Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Five — the state of innocence

QUESTION II. How great was the knowledge of Adam

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QUESTION II. How great was the knowledge of Adam.1

QUAESTIO II. Quanta fuerit scientia Adami.

Altera quaestio est, quantam habuerit Adam scientiam, hoc est, utrum ab initio tenuerit scientiam rerum omnium quae naturali via et ratione cognosci et sciri ab homine possunt. Sine causa Caietanus, locum Mosis de impositione nominum ab Adamo facta explanans, arbitratus est Adamum habuisse scientiam omnium rerum corporalium, praeter elementa tamen, et coelos, et sydera: nam cum haec sint principes mundi partes, e quibus hic mundus coagmentatus et integratus constat, eorum perfe-...
The second question is, how great a knowledge Adam had—that is, whether from the beginning he held the knowledge of all things that can be known and understood by man by the natural way and reasoning. Without cause Cajetan, in explaining the passage of Moses about the imposition of names by Adam, judged that Adam had knowledge of all bodily things, except, however, the elements, and the heavens, and the stars: for since these are the principal parts of the world, out of which this world is compacted and made whole, their perfe-...2

...perfect knowledge is reserved to God alone, who, as David sang in Psalm 146, ‘numbers the multitude of the stars, and calls them all by their names’: and for that reason Moses did not say that Adam imposed names on all things, but only on the flying and land animals. I wish the reader to recognize this opinion of Cajetan from his own words. Thus Cajetan writes in that place: ‘And Moses said this, not only to show that there was in Adam a perfect knowledge of animals, but to mark the difference of the stars, whose names are reserved to God; according to that text, “He numbers the multitude of the stars, and calls them all by their names”; and to mark the difference of the heavens before the rest, and of the earth and sea, which were written above to have received their names from God. So that we may understand from these things that perfect knowledge of all bodily things was not communicated to Adam: whence it is the more significantly added that Adam imposed names only on the animals. But it is reasonable to understand that the knowledge of fishes and plants was also communicated to the first man, since it is of the same character that the knowledge of land and flying animals be communicated, and the knowledge of fishes and plants. Indeed, since in the greater the less is included, and land and flying creatures are more perfect than fishes and plants, when the knowledge of the more perfect is communicated, the knowledge of the less perfect is thereby implied as communicated too. Nor is it the same with the heavens and the earth, since the perfect knowledge of these pertains to the perfect knowledge of the whole Universe: for these are the first principles of the Universe, and therefore they were deservedly reserved to the divine naming, together with the seas, of which also the knowledge was never perfectly had by man.’ Thus Cajetan.3

...perfecta cognitio reservata est soli Deo, qui, ut cecinit David Psalmo 146, numerat multitudinem stellarum, et omnibus eis nomina vocat: atque ob eam causam Moses non omnibus rebus dixit Adamum imposuisse nomina, sed volatilibus modo et terrestribus animantibus. Volo ut hanc Caietani sententiam ex propriis eius verbis lector agnoscat. Sic autem eo loci scribit Caietanus: Et dixit hoc Moses, non solum ut ostenderet perfectam notitiam animalium fuisse in Adamo, sed ad differentiam astrorum, quorum nomina reservata sunt Deo; iuxta illud: Qui numerat multitudinem stellarum, et omnibus eis nomina vocat; et ad differentiam coelorum prius quam reliquorum, et terrae ac maris, quae a Deo nomina sortita fuisse scriptum est superius. Ut ex his intelligamus Adam non fuisse communicatam scientiam perfectam omnium corporalium: unde et significatius subditur, Adam nomina imposuisse tantum animalibus. Rationabile autem est communicatam quoque intelligi primo homini scientiam piscium et vegetabilium, siquidem eiusdem rationis est communicari scientiam animalium terrestrium et volatilium atque scientiam piscium et vegetabilium. Immo cum in maiori claudatur minus, et terrestria atque volatilia perfectiora sint piscibus et vegetabilibus, communicata scientia perfectiorum, communicata quoque insinuatur scientia imperfectiorum. Nec est simile de coelis et terra, quoniam horum perfecta notitia ad totius Universi perfectam notitiam spectat: sunt enim haec prima Universi principia, et propterea merito divinae nominationi reservata sunt simul cum maribus, quorum etiam notitia nunquam perfecte habita est ab homine. Haec Caietanus.

