NINTH DISPUTATION. Of what kind that confusion of tongues was, and how it was made — Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume II

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NINTH DISPUTATION. Of what kind that confusion of tongues was, and how it was made.¹

NONA DISPUTATIO. Qualis fuerit illa confusio linguarum, et quemadmodum facta sit.

DISPUTAT hac de re multis et disertis verbis Philo sub finem eius libri quem De confusione linguarum scripsit, tractans illa verba „Venite, descendamus et confundamus,“ etc. Tres autem partes habet eius disputatio. Primo loco exponit quid significet vox illa, „Confusio.“ „Res,“ inquit Philo, „quae per se non facile noscuntur, ex cognatarum rerum similitudine manifestae fiunt; saepe enim ignotos ex similium et eiusdem generis collatione cognoscimus…“

Philo disputes on this matter, in many and eloquent words, toward the end of the book which he wrote On the Confusion of Tongues, treating those words, „Come, let us go down and confound,“ etc. And his disputation has three parts. In the first place he sets forth what that word, „Confusion,“ signifies. „Things,“ says Philo, „which are not easily known of themselves become manifest from the likeness of kindred things; for we often come to know the unknown by the comparison of similar things and of the same kind…“²

„…Sed quid est confusionis simile? Mixtura scilicet et temperatura, ut a maioribus traditum est: mixtura in rebus aridis, temperatura in humidis. Est igitur mixtura corporum diversorum perturbata coniunctio, ut si quis hordeum, triticum, ceterarumque frugum species in unum acervum congerat. Temperatura vero non est coniunctio, sed dissimilium partium mutua penetratio, quarum semel temperatarum qualitates arte quadam secerni queunt. Id quod aiunt in vino et aqua contingere: nam haec duo si uniantur, temperaturam conficiunt, et nihilominus tamen per secretionem ad pristinas qualitates redire possunt. Si enim spongiam imbuas oleo, aquam ea colligi, vinum relinqui aiunt; fortassis quia spongia, ex aquis genita, cognatum sibi liquorem in temperamento attrahit, vinum vero ut alienum respuit. At confusio fit cum, penetrantibus se invicem partibus, qualitates earum pereunt, ut, corruptis rebus quae prius fuerant, unius nova et a prioribus diversa exsistat generatio: quod accidit in Medicorum compositione quam vocant Tetrapharmacum, quae constat e cera, pice, resina et adipe; haec semel composita et invicem confusa non possunt ulla arte separari ut redeant ad qualitates pristinas, sed, cum singula nusquam appareant, ex omnibus corruptis una egregia conficitur. Quid igitur vocabulum confusionis significet, ex his quae diximus apparet.“

„…But what is similar to confusion? Mixture, namely, and tempering, as has been handed down by our elders: mixture in dry things, tempering in moist. Mixture, then, is a disordered joining of diverse bodies — as if one should heap together barley, wheat, and the kinds of the other grains into one heap. But tempering is not a joining, but a mutual penetration of dissimilar parts, whose qualities, once tempered, can by some art be separated. Which they say happens in wine and water: for these two, if united, make a tempering, and nonetheless can, by separation, return to their former qualities. For if you soak a sponge in oil, they say the water is gathered by it and the wine left; perhaps because the sponge, born of waters, draws to itself in the tempering the kindred liquid, but rejects the wine as foreign. But confusion comes about when, the parts penetrating one another, their qualities perish, so that, the things that were before being corrupted, a new generation of one thing, different from the former, arises: which happens in the physicians' compound which they call Tetrapharmacum, made of wax, pitch, resin, and fat; these, once compounded and confounded together, cannot by any art be separated so as to return to their former qualities, but, since the single ingredients appear nowhere, one excellent thing is made from all the corrupted ones. What, therefore, the word ‘confusion’ signifies, from these things which we have said appears.“³

