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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Five — the state of innocence

QUESTION I. Whether, as soon as he was created, Adam had knowledge of all things

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QUESTION I. Whether, as soon as he was created, Adam had knowledge of all things.1

QUAESTIO I. An statim ut creatus est Adam habuerit scientiam omnium rerum.

Quantum ad primam quaestionem, videtur non ita simul ut creatus est Adam habuisse scientiam. Nam vel ea scientia fuisset acquisita, vel ingenerata et naturalis ei, vel infusa: sed nec tempus ei fuit acquirendi omnes scientias et experiendi res omnes; et quod est naturale inest in omnibus quae sunt eiusdem speciei: ceterorum autem omnium animi creantur a Deo nudi omni scientia, ita ut ignorantia magis homini naturalis quam scientia esse videatur. Si autem infusam habuit scientiam, non igitur ea fuit eiusdem speciei atque est aliorum hominum scientia. Adiice quod eorum omnium quae in eadem specie continentur eadem ratio est consequendi suam perfectionem: cum ergo ceteri homines scientiam rerum naturalium non singulari aliquo Dei munere et inspiratione, sed proprio studio et opera consequantur, idem quoque accidisse Adamo existimare convenit.
As to the first question, it seems that Adam did not have knowledge as soon as he was created. For that knowledge would have been either acquired, or innate and natural to him, or infused: but neither was there time for him to acquire all the sciences and to experience all things; and what is natural is present in all things that are of the same species: but the souls of all the rest are created by God bare of all knowledge, so that ignorance seems more natural to man than knowledge. But if he had infused knowledge, then it was not of the same species as is the knowledge of other men. Add that, of all things contained under the same species, there is one and the same manner of attaining their perfection: since therefore other men attain knowledge of natural things not by any singular gift and inspiration of God, but by their own study and effort, it is fitting to suppose that the same befell Adam.2
Verum certa et indubitata Theologorum sententia est, Adamum omni scientia rerum naturalium a suo usque ortu fuisse praeditum. Lege Magistrum Sententiarum, lib. 2. dist. 23., et super eandem dist. Scholasticos, praesertim vero Bonaventuram, art. 2. quaest. 1. et 2., etiam Thomam 1. p. quaest. 94., necnon et Hugonem S. Victoris, lib. 1. de Sacramentis, part. 6. cap. 12. Id autem supra ostendimus divinae Scripturae testimoniis, tum ex hoc loco Mosis, tum ex cap. 17. libri Ecclesiastici, tum ex libri Ecclesiastae cap. 7. expromptis. Hoc ipsum praeterea...
But it is the certain and undoubted opinion of the Theologians that Adam was, from his very origin, endowed with all knowledge of natural things. Read the Master of the Sentences, book 2, distinction 23, and on the same distinction the Scholastics, but especially Bonaventure, article 2, questions 1 and 2; also Thomas, part 1, question 94; and likewise Hugh of St. Victor, book 1 of On the Sacraments, part 6, chapter 12. This we showed above by the testimonies of divine Scripture, drawn both from this passage of Moses, and from chapter 17 of the book of Ecclesiasticus, and from chapter 7 of the book of Ecclesiastes. This same thing, moreover...3
...praeterea quatuor rationibus ex Patrum et Theologorum doctrina expressis confirmare possumus. Prima ratio: Deus in exordio mundi animalia omnia creavit in suo quaeque genere perfecta, tam secundum perfectiones specificas quam individuales, id est, secundum magnitudinem et robur corporis, secundum potentiam generandi, denique secundum potentiam exequendi et perficiendi omnes actiones naturales: ergo similiter Adamum secundum easdem res perfectum condidit. Quemadmodum igitur Adam creatus est perfecto corpore, videlicet quantum ad integritatem aetatis, proceritatem staturae, robur et firmitatem virium, et potentiam generandi alios; ita credendum est factum esse eum animo menteque perfectum, sed naturalis perfectio mentis scientia est, hanc igitur habuit Adam ab initio, praesertim vero cum quae a Deo proxime efficiuntur ea sint perfectissima; Adamum vero totum solus Deus, nullius causae efficientis concursu, tam secundum corpus quam secundum animam creavit: utraque igitur parte perfectissimus a Deo creatus est: non fuisset autem perfectus si praecipua ei perfectio naturalis defuisset.
...we can confirm, moreover, by four reasons drawn from the doctrine of the Fathers and the Theologians. First reason: God, at the beginning of the world, created all the animals each perfect in its own kind, both according to specific and according to individual perfections, that is, according to the size and strength of body, according to the power of generating, and finally according to the power of carrying out and completing all natural actions: therefore likewise he founded Adam perfect according to the same things. As, therefore, Adam was created with a perfect body—namely as to the fullness of age, tallness of stature, vigor and firmness of strength, and the power of generating others—so it is to be believed that he was made perfect in soul and mind; but the natural perfection of the mind is knowledge, this therefore Adam had from the beginning, especially since the things that are produced immediately by God are most perfect; and Adam as a whole God alone created, with the concurrence of no efficient cause, both according to body and according to soul: in both parts, therefore, he was created by God most perfect: but he would not have been perfect if the chief natural perfection had been lacking to him.4
Altera ratio: Quoniam Adam humani generis secundum carnalem generationem sator et parens futurus erat, idcirco creari eum oportuit aetate perfecta et ad generandum idonea; cum idem futurus esset primus doctor rectorque hominum, conveniens profecto fuit praeditum creari eum perfecta facultate docendi et regendi alios homines: id autem sine scientia praestari non potest. Namque, ut scribit Aristoteles in primo et secundo libro Metaphysicorum, signum scientis est posse alios docere, et quod est causa cur alia sint talia, ipsum maxime tale esse necesse est.
Second reason: Since Adam was to be the sower and parent of the human race according to carnal generation, for that reason it was fitting that he be created at a perfect age and suited for generating; and since the same man was to be the first teacher and ruler of men, it was assuredly fitting that he be created endowed with the perfect faculty of teaching and governing other men: but that cannot be furnished without knowledge. For, as Aristotle writes in the first and second books of the Metaphysics, the sign of one who knows is to be able to teach others, and what is the cause why other things are such, must itself most of all be such.5
