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QUESTION II. Whether from this passage of Moses the immortality of the rational soul can be demonstrated.1
QUAESTIO II. An ex hoc loco Mosis demonstrari possit immortalitas animae rationalis.
NON est dubitandum, ex his paucis verbis quibus Moses creationem animae rationalis indicavit, demonstrari & probari posse animum hominis esse immortalem: quod etiam multifariam & hoc libro, & aliis suis libris Moses significavit. Quocirca vehementer miror Sadducaeos qui negabant immortalitatem animi nostri, omnémque spiritum incorporeum & immortalem de medio tollebant, non modo toleratos esse, verùm etiam auctoritate, operibus, atque honoribus apud Iudaeos floruisse. Quanquam ne hoc quidem miran-[dum accidere debet...]
It must not be doubted that, from these few words by which Moses indicated the creation of the rational soul, it can be demonstrated and proved that the soul of man is immortal: which Moses also signified in many ways, both in this book and in his other books. Wherefore I greatly wonder that the Sadducees — who denied the immortality of our soul, and did away with every incorporeal and immortal spirit — were not only tolerated, but even flourished in authority, in works, and in honors among the Jews. Although not even this ought to seem a thing to be wondered at [to happen...] [continues]
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[...ne hoc quidem miran]dum accidere debet, cogitanti etiam in populo Christiano tot haereses, tam apertè contrarias divinae Scripturae, multis esse persuasas, tanta est hominum vel ignoratio veritatis, vel stupor animi, vel ad pessima quaeque ingenij proclivitas, vel arbitratu suo vivendi & quodlibet sentiendi libido ac licentia, vel Principum qui haec vetare & punire deberent socordia. Eusebius libro sexto Historiae Ecclesiasticae, cap. 30. tradit, in partibus Arabiae exortum esse quorun-[dam...]
[...nor ought even this] to seem a thing to be wondered at — to one who considers that even among the Christian people so many heresies, so openly contrary to divine Scripture, are believed by many; so great is men's either ignorance of the truth, or stupor of mind, or proclivity of disposition toward all the worst things, or lust and license of living by their own judgement and holding whatever they please, or the negligence of Princes who ought to forbid and punish these things. Eusebius, in the sixth book of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 30, relates that in the parts of Arabia there arose of certain [men...] [continues]
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[...exortum esse quorun]dam errorem dicentium, occidente homine simul etiam interire animum, sed eum postea in resurrectione mortuorum iterum reviviscere ad vitam tamen immortalem. Sectatores huius erroris à gente in qua primum viguit, Arabicos nominari posse putat Augustinus, in libro de Haeresibus numero 83.
[...there arose] the error of certain men saying that, when the man dies, the soul also at the same time perishes, but that afterward, in the resurrection of the dead, it revives again to a life that is nevertheless immortal. The followers of this error can be named “Arabici,” from the nation in which it first flourished, as Augustine thinks, in the book On Heresies, number 83.
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IN simili errore fuisse necesse est, quicunque putarunt animas rationales non creari à Deo ex nihilo, sed à parentibus proseminari & propagari, non aliter quàm ipsum corpus: ut quemadmodum corpus ex corpore propagatur, sic animus ex animo multiplicetur, scilicet ad similitudinem luminis quod ex alio lumine accenditur. Cuius erroris auctores in lib. de Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, cap. 13. & 14. Luciferiani, Cyrillus item & aliqui Latinorum appellantur. Augustinus item in libro de Haeresibus, numero 86. memorans opinionem Tertulliani facientis animam hominis corpoream, haec subdit: Dicit sanè ipse animas hominum pessimas post mortem in daemones verti, statum autem animae credit per traducem propagari. Non tamen censet Augustinus, Tertullianum propter primam aut ultimam opinionem damnatum esse ab Ecclesia tanquam haereticum, sed quia adhaeserit errori Cataphrygarum secundas nuptias non aliter quàm adulterium condemnantium.
In a similar error were, of necessity, all who supposed that rational souls are not created by God from nothing, but are seeded and propagated from parents, no otherwise than the body itself: so that, just as body is propagated from body, so the soul is multiplied from soul — namely, after the likeness of a light kindled from another light. The authors of this error are called, in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, chapters 13 and 14, Luciferians; Cyril likewise, and some of the Latins. Augustine too, in the book On Heresies, number 86, recalling the opinion of Tertullian, who made the soul of man corporeal, subjoins this: “He indeed says that the worst souls of men are, after death, turned into demons, and he believes that the state of the soul is propagated by traduction.” Yet Augustine does not judge that Tertullian was condemned by the Church as a heretic on account of the first or the last opinion, but because he adhered to the error of the Cataphrygians, who condemned second marriages no otherwise than adultery.
