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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Four — the creation of the first human beings

GENESIS CH. 2, VERSES 16 & 17. And He commanded him, saying: Of every tree of paradise you may eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat. For in whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death

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GENESIS CH. 2, VERSES 16 & 17. And He commanded him, saying: Of every tree of paradise you may eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat. For in whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death.1

CAP. 2. VERS. 16. & 17. Praecepítque ei dicens: Ex omni ligno paradisi comede: de ligno autem scientiae boni & mali ne comedas. In quocunque enim die comederis ex eo, morte morieris.

ARBITRATVR S. Thomas in 1. part. quaest. 97. art. 3. & in Opusculo 3. c. 188. sicut datú est Adae praeceptum non comedendi ex arbore scientiae boni & mali, ita datum ei praeceptum esse comedendi ex omni alia paradisi arbore: tum quia perspicuè supradictis verbis significatur, Deum praecepisse Adamo ut comederet ex omni arbore paradisi: náque verbum illud, Praecepit, totam sequentem narrationem vi sua comprehendit: quapropter aequè pertinet ad comedendú ex omni arbore, quàm ad non comedendum ex arbore scientiae boni & mali: tum etiá quòd si homo non comedisset, proculdubio in mortem aliáque mala vel praecurrentia, vel comitantia, vel consequentia mortem corporis incurrisset: quae tamen mala nisi propter peccatú prius admissum nequaquá homini contigissent: Opus igitur homini fuit praecepto comedédi, ne obnoxius tot tantísque malis existeret.
Saint Thomas judges, in the First Part, question 97, article 3, and in Opusculum 3, chapter 188, that just as a precept was given to Adam of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, so a precept was given him of eating from every other tree of paradise: both because it is clearly signified, by the above words, that God commanded Adam to eat from every tree of paradise — for that word “He commanded” comprehends, by its own force, the whole following narration; wherefore it pertains as much to eating from every tree as to not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; and also because, if man had not eaten, he would doubtless have incurred death, and other evils — whether preceding, or accompanying, or following the death of the body — which evils, however, would by no means have befallen man except on account of sin previously committed: there was, therefore, need for man of a precept of eating, lest he be liable to so many and so great evils.2
His quidam addunt, in illo statu innocentiae nunquam hominem vel esurientem ad manducandú, vel sitientem ad bibendum accessurum. Siquidem fames & sitis molestiam afferunt & poená: quicquid auté molestiae aut poenae est, longè ab illo felici statu remotum fuisset. Cùm igitur in eo statu nec fames nec [sitis incitaret hominem...]
To these some add, that in that state of innocence man would never have come to eat while hungry, or to drink while thirsty. For hunger and thirst bring trouble and punishment; but whatever is of trouble or of punishment would have been far removed from that happy state. Since, therefore, in that state neither hunger nor [thirst would incite a man...] [continues]3
[...Cùm igitur in eo statu nec fames nec] sitis incitaret hominem ad comedendum aut bibendum, oportebat divino eum praecepto ad id agendum incitari. VERVM haec nec vera sunt, meritóque reprobantur à Tostato in Quaestionibus 206. 207. 208. & 209. super 13. caput Geneseos, sanè ad id refellendú multa possunt argumenta proferri. Principiò, non opus erat homini praecepto divino ad comedendum, cùm id homo nullo etiam iubente sponte naturae suae facturus esset: quippe cùm naturali eius rei desiderio teneretur, ratióque doceret, eum nisi comedisset haud dubiè moriturú, ob idque peccaturum gravissimè. Sciebat item se principem & Dominum cunctarum animantium, multóque magis ipsarum stirpium à Deo esse constitutum; videlicet ut ex usu suo suáque voluntate illis vesci posset.
[...Since, therefore, in that state neither hunger nor] thirst would incite a man to eat or to drink, it was fitting that he be incited to do it by a divine precept. BUT these things are not true, and are deservedly reproved by Tostatus, in Questions 206, 207, 208, and 209 on the thirteenth chapter of Genesis; and indeed, to refute it, many arguments can be brought forward. In the first place, man had no need of a divine precept for eating, since he would do it of his own accord, by his own nature, even with none commanding — seeing that he was held by a natural desire of that thing, and reason would teach him that, unless he ate, he would undoubtedly die, and on that account sin most gravely. He knew likewise that he had been constituted by God the prince and lord of all living things, and much more of the plants themselves — namely, that by his own use and will he might feed upon them.4
Deinde, tam necessarius erat homini ad tuendam vitam potus, quàm cibus: horum enim alterutro deficiente, necessario periisset: quare si dandum erat praeceptum comedendi, dandum itidem bibendi praeceptum fuisset. Posteà, si idcirco impositum est homini praeceptum sumendi cibi, ut is declinaret incommoda quae cibi penuria & defectus affert; ob eandem profectò causam praecipiendum fuisset homini ut evitaret alia permulta incommoda, quae ei vel ex terra & aqua, vel ex aëre & igne, vel aliis ex rebus accidere potuissent. Quòd si ad haec cavenda non opus fuit novo & singulari praecepto, sed satis erat ipsa hominis ratio prudentiáque, & specialis Dei erga hominem in statu illo constitutum providentia, idem planè de praecepto comedendi sentire ac dicere oportet.
