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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Four — the creation of the first human beings

QUESTION I. Whether the soul of Adam was created earlier than his body was formed

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QUESTION I. Whether the soul of Adam was created earlier than his body was formed.1

QUAESTIO I. An anima Adami creata fuerit prius quàm corpus eius formaretur.

EX nobilioribus Philosophis, Plato quidem in Timaeo dixit, omnes animas rationales fuisse à Deo in mundi exordio creatas: posteà verò summú & omnium patrem Deum mandasse secúdis diis, ut quod reliquum erat hominis, id est, corpus & animam alentem atque sentientem, ipsi fabricarent. De sentétia Aristotelis lis est inter Peripateticos, multis enim visum est Aristotelem fecisse animam rationalem priorem, & antiquiorem corpore: is enim disputans in libro secundo, de Generatione animalium capite tertio, utrum omnis anima sit ante corpus; tandem decernit animam rationalem ante corpus esse, & extrinsecus advenire quod ipsa & eius propria actio sit incorporea. Alij opponunt istis sententiam eiusdem Aristotelis affirmátis, in libr. 12. Metaphysicorum text. 17. fieri non posse ut forma sit ante compositum: ut autem aliqua forma post compositum remaneat, nihil prohibere, cuiusmodi est anima, non omnis sed intellectus.
Among the nobler Philosophers, Plato indeed in the Timaeus said that all rational souls were created by God at the beginning of the world; but that afterward God, the supreme and Father of all, commanded the second gods that what remained of man — that is, the body and the nourishing and sentient soul — they themselves should fabricate. About the view of Aristotle there is a dispute among the Peripatetics; for to many it seemed that Aristotle made the rational soul prior to and older than the body: for he, disputing in the second book On the Generation of Animals, chapter three, whether every soul is before the body, at length decides that the rational soul is before the body and comes from without, because it and its own proper action is incorporeal. Others oppose to these the view of the same Aristotle when he affirms, in book 12 of the Metaphysics, text 17, that it cannot come to pass that the form be before the composite; but that some form should remain after the composite, nothing forbids — of which kind is the soul, not every soul, but the intellect.2
Ex doctoribus Christianis, Origenes in eo fuit errore, ut censeret omnes animas rationales ab initio esse creatas ante corpora, & propter errata & scelera quae in eo statu admiserunt, ad luendas eorum poenas in varia corpora pro varietate meritorum, tanquam in carcerem esse detrusas: quem errorem etiam Beato Hieronymo impingere voluit Ruffinus, sed immeritò & falsò. Namque ut alios Hieronymi locos taceam, certè Hieronymus in Epistola 139. ad Cyprianum scripta, qua Psalmum 89. explanat, apertis verbis dogma hoc Origenis, tacito eius nomine condemnat: Et in epist. 61. quam dedit ad Pammachium, hunc ipsum errorem assignat Ioanni Episcopo Hierosolymitano, eumque validissimè confutat. Nec videtur Augustinus abhorruisse ab hac opinione, quippe qui libro septimo, de Genesi ad litteram capite vigesimoquarto, significat animam primi Hominis creatam esse simul cum Angelis primo die mundani opificij: corpus [autem posteà esse formatum...]
Among the Christian doctors, Origen was in this error, that he held all rational souls to have been created from the beginning before bodies, and, on account of the faults and crimes they committed in that state, to have been thrust — for the paying of their penalties — into various bodies according to the variety of their merits, as into a prison: which error Rufinus too wished to fasten upon blessed Jerome, but undeservedly and falsely. For — to say nothing of other passages of Jerome — Jerome certainly, in Epistle 139 written to Cyprian, in which he explains Psalm 89[88], condemns in open words this dogma of Origen, with his name unspoken; and in Epistle 61, which he addressed to Pammachius, he assigns this very error to John, Bishop of Jerusalem, and most forcibly refutes it. Nor does Augustine seem to have abhorred this opinion, since in the seventh book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter twenty-four, he signifies that the soul of the first Man was created together with the Angels on the first day of the mundane work: but that the body [was afterward formed...] [continues]3
[...primo die mundani opificij: corpus] autem posteà esse formatum, eíque infusam animam. Verùm hoc ille non dicit affirmatè, mox enim subdit: Credatur ergo, si tamen nulla Scripturarum auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit. Hugo de Sancto Victore, & auctor Historiae Scholasticae, Magister item sententiarum, & alij quidem Theologi, hoc de anima quidem primi hominis in dubio relinquunt: de aliis tamen omnibus non dubitant affirmare, eas non ante corpus, sed simul cum corpore creari.
[...on the first day of the mundane work; but that the body] was afterward formed, and the soul infused into it. But he does not say this affirmatively, for he soon subjoins: “Let it be believed, then — provided, however, that no authority of the Scriptures or reason of truth contradicts.” Hugh of St. Victor, and the author of the Scholastic History, the Master of the Sentences likewise, and certain other Theologians, leave this, concerning the soul of the first man indeed, in doubt; but about all the others they do not hesitate to affirm that they are created not before the body, but together with the body.4