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Certè Augustinus ipse, licèt animam ex traduce propagari non audeat affirmare, non putat eam tamen ex divina Scriptura ut falsam & haereticam confutari posse. Quin ipse in ea quaestione, quae est de Origine animae, dubius & incertus est, quéadmodum apertè ostendit in Epistola 7. & 28. quas scripsit ad sanctum Hieronymum, & in 157. quam misit ad Optatum, & libro 3. de Baptismo parvulorum, cap. 10. & 1. libro Retractationum, capite 1. & libro 10. de Genesi ad litteram primis quatuor capitibus, in quorum quarto capite scribit, opinari animas omnium hominum ex nihilo creatas esse, nimis esse durum & violentum, cùm Scriptura doceat, Deum creasse omnia simul & cessasse die septimo ab omni opere, ex quo effici, omnes animas hominum posteà creatas, fuisse aliquo modo in anima primi hominis. Si autem singulae crearentur ex nihilo, non magis aliae animae fuissent in anima primi hominis, quàm illa in aliis.
Certainly Augustine himself, although he dares not affirm that the soul is propagated by traduction, nevertheless does not think that it can be refuted from divine Scripture as false and heretical. Indeed he himself, in that question which concerns the Origin of the soul, is doubtful and uncertain, as he openly shows in Epistles 7 and 28, which he wrote to Saint Jerome, and in 157, which he sent to Optatus, and in book 3 On the Baptism of Infants, chapter 10, and in book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 1, and in book 10 On Genesis according to the Letter, in the first four chapters — in the fourth of which he writes that to suppose the souls of all men to have been created from nothing is too hard and violent, since Scripture teaches that God created all things at once and rested on the seventh day from all His work; from which it follows that all the souls of men, created afterward, were in some way in the soul of the first man. But if individual ones were created from nothing, other souls would no more have been in the soul of the first man than that one in the others.
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Illud tamen vehementiùs Augustinum urgebat, atque premebat, quòd non videbat ipse, si posteriorum hominum animae non propagantur ex anima Adae, sed ex nihilo singulae creabantur, qua ratione peccatum Adae per generationem carnalem in omnes eius posteros transfunderetur: cum peccatum originale propriè non sit in corpore, sed in anima. Quod si animae aliorum hominum nullo modo pendent ex anima Adami, nulla ratione videtur peccatum eius in alios homines derivari potuisse. Tractat hanc quaestionem S. Thomas, Prima parte, quaest. 118. art. 2. sed accuratissimè Bonaventura in 2. sententiarum, dist. 18. quaest. ultima, & Alphonsus de Castro, lib. 2. adversus Haereses, ubi agit de Anima, quintum errorem confutans. VERUM [...]
But this pressed and urged Augustine the more vehemently, that he did not himself see — if the souls of later men are not propagated from the soul of Adam, but each is created from nothing — by what reasoning the sin of Adam would be transfused through carnal generation into all his posterity: since original sin is, properly, not in the body but in the soul. And if the souls of other men in no way depend on the soul of Adam, by no reasoning does his sin seem to have been able to be derived into other men. This question Saint Thomas treats, in the First Part, question 118, article 2; but most accurately Bonaventure, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 18, the last question, and Alfonso de Castro, in book 2 against the Heresies, where he treats Of the Soul, refuting the fifth error. But [...] [continues]
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VERVMTAMEN B. Hieronymi constans perpetuáque fuit sententia, animas rationales in singulorum hominum corporibus creari singulas, non aliter quàm creata sit anima primi hominis: atque hanc doctrinam tota deinceps secuta est Ecclesia. Nam quia anima rationalis est incorporea & indivisibilis, nó potest ex alia anima propagari: quia verò est immaterialis, non potest ex ulla materia procreari & multiplicari. Id quod B. Thomas multis rationibus adducit libro 2. contra Gentes capit. 86. idémque significavit David, Psalmo 32. illis verbis, Qui finxit sigillatim corda eorum, & Zacharias cap. 12. Cùm, inquit, Dicit Dominus extendens Coelum, & fundans terram, & fingens spiritum hominis in eo: quibus verbis ut in eorum explanatione scribit Hieronymus, indicatur, quemadmodum Coelum & terram, ita animum hominis & à solo Deo & ex nihilo creari. Apud Ecclesiasten quoque ca. 12. sic legimus, Pulvis revertatur in terram suam unde erat, & spiritus redeat ad eum qui dedit illú, cuius testimonij vim adversus facientes animas aliorum hominum propagari ex anima primi hominis, in lib. 10. de Genesi ad litteram capit. 9. conatur quidem Augustinus, sed frustrà conatur tamen, eludere atque infirmare.
