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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Five — the state of innocence

QUESTION I. Whether Adam was created with grace

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QUESTION I. Whether Adam was created with grace.1

QUAESTIO I. Vtrum sit cum gratia creatus Adam.

Prima haec quaestio et per se nobilis et celebris est, et est Theologorum eruditis disputationibus atque opinionum varietate et dissensione magis nobilitata. Catharinus opinatur Adamum primo esse conditum in puris naturalibus, postea esse orna-...
This first question is both in itself noble and celebrated, and has been made more renowned by the learned disputations of the Theologians and by the variety and dissension of opinions. Catharinus is of the opinion that Adam was first founded in pure naturals, and afterward was adorn-[ed with grace]...2
...ornatum iustitia originali: deinde gratia gratum faciente donatum esse ac decoratum. Illud apud Theologos extra controversiam est, Adam gratiam habuisse ante suum lapsum. Testimonia Patrum ad id probandum commemorat Magister in 2. lib. dist. 29., et Gratianus de Poenitentia, dist. 2, c. Tolle charitatem. Nec licet hoc in dubium vocare, cum duorum sit Conciliorum, Arausicani et Tridentini, decretis constitutum atque communitum. Certe in Tridentino, in sessio. 5, in decreto de peccato originali, sic est: Adam per peccatum amisit sanctitatem et iustitiam in qua fuerat a Deo constitutus. Et hoc rationi valde consentaneum est: propter peccatum enim Adamus gratiam Dei et dona coelestia perdidit, quippe propter illud primum peccatum ipse cum universa posteritate sua condemnatus est, et privatus iure possidendi regnum coeleste. Habebat igitur ante peccatum ius regni coelestis; hoc autem ius non aliter nisi propter gratiam Dei datur homini. Nimirum, si per primum illud peccatum non perdidisset Adam Dei gratiam, nulla erat ratio cur unius illius primi peccati reatus tantum, non autem aliorum peccatorum quae deinde patravit Adam, ad posteros derivaretur. Hoc igitur cum omnium concessum pro certo haberi debeat, non attinet pluribus verbis disputare.
...[Adam was first founded in pure naturals; then] adorned with original justice; then gifted and graced with sanctifying grace. This is among the Theologians beyond controversy: that Adam had grace before his fall. The testimonies of the Fathers to prove this the Master records in the second book, distinction 29, and Gratian in [the treatise] On Penance, distinction 2, chapter ‘Take away charity.’ Nor is it permitted to call this into doubt, since it is established and fortified by the decrees of two Councils, of Orange and of Trent. Certainly in [the Council of] Trent, in session 5, in the decree on original sin, it is thus: ‘Adam by sin lost the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted by God.’ And this is very consonant with reason: for on account of sin Adam lost the grace of God and the heavenly gifts, inasmuch as on account of that first sin he himself, with his whole posterity, was condemned, and deprived of the right of possessing the heavenly kingdom. He had, therefore, before sin the right to the heavenly kingdom; but this right is not given to man except on account of the grace of God. Indeed, if through that first sin Adam had not lost the grace of God, there would have been no reason why the guilt of that one first sin alone, and not of the other sins which Adam afterward committed, should be derived to his descendants. Since, therefore, this must be held as certain, granted by all, it is not worthwhile to dispute it in more words.3
Illud autem inter Theologos controversum est, utrum Adam in primo ortu suo et ab initio gratiam Dei habuerit, an postea eam acceperit: de hoc variant Theologi sententias. Non fuisse eum cum gratia creatum, sed tantum cum iustitia originali, multi et magni Doctores censuerunt: Hugo S. Victoris lib. 1 de Sacramentis, parte sexta; Alexander de Hales parte 2, quaest. 96; Bonaventura et Scotus lib. 2 sententiarum, distinct. 26; Marsilius in eundem librum, quaest. 16; et item Altissiodorensis.
