QUESTION I. Whether God gave to man a body apt and suited to his nature, dignity, and excellence — Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

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QUESTION I. Whether God gave to man a body apt and suited to his nature, dignity, and excellence.¹

QUAESTIO I. An Deus homini dederit corpus naturae eius, dignitati et praestantiae aptum atque conveniens.

NON videtur Deus tale dedisse homini corpus quale oportebat: conveniētius enim fore videbatur, si corpus humanum ex materia coelesti esset conflatum. Namque ut animus est immortalis, ita quoque decebat corpus eius animi capax immortale esse: inter materiam enim et formam, ut in secundo Physicorum docet Aristoteles, proportio esse debet. Adiice quod, ut animus humanus circulariter movetur intelligendo (quemadmodum scribit Aristoteles 1. libro de Anima text. 46.), ita coelum motu corporali in orbem versatur. Deinde, nobilissimae formae debebatur corpus nobilissimum; sed humanus animus est formarum omnium nobilissimus; ergo corpus eius omnium corporum oportebat esse nobilissimum. Coeleste autem corpus quatuor rebus dignitate praestat omnibus aliis corporibus: quia est incorruptibile; quia est causa universalis omnium; quia circulari motu perpetuò circumagitur; denique propter coelestem lucem.

It does not seem that God gave to man such a body as was fitting: for it would seem to have been more suitable if the human body had been made of celestial material. For as the soul is immortal, so too it was fitting that its body, capable of that soul, should be immortal: for between matter and form, as Aristotle teaches in the second book of the Physics, there ought to be a proportion. Add that, as the human soul moves circularly in understanding (as Aristotle writes in the first book On the Soul, text 46), so the heaven is turned in a circle by a corporeal motion. Next, to the noblest form the noblest body was owed; but the human soul is the noblest of all forms; therefore its body ought to have been the noblest of all bodies. And the celestial body excels all other bodies in dignity in four respects: because it is incorruptible; because it is the universal cause of all things; because it is perpetually turned about by a circular motion; and finally on account of the celestial light.²

Nec verò humanum corpus à coelesti duntaxat corpore dignitate vincitur, sed multis etiam rebus corporibus caeterarum animantium inferius videtur. Primò quidem perfectione sensuum exteriorum: acutior enim aquilae est visus; acrior vulpi et talpae auditus; cani sagacior odoratus; gallinae exquisitior gustatus, quippe quae, sine succi expressione, statim quae rostro vel levissimè tetigerit digna indignáve sentit, ut vel eligat vel respuat. Quinetiam limaces ostreásque vegetiore tactus pollere sensu arbitratur Iulius Scaliger, in Opere quod scripsit adversus Cardanum, exercitatione 247. Namque ut citiùs sentit defectus nervus quàm cute obductus, ita citiùs hae sentiant animantes quae tenuiore quàm homo cute operiuntur necesse est: argumenti enim vis et fundamentum est in analogia medij. Deinde, corporis robore tauris cedit homo; proceritate elephantis; longaevitate

Nor indeed is the human body surpassed in dignity by the celestial body alone, but it seems inferior in many things to the bodies of the other animals. First, in the perfection of the external senses: for the eagle's sight is sharper; the fox's and the mole's hearing keener; the dog's smell more sagacious; the hen's taste more exquisite—since, without any pressing-out of juice, it immediately perceives whatever it has touched even most lightly with its beak as worthy or unworthy, so as either to choose or reject it. Nay more, that snails and oysters are strong in a more vigorous sense of touch, Julius Scaliger thinks, in the work which he wrote against Cardano, exercise 247. For as a bare nerve feels more quickly than one covered with skin, so necessarily those animals which are covered with a thinner skin than man feel more quickly: for the force and foundation of the argument lies in the analogy of the medium. Next, in bodily strength man yields to bulls; in tallness to elephants; in longevity³

[longae]vitate corvis; velocitate tigribus. Quid, quòd aliorum animalium corpora naturalibus operta sunt tegumentis, vel pilis, vel coriis, vel testis, vel squamis? naturalibus item instructa et munita sunt armis et praesidiis? quaedam armata sunt cornibus, alia vel unguibus, vel dentibus, vel spinis, vel aculeis, quibus et se tueri et hostes suos ferire ac profligare queant: soli homini corpus nudum et inerme, et ad oppugnandum aequè atque propugnandum imbecillum et invalidum est datum.