Sed nec Caietani vera est opinio, et ratio qua ea nititur et fulcitur infirmissima est. Adamum enim rerum omnium etiam coelestium tenuisse scientiam, tam facile et promptum est ostendere et probare, ut non satis mirari queam id Caietano, viro scilicet acuto et docto, non fuisse cognitum ac persuasum. Principio, quibus rationibus in antecedentis quaestionis tractatione ostensum est fuisse ab initio scientiam in Adamo, iisdem plane concluditur fuisse in eo perfectam scientiam, id est, omnium rerum quae ab homine naturaliter scientia comprehendi possunt. Deinde, concors est Patrum et Theologorum sententia, Adamum creatum esse a Deo virum tam animo quam corpore perfectum: animi autem perfectio, quantum ad mentem et rationem, scientia est: huius autem primas partes tenet scientia rerum coelestium: ea namque natura sua nobilissima est omnium, et votis hominum optatissima, quin etiam possessione et usu pretiosissima, utilissima, et iucundissima: qui fit igitur credibile, ceterarum rerum cognitione Adamo concessa, hanc unam coelestium rerum scientiam non ei fuisse a Deo tributam? Ad haec, in rebus coelestibus, praeter alias res omnes naturales, clarissima elucent Dei sapientiae et providentiae indicia et argumenta; et hinc humana mens gradum facit ad naturalem Theologiam, id est, ad scientiam Dei ac mentium coelestium: Philosophica enim cognitio Dei et Angelorum praecipue colligitur ex scientia coelorum et syderum.
But the opinion of Cajetan is not true, and the reasoning by which it leans and is propped up is most feeble. For that Adam held the knowledge of all things, even of the heavenly ones, is so easy and ready to show and prove that I cannot sufficiently wonder that this was not known and persuaded to Cajetan, a man indeed acute and learned. In the first place, by the very reasons by which, in the treatment of the preceding question, it was shown that there was knowledge in Adam from the beginning, by those same reasons it is plainly concluded that there was in him perfect knowledge, that is, of all things that can be comprehended by man's natural knowledge. Next, the opinion of the Fathers and Theologians is in accord that Adam was created by God a man perfect both in soul and in body: but the perfection of the soul, as regards the mind and reason, is knowledge; and the foremost place of this is held by the knowledge of heavenly things: for that knowledge is by its nature the noblest of all, and the most desired by the wishes of men, indeed the most precious, most useful, and most delightful in possession and use: how then is it credible that, the knowledge of all other things having been granted to Adam, this one knowledge of heavenly things alone was not bestowed on him by God? Besides, in heavenly things, beyond all other natural things, the clearest indications and arguments of God's wisdom and providence shine forth; and from this the human mind makes its step toward natural Theology, that is, toward the knowledge of God and of the heavenly minds: for the philosophical knowledge of God and of the Angels is chiefly gathered from the knowledge of the heavens and the stars.4
Si igitur Adamus scientiam corporum coelestium non habuit, nec Dei et intelligentiarum naturalem scientiam habere potuit. Quid, quod perfecta rerum sublunarium scientia constare non potest sine corporum coelestium perfecta notitia? Coelum enim est causa universalis huius mundi sublunaris: causam dico efficientem, conservantem, regentem atque moderantem. Ac licet cuiuscumque rei cognitio iucunda sit homini, rerum tamen coelestium notitia praestantissimum est ac suavissimum humanae mentis pabulum, inenarrabili voluptate implens animum nostrum: ut si hac scientia caruerit Adam, nec perfectus homo fuisse, nec in summis voluptatibus ac deliciis vixisse, vere dici possit.
If, therefore, Adam did not have knowledge of the heavenly bodies, neither could he have natural knowledge of God and of the [angelic] intelligences. What of the fact that the perfect knowledge of sublunary things cannot stand without the perfect knowledge of the heavenly bodies? For the heaven is the universal cause of this sublunary world: a cause, I mean, that is efficient, conserving, governing, and moderating. And although the knowledge of any thing whatever is pleasant to man, yet the knowledge of heavenly things is the most excellent and sweetest food of the human mind, filling our soul with unspeakable delight: so that, if Adam had lacked this knowledge, it could truly be said that he was neither a perfect man, nor lived amid the highest pleasures and delights.5
Quod si rationibus ad id probandum deficeremus, nonne divina Scriptura plurimum nos movere deberet, quae in libro Ecclesiastici cap. 17 affirmat, Deum replevisse cor Adami scientia et disciplina, et ostendisse ei magnalia sua? At si defuit ei scientia rerum coelestium et elementorum, quomodo repletus fuit scientia et disciplina? Magnalia vero Dei operum potissime cernuntur in coelis et astris, sicut dixit David, Psalmo octavo: Quoniam videbo coelos tuos, opera digitorum tuorum, Lunam et Stellas quae tu fundasti. Atque haec nostra sententia est quoque sententia scholae Theologorum, ut videre licet apud Magistrum sententiarum distinctione 23, et apud S. Thomam prima parte qu. 94. Certe Hugo S. Victoris lib. 1 de Sacramentis, parte 6, c. 13, 14, et 15, scribit primum hominem ante lapsum triplicem habuisse perfectam naturalem cognitionem: Dei, a quo et propter quem creatus fuerat; sui ipsius, qui ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei creatus erat; et aliarum omnium rerum corporalium, quae a Deo fuerant propter hominem conditae.
But if we were to fail of reasons for proving this, ought not divine Scripture greatly to move us, which in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 17, affirms that God filled the heart of Adam with knowledge and instruction, and showed him his great works? But if knowledge of heavenly things and of the elements was lacking to him, how was he filled with knowledge and instruction? Now the great works of God's deeds are most of all discerned in the heavens and the stars, as David said in the eighth Psalm: ‘For I will behold thy heavens, the works of thy fingers, the Moon and the Stars which thou hast founded.’ And this our opinion is also the opinion of the school of the Theologians, as may be seen in the Master of the Sentences, distinction 23, and in St. Thomas, first part, question 94. Certainly Hugh of St. Victor, in book 1 of On the Sacraments, part 6, chapters 13, 14, and 15, writes that the first man, before the fall, had a threefold perfect natural knowledge: of God, by whom and for whom he had been created; of himself, who had been created to the image and likeness of God; and of all other bodily things, which had been founded by God for the sake of man.6
