QUESTION II. Why God imposed this law of not eating from that tree upon Adam.¹

QVAESTIO II. Cur Deus hanc legem non edendi ex illa arbore imposuerit Adae.

[...Honor your father] and your mother; and you shall not covet what is another's. For the primordial law was given to Adam and Eve in paradise, as it were the matrix of all the precepts of God. Indeed, if they had loved the Lord their God, they would not have acted against His precept; if they had loved their neighbor — that is, themselves — they would not have believed the persuasion of the serpent, and so would not have committed homicide against themselves, by falling away from immortality, by acting against God's precept; they would also have abstained from theft, and would not secretly have tasted of the fruit of the tree, nor would they have wished to lie hidden under the tree from the sight of the Lord our God. Nor would they have been made partakers with the devil who asserted a falsehood, by believing him that they would become like God. And so they would not have offended God as a Father, who had formed them from the slime of the earth as from a mother's womb. If they did not covet what was another's, they would not have tasted of the illicit fruit. Therefore, by this general and primordial law of God, which He had sanctioned to be observed in the fruit of the tree, we recognize that all the precepts of the later law were specially implanted — which, in their own times, being published, sprouted forth. For it belongs to the same one to teach the law afterward, who had before sent ahead the precept; since it is His to instruct afterward, who had before appointed to form the just. For what wonder is it if He augments the discipline who instituted it — if He perfects it who began it?” Thus Tertullian.³

[...Honora patrem] tuum & matrem tuam, & alienum non concupisces. Primordialis enim lex data est Adae & Euae in paradiso, quasi matrix omnium praeceptorum Dei. Denique, si Dominum Deum suum dilexissent, contra praeceptum eius non fecissent: si proximum diligerent, id est, semetipsos, persuasioni serpentis non credidissent, atque ita in semetipsos homicidium non commisissent, excidendo de immortalitate, faciendo contra Dei praeceptum: à furto quoque abstinuissent, & de fructu arboris clam non degustassent, nec à conspectu Domini Dei nostri sub arbore delitescere gestissent. Nec falsum asseveranti diabolo participes efficerentur, credendo ei quod similes Deo essent futuri. Atque ita nec Deum offendissent ut patrem, qui eos de limo terrae quasi ex utero matris figuraverat. Si alienum non concupiscerent, de fructu illicito non gustassent. Igitur hác generali & primordiali Dei lege quam in arboris fructu observari Deus sanxerat, omnia praecepta legis posterioris specialiter indita fuisse cognoscimus, quae suis temporibus edita germinaverunt. Eiusdem est enim posteà docere legem, qui ante praemiserat praeceptum: quoniam & ipsius est erudire posteà, qui ante iustos formare instituerat. Quid enim mirum si is auget disciplinam qui instituit: si is perficit qui coepit? Haec Tertullianus.

“Nor could it,” he says, “be better or more diligently commended how great an evil disobedience alone is, since man was made guilty of iniquity for this reason — that he touched that thing against the prohibition — which, had he touched it un-prohibited, he would surely not have sinned. For one who says, for instance, ‘Do not touch this herb’ (if perhaps it is poisonous), and foretells death if he should touch it, death indeed follows the despiser of the precept; but even if no one had prohibited, and he had touched it, he would nonetheless surely die. For that thing would be contrary to his health and life, whether it were forbidden him or not forbidden. Likewise, when someone prohibits a thing from being touched which would harm not the toucher, but the one who prohibited — as if someone had put his hand into another's money, being prohibited by him whose money it was — for that reason it would be a sin to the one prohibited, because it could be harmful to the prohibitor. But when that is touched which would neither harm the toucher, were it not prohibited, nor be touched to the harm of any other whatsoever, why is it prohibited, except that the good of obedience in itself, and the evil of disobedience in itself, might be shown? Finally, by the sinner nothing else was sought than not to be under [the power of God...] [continues]⁹

Nec potuit, inquit, melius & diligentius commendari quantum malum sit sola inobedientia, cùm ideo reus iniquitatis factus est homo, quia eam rem tetigit contra prohibitionem, quam si non prohibitus tetigisset, non utique peccasset. Nam qui dicit, verbi gratia, Noli tangere hanc herbam, si forte venenosa est, mortémq́ prenunciat, si tetigerit, sequitur quidem mors contemptorem praecepti: sed etiá si nemo prohibuisset, atque ille tetigisset, nihilominus utique moreretur. Illa quippe res contraria saluti vitaeq́ eius esset, sive illi vetaretur sive non vetaretur. Item cùm quisquam prohibet eam rem tangi, quae non quidem tangenti sed illi qui prohibuit obesset, velut si quisquam in alienam pecuniam misisset manum, prohibitus ab eo cuius erat pecunia illa: ideo esset prohibito peccatú, quia prohibenti poterat esse damnosum. Cùm verò illud tangitur quod nec tangenti obesset si non prohiberetur, nec cuiquá alteri quaelibet tangeretur, quare prohibitum est nisi ut ipsius per se bonum obedientiae, & ipsius per se malum inobedientiae monstraretur? Denique à peccanté nihil aliud appetitú est nisi non esse sub [Dei potestate...]