[in longe]vity to ravens; in speed to tigers. What of this, that the bodies of other animals are covered with natural coverings—whether with hair, or hides, or shells, or scales? and likewise are furnished and fortified with natural arms and defenses? Some are armed with horns, others with claws, or teeth, or spines, or stings, by which they can both protect themselves and strike and rout their enemies: to man alone a naked and unarmed body is given, and one feeble and weak both for attack and for defense.⁴

AT enimverò, sine dubitatione ulla, credendum et dicendum est corpus humanum aptissimum et decentissimum naturae hominis à Deo esse fabricatum. Etenim, quanto verius de homine existimare par est id quod de quibuslibet rebus naturalibus dixit Aristoteles, Deum et naturam in omnibus rebus semper ex his quae fieri possunt quod melius est facere, et ut quodque aptum est optimè fieri sic esse factum à natura, nec posse quicquam melius fieri quàm ab ipsa natura non impedita factum sit. Oportebat autem corpus hominis tale fieri ut esset capax sensuum: siquidem cùm anima rationalis creanda esset nuda et expers omnis scientiae, eamque deberet ipsa per sensus aucupari et acquirere, necesse fuit corpus hominis omnibus sensibus instructum et ornatum esse. Omnium verò sensuum quasi fundamentum est tactus, qui in quadam mediocritate et aequali temperatione primarum qualitatum est constitutus. Quemadmodum igitur sensus tactus, ita et alij sensus qui ab eo divelli nequeunt, nisi in corpore patibili et mortali esse non possunt. Ex quo apparet, cum substantia coelestis omnino expers sit primarum qualitatum, sítque penitus impatibilis et immortalis, ideóque sensuum minimè capax, ex ea corpus hominis coagmentari non potuisse.

But in truth, without any doubt, it is to be believed and affirmed that the human body was fashioned by God most apt and most becoming to the nature of man. For how much more truly is it fitting to judge of man what Aristotle said of all natural things whatever—that God and nature, in all things, always do, of those things that can be done, that which is better; and that, as each thing is apt to be made best, so it is made by nature, nor can anything be made better than what has been made by nature herself unimpeded. Now man's body had to be made such as to be capable of the senses: since the rational soul was to be created naked and devoid of all knowledge, and had to acquire it for itself through the senses, it was necessary that man's body be equipped and adorned with all the senses. And the foundation, as it were, of all the senses is touch, which is constituted in a certain mean and equal tempering of the primary qualities. As, therefore, the sense of touch, so also the other senses, which cannot be torn away from it, cannot exist except in a passible and mortal body. From which it appears that, since the celestial substance is wholly devoid of the primary qualities, and is utterly impassible and immortal, and therefore least of all capable of the senses, the body of man could not be compounded from it.⁵

Sanctus Bonaventura, in secundo Sententiarum distinct. 17. art. 2., non fuisse conveniens humanum corpus constare materia coelesti multis rationibus probat, sive homo consideretur in ordine ad Deum, sive ad Angelos, sive ad creaturas corporales, sive ad universum, sive in ordine ad seipsum. Quamvis autem corpus hominis suapte natura mortale esset, huic tamen mortalitatis defectui occurrerat Deus dono immortalitatis, quo Adam munitus, si non peccasset, longissimo et beatissimo aevo in terris fruens, posteà mortis nescius in coelestem et aeternam vitam et felicitatem translatus esset.