But this is controverted among the Theologians, whether Adam had the grace of God in his very origin and from the beginning, or received it afterward: on this the Theologians vary in their opinions. That he was not created with grace, but only with original justice, many great Doctors have judged: Hugh of St. Victor, book 1 of On the Sacraments, part six; Alexander of Hales, part 2, question 96; Bonaventure and Scotus, book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 26; Marsilius on the same book, question 16; and likewise the Altissiodorensis [William of Auxerre].4
Confirmat eam sententiam Bonaventura his argumentis: Magis congruit gratia cum gloria quam natura cum gratia: sed Adamo collata est gratia ante gloriam: ergo natura quoque data est ante gratiam. Postea, per gratiam fit matrimonium quoddam spirituale inter Deum et animam hominis, sed ea lex matrimonii est ut id minime fiat sine coniugis utriusque consensu: ergo dari non debuit Adamo gratia sine eius consensu: praesertim autem cum hoc habeat Dei providentia, ut nulli adulto, quique iam rationis usu pollet, gratiam suam absque eius consensu et praeparatione tribuat. Deinde, quo clarius et certius Adam cognosceret gratiam quae ipsi a Deo tribuebatur vere esse gratiam, id est, omnem naturae facultatem excedere, atque homini gratuito donari, eaque ratione Deo gratior et devotior esset: convenientius fuit ut eam postquam creatus est haberet, quam ut simul cum natura sibi quodammodo ingeneratam acciperet.
Bonaventure confirms that opinion by these arguments: Grace agrees more with glory than nature with grace: but grace was conferred on Adam before glory: therefore nature too was given before grace. Again, through grace there comes about a certain spiritual marriage between God and the soul of man, but this is the law of marriage, that it least of all takes place without the consent of both spouses: therefore grace ought not to have been given to Adam without his consent: especially since God's providence has this rule, that to no adult who already has the use of reason does he grant his grace without that person's consent and preparation. Next, so that Adam might know more clearly and certainly that the grace which was bestowed on him by God was truly grace—that is, that it exceeds every faculty of nature, and is freely given to man, and that for this reason he might be more grateful and devoted to God—it was more fitting that he should have it after he was created, than that he should receive it as it were ingrained in him together with nature.5
Scotus, eo quem supra nominavi loco respondens ad quartum argumentum, arbitratur iustitiam originalem cum qua creatus est Adam non fuisse gratiam gratum facientem: fuisse tamen donum supernaturale. Habebant autem se gratia gratum faciens et iustitia ori-...
Scotus, in the place I named above, answering the fourth argument, judges that the original justice with which Adam was created was not sanctifying grace: yet that it was a supernatural gift. Now sanctifying grace and original ju-[stice] stood to one another...6
...originalis, inquit Scotus, sicut excedens et excessum. Excedebat enim iustitia originalis ipsam gratiam gratum facientem quatuor rebus: etenim, iustitia originalis non modo rationem Deo subdebat, sed etiam sensum rationi, et corpus animae: deinde, promptius, delectabilius, firmius coniungebat mentem cum Deo: tum, non admittebat ullum peccatum, non tantum mortale, sed etiam veniale: denique, faciebat hominem omne bonum morale prompte et iucunde, et sine ulla interiori molestia operari. Gratia vero gratum faciens eo vincit et antecellit iustitiam originalem, quod hominem excellentius iungit Deo, scilicet ut fini et bono supernaturali: facitque hominem vere gratum et amicum Deo, eiusque filium et haeredem vitae aeternae, et ut is mereri queat etiam de condigno aeternam vitam.
...original [justice], says Scotus, as the exceeding and the exceeded. For original justice exceeded sanctifying grace itself in four things: for original justice not only subjected reason to God, but also sense to reason, and body to soul; next, it joined the mind to God more readily, more delightfully, more firmly; then, it admitted no sin, not only no mortal, but not even venial; finally, it made man perform every moral good readily and pleasantly, and without any interior trouble. But sanctifying grace surpasses and excels original justice in this, that it joins man to God more excellently, namely as to his supernatural end and good: and it makes man truly pleasing to God and his friend, and his son and heir of eternal life, and [makes it] that he can even merit eternal life by condign merit.7
Altera opinio est, Adamum creatum esse in gratia. Hanc fuisse Augustini sententiam multis ille locis aperte declaravit. Namque in Enchiridio, capite 104, sic ait: Primum hominem Deus in ea salute in qua conditus erat custodire voluisset, eumque opportuno tempore post genitos filios sine interpositione mortis ad meliora perducere: ubi iam non solum peccatum non committere, sed nec voluntatem posset habere peccandi; si ad permanendum sine peccato, sicut factus erat, perpetuam voluntatem habiturum esse praescisset. In libro autem de Correptione et gratia, capite 10, affirmat primum hominem factum esse a Deo rectum et cum bona voluntate. Apud Augustinum autem nulla est simpliciter bona voluntas sine Dei gratia. Tradit item ipsum factum esse beatum, ea nimirum beatitudine quae potest homini in hac vita contingere, quae tamen nulla esset sine Dei gratia.