But in truth, that the soul of the first man was not created before the body, but together with the body — just as the souls of all the rest, too, are each procreated together with its own body — I for my part judge not only more like the truth, but plainly true and certain. This too Gregory of Nyssa teaches, in the book On Man, chapters twenty-nine and thirty; and Damascene, in the second book On the Orthodox Faith, chapter twelve; and Jerome, as we recalled above, in Epistle 61 to Pammachius on the errors of Origen, and Epistle 139 to Cyprian; Leo likewise, Epistle 71. And to this view Augustine is more inclined, in the twenty-third chapter of the twelfth book of the City of God, writing thus: “God therefore made man to His own image and likeness; for He created for him such a soul as, through reason and intelligence, would be more excellent than all the animals. And when He had formed the man from the earthly dust, and had — by breathing — put into him a soul such as I have said (whether one He had already made, or rather one He made by breathing), and had willed that the breath which He made by breathing should be the soul of man.” The same holds blessed Thomas, First Part, question 90.5

AT verò, animam primi hominis non ante corpus esse creatam, sed simul cum corpore, quemadmodum caeterorum etiam omnium animae cum suo quaeque corpore simul procreantur, equidem non tantùm similius vero, sed planè verum certumque censeo. Hoc etiam tradit Gregorius Nyssenus in libro de Homine capite vigesimonono, & trigesimo, & Damascenus libro secundo, de fide orthodoxa, capite duodecimo, & Hieronymus, ut suprà memoravimus, in Epist. 61. ad Pammachium de erroribus Origenis, & 139. ad Cyprianum, Leo item Epistola 71. Et in hanc sententiam propensior est Augustinus in 23. capite libri duodecimi, de Civitate Dei, ita scribens: Fecit ergo Deus hominem ad imaginem & similitudiné suam, talem quippe illi animam creavit, qua per rationem atque intelligentiam omnibus esset praestantior animalibus. Et cùm virum terreno formasset ex pulvere, eíque animam qualem dixi, sive quam iam fecerat, sufflando indidisset, sive potius sufflando fecisset, eumq́ flatum quem sufflando fecit, animam hominis esse voluisset. Idem sentit B. Thomas 1. part. quaest. 90.

