Mind of the Church

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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Six — the temptation and fall

QUESTION I. Whether the sin of the first human beings was the gravest of all sins

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QUESTION I. Whether the sin of the first human beings was the gravest of all sins.1

QUAESTIO I. An primorum hominum peccatum, fuerit omnium peccatorum gravissimum.

Gravitas peccati multis ex rebus aestimari solet, vel ex ipsa specie peccati, sic adulterium gravius est simplici fornicatione: vel ex intentione affectus peccantis, ut si quis vehementiori studio & intensiori affectu rapiatur ad peccandum: vel ex effectu peccati, id est, damno, quod peccatum consequitur, sic homicidium gravius est furto, vel ex variis circumstantiis peccato adiunctis, quae gravitatem eius amplificant, ut sunt qualitas personae, locus, tempus, & id genus alia. Si spectetur igitur species peccati primorum hominum non utique fuit omnium gravissimum: gravius enim fuisset, si peccassent per blasphemiam, per infidelitatem, per contemptum, aut odium Dei. Nec...
The gravity of a sin is usually estimated from many things: either from the very species of the sin (thus adultery is graver than simple fornication); or from the intention of the sinner's affection (as when someone is carried off to sin with more vehement zeal and more intense affection); or from the effect of the sin, that is, the harm that follows the sin (thus homicide is graver than theft); or from various circumstances attached to the sin, which amplify its gravity, such as the quality of the person, the place, the time, and other things of that kind. If, therefore, the species of the sin of the first human beings be considered, it was certainly not the gravest of all: for it would have been graver if they had sinned through blasphemy, through infidelity, through contempt or hatred of God. Nor...2
dubitanter dixerim Iudam, Arium, Lutherum secundum speciem peccati gravius peccasse, quam Adamum, peccavit enim contra legem positivam, non contra legem naturalem, & contra praeceptum de re indifferenti, non de re per se mala. Nec affectus peccandi fuit in illis intensior, vehementior, praviorque quam in ullo eorum, qui postea peccaverunt. At enim gravissimum fuit illud peccatum, si penses damnum ex eo consecutum, id est, iacturam tot tantorumque bonorum...
...would I hesitatingly say that Judas, Arius, and Luther sinned more gravely, according to the species of the sin, than Adam: for he sinned against positive law, not against natural law, and against a precept concerning an indifferent thing, not concerning a thing evil in itself. Nor was the affection of sinning in them more intense, more vehement, and more depraved than in any of those who afterward sinned. But that sin was indeed the gravest, if you weigh the harm that followed from it — that is, the loss of so many and so great goods...3
...nunquam deinceps recuperandorum, & tot tantorumque malorum quae peccatum illud peperit, necessitatem. Neque damnum illud, proprium modo fuit illorum hominum, sed universi generis humani: illi enim primi parentes suo casu & ruina omnes posteros suos, quotquot deinceps fuerunt, futurique sunt, in peccati & mortis exitium pertraxerunt. Quocirca Paulus tantum hoc damnum ponderans, in cap. 5. epistolae ad Romanos, Per unum hominem, inquit, peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, & per peccatum mors: & ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt.
...goods never afterward to be recovered, and the necessity of so many and so great evils which that sin brought forth. Nor was that harm only proper to those human beings, but to the whole human race: for those first parents, by their own fall and ruin, dragged all their posterity, however many were afterward and shall be, into the destruction of sin and death. Wherefore Paul, weighing this great harm, in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans: 'By one man,' he says, 'sin entered into this world, and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all sinned.'4

This too greatly aggravates and magnifies Adam's sin, that he excelled in wisdom and in the grace of God, and had no proclivity to evil, but on the contrary a most keen propensity to good, so that with the greatest ease he could repel any temptation whatsoever and avoid all sin without effort: wherefore his iniquity in sinning was the greater, the greater was his ease of not sinning — as Augustine writes (chapter 15, book 14 of the City of God) in these words: 'If anyone thinks the condemnation of Adam either excessive or unjust, he surely does not know how to measure how great the iniquity in sinning was, where there was so great an ease of not sinning.' And Augustine declares this by the contrary, namely from a comparison with the obedience of Abraham and of our Lord Jesus Christ. 'As,' he says, 'the obedience of Christ was the more praiseworthy because he became obedient unto death: so the disobedience of the first man was the more detestable, because he became disobedient unto death. For where the disobedience is great, the punishment set forth, and the thing commanded by the Creator easy — who could sufficiently explain how great an evil it is not to obey in an easy matter, and at the command of so great a power, and with so terrifying a punishment?' Thus Augustine.5