SECUNDO loco enarrat Philo eorum sententiam qui putarunt Mosem supradictis verbis locutum esse de vera confusione linguarum, quasi tunc primum diversitatis linguarum quae sunt inter homines origo extiterit. Hanc opinionem, etsi non plane improbat Philo, negat tamen eam Mosis consilio et proposito esse convenientem; ita scribens: „Qui aperta solum et obvia sectantur, putant hic describi ortum linguarum Graecarum ac Barbararum. Quos equidem non accuso: fortassis enim et ipsi recte sentiunt; sed istos tamen admonitos cupio ne hactenus processisse contenti sint, sed transeant ad tropologiam, sic existimando divina oracula esse umbras quasdam corporum, ceterum quae per has significantur esse res verissimas. Id si quis animo caecutiens parum acute cernit, occasionem ab ipso legis latore porrectam minime negligat, vel hoc ipso in loco: confusionem enim rem hanc appellat; qui si solum voluisset ortum linguarum indicare, aptius divisione appellasset quam confusionem. Non confunduntur enim quae in partes distribuuntur, sed discernuntur potius: ut non minor pugna sit inter haec vocabula quam inter res ipsas. Est enim confusio facultatum simplicium corruptio, quae simul congestae unam quampiam generant; separatio vero est unius in plura divisio. Itaque si Moses voluisset significare unam loquelam in plures partes divisam esse, aliis aptioribus et magis propriis usus fuisset appellationibus, divisionem vel separationem vocando, non autem confusionem, quae plane contrarium significat.“

In the second place Philo recounts the opinion of those who thought that Moses, by the aforesaid words, spoke of a true confusion of tongues — as if then for the first time arose the origin of the diversity of tongues which is among men. This opinion, although Philo does not plainly disapprove it, he yet denies to be agreeable to Moses's design and purpose, writing thus: „Those who pursue only the open and obvious things think that here is described the origin of the Greek and Barbarian tongues. Whom indeed I do not accuse: for perhaps they too judge rightly; but I wish them nevertheless admonished not to be content to have proceeded thus far, but to pass on to tropology, thus deeming the divine oracles to be certain shadows of bodies, but that the things signified by these are most true realities. If anyone, dim of mind, perceives this too dully, let him by no means neglect the occasion offered by the lawgiver himself, even in this very place: for he calls this thing ‘confusion’; who, if he had wished only to indicate the origin of tongues, would more fitly have called it ‘division’ than ‘confusion.’ For things that are distributed into parts are not confounded, but rather distinguished: so that there is no less a conflict between these words than between the things themselves. For confusion is a corruption of simple faculties, which, heaped together, generate some one thing; but separation is a division of one into many. And so, if Moses had wished to signify that one speech was divided into many parts, he would have used other, fitter and more proper, appellations, calling it ‘division’ or ‘separation,’ not ‘confusion,’ which signifies plainly the contrary.“⁴

EXTREMO loco declarat Philo quemadmodum oratio haec Mosis non historice, sed secundum tropologicam intelligentiam exponenda et intelligenda est. „Quoties Deus,“ inquit Philo, „minatur confusionem cogitationibus impiis, ea non singulis tantum vitiorum speciebus earumque viribus intentatur, sed et operibus eorum quae fiunt de communi sententia; ne vel singula, vel communicatis consiliis, vires universas colligant ad delendam par[tem praestantiorem]…“

In the last place Philo declares how this discourse of Moses is to be expounded and understood not historically, but according to the tropological understanding. „As often as God,“ says Philo, „threatens confusion to impious thoughts, it is aimed not only at the single species of vices and their forces, but also at their works which are done by common purpose; lest, either singly, or by their counsels communicated, they gather their whole forces to destroy the [more excellent part]…“⁵

…tem praestantiorem. Quapropter ait: Confundamus ibi linguam eorum, ne audiat vocem quisque sui proximi. Ac si diceret: Muta surdaque faciamus vitia singula, ut nec loquendo nec invicem consentiendo damnum afferant. Hoc igitur est nunc propositum sub figura confusionis linguarum: disiicere constipatum vitiorum cuneum, irrita facere improborum foedera, perniciosam societatem convellere, iunctas impiorum copias ideoque validas dissipare, malitiae imperium maximis iniquitatibus communitum demoliri.“

…the more excellent part. Wherefore He says: Let us there confound their tongue, that no one may hear the voice of his neighbor. As if He said: Let us make the single vices mute and deaf, that neither by speaking nor by agreeing with one another they may do harm. This, then, is the present purpose under the figure of the confusion of tongues: to scatter the packed wedge of vices, to make void the leagues of the wicked, to tear apart their pernicious society, to dissipate the joined and therefore strong forces of the impious, to demolish the empire of malice fortified by the greatest iniquities.“⁶

