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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Four — the creation of the first human beings

QUESTION III. Why the precept of not eating from that tree of the knowledge of good and evil was given to Adam

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QUESTION III. Why the precept of not eating from that tree of the knowledge of good and evil was given to Adam.1

QVAESTIO III. Cur datum sit Adamo praeceptum non edendi ex illa arbore scientiae boni & mali.

CVM praeceptum illud datum sit Adae cùm alias ob causas, tum potissimè ad periclitandam explorandámque eius obedientiam; planè conveniens fuit ut id partim difficile observatu esset, partim facile. Difficile quidem, ut idoneam benè merendi de Deo materiam homini praeberet; alioqui nullius laudis & meriti fuisset eius observatio. Facilè verò esse oportuit, quia si nimis fuisset arduum & durum, tristitiam utique ac molestiam attulisset homini: quae res felicitati eius status minimè congruebat. Difficultas autem eius praecepti duabus in rebus posita erat: tum quod erat de non edendo ex illa arbore: vetare autem esum illius arboris, diminuere videbatur ho-[minis libertatem...]
Since that precept was given to Adam both for other causes and, most especially, for the testing and trying of his obedience, it was clearly fitting that it be partly difficult to observe, partly easy. Difficult, indeed, so that it might furnish man suitable matter for meriting well from God; otherwise the observance of it would have been of no praise and no merit. But it had to be easy, because, if it had been too arduous and hard, it would assuredly have brought sadness and trouble to man — a thing which by no means agreed with the happiness of his state. Now the difficulty of that precept was placed in two things: both that it concerned not eating from that tree — and to forbid the eating of that tree seemed to diminish [man's liberty...] [continues]2
[...diminuere videbatur ho]minis libertatem, cùm non quodlibet eorum quae in Paradiso erant comedere liberum ei ac licitum relinqueret: tum quòd quae erant in Paradiso, ea vehementer ad edendum alliciebant ac rapiebant: spectabantur enim cuiusque generis arbores, pulcherrimis & ad vescendum suavissimis onustae fructibus. Triplex item in homine maximè viget cupiditas, una cibi & potus, altera pecuniarum, tertia honorum; quarum prima illa est valde naturalis & penitus infixa homini, primáque [tenet hominem...]
[...seemed to diminish] man's liberty, since it did not leave it free and lawful for him to eat any of the things that were in Paradise; and also because the things that were in Paradise vehemently allured and drew him to eating — for there were to be seen trees of every kind, laden with the most beautiful fruits and the sweetest for eating. Likewise, a threefold desire is most vigorous in man: one of food and drink, the second of money, the third of honors; of which that first is very natural and deeply implanted in man, and first [holds a man...] [continues]3
[...primáque] primáque tenet hominem, & postrema derelinquit, ob idque violentior est ac superatu difficilior. Quocirca etiam daemon tentaturus Dominum nostrum, per hanc cibi cupiditatem primò eum adortus est, Dic, inquit, ut lapides isti panes fiant. Verùm Dominus in ea tentatione diabolum vincens, honorem quem in simili tentatione Adam victus à daemone perdiderat, cumulatissimè homini restituit. Certè posteriores duae cupiditates possunt ab homine removeri, possunt enim sine pecuniis & honoribus, non tamen sine cibo potúque homines vivere. Atque huc facit quod est apud Hieremiá Threnorum cap. 1. Dederunt, ait, pretiosa quaeque pro cibo ad refocillandam animam. Altera eius praecepti difficultas in eo erat, quòd per ipsum vetabatur homini arbor maximè spectabilis visúque pulcherrima, & ad cuius fructum concupiscendum, multis nominibus animus hominis rapiebatur, eóque difficilior esse videbatur eius arboris abstinentia.
[...and first] it holds a man, and last forsakes him, and on that account is more violent and harder to overcome. Wherefore the demon also, about to tempt our Lord, first assailed Him through this desire for food: “Tell,” he said, “these stones to become bread.” But the Lord, conquering the devil in that temptation, most abundantly restored to man the honor which Adam, conquered by the demon in a like temptation, had lost. Certainly the latter two desires can be removed from a man, for men can live without money and honors, yet not without food and drink. And to this pertains what is in Jeremiah's Lamentations, chapter 1: “They gave,” he says, “their precious things for food, to revive the soul.” The other difficulty of that precept was in this, that through it there was forbidden to man a tree most conspicuous and most beautiful to the sight, and to the desiring of whose fruit the mind of man was drawn by many titles; and on that account abstinence from that tree seemed the more difficult.4
CAETERVM, quàm esset alia ratione praeceptum illud leve ac facile, duabus ex rebus iudicari potest. Etenim lex aliqua duas ob causas valdè gravis & difficilis aestimari solet, primò quidem ob nimiam multitudinem ac varietatem eorum quae praecipit facienda, vel fugienda; quamobrem durissima erat lex Mosis, & ut Petrus dixit, tanquam iugú intolerabile, Quid tentatis, inquit, imponere illis iugum, quod neque Patres nostri, neque nos portare potuimus? Deinde, fieri potest, ut quamvis lex unum duntaxat, praeceptum contineat, ea tamen perdifficilis sit ad observandum, quia unum illud quod praecipit, gravissimum sit maximéque onerosum & acerbum, cuiusmodi fuit praeceptum Dei datum Abrahae, quo iubebatur filium suum unigenitum Isaac immolare.
BUT how, in another respect, that precept was light and easy, can be judged from two things. For a law is wont to be esteemed very grave and difficult for two causes: first, indeed, on account of the excessive multitude and variety of the things which it commands to be done or shunned — wherefore the law of Moses was very hard, and, as Peter said, like an intolerable yoke: “Why do you tempt,” he said, “to lay upon them a yoke which neither our Fathers nor we have been able to bear?” Then, it can happen that, although a law contain only one precept, it is nevertheless most difficult to observe, because that one thing which it commands is most grave and most burdensome and bitter — of which kind was the precept of God given to Abraham, by which he was commanded to immolate his only-begotten son Isaac.5
Atqui neutra difficultas erat in eo praecepto quod Adae datum est, neque enim Deus eo praecepto interdixit ipsi esu omnium arborum quae erant in Paradiso, sed unius duntaxat arboris, neque arbor illa erat sola visu pulchra & gustatu suavis, sed erant eius generis complures aliae, nec erat arbor illa omnium praestantissima, siquidem melior illá atque praestantior fuit arbor vitae, vel iam concessa homini vel certè mox concedenda. Levis igitur, ut inquit Rupertus, libro secundo, de operibus Trinitatis, capite 30. in tanta copia fuisset unius arboris continentia, si non defuisset continentia dux benevolentia. Clariùs etiam cernitur levitas & facilitas huius praecepti quod datum est Adae, si tentatio & probatio eius cum tentatione ac probatione vel Abrahae, vel Iob, vel Tobiae, vel plurimorum martyrum comparetur. Quantò autem facilior eius praecepti observatio [fuit...]
But neither difficulty was in that precept which was given to Adam: for God did not, by that precept, forbid him the eating of all the trees that were in Paradise, but of one tree only; nor was that tree the only one beautiful to the sight and sweet to the taste, but there were several others of its kind; nor was that tree the most excellent of all, since better and more excellent than it was the tree of life — whether already granted to man, or certainly soon to be granted. Light, therefore, as Rupert says (in the second book On the Works of the Trinity, chapter 30), in so great an abundance would the abstinence from one tree have been, had not the leader of abstinence — good will — been wanting. More clearly still is seen the lightness and easiness of this precept which was given to Adam, if its temptation and trial be compared with the temptation and trial of Abraham, or of Job, or of Tobias, or of very many martyrs. And by how much the easier the observance of that precept [was...] [continues]6