Then, drink was as necessary to man for preserving life as food: for, with either of these failing, he would necessarily have perished; wherefore, if a precept of eating had to be given, a precept of drinking would likewise have had to be given. Next, if a precept of taking food was imposed on man for this reason, that he might avoid the harms which scarcity and lack of food bring, then for the same cause, assuredly, man would have had to be commanded to avoid very many other harms, which could befall him either from earth and water, or from air and fire, or from other things. But if, for guarding against these, there was no need of a new and special precept, but man's own reason and prudence sufficed, together with God's special providence toward man constituted in that state, then the very same must plainly be thought and said concerning the precept of eating.5
Ad haec, minimè congruum erat praecipere ut comederet Adam ex omni arbore paradisi: tum quòd ad effugienda incommoda & mala quae defectionem cibi consequuntur, non erat opus edere ex omni arbore paradisi, sed satis fuisset ex aliqua vel aliquibus arboribus comedere: tum quòd id laboriosum & iniucundum accidisset homini: quippe qui maluisset ex certis aliquibus paradisi arboribus comedere, quàm ad comedendum ex omnibus, Dei praecepto astringi. Adiice, quod ex verbis quae dixit Eva respondens serpenti, videmur nobis, id quod nunc dicimus posse nos argumentari. Cùm enim serpens dixisset Evae, Cur praecepit vobis Deus ut non comederetis ex omni ligno paradisi. Sic ei respondit Eva, De fructu lignorum quae sunt in paradiso vescimur: de fructu verò ligni quod est in medio paradisi, praecepit nobis Deus ne comederemus: quibus ex verbis licet intelligere, permissum esse voluntati eorum, ut ex qualibet aliarum arborum paradisi comederent, [tantúmque ne comederent ex arbore scientiae boni & mali...]
Besides this, it was by no means fitting to command that Adam eat from every tree of paradise: both because, for escaping the harms and evils which follow upon the failure of food, there was no need to eat from every tree of paradise, but it would have sufficed to eat from some one or several trees; and because that would have proved laborious and unpleasant to man — seeing that he would have preferred to eat from certain particular trees of paradise, rather than to be bound, by God's precept, to eating from all. Add, that from the words which Eve spoke in answer to the serpent, we seem to ourselves able to argue what we now say. For when the serpent had said to Eve, “Why has God commanded you not to eat from every tree of paradise?” Eve answered him thus: “Of the fruit of the trees that are in paradise we eat; but of the fruit of the tree which is in the middle of paradise, God has commanded us not to eat”: from which words one may understand that it was permitted to their will to eat from any of the other trees of paradise, [and only that they should not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil...] [continues]6
[...tantúmque ne comederent ex arbore scientiae boni & mali,] praecepto Dei esse illis interdictum. Denique faciliùs fuisset serpenti persuadere Evae, ut in tanta paradisi arborum copia ab una aliqua earum abstineret, eáque re si divino praecepto comedendi ex omni arbore tenebantur, in peccatum caderet, quàm persuadere ei ut comederet ex unica illa arbore scientiae boni & mali: quamobrem illud potius quàm hoc persuadere ei aggressus esset.
