the second opinion on Q.III (Bonaventure and Aquinas, Sent. II d.21): Eve supposed some spirit acted through the serpent. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'ange' = angelicum). Running footer: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. III'. ↩
  7. Continuation (catchword 'ange' = angelicum) of opinion 2 on Q.III (Bonaventure and Aquinas, Sent. II d.21; ST I q.94 a.ult.): Eve thought the serpent's speech came from a supernatural operation, not nature. ↩
  8. Pererius's three objections against opinion 2 (Bonaventure/Aquinas): Eve would have been alarmed an 'angel' used a serpent; she blamed the serpent (not a spirit) to God; God punished the serpent. ↩
  9. Marginal gloss: 'Tertia sententia Cyrilli, Magistri senten. & Tostati, quae placet Auctori' (The third opinion, of Cyril, the Master of the Sentences, and Tostatus, which pleases the Author). Opinion 3 (Pererius's preference): Eve's non-astonishment came from ignorance (novelty, inexperience) that speech is natural to no animal. ↩
  10. Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Julianum, book 3: Julian the Apostate's mockery of the talking serpent (likening it to Greek poetic fables), and Cyril's reply—the simple Eve may have supposed animals could speak, but in fact it was the demon's work, masked by the serpent. Sentence continues (catchword 'Hoc'). ↩
  11. Marginal gloss: 'Daemones olim solitos per animalia, & res inanimas humano modo loqui, multis exemplis declarat Cyrillus' (Cyril shows by many examples that demons were formerly wont to speak in human fashion through animals and inanimate things). Cyril's pagan parallels (Homer's horse of Achilles; Pythagoras and the river; Philostratus's elm greeting Apollonius; the Dodonaean oak; the bull of Jove on Rhodes) that demon-induced animal/inanimate speech was widely reported. ↩
  12. Peter Lombard (Sent. II d.21): Eve thought the serpent received speech from God. Tostatus (on Gen., q.457): she believed it naturally had speech, owing to the novelty of newly-created things and her inexperience. ↩
  13. Tostatus's reasoning continued: Eve had sound judgment but not perfect wisdom (else she could not have been deceived); created after the animals were named to Adam, she could not yet know whether speech was natural to a serpent. ↩
  14. Tostatus answers Rupert's objection: Eve's case differs from women now, who know from countless examples that serpents cannot speak; at that time no such experience yet existed. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'expe' = experimenta). ↩
  15. Conclusion of the Tostatus quotation: Eve's created perfection was proportioned to her womanly condition (knowledge for household and family duties), not encyclopedic knowledge of all animals. ↩
  16. Marginal glosses: 'Auctoris opinio' (The Author's opinion); 'Obiectio Sancti Thomae adversus opinionem Auctoris' (St. Thomas's objection against the Author's opinion). Pererius adopts the Cyril/Lombard/Tostatus view (best fits the historical sense), then raises Aquinas's objection (ST I q.94 a.ult.): mental error is an evil incompatible with the sinless state. ↩
  17. Marginal gloss: 'Solutio obiectionis' (Solution of the objection). The reply to Aquinas: ignorance is twofold (pure negation vs. evil disposition); only the latter is incompatible with innocence. Eve had only ignorance of pure negation, with doubtful, not firm, assent—and was drawn in by the serpent's enticing promises. ↩