Illud quoque valde gravat & magnificat peccatum Adami, quod is sapientia, & gratia Dei excelleret nullamque haberet ad malum proclivitatem: sed contra, acerrimam ad bonum propensionem, ita ut summa facilitate quantamlibet tentationem propulsare, omneque peccatum vitare nullo labore posset: quamobrem tanto fuit maior eius in peccando iniquitas, quanto maior erat in eo non peccandi facilitas, quemadmodum Augustinus cap. 15. lib. 14. de Civitate Dei, his verbis scribit. Si quis damnationem Adami, vel nimiam vel iniustam putat, metiri profecto nescit, quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando, ubi tanta erat non peccandi facilitas. Idque declarat Augustinus ex contrario, scilicet ex comparatione obedientiae Abrahae, & domini nostri Iesu Christi. Sicut, inquit, obedientia Christi eo praedicabilior fuit, quia factus est obediens usque ad mortem: ita inobedientia primi hominis eo fuit detestabilior, quia factus est inobediens usque ad mortem. Ubi enim magna est inobedientia poena proposita, & res a Creatore facilis imperata: quisnam satis explicet quantum malum sit non obedire in re facili, & tantae potestatis imperio, & tanto terrenti supplicio? Sic Augustinus.

Locus praeterea Paradisi, quem Adamus scelere suo dehonestavit, ac dedecoravit, detestabilius fuisse peccatum eius arguit: siquidem eo loci nulla erat peccandi occasio, nullumque male agendi irritamentum: quinimo plurima & acerrima ad laudandum, colendum, & amandum Deum, eiusque iussis obtemperandum incitamenta. Quid ego dicam de circumstantia temporis, quae non parum scelus eius amplificat? talem enim Deus Adamum fecerat, ut omni tempore summa facilitate innocens, & sanctus perseverare, omneque peccatum vitare, & quantamvis tentationem daemonis nullo negotio superare posset. At ille quam facile? quam cito? tanquam inermis & imbecillis atque ignavus miles, prima hostis, minimeque gravi ad sustinendum impressione victus & prostratus est? Nimirum, quam facilis ei victoria esse poterat: tam insigne fuit ad perpetuum dedecus & ignominiam, fuisse victum.
Moreover the place of Paradise, which Adam dishonored and disgraced by his crime, argues his sin to have been the more detestable: since in that place there was no occasion of sinning and no incitement to ill-doing — nay, very many and most keen incentives to praising, worshiping, and loving God, and to obeying his commands. What shall I say of the circumstance of time, which not a little amplifies his crime? For God had made Adam such that at all times he could, with the greatest ease, persevere innocent and holy, avoid all sin, and overcome any temptation whatsoever of the demon without trouble. But he — how easily? how quickly? — like an unarmed, feeble, and cowardly soldier, was conquered and laid low by the enemy's first and least grievous assault. Surely, as easy as victory could have been for him, so signal was it, to his perpetual disgrace and ignominy, to have been conquered.6

Translator’s notes

  1. First Quaestio of the disputation. ↩
  2. Gravity of sin estimated in four ways (species, intention, effect, circumstances). By species, the first sin was not the gravest. Marginal glosses: 'Unde aestimetur gravitas peccati'; 'Quomodo peccatum primorum hominum, & fuerit, & non fuerit omnium gravissimum.' Catchword: 'dubitanter' (continues on the next page). ↩
  3. By the species of sin, even Judas, Arius, and Luther sinned more gravely than Adam (who sinned against positive, not natural, law, over an indifferent thing). But by its effect the first sin was the gravest. Catchword: 'nunquam' (continues on the next page); page footer signature 'OOO 2'. ↩
  4. The harm of the first sin = the loss of irrecoverable goods, affecting the whole race. Citation: Rom 5:12. Running head misprinted '650'; true printed page 660. ↩
  5. Aggravation: Adam's wisdom and ease of not sinning made his sin the greater. Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.15. Marginal glosses: 'Peccatum Adami qua ratione ceteris gravius'; 'Augustinus.' The margin 'Phil. 1' points to Phil 2:8 ('obediens usque ad mortem'). ↩
  6. Further aggravating circumstances: the place (Paradise, with no occasion to sin) and the time (Adam was made able to persevere with the greatest ease) — yet he was conquered like a feeble soldier at the first assault. ↩