NEVERTHELESS, the constant and perpetual view of blessed Jerome was that rational souls are created singly in the bodies of individual men, no otherwise than the soul of the first man was created; and this doctrine the whole Church thereafter followed. For because the rational soul is incorporeal and indivisible, it cannot be propagated from another soul; and because it is immaterial, it cannot be procreated and multiplied from any matter. This blessed Thomas adduces with many reasons, in the second book Against the Gentiles, chapter 86; and the same David signified, in Psalm 32[33], in those words, “Who fashioned individually the hearts of them”; and Zechariah, chapter 12 — when, he says, “The Lord says, who stretches out the Heaven and founds the earth and forms the spirit of man within him”: by which words, as Jerome writes in their explanation, it is indicated that, just as the Heaven and the earth, so the soul of man is created both by God alone and from nothing. In Ecclesiastes too, chapter 12, we thus read, “Let the dust return into its earth, whence it was, and the spirit return to Him who gave it”: the force of which testimony, against those who make the souls of other men propagated from the soul of the first man, Augustine indeed endeavors (in book 10 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 9) — but endeavors in vain — to evade and to weaken.
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VERVM age, indicemus quibus in locis & quibus verbis Moses docuerit animum hominis esse immortalem. Principio, id manifestè ostendit cùm dixit, solum animalium omnium hominé ad imaginem & similitudinem Dei esse factum. Si enim animus hominis non esset incorporeus & immaterialis, intelligendi sciendíque omnia potens atque idcirco immortalis, non verè solus homo diceretur ad imaginem Dei factus. Atque hanc rationem similitudinis humani animi cum Deo validissimum Plato in Alcibiade & in Phaedone, ad probandam immortalitatem animi nostri putavit argumentum. Et profectò esse omnium rationum quae ad id persuadendum afferri possunt firmissimum ac probabilissimum argumentum, multis verbis docet Porphyrius, lib. 1. ad Boëtium, ut in lib. 11. de Praepar. Evangelica refert Eusebius.
But come, let us indicate in what places and by what words Moses taught that the soul of man is immortal. In the first place, he shows it manifestly when he said that man alone of all the animals was made to the image and likeness of God. For if the soul of man were not incorporeal and immaterial, capable of understanding and knowing all things, and therefore immortal, man alone would not truly be said to have been made to the image of God. And this argument — of the likeness of the human soul to God — Plato, in the Alcibiades and in the Phaedo, thought a most powerful one for proving the immortality of our soul. And that it is, of all the reasons that can be brought to persuade it, the firmest and most probable argument, Porphyry teaches with many words, in book 1 to Boethius, as Eusebius reports in book 11 of the Preparation for the Gospel.
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Haec autem hominis & Dei similitudo quatuor in rebus potissimum enitet. Primò, in quadam infinita capacitate mentis, quae habilis & idonea est ad cognoscendas omnes res. Deinde, in appetitu voluntatis humanae sic infinito, ut nullo bono praeter infinitum, id est, Deum, omnino expleri & satiari queat. Posteà, in libertate voluntatis, & ut loquuntur in scholis, in quadam indeterminatione ad quaelibet particularia & finita bona. Denique, in quadam naturali cupiditate aeternitatis quam sibi expetit animus, suam ea re aeternitatem & immortalitatem satis prodens ac probans.
Now this likeness of man and God shines forth especially in four things. First, in a certain infinite capacity of the mind, which is apt and fit to know all things. Then, in the appetite of the human will, so infinite that it can be filled and satisfied by no good except the infinite — that is, God. Next, in the freedom of the will, and (as they say in the schools) in a certain indetermination toward any particular and finite goods whatsoever. Finally, in a certain natural desire of eternity which the soul seeks for itself, by that very thing sufficiently betraying and proving its own eternity and immortality.
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ALTER locus Mosis ex quo animae rationalis immortalitas enotescit, est superiori proximus, quo dixit Moses hominem esse cunctorú animalium principem & dominú à Deo constitutum: quo declaratur, hominem esse superioris ordinis & gradus naturae quá sint caetera animalia. Tertius locus est is quem in praesens tractamus: [Cùm enim Moses ait...]
Another passage of Moses, from which the immortality of the rational soul becomes known, is next to the previous: that in which Moses said man to have been constituted by God the prince and lord of all the animals; whereby it is declared that man is of a higher order and grade of nature than are the other animals. The third passage is the one we presently treat: [For when Moses says...] [continues]
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[...Tertius locus est is quem in praesens tractamus:] Cùm enim Moses ait, Deum inspirasse in corpus hominis animam rationalem, non obscurè indicavit eam extrinsecus advenire homini & à solo Deo creari, neque ex materia ulla neque ab alio efficiente generari. Cùm enim Moses memoraret generationem aliorum animalium, refert dixisse & iussisse Deum ut terra & aqua producerent animas terrestrium & aquatilium animantiú: ea oratione significás, animas caeterorum animalium ex materia elementari esse productas. De anima verò hominis multò aliter loquitur, dicens eam esse à Deo insufflatam seu inspiratam, ut intelligatur eam diversae conditionis, esse cuius non ex re aliqua corporea, sed ex solo Deo sit origo.