St. Bonaventure, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 17, article 2, proves by many reasons that it was not fitting for the human body to consist of celestial material—whether man be considered in relation to God, or to the Angels, or to corporeal creatures, or to the universe, or in relation to himself. And although man's body was by its own nature mortal, yet God had met this defect of mortality with the gift of immortality; armed with which Adam, had he not sinned, after enjoying a very long and most blessed age on earth, would afterward, knowing nothing of death, have been translated into celestial and eternal life and happiness.⁶

ESSE autem corpus hominis longè praestantius corporibus aliorum animalium, tribus ex rebus liquidò cerni et iudicari potest. Principio, hoc manifestè indicat recta humani corporis species et figura, cùm caeterarum animantium prona sint et in terram depressa corpora. Rectitudinis autem humani corporis triplex causa est: Efficiens quidem est abundantia caloris, quo pollet vis illa in semine virili residens, quae corpus humanum tanta solertia architectatur, tantáque arte membratim fingit ac figurat. Materia est valde mollis et delicata temperies eius materiae ex qua conflatur corpus humanum. Denique Finis seu usus eius rectitudinis quadruplex est: Primus, quò

And that the body of man is far more excellent than the bodies of the other animals can be clearly discerned and judged from three things. First, this is manifestly indicated by the upright form and figure of the human body, whereas the bodies of the other animals are prone and pressed down toward the earth. And of the uprightness of the human body there is a threefold cause: the Efficient is the abundance of heat, with which that force is strong that resides in the male seed, which constructs the human body with such skill, and with such art fashions and figures it limb by limb. The Material is the very soft and delicate temper of that matter from which the human body is compounded. And finally the Final cause, or use, of this uprightness is fourfold: the First, that⁷

[Primus,] quò functiones sensuum exteriorum (qui ferè vigent in capite) melius administrari queant: non enim, ut caeteris animalibus, sic homini propter cibum et potum modò et praesentis tantùm vitae conservationem sensus assignati sunt, sed praecipuè ad comparandam scientiam omnium rerum, praesertim verò coelestium, quarum scilicet contemplatione provehitur humanus animus ad ipsius Dei rerúmque divinarum cognitionem: quocirca congruum fuit ut sensus (maximè verò auditus et visus, qui praeter caeteros cognoscendis rebus adminiculo et adiumento sunt) essent in loco excelso et ad coelum erecto. Alter usus rectitudinis humani corporis pertinet ad maiorem perfectionem sensuum interiorum, qui materiam ad intelligendum proximè subministrant humanae menti: hi autem sensus, si caput hominis depressum esset in terram, nimis crassi, hebetes, et tardi fuissent. Tertius usus continet innumerabiles manuum commoditates, quibus careret humana vita si recto corpore non fuisset homo: si enim prono corpore esset, uti eum manibus ad ingrediendum modo aliorum animalium necesse foret; quapropter tot tamque praeclarae manuum utilitates quibus nunc fruimur ex manibus homini non potuissent accidere. Quartus usus spectat ad formandum sermonem: si enim homo ad similitudinem animalium curvo esset corpore, necesse fuisset eum ore cibum capere; quamobrem fuisset illi datum os nimis oblongum, diductum et apertum, lingua item nimis dura crassáque labia: non igitur humanum sermonem et orationem (qua, secundùm mentem, nihil melius homini à Deo concessum est) fingere potuisset.

[The first, that] the functions of the external senses (which for the most part flourish in the head) may be better administered: for the senses were assigned to man not, as to the other animals, merely for food and drink and the preservation of present life, but chiefly for acquiring knowledge of all things—and especially of the celestial things, by the contemplation of which the human soul is advanced to the knowledge of God himself and of divine things: wherefore it was fitting that the senses (and most of all hearing and sight, which beyond the rest are an aid and help for knowing things) should be in a lofty place, erect toward heaven. The second use of the uprightness of the human body pertains to the greater perfection of the internal senses, which most immediately supply matter for understanding to the human mind: and these senses, if man's head were pressed down toward the earth, would have been too gross, dull, and slow. The third use contains the innumerable conveniences of the hands, which human life would lack if man had not been of an upright body: for if he were of a prone body, he would need to use his hands for walking after the manner of the other animals; wherefore the many and excellent uses of the hands which we now enjoy could not have come to man from his hands. The fourth use looks to the forming of speech: for if man, after the likeness of the animals, were of a curved body, he would have needed to take food with his mouth; wherefore there would have been given him a mouth too long, gaping, and open, and likewise too hard a tongue and thick lips: he could not, therefore, have framed human speech and discourse—than which, according to the mind, nothing better was granted to man by God.⁸