[...And by how much the easier the observance of that precept] was, by so much was its violation the more inexcusable, and worthy of a graver chastisement and penalty. But these things must be adorned and confirmed by the weightiest words and judgements of Augustine. For he, disputing on this very matter in chapter 15 of the fourteenth book On the City of God, writes thus: “Whoever judges the condemnation of Adam to be measured as either excessive or unjust, surely I know not how great the iniquity was in sinning, where there was so great an easiness of not sinning. For just as to Abraham not un-[deservedly is great obedience ascribed...] [continues]7

[...Quantò autem facilior eius praecepti observatio] fuit, tantò fuit violatio eius inexcusabilior, gravioréque animadversione & supplicio digna. VERUM haec, gravissimis Augustini verbis & sententiis ornanda & comprobanda sunt. Is enim capite 15. libri 14. de Civitate Dei hac ipsa de re disputans, ita scribit, Quisquis damnationem Adae vel nimiam vel iniustam putat metiri, profectò nescio quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando ubi tanta erat non peccandi facilitas. Sicut enim Abrahae non im-[merito magna obedientia praedicatur...]

[...For just as to Abraham not un]deservedly is great obedience ascribed, because, that he might kill his son, a most difficult thing was commanded — so also in Paradise the disobedience was so much the greater, by as much as that which was commanded was of no difficulty. And just as the obedience of the second Man [Christ] was the more praiseworthy in this, that He was made obedient unto death — so the disobedience of the first man was the more detestable in this, that he was made disobedient unto death. For where a great penalty of disobedience is set forth, and an easy thing is commanded by the Creator, who could sufficiently explain how great an evil it is not to obey, in an easy matter, and under the command of so great a Power, and under so great a penalty for earthly creatures?” Thus Augustine.8

[...Sicut enim Abrahae non im]merito magna obedientia praedicatur, quia ut occideret filium res difficillima est imperata: ita & in Paradiso tanto maior inobedientia fuit, quanto id quod praeceptum est, nullius difficultatis fuit. Et sicut obedientia secundi hominis eo praedicabilior fuit, qua factus est obediens usque ad mortem: ita inobedientia primi hominis eo detestabilior fuit, qua factus est inobediens usque ad mortem. Ubi enim magna est inobedientiae poena proposita, & res à Creatore facilis imperata, quisnam satis explicet quantum malum sit non obedire in re facili & tantae potestatis imperio, & tanto terrenis supplicio? Haec Augustinus.