[...The third passage is the one we presently treat:] For when Moses says that God breathed the rational soul into the body of man, he indicated not obscurely that it comes to man from without and is created by God alone, and is generated neither from any matter nor by any other efficient cause. For when Moses recalled the generation of the other animals, he reports that God said and commanded that the earth and the water should produce the souls of terrestrial and aquatic living things — by that speech signifying that the souls of the other animals were produced from elemental matter. But of the soul of man he speaks far otherwise, saying that it was insufflated or inspired by God, so that it may be understood to be of a different condition, one whose origin is not from any corporeal thing, but from God alone.
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Quartus locus est in capite quarto libri Geneseos: quo loco scriptum est, Deum dixisse Cain, Sub te erit appetitus tuus, & tu dominaberis illius: quibus verbis perspicuè ostenditur libertas humanae voluntatis, cui etiam immortalitas animi necessariò connexa est. Quintus locus est in cap. 37. Geneseos, ubi sic loquitur Iacob, Descendam ad filium meum lugens in infernum: nec per infernum interpretari possumus sepulchrum ubi conditum esset corpus Iosephi, siquidem Iacob crediderat Ioseph dilaceratum & devoratum esse à feris: debet igitur intelligi de inferno propriè dicto, ad quem omnium hominum etiam iustorum animae ante adventum Christi descendebant. Sextus locus est cap. 3. Exodi: scriptum enim est eo loco dixisse Deum Mosi, Ego sum Deus Abraham, & Deus Isaac, & Deus Iacob. Quod Dominus noster in Evangelio commemorans, adiecit; Non est Deus mortuorum, sed viventium.
The fourth passage is in the fourth chapter of the book of Genesis: where it is written that God said to Cain, “Under you shall be your appetite, and you shall rule over it”: by which words the freedom of the human will is clearly shown, to which the immortality of the soul also is necessarily connected. The fifth passage is in chapter 37 of Genesis, where Jacob thus speaks, “I shall go down to my son, mourning, into hell (infernum)”: nor can we interpret “hell” as the tomb where Joseph's body had been laid, since Jacob had believed that Joseph was torn and devoured by wild beasts; it must therefore be understood of hell properly so called, to which the souls of all men, even of the just, descended before the coming of Christ. The sixth passage is chapter 3 of Exodus: for it is written in that place that God said to Moses, “I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” Which our Lord, recalling in the Gospel, added: “He is not the God of the dead, but of the living.”
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Septimus locus est in ca. 4. Deuteronomij quo loco dicitur Solem & Lunam & omnia Coeli astra esse à Deo facta & destinata ministerio cunctarum gentiú: at si homo esset omni ex parte materialis & mortalis, esset profectò ignobilior astris, nec astra propter eum facta esse dicerentur. Patet igitur, animum nostrum immortalem, significatum esse à Mose tum hoc loco, ubi de creatione hominis agit, tum aliis Pentateuchi locis. SED illud dubio verti potest, An animus rationalis sit immortalis natura sua, an tantùm per Dei gratiam? Hoc enim affirmatè dicitur in 6. Synodo sessione 11. in epist. Sophronij Patriarchae Hierosolymitani, quae in eiusdem concilij actione 14. ab universa Synodo est approbata, quinetiam S. Hieronymus libro 2. contra Pelagianos, & Damascenus lib. 2. de Fide orthodoxa, capite 3. & 12. tradunt Angelos non sua natura, sed per Dei gratiam habere immortalita-[tem...]
The seventh passage is in chapter 4 of Deuteronomy, where it is said that the Sun and the Moon and all the stars of Heaven were made by God and destined to the service of all the nations: but if man were in every part material and mortal, he would assuredly be more ignoble than the stars, nor would the stars be said to have been made for his sake. It is clear, therefore, that our soul is immortal, and was signified to be so by Moses, both in this place, where he treats of the creation of man, and in other places of the Pentateuch. BUT this can be turned into a doubt: Whether the rational soul is immortal by its own nature, or only through the grace of God? For this is said affirmatively in the Sixth Synod, session 11, in the epistle of Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, which in the 14th action of the same council was approved by the whole Synod; moreover Saint Jerome, in book 2 against the Pelagians, and Damascene, in book 2 On the Orthodox Faith, chapters 3 and 12, hand down that the Angels have immortality not by their own nature, but through the grace of God... [continues]
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[...habere immortalita]tem: id quod etiam Pauli confirmatur testimonio, qui in prioris ad Timotheum epistolae, extremo capite, scribit solum Deum habere immortalitatem. Nec id videtur non vidisse Plato, cùm scribit in Timaeo, secundos deos natura sua dissolubiles esse, voluntate tamen Dei fore immortales. Verumtamen, sine dubitatione ulla dicere oportet, animam rationalem natura sua esse immortalem, cum sit natura quaedam simplex, immaterialis, & per se subsistens. Quod autem Patres dixerunt de animo hominis & de Angelis, eos non sua na-[tura...]