SECUNDO loco, praestantia humani corporis aestimari potest ex praestantia sensuum tam interiorum quàm exteriorum. Interiores appello sensus, ipsum sensum communem et vim imaginandi, memoriam item ac reminiscentiam, denique quam in animalibus Philosophi vocant aestimativam, in homine autem cogitativam, supremam nimirum omnium facultatum sentiendum. Sensus autem interiores esse perfectiores in homine quàm in animalibus extra controversiam est. Nam et vis imaginandi potentior in eo est et efficacior, et memoria firmior atque capacior, et potestas reminiscendi nulli animalium concessa, ipsáque vis cogitandi seu quae dicitur cogitativa (ratio quaedam particularis est, et ab Aristotele nonnúquam intellectus appellatur). Quid plura? ipse appetitus animae sentientis, licèt per se sit irrationalis, fit tamen quodammodo rationalis, cum rationis humanae imperij et moderationis capax sit, ideóque plurimarum ac praestantissimarum virtutum sedes existat.

In the second place, the excellence of the human body can be estimated from the excellence of the senses, both internal and external. By internal senses I mean the common sense itself and the power of imagining, likewise memory and reminiscence, and finally what in the animals the Philosophers call the estimative power, but in man the cogitative—the highest, indeed, of all the sentient faculties. And that the internal senses are more perfect in man than in the animals is beyond controversy. For both the imaginative power is in him stronger and more efficacious, and the memory firmer and more capacious, and the power of reminiscence (granted to no animal), and the very power of thinking, or what is called the cogitative (which is a kind of particular reason, and is sometimes called by Aristotle the intellect). What more? the very appetite of the sentient soul, although in itself irrational, yet becomes in a manner rational, since it is capable of the command and moderation of human reason, and therefore is the seat of very many and most excellent virtues.⁹

Quemadmodum autem sensuum etiam exteriorum praestantia caeterae animantes vincantur ab homine, facilè demonstrari et probari potest, adhibita distinctione illa quam in libro 5. de Generatione animalium cap. 1. tradit Aristoteles: excellentiam cuiusque sensus duabus ex rebus aestimari posse, vel ex perceptione rei sensibilis, vel ex iudicio eiusdem rei. In perceptione rei sensi-

And how the other animals are surpassed by man in the excellence of the external senses too can easily be demonstrated and proved, by employing that distinction which Aristotle delivers in the fifth book On the Generation of Animals, chapter 1: that the excellence of each sense can be estimated from two things, either from the perception of the sensible object, or from the judgment of the same object. In the perception of the sensible object¹⁰

[In perceptione rei sensi]bilis, sensus unius animalis quatuor modis vincere potest sensum eiusdem rationis qui est in alio animali, ut visus visum, auditus auditum. Primò si rem sensibilem celeriùs, tum si longinquius percipiat; deinde si minutiora et tenuiora sensilia comprehendat; denique si vehementiùs et exuperátiùs sensile nulla sui offensione aut difficultate capiat et sustineat: atque his quatuor modis visus aquilae superat visum aliorum animalium. Nec inficiari possumus hominem hac ratione multis sensibus vinci ab animalibus. Verùm altera excellentia sensus in diiudicatione rerum sensilium earúmque differentiis omnibus exploratè distinctéque cognoscendis atque discernendis posita est: et hac ratione censemus hominem anteire sensibus caeteras animantes. Esto, citiùs et longinquiùs colores etiam minutos et exiles cernat aquila, et odores sentiat vultur, homo tamen omnem varietatem omnésque differentias colorum (sive in lapidibus illi sint, sive in metallis, sive in herbis et floribus, aliisve quibuslibet in rebus) distinctiùs certiúsque visu dignoscet.