ATQUE haec ferè Theologorum sententia est, quae tribus argumentis confirmari potest. Anima enim rationalis est pars essentialis ipsius hominis, ergo extra Hominem statum habet imperfectú, sicut omnes partes, cùm à toto cuius partes sunt, separatae sunt. Non est autem credibile, Deum in prima rerum constitutione rem aliquam fecisse in statu imperfecto, praesertim verò animum hominis omnium rerum, exceptis Angelis, longè praestantissimú. Quod si post primum Hominem, caeterorum Hominum animae simul procreatae sunt cum corporibus, cur non idem sentiamus de anima primi Hominis? siquidem similis ratio est omnium animarum, nec causa fuit ulla, cur vellet Deus animam primi hominis ante corpus creare. Deinde, aut naturale est animae rationali esse coniunctam cum corpore, aut hoc ei est contra naturam & violentum: Si est naturale, & Deus ab initio res condidit prout cuiusque rei natura postulabat, concluditur, ani-[mam primi hominis non esse creatam ante corpus...]
And this is roughly the view of the Theologians, which can be confirmed by three arguments. For (1) the rational soul is an essential part of man himself, and therefore outside Man it has an imperfect state, like all parts when they are separated from the whole of which they are parts. But it is not credible that God, in the first constitution of things, made anything in an imperfect state — and especially the soul of man, by far the most excellent of all things except the Angels. And if, after the first Man, the souls of the other Men were procreated together with their bodies, why should we not judge the same of the soul of the first Man? since the reasoning is alike for all souls, and there was no cause why God should wish to create the soul of the first man before the body. Then (2), either it is natural for the rational soul to be conjoined with the body, or this is for it contrary to nature and violent: if it is natural — and God from the beginning founded things as the nature of each thing demanded — it is concluded that the soul [of the first man was not created before the body...] [continues]6
[...concluditur, ani]mam primi hominis non esse creatá ante corpus eius, sed simul cum corpore copulatam. Sin autem est animae rationali contra naturam, & violentum esse in corpore, ergo generatio hominis non est naturalis, sed contra naturam, & excellentissima species omnium quas natura habet (hominem dico) contra naturam esset. Et è contrario dissolutio hominis & mors esset naturalis & secundùm naturam, ob idque cuilibet homini optabilis & iucunda, quod falsum esse, nostris aliorúmq́; experimentis exploratissimú & compertissimú est. Quinimo, si ita [esset...]
[...it is concluded that the soul] of the first man was not created before his body, but coupled together with the body at the same time. But if, on the other hand, it is for the rational soul contrary to nature and violent to be in the body, then the generation of man is not natural, but contrary to nature, and the most excellent of all the species that nature has (I mean man) would be contrary to nature. And, conversely, the dissolution and death of man would be natural and according to nature, and therefore desirable and pleasant to every man — which is false, as has been most thoroughly explored and ascertained by our own and others' experiences. Nay rather, if it were so [...] [continues]7
[...Quinimo, si ita] esset, resurrectio mortuorum, ut bene argumentatur Sanctus Hieronymus, violenta esset nec optanda homini sed adversanda & fugienda, cùm tamen ea pertineat ad consummatam hominis felicitatem, & in Sacris litteris promittatur velut amplissimum bonum maximéque optandum homini. Quocirca Paulus ad Romanos 8. Et nos, inquit, ipsi primitias Spiritus habentes, & ipsi intra nos gemimus adoptionem filiorum Dei, expectantes redemptionem corporis nostri. Idem in capite quinto, posterioris Epistolae ad Corinthios: Nam & qui sumus, ait, in hoc tabernaculo ingemiscimus gravati: eò quòd nolumus expoliari sed su-[pervestiri...]
[...Nay rather, if it were so,] the resurrection of the dead — as Saint Jerome well argues — would be violent and not to be desired by man, but to be opposed and shunned; whereas it pertains to man's consummated happiness, and in the Sacred Letters is promised as a most ample good, and most to be desired by man. Wherefore Paul, to the Romans, chapter 8: “And we ourselves,” he says, “having the firstfruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, awaiting the adoption of the sons of God, expecting the redemption of our body.” The same, in chapter five of the latter Epistle to the Corinthians: “For we also who are,” he says, “in this tabernacle, groan, being burdened, because we wish not to be unclothed, but to be [clothed upon...]” [continues]8
[...sed su]pervestiri, donec absorbeatur quod mortalé est à vita. Et in capit. 15. prioris Epistolae ad Corinthios Paulus argumentatur, si non esset futura resurrectio mortuorum, Christianos fore omnium mortalium miserrimos maximéque miserandos. Quin Aristoteles in primo libro de Anima, tex. 49. istam opinionem velut per ironiam, nec sine irrisionis significatione commemorans, sic ait: Laboriosum autem est animae commistam esse corpori non potentem absolui, & praeterea fugiendum. Siquidem melius est intellectui non cum corpore esse, quemadmodum & consuetum est dici & multis placet. Postremo, ex sententia Theologorú status hominis ad bene vel malè merendum non est nisi dum animus hominis est in corpore: quod quidem satis apertè indicat Paulus cap. 5. posterioris Epistolae ad Corinthios, affirmans omnes homines manifestari oportere ante tribunal Christi, ut referat unusquisque propria corporis, prout gessit, sive bonum, sive malum, id est, ut his quae dum [fuit in corpore...]
[...but to be] clothed upon, until that which is mortal be swallowed up by life.” And in chapter 15 of the former Epistle to the Corinthians Paul argues that, if there were to be no resurrection of the dead, Christians would be of all mortals the most wretched and most to be pitied. Indeed Aristotle, in the first book On the Soul, text 49, recalling this opinion as if by irony, and not without a note of mockery, says thus: “But it is laborious for the soul to be mingled with the body, unable to be freed, and moreover a thing to be shunned. Since it is better for the intellect not to be with the body, as is also customarily said, and pleases many.” Lastly, by the judgement of the Theologians, man's state for meriting well or ill is only while man's soul is in the body: which Paul indicates clearly enough in chapter 5 of the latter Epistle to the Corinthians, affirming that all men must be made manifest before the tribunal of Christ, that each may render the proper things of the body, according as he has done, whether good or evil — that is, that for those things which, while [he was in the body...] [continues]9
[...ut his quae dum] fuit in corpore, vel bene vel malè egit, digna referat vel praemia vel supplicia. Si igitur anima rationalis fuisset ante corpus, proculdubio aliquid eo tempore meruisset; aliquid enim egisset vel boni vel mali, quippe quae libero arbitrio praedita fuisset, nec dú aut beata aut damnata, quapropter eius actio fuisset vel meritoria vel demeritoria, & sic delaberemur in errorem Origenis censentis animas rationales propter peccata quae ante corpus fecerant, fuisse ad ipsum corpus velut ad custodiam & carcerem damnatas atque detrusas. VERUM roget me aliquis, sicut anima rationalis post mortem hominis remanet extra corpus existens, cur non itidem conveniens sit eam creari & existere ante generationem hominis? sed facile & in promptu responsum est. Quod enim animus post mortem hominis supersit, id accidit ex necessitate naturae tam corporis humani quàm animae rationalis, cùm enim homo sit mortalis, animus verò noster [immortalis...]
[...that for those things which, while] he was in the body, he did either well or ill, he may receive the worthy rewards or punishments. If, then, the rational soul had existed before the body, doubtless it would have merited something at that time; for it would have done something either good or evil, since it would have been endowed with free will, and not yet either blessed or damned — wherefore its action would have been either meritorious or demeritorious, and thus we would slip into the error of Origen, who held that the rational souls, on account of the sins they had committed before the body, were condemned and thrust to the body itself as to a ward and a prison. But someone may ask me: just as the rational soul, after a man's death, remains existing outside the body, why is it not likewise fitting that it be created and exist before a man's generation? But the answer is easy and ready at hand. For that the soul survives after a man's death befalls from the necessity of the nature both of the human body and of the rational soul; for since man is mortal, but our soul [immortal...] [continues]10