RVPERTVS autem libro secundo, de Trinitate & operibus eius, capite trigesimoprimo, tractans ea ipsa verba de quibus nunc disserimus, Ex omni ligno Paradisi comede, &c. affirmat, Deú his verbis exegisse à primo homine fidem spem & charitatem, quarum trium virtutum possessione, cultu & exercitatione, summa totius humanae perfectionis continetur. Scribit autem hoc modo Rupertus:
Rupert, moreover, in the second book On the Trinity and His Works, chapter thirty-one, treating those very words of which we now discourse — “Of every tree of Paradise eat, etc.” — affirms that God, by these words, exacted from the first man faith, hope, and charity, in the possession, cultivation, and exercise of which three virtues the sum of all human perfection is contained. And Rupert writes in this manner:9

“Of every tree of Paradise eat, etc. Three things the majesty of the Trinity deemed worthy to command: ‘Of every tree eat,’ and ‘of this one eat not,’ and ‘in whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death.’ By these three propositions exacting three virtues from man — that is, charity, hope, and faith — which now, in reciprocal order, the same Trinity, one God, exacts from us — faith, hope, and charity: so that, because he by falling descended, we, rising up from faith, through hope might ascend to the charity of God. For in that He made man freely, and freely nonetheless set him, in that place of pleasure, in that such Paradise flowing with delights, as the future father of the multitude of the saints, He plainly made that same man a debtor of great charity to Himself, and strongly bound him by His benefits. But that man, ungrateful for so great a grace, did not repay the debt of charity — in which the magnitude of the wickedness there is none who can estimate.10

Ex omni, inquit, ligno Paradisi comede, &c. Tria duxit digna imperare maiestas Trinitatis. Ex omni ligno comede, & de hoc ne comedas, & in quocumque die comederis ex eo, morte morieris. His tribus propositionibus tres ab homine virtutes exigens, id est, charitatem spem, & fidem quas nunc reciprocato ordine à nobis exigit eadem Trinitas unus Deus, fidem, spem, & charitatem: ut quia ille cadendo descendit, nos resurgentes à fide, per spem ad caritatem Dei ascendamus. Nam in eo quod hominem gratis fecit, & gratis nihilominus in illo voluptatis loco, in illo tali Paradiso delicijs affluenti, patrem futurum multitudinis sanctorú posuit, plane debitorem magna charitatis eundem sibi effecit hominé, & validè suis beneficiis obligavit. At ille ingratus tanta gratia, debitum charitatis non rependit: in quo magnitudinem nequitiae nullus est qui aestimare possit.

“Likewise, in the precept saying, ‘But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat,’ he ought to have shown signal hope: hope, I say, he ought to have had, and to have hoped from the good of God — that He who had already freely conferred such great goods upon him would assuredly, upon one keeping his subjection and obedience in the precept, confer greater things than He promised, that is, the heavenly Paradise and the society of the holy Angels in due time. But that man, doubtless, did not have the virtue of this hope concerning things to come — because, namely (as has already been said), not having charity, he was first ungrateful for present goods. Likewise, in the threat saying, ‘For in whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death,’ he ought to have had faith: faith, I say, to have and firmly to believe, that God had forbidden such a tree not by envying divinity to man, but had truly foretold the inevitable penalty of transgression. What then, you say? Does not Scripture say, ‘All things whatsoever the Lord willed He made in heaven and on earth’? How, then, did the Lord make all things whatsoever He willed, who could not bring to effect even that which He commanded — which surely, unless He had willed it to be done, He would by no means have commanded? For in that creature of His He did not find faith, hope, and charity according to His precept. To this, I say: the counsel or purpose of God was by no means frustrated; for powerfully He made those virtues bloom again from that trunk: for that man indeed turned out maimed for this work of God, and against the work or precept of God, [proved] incontinent through con-[cupiscence...] [continues]11