„NONNE vides ut mundi Opifex partes animae conspirare voluerit, sed propter ipsarum decorem atque incolumitatem loci disclusas et muneribus atque functionibus distinctas fecerit? Non possunt oculi quod aures praestant audire; non aures cernere; non odorari labia; non gustare nares; non ratio fungi sensuum officio, nec sensus formare vocem. Noverat ille omnium artifex non expedire ut haec invicem misceantur et confundantur, verum satius esse ut singulae partes animae intra suas quaeque functiones consistant et inconfusae maneant; idque non minus conferre in commune animantium generi quam privatim ipsis potentiis. E diverso autem vitia in confusionem et dispersionem adducit Deus, ne coadunata, iunctis nocendi viribus, insuperabile malum afferant. Sicut enim concentum virtutum a Deo foveri decet, ita dispergi et profligari vitia. Nec est aliud nomen quod vitio magis conveniat quam confusio: id quod evidens est in quovis insipiente, qui verbis, consiliis, factis perturbatis et confusis utitur.“ Atque haec est nostra (inquit Philo) super hoc textu et oratione Mosis sententia. Et hactenus quidem procedit Philonis disputatio.

„Do you not see how the Maker of the world willed the parts of the soul to conspire [together], but, for their own grace and safety, made them set apart in place and distinguished by their offices and functions? The eyes cannot hear what the ears furnish; nor the ears see; nor the lips smell; nor the nostrils taste; nor reason discharge the office of the senses, nor the senses form speech. That artificer of all knew that it was not expedient for these to be mingled and confounded among themselves, but better that the single parts of the soul should each stand within their own functions and remain unconfounded; and that this conduces no less to the common [good] of the race of living things than privately to the faculties themselves. But, conversely, God brings vices into confusion and dispersion, lest, united, with their powers of harming joined, they bring an insuperable evil. For just as the concord of the virtues ought to be fostered by God, so [it is fitting that] vices be dispersed and routed. Nor is there any other name that befits vice more than ‘confusion’: which is evident in any fool, who uses words, counsels, and deeds disordered and confused.“ And this (says Philo) is our opinion upon this text and discourse of Moses. And thus far indeed proceeds Philo's disputation.⁷

AT enim vero interpretationem hanc Philonis, in genere quidem tropologico, ut veram, acutam, nec ineruditam, laudo et amplector; at vero ut propriam et (quemadmodum vocant) literalem atque ab ipso Mose primo ac principaliter spectatam et designatam, plane improbo et abiicio. Namque orationem Mosis esse historicam et veram ac germanam rerum gestarum narrationem, praeter omnium tam Hebraeorum quam Christianorum auctoritatem, res ipsa loquitur. Totum enim genus dicendi Mosis in hoc libro historicum est, et nuda ac simplici narratione constans, non secus profecto quam in libris Iosue, Iudicum et Regum. Alioqui, cum liber Genesis tum ceteri omnes sacri libri qui nominantur historici, non essent quales nominantur et ab omnibus habentur, sed essent parabolici et allegorici aut etiam aenigmatici, similiter atque liber Salomonis qui inscribitur Cantica Canticorum.

But indeed this interpretation of Philo, in the tropological kind, as true, acute, and not unlearned, I praise and embrace; but as the proper and (as they call it) literal [interpretation], and as looked to and designed by Moses himself first and principally, I plainly disapprove and cast off. For that Moses's discourse is historical, and a true and genuine narration of things done, the matter itself proclaims — besides the authority of all, both Hebrews and Christians. For the whole manner of Moses's speaking in this book is historical, and consisting of a bare and simple narration, no otherwise indeed than in the books of Joshua, Judges, and Kings. Otherwise, both the book of Genesis and all the other sacred books which are called historical would not be such as they are named and held by all, but would be parabolic and allegorical or even enigmatic, similarly as the book of Solomon which is entitled the Canticle of Canticles.⁸

SED urget nos Philonis argumentum. Vocabulum enim confusionis, inquit ille, ad Mosis orationem minime quadrat: neque enim, si nudam spectes historiam, confusas esse linguas, sed divisas reperies. Nam ubi quaeso ista linguarum confusio est facta? An in illa prima et omnium communi lingua? At illa, etsi non apud omnes, attamen apud quos mansit, eadem mansit plane integra et incorrupta. Utrum in aliis linguis, quarum varietas tunc est invecta? Verum in illis nulla cernitur confusio. Quomodo enim confusae dici possunt quae nunquam antea fuerant et tunc primum ortae sunt? Cumque earum…

But Philo's argument presses us. For the word ‘confusion,’ says he, by no means fits Moses's discourse: for, if you look at the bare history, you will find the tongues not confounded but divided. For where, I ask, was that confusion of tongues made? In that first and common tongue of all? But that, even if not among all, yet among those with whom it remained, remained plainly the same, entire and incorrupt. Or in the other tongues, whose variety was then introduced? But in those no confusion is discerned. For how can those be called confounded which had never before existed and then for the first time arose? And since of them…⁹

…quaelibet sic esset ab alia qualibet distincta ut qui essent unius linguae nullam aliam intelligerent, non potuit ulla esse in illis confusio. Erant igitur omnes inconfusae atque omnino distinctae.

