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QUESTION IV. Why God enjoined that precept upon Adam, which He certainly knew would be violated by him, and whose violation would be calamitous and pernicious not only to him, but also to all his posterity.1
QVAESTIO IIII. Cur Deus praeceptum illud iniunxerit Adamo, quod certò sciebat fore, ut ab eo violaretur, eiúsque praecepti violationem fore non tantùm ipsi verùm etiam toti eius posteritati calamitosam atque perniciosam.
RESPONDEO, fuisse conveniens ut Deus ageret cum homine; non secundùm futurum eius statum, neque secundùm id quod ille posteà facturus erat, sed secundùm praesentem statum in quo eum creaverat: cui statui maximè consentaneum erat, ut Adam inde ab exordio suae creationis usque, lege aliqua obligaretur & astringeretur obsequio Dei, ob eas causas quas suprà quaestione secunda exposuimus. Nec verò, quòd eam legem violaturus erat Adam, propterea non fuit ea lex ferenda: isto enim modo nulla lex hominibus ferenda esset, siquidem paucissimi sunt qui leges custodiant, praesertim verò cum Deus non eo consilio dederit illam legem, ut Adamus eam non custodiret, nec talem fecerit eum ut non potuerit eam legem servare, quia fecit eum liberi arbitrij, ad bonum malumque iuxta flexibilis, & in cuius potestate esset legem servare vel non servare. Quinimo fecit eum rectum, nulláque ad malum propensione, cumulavit eum praeterea abundanti excellentíque gratia per quam facillimum ei iucundissimúmque fuisset quodcunque bonum agere aut malum evitare: & quamlibet legem custodire, praesertim illam quam acceperat, levissimam nempe atque observatu facillimam.
I RESPOND that it was fitting for God to deal with man not according to his future state, nor according to what he was afterward going to do, but according to the present state in which He had created him — to which state it was most consonant that Adam, from the very beginning of his creation onward, should be bound and constrained by some law to the obedience of God, for those causes which we expounded above, in the second question. Nor indeed, because Adam was going to violate that law, was the law for that reason not to be borne: for in that manner no law would be to be borne to men, since very few are those who keep the laws — and especially since God did not give that law with the intention that Adam should not keep it, nor did He make him such that he could not keep that law, because He made him of free will, flexible alike to good and to evil, and in whose power it was to keep the law or not to keep it. Nay rather, He made him upright, with no propensity to evil; and He heaped upon him, besides, an abundant and excellent grace, through which it would have been most easy and most pleasant for him to do any good whatsoever or to avoid any evil — and to keep any law, especially that one which he had received, the lightest, namely, and easiest to observe.2
Ad haec, licèt Deus praeviderat peccatum Adae, attamen simul etiam constituerat peccatum illud ad magnum & multiplex bonum convertere, ex eóque innumerabiles atque incomparabiles utilitates elicere. Nam ut de aliis bonis taceam, illud quanti debet aestimari, voluisse Deum, ut ad peccatum Adami eluendum ac delendum Filius suus humana indutus carne in terris videretur, & cum hominibus conversaretur, ac sui sanguinis & vitae profusione omnia peccati Adae damna cumulatissimè compensaret: ad maiorem gratiam & felicitatem provehens hominem, quàm fuerat ea cum qua creatus à Deo fuerat, & quam peccando perdiderat: ut quodammodo dicere liceat peccatum Adae magno nobis lucro [fuisse...]
Besides this, although God had foreseen the sin of Adam, He had nevertheless at the same time also determined to turn that sin to a great and manifold good, and from it to elicit innumerable and incomparable benefits. For — to say nothing of the other goods — how greatly ought this to be esteemed: that God willed that, for the washing away and blotting out of Adam's sin, His Son, clothed in human flesh, should be seen upon earth and converse with men, and by the pouring out of His blood and life should most abundantly compensate all the harms of Adam's sin — advancing man to a greater grace and happiness than that with which he had been created by God, and which he had lost by sinning: so that in a certain way it may be said that the sin of Adam was [a great gain to us...] [continues]3
[...peccatum Adae magno nobis lucro] fuisse, meritóque Gregorius exclamaverit, O felix culpa quae talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptoré. Adiice, quòd occasione peccati Adae factum est, ut complures maximéque nobiles virtutes in hominibus excellerent, quae in statu innocentiae non enituissent: veluti est fortitudo, patientia, amor erga inimicos, misericordia, abstinentia, virginitatis & martyrij palma: nec tam multiplex decor atque ornatus Ecclesiae fuisset: nec fuissent sacramenta quae nunc habemus, maximè verò divinissimum Eucharistiae Sacramentum.