[...but our soul] immortal, when the man is extinguished it is necessary that the soul survive and remain for all time: but in truth, since the rational soul is a natural form and a part of man himself, there is no reason why it ought to be created and to exist before the generation of man. For the rest, to those things which we have disputed on the proposed question, it will not be amiss to add what Saint Bonaventure discusses on the same matter, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 17, article 1, question 3: “Although,” he says, “it could seem congruous to someone that the soul of Adam ought to have been created before his body, that thus it might be declared that the rational soul does not depend on the body, nor is educed [from the potency of matter...]” [continues]11

[...animus verò noster] immortalis, extincto homine animum superesse & omni aevo permanere necesse est: at verò cum anima rationalis sit forma naturalis & pars ipsius hominis, nulla est ratio cur ante generationem hominis creari & existere debeat. Caeterùm, ad ea quae de proposita quaestione disputavimus, non alienum fuerit adiicere quae Sanctus Bonaventura eadem de re disserit in 2. sent. dist. 17. attic. 1. quaest. 3. Licèt, inquit, congruum videri cuipiam posset, animá Adae creari debuisse ante eius corpus, ut ita declararetur animam rationalem non pendere ex corpore, nec educi [ex potentia materiae...]

[...nor educed] from the potency of matter, but subsists by itself, and, created from nothing by God alone, is joined to the body from without; and that by this reasoning the agreement of our soul with the Angels would be demonstrated to be as natural — in the fact that it has in itself the image of God — as supernatural, in the fact that it is ordered to the same supernatural end and through similar supernatural means: nevertheless it was much more congruous that it be produced together with the body. Both because the soul is united to the body as its natural perfection, and as that with which it makes one essential composite which is man — whence it comes about that it naturally desires to be with the body, and to be outside it is for it contrary to nature and somehow penal; and also because the soul is united to the body as a mover to the movable, so that outside it [the body] it can merit or demerit nothing. Wherefore it was not fitting that it be produced before the body, lest it be produced in an imperfect state and contrary to nature, lest before fault it should feel punishment, nor without the body should it merit or demerit.12

[...nec educi] ex potentia materiae, sed per se subsistere, & à solo Deo creatam ex nihilo extrinsecus corpori adiungi, eáq́ ratione demōstraretur animae nostrae cum Angelis convenientia tam naturalis, in eo quod est habere in se imaginem Dei, quàm supernaturalis in eo quod est ad eundem finem supernaturalem, & per similia media supernaturalia ordinari: attamen multo congruentius fuit eam simul cum corpore produci: Tum quia anima unitur corpori ut perfectio naturalis eius, & ut cum quo facit unum compositum essentiale quod est, homo, quo fit ut naturaliter appetat esse cum corpore, & extra ipsum esse, sit illi praeter naturam & quodammodo poenale: tum etiam unitur anima corpori, ut motor mobili, adeò ut extra ipsum nihil mereri aut demereri queat. Quocirca non conveniebat ipsam produci ante corpus, ne produceretur in statu imperfecto & praeter naturam, ne ante culpam sentiret poenam, nec absque corpore mereretur vel demereretur.