…each was so distinct from every other that those who were of one tongue understood no other, there could be no confusion in them. They were, therefore, all unconfounded and altogether distinct.¹⁰

SED huic argumento facile occurritur, si dicamus confusionem illam de qua loquitur Moses non fuisse in linguis, sed in hominibus, propter linguarum tamen repentinam varietatem. Etenim propter primae linguae oblivionem, quae plerisque illorum hominum accidit, et subitam variarum linguarum valde dissonantium ac discrepantium in magna illa hominum multitudine usurpationem, tanta illis hominibus animorum confusio accidit ut et ab incepta aedificatione desistere et invicem segregari diversaque terrarum loca ad habitandum capessere coacti fuerint. Et hanc quidem interpretationem vehementer adiuvant verba illa quibus Moses Deum ita loquentem facit: „Venite, descendamus et confundamus ibi linguam eorum, ut non audiat unusquisque vocem proximi sui.“ Vides in eo fuisse linguarum confusionem, quod in tanta illa multitudine hominum, propter repentinam linguarum varietatem, cum alii alios non intelligerent, supra quam credi possit perturbati animo et confusi fuerint?

But this argument is easily met, if we say that the confusion of which Moses speaks was not in the tongues, but in the men — yet on account of the sudden variety of tongues. For, on account of the oblivion of the first tongue, which befell most of those men, and the sudden use, in that great multitude of men, of various tongues very dissonant and discrepant, so great a confusion of minds befell those men that they were compelled both to desist from the begun building and to be segregated from one another and to take up diverse places of the earth for dwelling. And this interpretation those words greatly help, by which Moses makes God speak thus: „Come, let us go down and there confound their tongue, that they may not understand one another's speech.“ Do you see that the confusion of tongues was in this — that in that great multitude of men, on account of the sudden variety of tongues, since some did not understand others, they were perturbed and confounded in mind beyond what can be believed?¹¹

SED quomodo linguarum illa confusio et divisio facta est? Hoc nempe modo. Primo quidem fecit Deus omnes illos homines (praeter Heber et familiam eius) oblivisci primae linguae quae antea fuerat omnium communis. Oblivionem vero attulit delendo ex animis eorum hominum habitum illum quo significationes omnium vocum illius linguae cognitas habuerant, iusque, quotiescunque volebant, ad loquendum uti promptissimum et facillimum illis fuerat. Hac inducta oblivione, tanta illis contigit eius linguae ignoratio ut, cum ea loquentes audirent ipsum Heber et Phaleg, quasi nihil de ea unquam vel novissent vel etiam audissent, nullo modo eos intelligerent.

But how was that confusion and division of tongues made? In this manner, namely. First, God made all those men (except Heber and his family) forget the first tongue which had before been common to all. And He brought the oblivion by deleting from the minds of those men that habit by which they had held known the significations of all the words of that tongue, and [by which] it had been most ready and most easy for them to use it for speaking whenever they wished. This oblivion being induced, so great an ignorance of that tongue befell them that, when they heard Heber and Phaleg themselves speaking it, as if they had never either known or even heard of it, they understood them in no way.¹²

DEINDE, pro diversitate illarum gentium quae tribus ex filiis Noë proseminatae concurrerant ad aedificationem civitatis et turris, diversos habitus variarum linguarum mentibus eorum inseruit Deus. Quo factum est ut unaquaeque illarum gentium eius linguae quae divina dispensatione ei contigerat non modo cognitionem (quantum ad verba, phrases, proverbia aliaque id genus propria cuiuslibet linguae), verum etiam ad loquendum facilem et promptum haberet usum. Itaque sic illi circa suam quisque linguam affecti erant ut affecti esse solent qui linguam aliquam probe noverunt eaque, quoties libet, expedite et facile utuntur.