Tertia ratio: Si Adam creatus esset sine scientia, eamque paulatim studio et opera comparare sibi debuisset, longo tempore in veritatis ignoratione versatus esset: ignorantia autem veritatis et inscitia rerum quae patent sensibus admodum molesta et acerba fuisset homini sciendi cupidissimo: atqui nihil molesti vel acerbi in eo statu vel animo vel corpori accidisset: non igitur ignorans et inscius creatus est Adam. Etenim, si diu ille fuisset ignorans, facile fuisset propter veritatis et rerum ignorationem falsis eum assentiri opinionibus, et in absurdos errores prolabi; videlicet approbare falsa pro veris, aut vera pro falsis reprobare, quod, ut praeclare dixit Augustinus, non est natura hominis conditi, sed poena damnati. Quarta ratio: Si Deus talem creavit hominem, ut summa tranquillitate animi ac iucunditate, omnique tristitia et dolore vacuus quietam et beatam vitam ageret, eique ad esum corporalem tantam optimorum ciborum copiam comparavit; consentaneum profecto fuit ita creari hominem a Deo, ut ne propter ignorantiam rerum afficeretur tristitia, et careret suavissima voluptate quae ex rerum scientia percipitur, quarum contemplatione velut dulcissimo mentis pabulo animus noster pascitur, et alitur ad aeternitatem. Quod si Adam simul atque creatus est, omnes et corporis et animi alentis atque sen-
Third reason: If Adam had been created without knowledge, and had had to procure it for himself gradually by study and effort, he would have spent a long time in ignorance of the truth: but ignorance of the truth and unacquaintance with the things that lie open to the senses would have been exceedingly troublesome and bitter to a man most eager to know: yet nothing troublesome or bitter would have befallen, in that state, either his soul or his body: therefore Adam was not created ignorant and unknowing. For indeed, if he had long been ignorant, it would have been easy, on account of his ignorance of the truth and of things, for him to assent to false opinions and to slip into absurd errors; namely, to approve false things as true, or to reject true things as false—which, as Augustine excellently said, is not the nature of man as created, but the penalty of man condemned. Fourth reason: If God created man such that, with the utmost tranquillity and pleasantness of soul, and free from all sadness and pain, he might lead a quiet and blessed life, and provided for him so great an abundance of the best foods for bodily nourishment; it was assuredly consistent that man be so created by God that he should not, on account of ignorance of things, be afflicted with sadness, and lack the sweetest delight which is derived from the knowledge of things—by whose contemplation, as by the sweetest food of the mind, our soul is fed and is nourished unto eternity. But if Adam, as soon as he was created, [had] all the faculties both of the body and of the nourishing and per-6
...tientis facultates perfecte obire et explere poterat, quis dubitet eum quoque functiones mentis, cognoscendis et contemplandis rebus omnibus, excellenter ab initio exercere potuisse?
...he could perfectly fulfill and discharge the faculties [of the nourishing and perceiving soul], who would doubt that he was also able, from the beginning, excellently to exercise the functions of the mind in knowing and contemplating all things?7
Sed roget aliquis, an illa scientia rerum naturalium quam Adam habuit infusam, specie differret a scientia earundem rerum quam ceteri homines habent proprio studio acquisitam? Huic ego responderim non fuisse diversam specie: erat enim scientia humana, id est, naturalis perfectio hominis, agentis etiam tunc vitam animalem. Erat quidem illa infusa scientia, sed per accidens, nam per se debebat esse acquisita: sed quia Adam fuit primus homo futurusque aliorum hominum doctor, necesse fuit ipsum statim esse perfectum secundum scientiam: et quia non potuit eam perfectionem statim habere per acquisitionem, necesse fuit habere eam per infusionem. Sicut igitur Adam, licet longe aliter procreatus esset a Deo quam ceteri omnes generantur, non idcirco tamen specie differebat ab aliis hominibus, ita scientia eius infusa non erat diversae speciei atque scientia aliorum hominum acquisita.
But someone may ask whether that knowledge of natural things which Adam had infused differed in species from the knowledge of those same things which other men have, acquired by their own study. To this I would reply that it did not differ in species: for it was human knowledge, that is, the natural perfection of man, who even then was living an animal life. That knowledge was indeed infused, but accidentally so, for of itself it ought to have been acquired: but because Adam was the first man and was to be the teacher of other men, it was necessary that he be at once perfect in knowledge; and because he could not have that perfection at once by acquisition, it was necessary that he have it by infusion. Just as, therefore, Adam—although he was procreated by God in a far different way than all the rest are generated—did not on that account differ in species from other men, so his infused knowledge was not of a different species than the acquired knowledge of other men.8
Certe, ut B. Thomas non uno loco philosophari solet, in quo magistrum suum Aristotelem sequitur, simpliciter et absolute prius est perfectum quam imperfectum, et actus prior est potentia: quia nec imperfectum ad perfectionem, neque quod est potentia perduci ad actum potest, nisi ab eo quod sit perfectum et actu existat. Cogitandum igitur est Adami scientiam ita se habuisse, ut se habet scientia acquisita in eo homine qui eam perfecte tenet et possidet. Habebat enim Adam in intellectu species intelligibiles omnium universalium et specierum naturalium scibilium sic expressas, sic inter se dispositas et ordinatas, ut propria cuiusque scibilis ratio exigit. At vero, quia dum animus est in hoc mortali corpore, non potest perficere actum sciendi et intelligendi sine respectu et conversione sui ad phantasmata, propterea Adam praeter species intelligibiles rerum universalium intellectui suo a Deo impressas, habebat expressa phantasmata proprie ac distincte repraesentantia individua cuiuslibet speciei, ut in eis mens, quae ad naturam eius speciei pertinebant, scrutari et contemplari sine errore posset.
Certainly, as the Blessed Thomas is wont to philosophize in more than one place, wherein he follows his master Aristotle: simply and absolutely the perfect is prior to the imperfect, and act is prior to potency: because neither can the imperfect [be brought] to perfection, nor can what is in potency be brought to act, except by that which is perfect and exists in act. It must therefore be thought that Adam's knowledge was such as acquired knowledge is in a man who perfectly holds and possesses it. For Adam had in his intellect the intelligible species of all universals and of the natural knowable species, so expressed, and so arranged and ordered among themselves, as the proper character of each knowable demands. But since, while the soul is in this mortal body, it cannot complete the act of knowing and understanding without regard and conversion of itself to phantasms, therefore Adam, besides the intelligible species of universal things impressed on his intellect by God, had also expressed phantasms properly and distinctly representing the individuals of each species, so that in them his mind could examine and contemplate, without error, the things that pertained to the nature of that species.9