[...by the sinner nothing else was sought than not to be] under the dominion of God, when that was committed in which, lest it be committed, the command of the One ruling alone ought to have been heeded — which, if it alone were heeded, what else than the will of God would be loved? what else than the will of God would be set before the human will? Why the Lord commanded, let Him see to it: what He commanded must be done by the servant, and then perhaps it must be seen, by the one earning his reward, why He commanded. Yet, that we may not longer seek the cause of this command — if this very thing is a great usefulness for man, that he serves God — by commanding, God makes useful whatever He shall have willed to command; and about this there is no fear, lest He could command what is useless. Nor can it happen that a man's own will does not fall upon him with the great weight of ruin, if, exalting it, he sets it before the will of the Superior. This man experienced, despising the precept of God, and by this experience learned what lies between good and evil — the good, namely, being obedience; the evil, disobedience, that is, the pride and perverse contumacy of imitating God, and the harmful [exercise] of liberty. Thus Augustine.¹⁰

[...nihil aliud appetitú est nisi non esse] sub dominatione Dei, quando illud admissum est, in quo ne admitteretur sola deberet iussio dominantis attendi, quae si sola attenderetur, quid aliud quàm Dei voluntas amaretur? quid aliud quàm Dei voluntas humanae voluntati praeponeretur? Dominus quidem cur iusserit, viderit: faciendum est à serviente quod iussit, & tunc forte videndum est à promerente cur iusserit. Sed tamen ut causam iussionis huius non diutius requiramus, si haec ipsa magna est utilitas homini, quod Deo servit, iubendo Deus utile facit quicquid iubere voluerit; de quo metuendum non est, ne iubere quod inutile est possit. Nec fieri potest ut voluntas propria non grandi ruina pondere super hominem cadat, si eam voluntati superioris extollendo praeponat. Hoc expertus est homo contemnens praeceptum Dei, & hoc experimento didicit quid interest inter bonum & malum; bonum scilicet obedientia, malum autem inobedientia, id est, superbia & contumacia perversa imitationis Dei, & noxia libertatis. Haec Augustinus.

“It must be known that never through obedience can evil be done, but sometimes the good that is done ought to be intermitted through obedience. For there was not in Paradise an evil tree, which God forbade man to touch; but in order that man, well-founded, might grow through a better merit of obedience, it was fitting that He prohibit him even from a good — to the end that what he did would be so much the more truly a virtue, by as much as, ceasing even from a good, he showed himself more humbly subject to his Author. But it is to be noted what is said there: ‘Of every tree of Paradise eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil touch not.’ For he who forbids his subjects from some one good must of necessity concede many, lest the obedient one's mind perish utterly, if, wholly repelled from all goods, it should fast. But the Lord granted all the trees of Paradise for eating, when He prohibited from one — so that He might so much the more easily restrict His creature (which He did not wish to be extinguished, but advanced) from one, by as much as He relaxed it more widely toward all.” Thus Gregory.¹⁵

Sciendum est quod nunquam per obedientiam malum fieri, aliquando autem debet per obedientiam bonum quod agitur, intermitti. Neque enim mala in Paradiso arbor extitit, quam Deus homini ne contingeret interdixit. Sed ut per melius obedientiae meritum homo bene conditus cresceret, dignum fuerat ut hunc etiam à bono prohiberet: quatenus tanto verius hoc quod ageret virtus esset, quanto & à bono cessans, auctori suo se subditum humilius exhiberet. Sed notandum quod illic dicitur: Ex omni ligno Paradisi comedite; de ligno autem scientiae boni & mali ne tetigeritis. Qui enim ab uno quolibet bono subiectos vetat, necesse est ut multa concedat; ne obedientis mens funditus intereat, si à bonis omnibus penitus repulsa ieiunat. Omnes autem Paradisi arbores ad esum Dominus concessit, cum ab una prohibuit: ut creaturam suam quam nolebat extingui, sed provehi, tanto faciliùs ab una restringeret, quanto ad cunctas latiùs relaxaret. Sic Gregorius.