[...and only that they should not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil] was forbidden to them by the precept of God. Finally, it would have been easier for the serpent to persuade Eve, in so great an abundance of paradise's trees, to abstain from some one of them — and by that very thing, if they were bound by a divine precept of eating from every tree, she would fall into sin — than to persuade her to eat from that single tree of the knowledge of good and evil; wherefore he would have undertaken to persuade her of the former rather than of this latter.7
NEc magni negotij est contrarias rationes diluere. Licèt enim verbum illud Praecipit, praeponatur toti orationi subsequenti, in qua est de comedendo ex omnibus paradisi arboribus, & de non comedendo ex arbore scientiae boni & mali: propriè tamen ad hoc posterius duntaxat referri debet; ut haec sit eius orationis sententia: Praecepit Deus Adamo ne comederet ex arbore scientiae boni & mali; ex omni autem alia paradisi arbore ut comederet, supple tu, concessit, vel potestatem dedit. Similis quidam loquendi modus reperitur hoc ipso in libro Geneseos, capit. 15. quo loco scriptum est, praedixisse Deum Abrahae, fore ut semen eius peregrinum esset in terra aliena & subijceretur servituti, & affligeretur quadringentis annis. Namque hoc quod ultimo loco dicitur de quadringentis annis, nullo modo referri potest ad servitutem & afflictionem seminis, seu posterorum Abrahae, sed ad peregrinationem eorum in terra aliena tantummodo referri debet, siquidem ab ingressu Iacob cum filiis suis in Aegyptum usque ad egressionem Mosis ex Aegypto cum populo Hebraeo, non plures ducentis quindecim annis numerantur, è quibus praeterea detrahendi sunt septuaginta anni vitae Ioseph exacti, postquam Iacob venit in Aegyptum; quo tempore Hebraei tranquillè & feliciter apud Aegyptios versati sunt: restant igitur anni duntaxat centum quadragintaquinque, quibus annis Hebraei dura servitute ab Aegyptiis pressi & conflictati sunt.
Nor is it a matter of great trouble to wash away the contrary reasons. For although that word “He commanded” is prefixed to the whole following speech — in which there is [mention] both of eating from all the trees of paradise and of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil — yet, properly, it ought to be referred only to this latter; so that this be the meaning of that speech: “God commanded Adam not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; but to eat from every other tree of paradise” — supply: He permitted, or gave power. A similar manner of speaking is found in this very book of Genesis, chapter 15, where it is written that God foretold to Abraham that his seed would be a stranger in a foreign land, and would be subjected to servitude, and afflicted for four hundred years. For that which is said in the last place, about the four hundred years, can in no way be referred to the servitude and affliction of the seed, or descendants, of Abraham, but ought to be referred only to their sojourning in a foreign land — since, from the entrance of Jacob with his sons into Egypt up to the departure of Moses out of Egypt with the Hebrew people, no more than two hundred and fifteen years are counted, from which, moreover, must be subtracted the seventy years of Joseph's life completed after Jacob came into Egypt (during which time the Hebrews dwelt tranquilly and happily among the Egyptians): there remain, therefore, only one hundred and forty-five years, in which years the Hebrews were pressed and afflicted by the Egyptians with hard servitude.8
Nec verò inficior, in statu innocentiae debuisse hominem comedere ac bibere, & peccaturum fuisse eum, nisi cùm ei opus erat comedisset & bibisset: verùm obligatio illa comedendi & bibendi non proveniebat ex aliquo praecepto positivo, sed ex ipso praescripto, & ut vocant, dictamine rationis & legis naturalis: nec id non faciens homo, contra aliam legem peccasset quàm naturalem. ILLVD porrò falsum est, hominem in eo statu sine ulla fame ac siti manducaturum ac bibiturum, non enim cibus & potus non esurienti & sitienti iucundus fuisset aut etiam salubris; neque congruum erat edere aut bibere sine ulla indigentia cibi aut potus, hanc verò indigentiam, famis & sitis necessariò consequebantur. Haec igitur prout significant appetitum frigidi & humidi qui est sitis, aut calidi & sicci qui est fames, etiam homini in statu innocentiae accidissent: ut autem haec, cùm non satisfit naturali indigentiae adiunctam secum habent molestiam & cruciatum; ea ratione nequaquam homini eo tempore contigissent.
Nor indeed do I deny that, in the state of innocence, man had to eat and drink, and that he would have sinned, unless, when there was need for him, he had eaten and drunk: but that obligation of eating and drinking did not arise from any positive precept, but from the prescript itself and (as they call it) the dictate of reason and of the natural law; nor would man, by not doing it, have sinned against any other law than the natural. Moreover, that is false — that man, in that state, would eat and drink without any hunger and thirst; for food and drink would not have been pleasant, nor even healthful, to one not hungry and thirsty; nor was it fitting to eat or drink without any want of food or drink, and this want hunger and thirst necessarily attended. These, therefore, insofar as they signify the appetite of the cold and moist, which is thirst, or of the hot and dry, which is hunger, would have befallen man even in the state of innocence; but inasmuch as these, when natural want is not satisfied, have joined with them trouble and torment, in that respect they would by no means have befallen man at that time.9
Caeterùm roget me quispiam, si non est datum Adamo praeceptum edendi ex omni arbore, sed duntaxat non edendi ex arbore sciétiae boni & mali, satis fuisset hoc unum tantummodo exprimere: cur igitur illud de comedendo ex omni arbore paradisi adiunctum est? An fortasse, ne quia interdictum erat homini esu unius arboris, eum religio incesseret non edendi ex aliis arboribus? Ut igitur omnis ei scrupulus eximeretur, perspicuis verbis copia edendi ex omnibus aliis arboribus facienda erat homini. An potiùs illud adiunctum est, quò manifestú esset quàm leve esset & facile ob-[servatu...]