[In the perception of the sensible] object, the sense of one animal can surpass the sense of the same kind which is in another animal in four ways (as sight may surpass sight, and hearing hearing): first, if it perceive the sensible object more quickly, and then if more distantly; next, if it apprehend smaller and finer sensibles; finally, if it take in and bear a more vehement and excessive sensible without any offense or difficulty to itself: and in these four ways the eagle's sight surpasses the sight of the other animals. Nor can we deny that man is, in this respect, surpassed in many senses by the animals. But the other excellence of sense consists in the discernment of sensible things, and in knowing and distinguishing carefully and distinctly all their differences: and in this respect we judge that man precedes the other animals in the senses. Granted that the eagle discerns more quickly and more distantly even minute and slight colors, and that the vulture perceives odors, yet man will more distinctly and surely discern by sight all the variety and all the differences of colors—whether they be in stones, or in metals, or in herbs and flowers, or in any other things whatever.¹¹

TERTIO loco perspicuè cognoscitur excellentia humani corporis ex praestantia temperamenti, seu (ut vulgò appellant) complexionis: quod quidem in homine, caeterorum animalium corporibus, propius accedit ad aequalitatem et ad mediocritatem, longiúsque remotum est ab excessu primarum qualitatum, cùm aliorum animalium corpora vel nimis terrea sint vel nimis aquea. Quo fit ut habere naturalia indumenta et arma (uti habent animalia) imperfectam arguat corporis eorum constitutionem: nam istiusmodi proveniunt ex magna terrestris vel aqueae materiae copia. Nec verò decebat hominis (cuius est tam multiplex et multiformè ingenium, et cui, pro varietate regionum—nam totius orbis terrarum spectator et habitator atque cultor esse debebat—varios esse mores variámque victus rationem esse oportebat) unum aliquem certum et immutabilem victus, vestitus, et armorum modum naturaliter habere, sicut habent animalia. Sed eorum omnium vice quae naturaliter non habet homo, habent autem animalia, Deus homini duas res dedit, Rationem et Manum: ut per illam omnia quae homini ex usu essent futura excogitare et adinvenire, per hanc eadem conficere sibíque comparare facilè posset.

In the third place, the excellence of the human body is clearly known from the excellence of its temperament, or (as they commonly call it) its complexion: which indeed in man, beyond the bodies of the other animals, comes nearer to equality and to the mean, and is farther removed from an excess of the primary qualities, whereas the bodies of the other animals are either too earthy or too watery. Whence it comes about that to have natural coverings and weapons (as the animals have) argues an imperfect constitution of their body: for such things arise from a great abundance of earthy or watery material. Nor indeed was it fitting for man—whose nature is so manifold and multiform, and who (because, according to the variety of regions, he was to be the spectator and inhabitant and cultivator of the whole world) had to have various manners and a various mode of living—to have naturally some one fixed and unchangeable mode of food, clothing, and arms, as the animals have. But in place of all those things which man does not have by nature, but the animals do, God gave to man two things: Reason and the Hand—so that by the one he might devise and discover all things that would be of use to him, and by the other might easily make and procure those same things for himself.¹²

SED ne longius faciam, concludam hunc locum appositis duabus luculentissimis sententiis, altera Senecae et altera Lactantij, quibus hoc ipsum quod docuimus mirificè illustrabitur. Seneca igitur, eos reprehendens qui de natura et Deo quaeruntur quod ab his malignè tractatus sit homo, aut certè minus liberaliter et benignè quàm animalia, in 29. c. lib. 2. de Beneficiis hoc modo scribit:

But, not to make this longer, I will conclude this place by setting down two most brilliant passages, one of Seneca and the other of Lactantius, by which this very thing which we have taught will be wonderfully illustrated. Seneca, then, rebuking those who complain of nature and of God that man was dealt with by them malignantly, or at least less liberally and kindly than the animals, in chapter 29 of book 2 of On Benefits writes in this manner:¹³