[...that the sin of Adam was] a great gain to us, and that Gregory deservedly exclaimed, “O happy fault, which merited to have so great and so good a Redeemer!” Add, that by the occasion of Adam's sin it came about that several and most noble virtues excelled in men, which in the state of innocence would not have shone forth — such as fortitude, patience, love toward enemies, mercy, abstinence, the palm of virginity and of martyrdom; nor would the manifold beauty and adornment of the Church have been so great; nor would there have been the sacraments which we now have — and most especially the most divine Sacrament of the Eucharist.4
ILLVD autem hoc loco advertere lectorem volumus, in evitandis seu impediendis malis futuris, non esse parem aut similem rationem Dei atque hominum: quòd homines legibus astricti & subiecti sint, Deus verò supra & extra legem omnem sit positus. Duo enim facit Deus, & bene quidem facit: quae si faceret homo malè profectò faceret: mala enim Deus sinit fieri, quae si vellet ne fierent, facillimè posset impedire: quemadmodum Angelorum lapsum impedire potuisset, si dedisset eis gratiam efficacem, talem, inquam, ut per eam in amore & obedientia Dei omnino perseverarent. Multa etiam facit Deus ex quibus ipse certò scit, mala quaedam consecutura, & complures inde capturos occasionem deterius agendi: cuius generis fuere miracula in Aegypto facta coram Pharaone Aegyptiis, quibus illi vehementius in odio Haebreorum & cótumacia adversus Deum obfirmati & obdurati sunt. Creat item Deus quotidiè quamplurimas animas rationales, quas scit aeternis suppliciis damnatum iri: fert leges [quarum occasione permultos sceleratiores fore novit...]
But we wish the reader to note here, that in the avoiding or impeding of future evils, the reckoning of God and of men is not equal or alike — because men are bound and subject to laws, but God is set above and outside every law. For God does two things, and indeed does them well, which, if a man did them, he would assuredly do badly. For God allows evils to happen, which, if He willed them not to happen, He could most easily impede — just as He could have impeded the fall of the Angels, had He given them efficacious grace, such, I say, as that through it they would altogether have persevered in the love and obedience of God. God also does many things from which He Himself certainly knows that certain evils will follow, and that many will take from them the occasion of acting worse — of which kind were the miracles done in Egypt before Pharaoh and the Egyptians, by which they were the more vehemently hardened and obdurate in hatred of the Hebrews and in contumacy against God. God likewise creates daily very many rational souls which He knows will be condemned to eternal punishments; He bears laws [by occasion of which He knows that very many will become more wicked...] [continues]5
[...fert leges quarum occasione permultos sceleratiores fore novit], quàm si leges illae non fuissent latae. Id quod duabus ex causis accidit: tum quòd ipsa legis prohibitio ardentiorem excitat rei vetitae cupiditatem: scitum enim & verum est illud, Nitimur in vetitum semper, cupimúsque negata. & Paulus ad Romanos 7. Occasione, inquit, accepta peccatú per mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam: tum quòd quaedam ante datam legem vel non erant peccata, vel non tam gravia quàm sunt posteà, vel non ut talia cognoscebantur: Peccatum enim, inquit, Paulus, non cognovi, nisi per legem: lata verò lege, quod nó erat anteà peccatum fit peccatum quia lege vetitum est, & quod erat peccatum fit gravius accedente praevaricatione legis, & agente homine non modò quod per se malum est, verùm etiam quod novit ipse malum esse, id est, contra conscientiam suam peccante.
[...He bears laws by occasion of which He knows that very many will become more wicked] than if those laws had not been borne. Which happens for two causes: both because the prohibition of the law itself excites a more ardent desire of the forbidden thing — for that is well-known and true: “We always strive toward the forbidden, and desire the things denied”; and Paul, to the Romans 7: “Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all concupiscence”; and also because certain things, before the law was given, either were not sins, or not so grave as they are afterward, or were not recognized as such: “For I did not know sin,” says Paul, “except through the law.” But the law being given, what was not before a sin becomes a sin because it is forbidden by the law; and what was a sin becomes graver, with the transgression of the law added, and with man doing not only what is evil in itself, but also what he himself knows to be evil — that is, sinning against his own conscience.6
ILLA igitur duo facit Deus non tantùm non malè, sed etiam rectissimè, iustissimè, ac sapientissimè. Etenim non convenit, Deum prohibere atque impedire ne ullum malum fiat: quinimo decet ordinatissimam eius providentiam, ut res quas ipse condidit, convenienter naturis ipsarum operari sinat: res nempe necessarias necessariò, contingentes contingenter, liberas liberè. Verè enim dictum est ab Augustino, in capite 30. libri septimi, de Civitate dei, Deum quaecumque creavit sic administrare, ut suos exercere & agere motus sinat. Cum igitur, [naturam rationalem fecerit...]