[...to have immortali]ty: which is also confirmed by the testimony of Paul, who, in the last chapter of the former Epistle to Timothy, writes that God alone has immortality. Nor does Plato seem not to have seen this, when he writes in the Timaeus that the second gods are by their own nature dissoluble, yet by the will of God will be immortal. Nevertheless, without any doubt it must be said that the rational soul is by its own nature immortal, since it is a certain simple, immaterial nature, subsisting by itself. But as for what the Fathers said of the soul of man and of the Angels, that they [are immortal] not by their own na-[ture...] [continues]
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[...eos non sua na]tura, sed per gratiam Dei esse immortales, sic intelligi debet, eos non habere ex se vel à se immortalitatem, sed à Deo, qui quantùm ad actualem eorum existentiam, potuit eos & creare & non creare, & creatos in nihilum redigere, quia ergo possunt esse & non esse extrinsecus, id est, respectu habito ad omnipotentiam Dei, propterea Patres dixerunt eos non habere immortalitatem ex sua natura, sed ex Dei gratia. Atque hac etiam ratione interpretari convenit illud Pauli dictum, solum Deum habere immortalitatem: quanquam Chrysostomus in eius loci explanatione, putat solum Deum esse dictum immortalem à Paulo, comparatione Regum terrenorum, siquidem proximè antè dixerat, Solus potens, Rex regum, & Dominus dominantium.
[...that they are] immortal not by their own nature, but through the grace of God — this must be understood thus: that they have immortality not from themselves or by themselves, but from God, who, as to their actual existence, was able both to create them and not to create them, and to reduce the created to nothing; and so, because they can be and not be extrinsically — that is, with respect had to the omnipotence of God — therefore the Fathers said that they have immortality not from their own nature but from the grace of God. And by this reasoning too it is fitting to interpret that saying of Paul, that God alone has immortality: although Chrysostom, in the explanation of that passage, thinks that God alone is said by Paul to be immortal in comparison with earthly Kings, since just before he had said, “the only powerful, the King of kings, and Lord of lords.”
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Sanctus autem Augustinus libro tertio, contra Maximinum cap. 12. vocabulum immortalitatis interpretatur positum pro immutabilitate, ut significetur solum Deum esse immutabilem. Nec aliena est significatio haec immortalitatis: nam in omni mutabili natura, nonnulla mors est ipsa mutatio, quia facit aliquid in ea quod non erat. Simile quippiam scribit Leo, sermone 1. de Resurrectione Domini: Unicuique, inquit, homini qui ex alio in aliud aliqua conversione mutatur, finis est non esse quod fuit, & ortus est esse quod non fuit. Nec hoc non maximè congruit cum Aristotelis doctrina, cuius in libro octavo Physicorum, textu 24. haec sunt verba: Ferè autem & ipsum moveri, fieri quippiam & corrumpi videtur omnibus: in quod enim mutatur, fit hoc, aut in hoc: ex quo autem mutatur, corrumpitur hoc, aut hinc.
But Saint Augustine, in the third book against Maximinus, chapter 12, interprets the word “immortality” as put for immutability, so that it may be signified that God alone is immutable. Nor is this signification of “immortality” foreign: for in every mutable nature, change itself is a kind of death, because it makes something in it that was not. Leo writes something similar, in sermon 1 On the Resurrection of the Lord: “For every man,” he says, “who is changed by some conversion from one thing into another, the end is not to be what he was, and the rise is to be what he was not.” And this agrees most fully with the doctrine of Aristotle, of whom, in the eighth book of the Physics, text 24, these are the words: “But to almost all it seems that to be moved is for something to come to be and to be corrupted: for into that which it changes, it becomes this, or in this; but out of that from which it changes, this is corrupted, or hence.”
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NON solùm autem ex hac doctrina Mosis discimus animam hominis esse immortalem, sed etiam veram esse ac naturalem eius formam, & suam cuique hominum esse animam, scilicet pro multitudine hominum qui generantur multiplicatam. Hoc satis indicavit Moses, cùm appellavit eam, spiraculum vitae, & cùm dixit, per eam factum esse hominem viventem. Si enim anima rationalis homini est causa vitae & vivendi, necesse est ipsam esse formam hominis. Forma enim definitur qua res est id quod est, & à qua esse rei accidit. Si igitur vivere provenit homini ex anima rationali, ergo etiam esse: nam vivere viventibus est esse, ut benè disputat Aristoteles in libro 2. de Anima tex. 36. Moses quoque, cùm dixit Deum fecisse hominem ad imaginem & similitudinem suam, quod pertinet ad animam, & formasse hominem ex limo terrae, quod pertinet ad corpus, aper-[tè ostendit...]