Item in praecepto dicétis, De ligno autem scientiae boni & mali ne comodas, spem insignem exhibere debuit: spem, inquam habere, & de bono Dei sperare debuit, quod is qui gratis tanta iam bona sibi cótulerat, profectò subiectionem & obedientiam in praecepto custodienti, maiora qua promittebat, id est, coelestem Paradisum & sanctorum Angelorum societatem quandoque conferret. At ille proculdubio spei huius virtutem non habuit de futuris, quia videlicet (sicut iam dictum est) charitatem non habens, primum ingratus erat praesentibus bonis. Item in cóminatione dicentis, In quocúque enim die comederitis ex eo, morte moriemini, fidem habere debuit: fidem, inquam, habere & firmiter credere, quod non invidendo divinitatem homini Deus tale lignum interdixisset, sed inevitabilem praevaricationis poenam veraciter praenuntiasset. Quid ergo, inquis, nonne Scriptura dicit, Omnia quaecunque voluit Dominus fecit in coelo & in terra? quomodo ergo omnia quaecunque voluit fecit Dominus, qui nec illud quod praecepit, quod utique nisi fieri voluisset, nequaquam praecepisset, ad effectum perducere valuit? Etenim in isto plasmate suo fidem, spem, & caritatem, secundùm praeceptum suum non invenit. Ad haec, inquam, nequaquam frustratum est consilium vel propositum Dei: Valenter enim de trunco illo virtutes illas reflorescere fecit: nam ille quidem ad hoc opus Dei mancus exstitit, & contra opus vel praeceptum Dei minus incontinentes per concupi-[scentiam...]

[...being incontinent, he stretched out his hands through con]cupiscence; but there was found, of his race, a man according to the heart of God, who stretched out hands restrained from all concupiscence to a penal obedience for Himself upon the wood of the cross, and, with sin trampled beneath His feet, set Himself before many thousands of His followers as examples of virtue to be read. Thus Rupert.12

[...minus incontinentes per concupi]scentiam extendit: sed inventus est de genere eius homo secundùm cor Dei, qui contentas ab omni concupiscentia manus ad poenalem sibi obedientiam in ligno crucis extendit, & sub pedibus suis conculcato peccato, legenda virtutis exempla multis millibus sequentium se proposuit. Haec Rupertus.

Translator’s notes

  1. Third question of the disputation (rule above). Its focus, as the body shows, is the manner of the precept — why it was made partly hard and partly easy to keep. ↩
  2. Large decorated initial 'C'. The precept was fittingly part-hard (for merit), part-easy (suited to bliss). Its two difficulties: it curbed liberty, and it forbade an alluring tree. ↩
  3. The second difficulty (alluring fruit), and the three great human desires (food, money, honor) — the first (food) the most natural. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'primáque.' ↩
  4. The desire for food is the deepest and most violent (the demon tempted Christ through it, Matt 4:3; Lam 1:11); the second difficulty: the forbidden tree was beautiful and alluring. Marginal gloss: 'Matthaei 4.' ↩
  5. A law is hard either by its multitude (the Mosaic 'yoke,' Acts 15:10) or by the severity of a single command (Abraham and Isaac, Gen 22). Marginal glosses: 'Difficultas legis, duabus ex rebus oritur'; 'Actorum 15.' ↩
  6. Adam's precept had neither difficulty: only one tree (not the best — the tree of life was greater); cf. the far harder trials of Abraham, Job, Tobias, the martyrs (Rupert, de op. Trin. 2.30). Marginal gloss: 'Facilitas praecepti quod datum est Adamo.' ↩
  7. The easier the precept, the more inexcusable the sin. Opens the Augustine block-quote (Civ. Dei 14.15), which continues onto PDF 490. Marginal gloss: 'Praeclara B. Augustini sententia.' Sentence breaks at the catchword 'merito.' ↩
  8. Conclusion of the Augustine block-quote (Civ. Dei 14.15, 'Haec Augustinus'): Adam's disobedience was as detestable (in an easy command) as Abraham's obedience (in a hard one) was praiseworthy; cf. Christ 'obedient unto death' (Phil 2:8). ↩
  9. Introduces the Rupert block-quote (de Trin. et operibus eius 2.31): the threefold precept of Gen 2:16-17 exacted the three theological virtues. ↩
  10. Rupert, continued: the three clauses of the precept correspond to charity ('of every tree eat'), hope ('of this eat not'), and faith ('you shall die'); man owed charity for God's free gifts but proved ungrateful. ↩
  11. Rupert, continued (block-quote runs onto PDF 491): the prohibition called for hope, the threat for faith; Adam failed in all three. The objection from Ps 135:6 ('all the Lord willed He made') answered: God's purpose was not frustrated — the virtues bloomed again 'from that trunk' (in Christ/the saints). Page ends at the catchword 'scentiam' (signature LL). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 491, '...per concupi[scentiam]...'. ↩
  12. Conclusion of the Rupert block-quote (de Trin. et op. 2.31, 'Haec Rupertus') begun on PDF 490: Adam stretched out his hands in concupiscence; Christ, 'the man after God's heart,' stretched His out in obedience on the cross. ↩