Next, according to the diversity of those nations which, sprung from the three sons of Noah, had come together to the building of the city and tower, God inserted into their minds the diverse habits of the various tongues. Whereby it came about that each of those nations had not only the knowledge of that tongue which by divine dispensation had befallen it (as to the words, phrases, proverbs, and other such things proper to each tongue), but also a ready and easy use for speaking. And so they were each so disposed toward his own tongue as those are wont to be disposed who know some tongue well and use it, whenever they please, readily and easily.¹³

PAENE fugerat memoriam quod superiori disputatione de Philastrio dicendum fuerat. Id, quia illic praetermissum est, hic reddemus, satius rati alieno quam nullo loco dicere. Philastrius in Catalogo Haereseon capite 106 opinionem de unitate linguae omnium hominum ante aedificationem turris (quam nos supra gravissimis auctoritatibus optimisque rationibus firmatam secuti sumus) ut haereti[cam]…

It had almost escaped my memory what should have been said in the foregoing disputation about Philastrius. Since it was passed over there, we shall render it here, deeming it better to say it in the wrong place than in none. Philastrius, in the Catalogue of Heresies, chapter 106, the opinion concerning the unity of the tongue of all men before the building of the tower (which we above, confirmed by the weightiest authorities and best reasons, have followed) as heret[ical]…¹⁴

…ut haereticam improbat et damnat. Ait ille firmiter esse credendum etiam ante aedificationem Babel multis saeculis magnam fuisse inter homines linguarum et sermonum varietatem, quarum tamen omnium linguarum scientiam omnes homines, Dei munere, usque ad constructionem turris et linguarum confusionem tenuerunt. Quod autem Moses dixit terram fuisse labii unius, idcirco dictum putat quia, etsi varia erant linguarum genera, omnes tamen se invicem intelligebant; eratque omnibus lingua una et idem sermo, non quidem eorundem vocabulorum usu, sed eadem omnium loquentium et audientium intelligentia. Sic ille.

…disapproves and condemns as heretical. He says it must be firmly believed that even many ages before the building of Babel there was among men a great variety of tongues and speech, the knowledge of all which tongues, however, all men, by God's gift, held down to the construction of the tower and the confusion of tongues. And what Moses said, that the earth was of one lip, he thinks was said for this reason: that, although there were various kinds of tongues, yet all understood one another; and there was to all one tongue and the same speech — not indeed by the use of the same words, but by the same understanding of all speakers and hearers. So he.¹⁵

VERUM Philastrius, dum quod verissimum erat quasi falsum et haereticum damnavit, a vero ipse et a recta divinarum literarum intelligentia longe aberravit. Verum quia superiori disputatione satis de hoc est dictum, nihil attinet hoc loco contra Philastrium eadem de re disputare. Videtur autem Philastrius levi consideratione eorum quae supra scripsit Moses capite decimo in eum esse inductus errorem. Proditum enim est capite decimo filios Iaphet et Sem fuisse divisos in diversas familias, regiones et linguas, quasi ante aedificationem turris iam fuisset inter posteros filiorum Noë diversitas linguarum. Sed non animadvertit Philastrius illa esse scripta per anticipationem, figuram nempe sacris literis non infrequentem: id quod supra nos B. Augustini et Ruperti testimonio comprobavimus.

But Philastrius, while he condemned what was most true as if false and heretical, himself wandered far from the truth and from the right understanding of the divine letters. But since enough has been said about this in the foregoing disputation, it is not worthwhile here to dispute against Philastrius on the same matter. And Philastrius seems to have been led into this error by a light consideration of those things which Moses wrote above in the tenth chapter. For it is set forth in the tenth chapter that the sons of Japheth and Sem were divided into diverse families, regions, and tongues, as if before the building of the tower there had already been among the descendants of the sons of Noah a diversity of tongues. But Philastrius did not observe that those things were written by anticipation — a figure not infrequent in the sacred letters — which we above proved by the testimony of Blessed Augustine and Rupert.¹⁶