Not only, however, do we learn from this doctrine of Moses that the soul of man is immortal, but also that its form is true and natural, and that each man has his own soul — namely, multiplied according to the multitude of men who are generated. This Moses sufficiently indicated when he called it “the breath of life,” and when he said that through it man was made living. For if the rational soul is to man the cause of life and of living, it is necessary that it itself be the form of man. For form is defined as that by which a thing is what it is, and from which the being of the thing results. If, then, living comes to man from the rational soul, therefore also being: for to live, for living things, is to be — as Aristotle well argues in the second book On the Soul, text 36. Moses too, when he said that God made man to His image and likeness (which pertains to the soul), and formed man from the slime of the earth (which pertains to the body), [openly shows...] [continues]
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[...aper]tè ostendit, hominem substantialiter constare ex anima & corpore. Si autem anima rationalis est substantialis forma hominis, ex eo concluditur eam multiplicari pro multitudine hominum: neque enim potest multiplicari compositum substantiale, nisi multiplicatis eius partibus substantialibus, praesertim verò forma, ex qua potissimum & unitas & distinctio composito accidit. ILLVD praeterea ex verbis Mosis licet argumentari, in homine unam duntaxat esse animam secundùm substantiam, & hanc esse [animam rationalem...]
[...openly] shows that man consists substantially of soul and body. But if the rational soul is the substantial form of man, from this it is concluded that it is multiplied according to the multitude of men: for a substantial composite cannot be multiplied except by the multiplication of its substantial parts, and especially of the form, from which above all both unity and distinction accrue to the composite. Furthermore, from the words of Moses it may be argued that in man there is only one soul according to substance, and that this is [the rational soul...] [continues]
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[...in homine unam duntaxat esse animam secundùm substantiam, & hanc esse] animam rationalem; quae tamen potestate aliarum animarum vices & munera abundè implet: dat enim homini esse sensitivum & vegetativum, multo excellentiori modo, quàm seorsim praestent anima sensitiva & vegetativa. Sed quibus verbis hoc indicavit Moses? videlicet cùm narrans creationem animae rationalis, appellavit eam simpliciter spiraculum vitae: quasi triplex vita quae est in homine, vegetativa, sensitiva, & intellectiva, à sola praestetur anima rationali. Nec tantùm dixit hominem esse factum viventem anima humana & intellectiva, sed dixit per eam praecisè ac simpliciter factum esse viven-[tem...]
[...that in man there is only one soul according to substance, and that this is] the rational soul — which, however, by its power abundantly fulfills the offices and functions of the other souls: for it gives man to be sensitive and vegetative, in a far more excellent manner than the sensitive and vegetative souls would furnish them separately. But by what words did Moses indicate this? namely, when, narrating the creation of the rational soul, he called it simply “the breath of life”: as though the threefold life which is in man — vegetative, sensitive, and intellective — is furnished by the rational soul alone. Nor did he only say that man was made living by a human and intellective soul, but said that through it precisely and simply he was made liv-[ing...] [continues]
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[...factum esse viven]tem, quasi ab ea acceperit omne genus vitae, & omnem vivendi gradum quem in se habet. Videtur etiam apertè id significasse Dominus, cùm dixit, ut refert Matthaeus, cap. 10. Nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus, animam autem non possunt occidere: quibus verbis, non modò significatur animam hominis esse immortalem, sed unam etiam duntaxat in unoquoque homine esse: nam quia non dixit, Animam autem rationalem non possunt occidere, sed dixit simpliciter, animam non possunt occidere, satis indicavit nullam esse in homine animam quae occidi queat, at si praeter animam rationalem essent in homine anima vegetativa & sensitiva, quae sunt mortales & simul cum corpore intereunt, non illud simpliciter verè dictum esset, animam autem non possunt occidere. In hac etiam sententia videtur fuisse B. Hieronymus: is enim explanans ea verba, quae sunt in Oratione Azariae apud Dan. cap. 3. Sed in anima cōtrita & spiritu humilitatis suscipiamur: Et ex praesenti [...]
[...made liv]ing, as though from it he received every kind of life, and every grade of living which he has in himself. The Lord also seems to have signified this openly when He said, as Matthew reports, chapter 10: “Do not fear those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul”: by which words it is signified not only that the soul of man is immortal, but also that there is only one in each man: for since He did not say, “but the rational soul they cannot kill,” but said simply, “the soul they cannot kill,” He sufficiently indicated that there is no soul in man that can be killed; but if, besides the rational soul, there were in man a vegetative and a sensitive soul, which are mortal and perish together with the body, that would not simply and truly have been said, “but the soul they cannot kill.” In this view Saint Jerome too seems to have been: for he, explaining those words which are in the Prayer of Azariah, in Daniel chapter 3, “But in a contrite soul and a spirit of humility may we be received”: and from the present [passage...] [continues]
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[...And from the present] passage, he says, and from that which follows, “Bless the Lord, you spirits and souls of the just”: and in the Psalms, “A sacrifice to God is a troubled spirit: a contrite and humbled heart, O God, you will not despise” — there are those who would have there be in man another spirit, besides the Holy Spirit, and another soul. But they will have to labor [to explain] how, apart from the flesh and the grace of the Holy Spirit, two substances and two interior men can be said to be in one man. Thus Jerome.22
[...Et ex praesenti] loco, inquit, & ex eo quod sequitur, Benedicite spiritus, & animae iustorū Domino: Et in psalmis, Sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus: cor contritum & humiliatum Deus non despicies: sunt qui alium velint esse spiritum in homine, excepto Spiritu sancto, & aliam animam. Sed laborandum eis erit quomodo absque carne & gratia Spiritus sancti duae substantiae & duo interiores homines in uno homine esse dicantur. Sic Hieronymus.