The other opinion is that Adam was created in grace. That this was Augustine's view he declared openly in many places. For in the Enchiridion, chapter 104, he says thus: ‘God would have kept the first man in that salvation in which he had been founded, and at a suitable time, after children were begotten, would have led him without the interposition of death to better things: where now he would be able not only not to commit sin, but not even to have the will of sinning—if he had foreknown that [Adam] would have a perpetual will to remain without sin, as he had been made.’ But in the book On Reproof and Grace, chapter 10, he affirms that the first man was made by God upright and with a good will. But for Augustine there is no simply good will without the grace of God. He hands down likewise that he was made blessed—with that blessedness, namely, which can befall a man in this life, which nevertheless would be none without the grace of God.8
Ad hunc autem modum scribit: Primum hominem fecit Deus beatum: quia et non mori et non miserum fieri in sua potestate esse sentiebat. In quo statu recto ac sine vitio si per ipsum liberum arbitrium manere voluisset, profecto sine ullo mortis et infelicitatis experimento acciperet illam, merito huiusmodi permansionis, et beatitudinis plenitudinem qua et sancti Angeli sunt beati, id est, ut cadere non posset ulterius, et hoc certissime sciret. Et in capite eiusdem libri undecimo: Tunc, inquit, dederat homini Deus bonam voluntatem: in illa quippe eum fecerat qui fecerat rectum. Dederat adiutorium, sine quo in ea non posset permanere si vellet; ut autem vellet, in eius libero reliquit arbitrio. Si autem hoc adiutorium vel Angelo vel homini, cum primum facti sunt, defuisset, quoniam non talis natura facta erat ut sine divino adiutorio posset manere si vellet, non utique sua culpa cecidisset: adiutorium quippe defuisset sine quo manere non possent.
And in this manner he writes: ‘God made the first man blessed: because he felt it to be in his own power both not to die and not to become wretched. In which upright and faultless state, if by his own free will he had willed to remain, he would assuredly, without any experience of death and unhappiness, have received—by the merit of such perseverance—both that fullness of blessedness by which the holy Angels too are blessed, that is, that he could fall no further, and would know this most certainly.’ And in the eleventh chapter of the same book: ‘Then,’ he says, ‘God had given man a good will: for in that will he had made him who had made him upright. He had given help, without which he could not remain in it if he willed; but that he should will, he left to his free choice. But if this help had been lacking to the Angel or to man when they were first made, since their nature had not been made such that it could remain without divine help if it willed, [Adam] would certainly not have fallen by his own fault: for the help would have been lacking without which they could not remain.’9
In libro quoque decimoquarto de Civitate Dei, capite 11 et 17, dicit primum hominem creatum esse a Deo rectum et cum bona voluntate; cumque par sit ratio Angelorum atque primorum hominum, ut significat Augustinus in libro de Correptione et gratia, capite decimo et undecimo, idque placet fere Theologis, si Angelus cum gratia creatus est, similiter hominem creatum esse cum gratia putandum est. Angelos autem creatos esse cum gratia, multis disertisque verbis disputat...