For if it had been produced before the body, since it would then have had the use of free will, and nothing would have hindered, doubtless it would have either merited or demerited: wherefore the body would not be a partaker of all the soul's merit or demerit; and false would be what the Apostle said, that all will receive their reward according as they have done in the body, whether good or evil. Nor indeed would its pre-existence have contributed anything toward declaring the immortality of the rational soul: since that pre-existence of it could have been known to no one by natural reason, but only from Scripture itself handing it down. But without that there are many other passages of Scripture from which it could be demonstrated. Thus far from Bonaventure.13

Nam si producta esset ante corpus, cùm tunc habuisset usum liberi arbitrij, nec obstaret quicquam, proculdubio, vel meruisset vel demeruisset: quare corpus non esset particeps omnis meriti aut demeriti animae: & falsum esset quod dixit Apostolus, Omnes recepturos mercedem suam prout in corpore gesserint sive bonum sive malum. Neque verò ad declarandam animae rationalis immortalitatem, praeexistentia eius quicquam contulisset: Siquidem illa eius praeexistentia nemini per rationem naturalem, sed ex ipsa duntaxat Scriptura id tradente notum esse potuisset. Atqui sine illo multi sunt alij Scripturae loci, ex quibus id posset demonstrari. Hactenus ex Bonaventura.

Translator’s notes

  1. First quaestio of the disputation. ↩
  2. Large decorated initial 'E'. The pre-existence question in the philosophers: Plato (Timaeus); the Peripatetic dispute over Aristotle (de Gen. An. 2.3 vs Metaph. 12 text 17). Marginal gloss: 'Sententia Platonis & Aristotelis, de origine animae rationalis' (the view of Plato and Aristotle on the origin of the rational soul). ↩
  3. Origen's pre-existence-and-fall error; Rufinus' false imputation of it to Jerome (refuted from Jerome Ep. 139 ad Cyprianum on Ps 88, and Ep. 61 ad Pammachium against John of Jerusalem); Augustine (de Gen. ad lit. 7.24) seemingly favoring the soul's creation with the Angels on day one. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'corpus'. ↩
  4. Completes the Augustine citation (de Gen. ad lit. 7.24) carried over from PDF 463 — and notes he does not affirm it. Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Comestor (Historia Scholastica), Peter Lombard leave the first man's soul an open question. Marginal gloss begins: 'Animam primi hominis non ante corpus esse creatam' (that the soul of the first man was not created before the body). ↩
  5. Pererius' own settled view, with its authorities (Gregory of Nyssa, Damascene, Jerome, Leo Ep. 71) and the Augustine block-quote (Civ. Dei 12.23), plus Aquinas ST I q.90. Marginal gloss (continued): '...non ante corpus esse creatam.' ↩
  6. The first two of three arguments: (1) the soul as an essential part would be imperfect if made apart; (2) the body-soul union being natural, God made it as nature demands. Sentence breaks at 'animam'. ↩
  7. Completes the second argument: were union violent, generation would be 'against nature' and death 'natural/desirable' — refuted by experience. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'ita'. ↩
  8. The resurrection (desirable, not violent) shows body-soul union is natural: Rom 8:23 and 2 Cor 5:4. Marginal gloss: 'Quàm sit optabilis homini resurrectio ad vitam immortalem, ex sententia Pauli' (how desirable to man is the resurrection to immortal life, according to Paul's judgement). ↩
  9. 1 Cor 15:19 and Aristotle's ironic de Anima 1 (text 49) on the soul 'mingled with' the body; 2 Cor 5:10 on the tribunal of Christ as the ground that merit happens only in the body. ↩
  10. Pre-existence would entail merit/demerit before the body — Origen's error. The disanalogy with post-mortem survival is set up. Marginal gloss: 'Cur sicut animus noster post corpus existit, non item existat ante corpus' (why, just as our soul exists after the body, it does not likewise exist before the body). ↩
  11. The disanalogy resolved: survival is from natural necessity, but the soul being the body's natural form gives no reason for pre-existence. Opens the Bonaventure block-quote (Sent. II d.17 a.1 q.3), which runs onto PDF 466. Sentence breaks at 'educi'. ↩
  12. Bonaventure, continued: the soul as the body's natural perfection and as mover, hence not fittingly produced before the body. ↩
  13. Bonaventure concluded ('Hactenus ex Bonaventura'): pre-existence would void the Apostle's rule (2 Cor 5:10) and adds nothing for proving immortality, which other Scriptures establish. ↩