Those two things, therefore, God does not only not badly, but most rightly, most justly, and most wisely. For it is not fitting that God should prohibit and impede that no evil happen at all; nay rather, it befits His most ordered providence that the things which He Himself founded He should allow to operate suitably to their own natures — namely, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, free things freely. For it is truly said by Augustine, in chapter 30 of the seventh book On the City of God, that God so administers whatever He created, that He allows them to exercise and to carry out their own motions. Since, therefore, [He made the rational nature...] [continues]7
[...Cum igitur naturam] rationalem fecerit praeditá libero arbitrio, quod ad bonum malumáque iuxta flexibile est, conveniens fuit ut eam agere sineret prout ipsa vellet, adiuvando quidem eam ad bonum faciendum, non tamen ad malum impellendo. Si enim Deus nihil mali sineret fieri ubi eluceret clementia eius in condonandis peccatis? ubi misericordia in sublevandis malis? ubi iustitia in sceleribus vindicandis? ubi tantus in hac rerum universitate, praesertim verò in rebus humanis decor & ornatus eniteret? Neque verò propterea decet aliquid non fieri à Deo, quod eius occasione nonnulli deteriores futuri sint, cùm ea facillimum sit ut occasio illa non sit data, sed accepta: nec proveniat ex consilio propositóque & culpa facientis, sed ex pravo perversóque animo abutentis, alioqui nullam hominibus legem dari oporteret, quippe cùm ea plerique homines abutantur: nulla instituenda fuissent Sacramenta, nec Filius Dei incarnandus, nec mittendus ad Iudaeos fuisset: nec mortem pro redemptione hominum subire debuisset. Patet igitur non ideo fuisse conveniens ut Deus praeceptum illud Adamo non daret, quod ab eo violatum iri praenovisset.
[...Since, therefore,] He made the rational nature endowed with free will, which is flexible alike to good and to evil, it was fitting that He allow it to act as it itself willed — helping it, indeed, to do good, yet not impelling it to evil. For if God allowed no evil to happen, where would His clemency shine forth, in forgiving sins? where His mercy, in relieving evils? where His justice, in avenging crimes? where would so great a beauty and adornment shine, in this universe of things, and especially in human affairs? Nor indeed is it fitting that anything should not be done by God because, by its occasion, some are going to become worse — since it is most easy that that occasion be not given, but taken, and arise not from the counsel and purpose and fault of the one acting, but from the depraved and perverse mind of the one abusing it; otherwise no law would have to be given to men, since most men abuse it: no Sacraments would have had to be instituted, nor would the Son of God have had to be incarnate, nor sent to the Jews, nor have had to undergo death for the redemption of men. It is clear, therefore, that it was not on that account fitting for God not to give that precept to Adam, because He had foreknown that it would be violated by him.8
Translator’s notes
- Fourth question of the disputation (rule above). ↩
- Large decorated initial 'R'. God dealt with man as then he was (upright, free, graced) — the law fittingly given though foreknown to be broken (else no law could ever be given; Adam was made able to keep it). ↩
- God ordained the foreseen sin to a greater good: the Incarnation and Redemption, raising man higher than his original state (the 'felix culpa' theme; completed on PDF 492). Sentence breaks at the catchword 'fuisse.' ↩
- The 'felix culpa' ('O happy fault...', from the Easter Exsultet, ascribed to Gregory): the Fall occasioned the heroic virtues, the Church's beauty, and the sacraments (above all the Eucharist). ↩
- God's 'reckoning' differs from man's: He rightly permits foreseen evils — the angels' fall (withholding efficacious grace), Pharaoh's hardening at the miracles, creating souls He foresees damned, bearing laws that occasion more sin. Marginal gloss: 'Non esse similem Dei atque hominum rationem in prohibendis, impediendisve malis futuris.' ↩
- Why law occasions more sin: the prohibition inflames desire (Ovid, Amores 3.4.17; Rom 7:8), and the law makes the act formally sinful and graver (against conscience; Rom 7:7). ↩
- God's providence lets each nature act per its kind — necessary necessarily, contingent contingently, free freely (Augustine, Civ. Dei 7.30). Sentence breaks at the catchword 'naturam.' ↩
- God lets the free nature act as it wills; without permitted evil there would be no place for clemency, mercy, justice, or the world's moral beauty. The occasion of sin is 'taken,' not given — else no law, sacraments, or Redemption. Conclusion: God rightly gave the precept though foreknowing its violation. ↩