Ceterum, ex hac generali rerum scientia quam in Adamo fuisse contendimus, tria rerum genera excipienda censemus: unum eorum quae vocantur futura contingentia, alterum eorum quae nominantur arcana vel secreta cordium, tertium etiam omnium praesentium individuorum cuiuslibet speciei. Verbi gratia, non sciebat Adam omnia individua piscium, nec omnem numerum arenae aut lapidum: huiusmodi enim nec pertinent ad perfectionem humani intellectus, neque conferebantur ad perfectionem et felicitatem illius status innocentiae. Hinc quoque apparet quemadmodum Adamus in scientia progressu temporis proficere potuerit: tribus nempe modis. Primo, cognoscendo novas rerum species, quae subinde creatae fuissent vel ex putri materia, vel ex diversarum specierum admistione: deinde, quantum ad cognitionem individuorum cuiuslibet speciei: denique, quantum ad modum sciendi. Ab initio enim habuit Adam scientiam rerum speculative tantum et abstractive (sicut nunc in scholis Philosophi et Theologi loquimur), eandem postea clariorem quodammodo et firmiorem habuit, sensuum iudiciis et experimentis illustratam atque confirmatam.
But from this general knowledge of things which we maintain was in Adam, we judge that three kinds of things must be excepted: one, those which are called future contingents; another, those which are named the hidden or secret things of hearts; the third, [the knowledge] of all present individuals of every species. For example, Adam did not know all the individual fishes, nor the whole number of the sand or of the stones: for things of this sort neither pertain to the perfection of the human intellect, nor contributed to the perfection and happiness of that state of innocence. Hence it also appears in what way Adam could have progressed in knowledge with the passage of time: namely, in three ways. First, by coming to know new species of things, which were thereafter created either from putrid matter, or from the mixture of diverse species; next, as regards the knowledge of the individuals of each species; finally, as regards the manner of knowing. For from the beginning Adam had knowledge of things only speculatively and abstractly (as we Philosophers and Theologians now speak in the schools), and afterward he had the same knowledge somewhat clearer and firmer, illustrated and confirmed by the judgments of the senses and by experience.7
...et syderum atque elementorum, quae scilicet competere in hominem potest, nulli hominum fuisse concessam, sed soli Deo reservatam, luculento Salomonis exemplo et argumento manifeste refellitur. Auctor enim libri Sapientiae in capite septimo Salomonem, de multiiugi scientia quam sibi Deus concesserat, his verbis loquentem inducit: Ipse dedit mihi horum quae sunt scientiam veram; ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum et virtutes elementorum, initium et consummationem et medietatem temporum, vicissitudinum permutationes et consummationes temporum, morum mutationes et divisiones temporum, anni cursus et stellarum dispositiones, naturas animalium et iras bestiarum, vim ventorum et cogitationes hominum, differentias virgultorum et virtutes radicum; et quaecunque sunt absconsa et improvisa didici: omnium enim artifex docuit me Sapientia.
...and of the stars and of the elements—which, namely, can belong to man—was granted to no man, but reserved to God alone: [this] is manifestly refuted by the clear example and argument of Solomon. For the author of the book of Wisdom, in the seventh chapter, introduces Solomon speaking these words about the manifold knowledge which God had granted him: ‘He gave me the true knowledge of the things that are; that I may know the disposition of the globe of the earth and the powers of the elements, the beginning and ending and midst of the times, the alterations of their courses and the changes of seasons, the revolutions of the year and the dispositions of the stars, the natures of animals and the rage of wild beasts, the force of winds and the reasonings of men, the diversities of plants and the virtues of roots; and whatsoever things are hidden and unforeseen, I have learned: for Wisdom, the artificer of all, taught me.’8
Audis, lector, datam fuisse Salomoni veram, id est, certam, evidentem, ac perfectam scientiam orbis terrarum, elementorum, et stellarum, et omnium quae abscondita sunt et abstrusa? Non igitur earum rerum perfecta cognitio soli Deo, ut putavit Caietanus, sic reservata est, ut ob id Adamum eiusmodi scientia caruisse credendum sit. Sed Caietanus, eo quod Adamus nec terrae, nec mari, nec coelis nomina indidit, argumentatur earum rerum non fuisse in Adamo scientiam. Egregia scilicet argumentatio: quasi vero Adamus, ipso auctore Caietano, non perfectam habuerit scientiam lapidum, metallorum, stirpium, ac piscium, quibus tamen rebus nomina eum imposuisse nusquam legimus. Cur autem solis terrestribus animantibus et avibus nomina assignaverit Adam, paulo supra indicavimus.
Do you hear, reader, that there was given to Solomon a true—that is, certain, evident, and perfect—knowledge of the globe of the earth, of the elements, and of the stars, and of all things that are hidden and abstruse? Therefore the perfect knowledge of those things was not so reserved to God alone, as Cajetan supposed, that on that account it should be believed that Adam lacked such knowledge. But Cajetan argues, from the fact that Adam imposed names neither on the earth, nor on the sea, nor on the heavens, that there was no knowledge of those things in Adam. An excellent argument, to be sure! As if indeed Adam, by Cajetan's own admission, did not have perfect knowledge of stones, metals, plants, and fishes—on which things, however, we nowhere read that he imposed names. But why Adam assigned names only to the land animals and the birds, we have indicated a little above.9