Translator’s notes

Liber XVI, Disputation 9 (title): the nature and manner of the confusion of tongues. ↩
§128. Disp. 9. Philo (end of On the Confusion of Tongues) treats this in three parts. First, what ‘confusion’ means: things hard to know of themselves become clear by comparison with similar things (continues p. 522). Margin: Philo. ↩
§128 (concl.). Philo distinguishes: ‘mixture’ (disordered joining of dry things, like grains heaped together); ‘tempering’ (mutual penetration of moist things, separable again — wine and water, drawn apart by a sponge); but ‘confusion’ (parts penetrating so their qualities perish, a new thing arising from the corrupted — the physicians' Tetrapharmacum of wax, pitch, resin, fat, inseparable). Margin: what confusion is. ↩
§129. Philo's second part: those who take Moses to speak of a real confusion of tongues (the origin of Greek/Barbarian tongues) — Philo does not condemn them but says it does not fit Moses's intent, urging them to pass to tropology (the oracles are ‘shadows,’ the things signified the realities). His clue: Moses calls it ‘confusion,’ not ‘division’ — and the two are opposite (confusion = corruption of simples into one new thing; separation = one divided into many); so for a mere division of one speech Moses would have said ‘division,’ not ‘confusion.’ ↩
§130. Philo's third part: the passage is to be taken tropologically, not historically. As often as God threatens ‘confusion’ to impious thoughts, it is aimed not only at single vices but at their works done by common conspiracy — lest, singly or together, they gather all their forces to destroy the better part (continues p. 523). ↩
§130 (concl.). Philo: ‘let us confound their tongue’ = let us make the single vices mute and deaf, so they harm not by speech or agreement. The purpose under the ‘confusion of tongues’ figure: to scatter the packed wedge of vices, void the wicked's leagues, tear apart their society, dissipate the impious' joined forces, and demolish the fortified empire of malice. ↩
§131. Philo (cont.): the world's Maker set the soul's parts distinct by function (eyes don't hear, ears don't see, etc.), unconfused — better for the whole and the faculties. Conversely God brings vices to confusion and dispersion, lest united they do insuperable harm: as virtue's concord is fostered, so vice is to be routed — ‘confusion’ being the fittest name for vice (evident in the fool's disordered words and deeds). This is Philo's view; thus far his disputation. ↩
§132. Pererius: Philo's reading, as tropology, is true, acute, and learned — but as the proper/literal sense Moses primarily intended, it is to be rejected. Moses's discourse here is historical (a bare, simple narration, like Joshua/Judges/Kings) — per all Hebrews and Christians; else Genesis and the other ‘historical’ books would be not such but parabolic/allegorical/enigmatic, like the Canticle of Canticles. Margin: Philo refuted. ↩
§133. Philo's pressing argument: ‘confusion’ does not fit — historically the tongues were divided, not confounded. Where was the confusion? Not in the first common tongue (which remained entire where it survived); not in the new tongues (no confusion there — how can what never existed before and then first arose be ‘confounded’?) (continues p. 524). ↩
§133 (concl.). …each tongue was so distinct that one-tongue speakers understood no other — so there was no confusion in them; they were all unconfounded and wholly distinct. ↩
§134. The answer: the ‘confusion’ Moses means was not in the tongues but in the men — through the tongues' sudden variety. By forgetting the first tongue and the sudden onset of many dissonant tongues, the men fell into such confusion of mind that they abandoned the building, split apart, and took up diverse lands. The words ‘let us confound their tongue, that they may not understand one another’ support this — the confusion was that, not understanding one another, they were confounded in mind beyond belief. Margin: how the confusion of tongues is to be understood. ↩
§135. How the confusion/division was made: first, God made all (except Heber's family) forget the first common tongue — by deleting from their minds the habit by which they knew the words' meanings and spoke it readily; so completely that, hearing Heber and Phaleg speak it, they understood nothing, as if they had never known or heard it. Margin: how the division and multiplication of tongues was suddenly made. ↩
§136. Next, God inserted into the minds of those nations (sprung from Noah's three sons) the diverse habits of the various tongues — so each nation had both the knowledge of its divinely-allotted tongue (words, phrases, idioms) and a ready use of it, disposed toward it as one who knows a tongue well and speaks it readily. ↩
§137. (Almost forgotten from the previous disputation:) Philastrius, in his Catalogue of Heresies (ch. 106), condemns as heretical the view (which Pererius has followed, backed by the weightiest authorities) that one tongue was common to all before Babel (continues p. 525). Margin: Philastrius, who thinks even before Babel men had diverse tongues, is refuted. ↩
§137 (concl.). Philastrius: it must be firmly believed that for many ages before Babel there was a great variety of tongues, the knowledge of all of which all men held by God's gift until the tower and the confusion; and ‘the earth was of one lip’ means only that, though tongues varied, all understood one another — one speech not by the same words but by the same mutual understanding. ↩
§138. Philastrius, condemning the truth as heresy, wandered far from the right sense of Scripture (enough was said above). He was misled by a light reading of Gen 10 (the sons of Japheth and Sem ‘divided into families, regions, and tongues,’ as if tongues differed before Babel) — not seeing that this was written by anticipation (a figure not rare in Scripture; proved above from Augustine and Rupert). ↩