See how unjust appraisers of the divine gifts they are. And these, forsooth, professing wisdom, complain that we do not equal the elephants in bodily size, the stags in speed, the birds in lightness, the bulls in onset; that the skin is more solid in beasts, more comely in deer, thicker in bears, softer in beavers; that the dogs surpass us in keenness of nostrils; that¹⁴

Vide quàm iniqui sunt divinorum munerum aestimatores. Et quidem professi sapientiam, queruntur quòd non magnitudine corporis aequemus elephantes, velocitate cervos, levitate aves, impetu tauros; quòd solidior sit cutis belluis, decentior damis, densior ursis, mollior fibris; quòd sagacitate nos narium canes vincant, quòd

[...so that, if you weigh all these things in your mind and] rightly estimate the indulgence of nature, you must confess that you have been her darling. Thus Seneca — no less truly and wisely, in truth, than elegantly and eloquently.¹⁵

[...quod si omnia ista cum animo perpenderis, &] benè aestimata naturae indulgentia, confitearis necesse est, in delicijs te illi fuisse. Haec Seneca, non minùs profectò verè ac sapienter, quàm eleganter ac disertè.

Lactantius quoque, in libro de opificio Dei, eandem sententiam de admirabili humani corporis constitutione & providentia luculentissimè persequitur: cuius verba, quòd & gravia sint & ad rem nostram apprimè faciant, hîc adscribere libet.

Lactantius too, in his book On the Workmanship of God, pursues most lucidly the same judgement concerning the admirable constitution and providence of the human body; and since his words are both weighty and exceedingly apt to our purpose, I am pleased to set them down here.¹⁶

“To man,” he says, “that artificer and parent of ours, God, gave sense and reason, so that from this it might appear that we were begotten by him who is himself endowed with intelligence, with sense, with reason. As for the other animals, since they are devoid of reason and intelligence, he has clothed them all with their own skins, that by a natural defence they might protect themselves against the cold and the force of storms. And if any of them fall as prey to the greater beasts, lest they be caught easily nature has provided for them either swiftness of foot, or fleetness in flight, or cunning in hiding themselves.” [continues on the following page.]¹⁷

Dedit, inquit, homini artifex ille noster ac parens Deus sensum atque rationem, ut ex eo appareret nos ab eo esse generatos, qui ipse intelligentia, qui sensu, qui ratione praeditus est. Caetera animalia, quoniam rationis & intelligentiae sunt expertia, omnes enim suis ex pellibus texit, ut munimento naturali adversus frigus ac vim tempestatum tueri sese possent. Si qua verò in praedam maioribus cedunt, ne facilè caperentur, aut celeritate pedum, aut volandi pernicitate, aut occultandi sui solertia eis natura prospexit. [continuatur in pagina sequenti.]

[Lactantius continued:] “Man alone, since he is endowed with reason, He appointed naked and unarmed, because he could both be armed by his wit and clothed by his reason. Indeed those very things that were bestowed on the dumb beasts ought not to have been given to man, because He armed him not from without, as the rest, but from within: since He had granted him that which is more excellent than all, namely the hand and reason. For hands accomplish more than lightness and the use of wings; the tongue more than the strength of the whole body. What madness, then, is it to prefer those things which, were they offered, you would decline to accept?” Thus Lactantius.¹⁸

[continuatio Lactantij:] Solus homo, quoniam ratione donatus est, statuit eum nudum & inermem, quia & ingenio poterat armari & ratione vestiri. Ea verò ipsa quae mutis attributa sunt, homini dari non oportebat, quia non forinsecùs, ut caetera, sed interiùs armavit: cùm ei tribuisset id quod esset omnibus praestantius, manum scilicet & rationem. Plùs enim manus praestant quàm levitas usúsque pennarum: plùs lingua quàm totius corporis fortitudo. Quae igitur amentia est ea praeferre, quae si data sint accipere detrectes? Haec Lactantius.