But someone may ask me: if a precept of eating from every tree was not given to Adam, but only of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, it would have sufficed to express this one thing only: why, then, was that about eating from every tree of paradise adjoined? Was it, perhaps, lest — because the eating of one tree was forbidden to man — a scruple should come upon him about not eating from the other trees? So that, then, every scruple might be removed from him, the liberty of eating from all the other trees had, in clear words, to be granted to man. Or rather was that adjoined, so that it might be manifest how light it was and how easy to ob-[serve...] [continues]10
[...quàm leve esset & facile ob]servatu quod homini Deus interdixerat, abstinentia scilicet unius duntaxat arboris, cùm amplissimam ei ex innumerabilibus aliis paradisi arboribus edendi potestatem fecisset? Si quis porrò quaerat ex nobis, cur hic arborum duntaxat mentio fiat, non autem herbarum, cùm suprà extremis verbis primi capitis scriptum sit, Deum homini dedisse potestatem vescendi fructibus arborum, omníque genere herbarum? Respondebimus, Quia inter herbas, nullius earum esu fuerat homo prohibitus, sicut inter arbores interdictum est illi esu unius arboris; ideò propter unius arboris prohibitionem, adiungere oportuit facultatem edendi ex aliis omnibus, quod nulla ratio erat ut de ipsis herbis exprimeretur.
[...how light it was and how easy to ob]serve what God had forbidden to man — namely, abstinence from one tree only — when He had granted him the most ample power of eating from innumerable other trees of paradise. But if anyone should further ask of us why here mention is made of trees only, and not of herbs, since above, in the last words of the first chapter, it was written that God gave man the power of feeding upon the fruits of the trees and upon every kind of herb? — we shall answer: Because, among the herbs, man had been forbidden the eating of none, just as, among the trees, the eating of one tree was forbidden him; therefore, on account of the prohibition of one tree, it was necessary to adjoin the faculty of eating from all the others, whereas there was no reason that it should be expressed concerning the herbs themselves.11

Translator’s notes

  1. Scripture lemma (set in the margin as CAP. 2. VERS. 16. & 17., the verse in italic) opening the next stretch of commentary. ↩
  2. Large decorated initial 'A'. Aquinas (ST I q.97 a.3; Opusc. 3 c.188): a positive precept TO eat from the other trees was also given (since 'He commanded' governs the whole), to spare man the evils of starvation. Marginal gloss: 'An datum sit Adamo praeceptum comedendi ex omnibus alijs arboribus paradisi.' ↩
  3. An additional reason offered (and later rejected): in innocence man would feel neither hunger nor thirst, so a precept was needed to prompt eating. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'sitis.' ↩
  4. Tostatus' refutation of Aquinas begins (Quaest. 206-209 on Gen): no positive precept to eat was needed — nature, desire, and reason already prompt it (and man is lord of the plants). Marginal gloss: 'Tostatus refellit opinionem S. Thomae.' ↩
  5. Two further arguments: a precept to drink would equally be required; and if reason/providence suffices against other harms, no special precept to eat was needed. ↩
  6. Further: commanding to eat from EVERY tree would be needless and burdensome; and Eve's reply to the serpent (Gen 3:1-3) shows only the one tree was forbidden, the rest left to free choice. ↩
  7. Last argument: had eating from all trees been commanded, the serpent's easier path would have been to induce abstaining from one — yet he tempted to the single forbidden tree, showing no such universal precept existed. ↩
  8. Pererius' reply: 'He commanded' grammatically governs both clauses but applies properly only to the prohibition (the permission supplied), as the Gen 15:13 syntax of the '400 years' attaches only to the sojourning, not the servitude (with his chronological reckoning: 215 years in Egypt, minus Joseph's 70 prosperous, leaving 145 of affliction). Marginal gloss: 'Solutio rationum opinionis S. Thomae.' ↩
  9. Pererius grants man ate by natural law (not a positive precept), and corrects the added view: hunger and thirst as appetites WOULD exist in innocence — only their attendant pain would not. Marginal gloss: 'Homines in statu innocentiae nec famis nec sitis expertes futuros' (men in the state of innocence would not be free of hunger or thirst). ↩
  10. Objection answered: the 'eat of every tree' clause was added either to remove any scruple about the other trees, or to underscore how light the single prohibition was. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'servatu.' ↩
  11. Concludes the precept discussion: the prohibition is light (one tree against innumerable); the permission concerns trees (not herbs) only because only a tree was forbidden. ↩