Translator’s notes

  1. Question divider opening the second of the five questions.
  2. Marginal gloss: 'Caietanus censet Adamum non habuisse scientiam ex[quisitam coelorum et elementorum]' (Cajetan holds Adam did not have exact knowledge of the heavens and elements; gloss continues onto next page margin). Cajetan = Thomas de Vio Cajetanus. Sentence continues onto next page (catchword 'perfecta').
  3. Block-quote of Cajetan's own words, ending with the attribution marker 'Haec Caietanus.' 'Qui numerat multitudinem stellarum, et omnibus eis nomina vocat' = Psalm 146:4 (Vulgate; = Ps. 147:4 Hebrew numbering). Cajetan: God reserved to himself the naming (hence perfect knowledge) of stars, heavens, earth and seas. Catchword 'Si' (signature XX 2).
  4. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur ... praedicta opinio Caietani' (the aforesaid opinion of Cajetan is refuted). Pererius's refutation: the same arguments that prove Adam had knowledge prove he had perfect knowledge, including of the heavens—the noblest knowledge, the gateway to natural theology.
  5. Continuation: heavenly knowledge is the foundation of perfect sublunary science (the heavens being the universal cause) and the sweetest 'pabulum' of the mind.
  6. Scriptural proof: Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 17:6-8; Psalm 8:4 ('I will behold thy heavens...'). Concurring authorities: Peter Lombard Sent. II d.23, Aquinas ST I q.94, Hugh of St. Victor De Sacramentis I.6.13-15 (Adam's threefold knowledge: of God, of self, of bodily creation).
  7. Marginal glosses: 'Tria genera rerum scientia Adami minime comprehensa' (three kinds of things not comprehended by Adam's knowledge); 'Quomodo profecisset Adam in scientia' (how Adam would have progressed in knowledge). The three exceptions: future contingents, secrets of hearts, and all present individuals. Catchword '& syde[rum]' continues to next page.
  8. Marginal gloss: 'De scientia Salomonis' (on the knowledge of Solomon). Block-quote of Wisdom 7:17-21 (Vulgate). Completes from p.532 catchword '& syde[rum]': Cajetan held perfect knowledge of stars/elements was reserved to God—refuted by Solomon's example.
  9. Pererius drives the refutation home: Solomon had perfect knowledge of the heavens, so the absence of name-giving proves nothing—Adam knew stones, metals, plants, fishes too without naming them.