Translator’s notes

  1. Question divider opening the first of the five questions. ↩
  2. The 'videtur' arguments (objections) holding that Adam did not have knowledge at his creation—the threefold disjunction acquired/innate/infused. ↩
  3. The determinatio (the affirmative answer). References: Peter Lombard, Sentences II d.23; Bonaventure; Aquinas, ST I q.94; Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis I.6.12; Sirach (Ecclesiasticus) 17; Ecclesiastes 7. Sentence continues onto next page (catchword 'praeterea'). ↩
  4. Marginal gloss: 'Auctor quatuor rationibus probat Adamum creatum esse in scientia perfectum' (the author proves by four reasons that Adam was created perfect in knowledge). Prima ratio: argument from the perfection of God's immediate creation. ↩
  5. Altera ratio: argument from Adam's role as first parent, teacher, and ruler. Aristotle, Metaphysics I-II (the mark of knowledge is the ability to teach; cf. Metaph. A.1-2, alpha minor). ↩
  6. Tertia and Quarta rationes. Augustine: 'non est natura hominis conditi, sed poena damnati' (it is not the nature of man as created, but the penalty of the condemned). Colophon/signature at foot: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with gathering signature 'XX'. Sentence continues onto next page (catchword 'tientis', i.e. ...alentis atque sentientis facultates...). ↩
  7. Completes the Quarta ratio sentence carried over from p.529 (catchword 'tientis'): if Adam's lower faculties were perfect, so too his mind. ↩
  8. Marginal gloss: 'An scientia Adami specie differebat a nostra' (whether Adam's knowledge differed in species from ours). Answer: no—infused only 'per accidens' because he had no time to acquire it. ↩
  9. Aquinas/Aristotle: act is prior to potency, the perfect to the imperfect (cf. Metaph. IX; ST I q.94). Scholastic account of Adam's knowledge: infused intelligible species plus distinct phantasms (the mind needing 'conversio ad phantasmata'). ↩