AD idem confirmandum, afferunt nonnulli quod in libro de Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, capite 15. scriptum est, ubi damnantur qui ponunt in uno homine duas animas: & sententiam octavae Synodi generalis, quae est in canone 11. ubi dicitur, impium esse duas animas in uno homine ponere: cùm & vetus & novum Testamentum, omnesque Ecclesiae Patres unam animam rationalem habere homines asseverent. Adducunt etiam testimonium Augustini, ex libro de duabus animabus adversus Manichaeos. Alii tamen docti viri, ut verum censent unam esse [tantùm animam in homine...]
To confirm the same, some bring forward what is written in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, chapter 15, where those are condemned who place two souls in one man; and the opinion of the eighth general Synod, which is in canon 11, where it is said that it is impious to place two souls in one man — since both the Old and the New Testament, and all the Fathers of the Church, assert that men have one rational soul. They also adduce the testimony of Augustine, from the book On the Two Souls against the Manichees. Yet other learned men, while they judge it true that there is only one [soul in man...] [continues]
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[...ut verum censent unam esse tantùm animam in homine, ita putant id non esse unquam definitum secundùm Fidem] Catholicae. Neque enim hoc usquam expressum est vel in Scriptura, vel in Conciliis, neque à Patribus ut dogma Fidei traditum est: neque Theologi Nominales, qui tres animas in quolibet homine esse censent, ullo tempore sunt damnati ab Ecclesia ut haeretici. Nám quod in supradictis locis dicitur, non esse duas animas in homine, facilè intelligitur sermonem haberi de duabus animabus, quarum una sit vivificans, altera verò non vivificans, sed tantùm rationem ministrás, & quasi assistens: vel quarum una sit à Deo & de substantia Dei, altera verò sit ab alio quodam principio, sicut dicebant Manichaei. Non autem damnantur qui multas animas ponunt in homine eo modo quo suprà exposuimus, & quemadmodum opinantur Nominales.
[...while they judge it true that there is only one soul in man, yet they think that this was never defined according to the] Catholic Faith. For this is nowhere expressed, either in Scripture or in the Councils, nor was it handed down by the Fathers as a dogma of Faith; nor were the Nominalist Theologians, who hold that there are three souls in each man, ever condemned by the Church as heretics. For as to what is said in the above-mentioned passages, that there are not two souls in man, it is easily understood that the discourse is about two souls — of which one is vivifying, the other not vivifying, but only ministering reason, and as it were assisting; or of which one is from God and of the substance of God, the other from some other principle, as the Manichees said. But those are not condemned who place many souls in man in the way we have set forth above, and as the Nominalists hold.
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Translator’s notes
- Section divider (rule above). Second quaestio of the disputation. ↩
- Large decorated initial 'N'. The immortality is demonstrable from Gen 2:7; astonishment at the Sadducees' standing among the Jews. Sentence breaks at 'miran-'. ↩
- The wonder tempered by the prevalence of heresy among Christians. Eusebius (HE 6.37, here cited as 6.30) on a heresy arising in Arabia (the 'Thnetopsychites,' who held the soul dies with the body). Marginal gloss: 'Haeresis Arabum quorundam de immortalitate animae' (the heresy of certain Arabs concerning the immortality of the soul). Page ends at catchword 'dam' (= quorundam; signature HH). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 467, continuing 'quorun[dam]...' on the Arabian heresy. ↩
- Completes the sentence broken at the catchword 'dam' on PDF 466. The Arabian 'Thnetopsychites' (soul dies with the body, revives at the resurrection); Augustine, de Haeresibus 83. ↩
- Traducianism (the soul propagated from parents, 'light from light'): the Luciferians; Tertullian's corporeal soul (Augustine, de Haeresibus 86) — condemned not for traducianism but for Montanism (Cataphrygians). Marginal gloss: 'An anima nostra sit ex traduce' (whether our soul is by traduction). ↩
- Augustine's lifelong uncertainty about the soul's origin, with its dossier (Ep. 7, 28, 157; de Bapt. parv. 3.10; Retract. 1.1; de Gen. ad lit. 10.1-4): creationism ex nihilo seems to clash with the rest on day seven. ↩