Translator’s notes

First question, set centered. ↩
The objections (in scholastic style): a celestial body would have been nobler and immortal, befitting the noblest soul. Aristotle, Physics 2; De anima 1; the four dignities of the celestial body. ↩
More objections: animals surpass man in the external senses (eagle, fox, mole, dog, hen; snails/oysters per J.C. Scaliger, Exercitationes against Cardano's De subtilitate, exerc. 247) and in strength/height/longevity. Page breaks; catchword 'gaeuitate' (= longaevitate). ↩
Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 407.' Conclusion of the objections: animals have natural coverings and weapons, man has none. ↩
Margins: 'Praestantia humani corporis'; 'Sensuum quasi omnium fundamentum est tactus.' The reply: nature does the best possible (Aristotle, De caelo 2.5 / De gen. an.); the soul learns through the senses, which require a passible (hence non-celestial) body; touch as the basis of all sense. ↩
Margin: 'Cur corpus hominis ex coelesti materia fieri non potuerit, ex Bonaventura.' Bonaventure, Sent. II, d.17, a.2; the body's natural mortality remedied by the donum immortalitatis (and the translation Adam would have had). ↩
Margins: 'Corpus humanum praestantius esse corporibus omnium animalium'; 'Triplex causa cur corpus humanum sit erectum.' The first proof of bodily excellence: uprightness (its efficient = heat; material = soft matter; final = a fourfold use). Page breaks; catchword 'quò'. ↩
Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 408.' The fourfold use of uprightness: (1) the head's senses raised to heaven for knowledge; (2) the internal senses' perfection; (3) the freed hands; (4) the framing of speech. ↩
Margin: 'Omnia Animalia sensuum tam interiorum quàm exteriorum praestantia vinci ab homine.' The second proof: the superior internal senses (common sense, imagination, memory, reminiscence, the cogitative power); the sensitive appetite made rational by reason's rule (seat of the virtues). ↩
Margin: 'Notabilis distinctio circa praestantiam sensuum, ab Aristotele tradita.' Aristotle, De generatione animalium 5.1: each sense judged by perception and by discrimination. Page breaks; catchword 'bilis' (= sensibilis). ↩
Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 409.' Perception (four ways the eagle excels) vs. judgment/discrimination (in which man surpasses all). ↩
Margins: 'Excellentia temperamenti corporis humani'; 'Vice omnium quae habent animalia, Deus homini dedit rationem et manus.' The third proof: man's temperament nearest the mean; in place of natural coverings/weapons, God gave reason and the hand (the famous 'organ of organs'). ↩
Introduces the two confirming quotations (Seneca and Lactantius). Margin: 'Praeclara sententia Senecae, de Divina providentia.' Seneca, De beneficiis 2.29. ↩
Seneca, De beneficiis 2.29 (block-quote, continues onto p. 410). 'Fibri' = beavers. Page breaks at 'quòd'; signature 'F F'. RESUME next batch at PDF 451 with the continuation of the Seneca quotation. ↩
Conclusion of the Seneca block-quote (de Beneficiis 2.29) carried over from PDF 450/printed 409; the bracketed clause completes the sentence begun on the prior page. Pererius caps the citation with his customary verdict on the Father/author quoted. ↩
Pererius' transition introducing the next patristic block-quote. Marginal gloss: 'Disertissima Lactantij sententia, de perfectione humani corporis' (Lactantius' most eloquent judgement on the perfection of the human body). ↩
Lactantius, de opificio Dei ch. 2–3, block-quote beginning here and concluding on PDF 452/printed 411 at 'Haec Lactantius.' Set as a head block-quote per the lemma/quotation convention; bracketed catch-note marks the cross-page span. ↩
Conclusion of the Lactantius de opificio Dei block-quote begun on PDF 451. Catchword at foot of page: 'QVAE' (anticipating the QUAESTIO divider of the next page). ↩