- The crux: if souls are created (not traduced), how is original sin (seated in the soul) transmitted? References: Aquinas ST I q.118 a.2; Bonaventure Sent. II d.18 q.ult.; Alfonso de Castro adv. Haereses 2. Page ends at the catchword 'VERUM' (signature unmarked here). ↩
- Large initial 'V'. Jerome's settled doctrine (souls created singly, the Church's), grounded in the soul's incorporeality/immateriality: Aquinas SCG 2.86; Ps 33:15; Zech 12:1; Eccl 12:7 (which Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. 10.9, vainly tries to blunt). ↩
- First Mosaic proof of immortality: man in God's image implies an incorporeal, all-knowing, immortal soul (Plato, Alcibiades and Phaedo; Porphyry ad Boethium, via Eusebius Praep. Evang. 11). Marginal glosses: 'Quibus ex verbis Mosis ostendatur immortalitas animae nostrae'; 'Quae ratio Platoni & Porphyrio visa sit validissima ad probandam animi nostri immortalitatem.' ↩
- The four marks of the image of God in the soul: infinite intellect, infinite (God-directed) will, free will, and the natural desire of eternity. Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor in rebus similitudo hominis & Dei posita est' (in four things is placed the likeness of man and God). ↩
- Second proof: man's dominion over the animals (Gen 1:26-28) shows his higher rank. The third proof (Gen 2:7 itself) begins. Page ends at the catchword 'Cùm' (signature HH 2). ↩
- Third proof: Gen 2:7's insufflation distinguishes man's soul (from God alone, immaterial) from the animal souls drawn from elemental matter (Gen 1:20,24). ↩
- Proofs four–six: Gen 4:7 (free will → immortality); Gen 37:35 (Jacob's 'infernum' = the true netherworld of departed souls, not a grave); Exod 3:6 with Christ's gloss in Matt 22:32. Marginal gloss: 'Matth. 22.' ↩
- Seventh proof: Deut 4:19 (the stars serve man, who is thus nobler). Then the new question — immortal by nature or only by grace? — opened with authorities (Third Council of Constantinople / Sophronius; Jerome c. Pelag. 2; Damascene de Fide Orth. 2.3, 2.12 on the Angels' immortality by grace). Marginal gloss: 'An animus hominis sit immortalis natura sua, an tantùm Dei voluntate & gratia.' Sentence breaks at 'immortalitatem.' ↩
- 1 Tim 6:16 (God alone has immortality); Plato Timaeus (the 'second gods' immortal by God's will). Pererius' own answer: the soul is immortal by nature (simple, immaterial, self-subsisting); the Fathers' 'not by nature' to be qualified (continues on PDF 470). Sentence breaks at 'natura' (catchword 'tura'). ↩
- Reconciliation: 'not immortal by nature' means contingent on God's omnipotence (He could annihilate them). 1 Tim 6:15-16 read either thus or (Chrysostom) as a comparison with earthly kings. Marginal gloss: 'Locus Pauli 1. ad Timoth. cap. ultimo.' ↩
- Immortality = immutability (Augustine c. Maximinum 3.12): every change is a kind of death (Leo, Serm. 71 [here 'sermo 1 de Resurrectione']; Aristotle Phys. 8 text 24). ↩
- Gen 2:7 also teaches the soul is the true natural form of man, individuated per person: living = being (Arist. de Anima 2 text 36). Marginal gloss: 'Ex doctrina Mosis colligi, animam rationalem esse formam hominis, & unam in unoquoque' (from Moses' doctrine is gathered that the rational soul is the form of man, and one in each individual). ↩
- The soul as substantial form is individuated and multiplied per man. Begins the argument for the unicity of the soul. Marginal gloss: 'Unam tantum animam esse in homine' (that there is only one soul in man). Page ends at the catchword 'animam' (signature HH 3). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 471, 'in homine unam duntaxat esse animam... & hanc esse animam [rationalem]...'. ↩
- Completes the unicity argument from PDF 470: one rational soul performs the offices of the vegetative and sensitive souls (it makes man 'living' simply, Gen 2:7's 'breath of life'). Sentence breaks at 'viventem.' ↩
- Matt 10:28 ('cannot kill the soul' — said simply, not 'the rational soul') argues one soul per man. Jerome on the Prayer of Azariah (Dan 3:39) begins. Marginal gloss: 'Locus Matthaei, cap. 10.' ↩
- Jerome (on Dan 3) block-quote, 'Sic Hieronymus': against doubling spirit/soul in man (citing Dan 3:86, Ps 50[51]:19). Marginal gloss: 'Psalm. 50.' ↩
- Authorities against 'two souls': Gennadius de Eccl. dogm. 15; the Eighth General Synod (Constantinople IV) canon 11; Augustine de duabus animabus c. Manich. Some, however, hold the unicity is not strictly de fide (continues on PDF 472). ↩
- Completes the qualification: the unicity of the soul is not strictly de fide; the condemnations target the dualist/Manichee 'two souls,' not the Nominalist subordinated plurality. (The header word 'Catholicae' begins the page, completing 'rationem Fidei Catholicae' from PDF 471.) ↩