Also in the fourteenth book of the City of God, chapters 11 and 17, he says that the first man was created by God upright and with a good will; and since the case of the Angels and of the first men is parallel, as Augustine indicates in the book On Reproof and Grace, chapters ten and eleven—and this pleases nearly all the Theologians—if the Angel was created with grace, likewise man must be thought to have been created with grace. And that the Angels were created with grace, [Augustine] disputes in many eloquent words...10
Augustinus lib. 12 de Civitate Dei, cap. 9: Simul, inquit, atque facti sunt Angeli, ei a quo facti sunt, amore cum quo facti sunt, adhaeserunt. Et paulo infra: Deus fecit Angelos cum bona voluntate, hoc est, cum amore casto quo illi adhaeserunt: simul in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam. Denique post haec, amorem et bonam voluntatem cum qua creati sunt Angeli appellat charitatem diffusam in eos per Spiritum sanctum.
Augustine, book 12 of the City of God, chapter 9: ‘As soon,’ he says, ‘as the Angels were made, they clung, by the love with which they were made, to him by whom they were made.’ And a little below: ‘God made the Angels with a good will, that is, with the chaste love by which they clung [to him]: at once founding nature in them and bestowing grace.’ And then, after these things, the love and good will with which the Angels were created he calls charity poured out into them through the Holy Spirit.11
Sanctus item Hieronymus in Commentariis super Oseam testatur, daemones in magna esse spiritus pinguedine a Deo creatos. Hoc ipsum Patres colligunt ex iis quae Isaias cap. 14 de Lucifero sub persona regis Babylonis, et Ezechiel capite 28 de eodem sub persona principis Tyri vaticinantur. Accedit ad haec, quod multi sanctorum Patrum et veterum doctorum, explanantes illa verba, Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, illud, Ad similitudinem nostram, de similitudine quam habet homo cum Deo propter gratiam et virtutes interpretandum et intelligendum censuerunt: cuius interpretationis auctores, supra libro quarto, Origenem, Victorinum, Basilium, Ambrosium, Chrysostomum, Augustinum, Bedam, Rupertum atque Hugonem nominavimus. Ab hac etiam sententia stare videtur Paulus ita scribens ad Colossen. 3: Expoliantes vos veterem hominem cum actibus suis, et induentes novum, eum qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit illum: ubi renovationem hominis per gratiam appellat Paulus renovationem imaginis in qua creatus est homo. Et sic interpretandum est quod multi veteres dixerunt, Adamum propter peccatum quod admisit imaginem Dei ad quam erat conditus perdidisse.
Saint Jerome likewise, in his Commentaries on Hosea, attests that the demons were created by God in great fatness of spirit. This same thing the Fathers gather from what Isaiah, chapter 14, prophesies of Lucifer under the person of the king of Babylon, and Ezekiel, chapter 28, of the same under the person of the prince of Tyre. To these is added that many of the holy Fathers and ancient doctors, in explaining those words, ‘Let us make man to our image and likeness,’ judged that the phrase ‘to our likeness’ should be interpreted and understood of the likeness which man has with God on account of grace and the virtues: of which interpretation we named, above in the fourth book, as authors Origen, Victorinus, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, Bede, Rupert, and Hugh. With this opinion Paul too seems to stand, writing thus to the Colossians 3: ‘Stripping off the old man with his deeds, and putting on the new, him who is renewed unto the knowledge of God according to the image of him that created him’: where Paul calls the renewal of man through grace the renewal of the image in which man was created. And thus must be interpreted what many of the ancients said, that Adam, on account of the sin he committed, lost the image of God to which he had been founded.12
Ad huius praeterea opinionis confirmationem quidam pertinere existimant quod in capite 17 libri Ecclesiastici scriptum est his verbis: Deus creavit hominem de terra, et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum: et secundum se vestivit illum virtute. Illud autem secundum se idem significat quod ad sui similitudinem. Sicut enim dicitur de Deo, Confessionem et decorem induisti: et alio in Psalmo, Dominus regnavit, decorem induit, induit Dominus fortitudinem et praecinxit se: sic etiam homo ad similitudinem Dei suo modo virtute ornatus est, hoc est, praeditus acumine ingenii quo per omnia animo et cogitatione penetrare, multaque praeclara potenter efficere valeat. Hoc enim loco vocabulum illud Virtute non significat virtutem moralem quae vitiis contraria est, quam Graeci vocant ἀρετήν, sed significat robur et fortitudinem, Graece enim est ἰσχύν. Quare probabilius quidam ex eo loco argumentantur, Adamum esse conditum perfecto corporis robore et perfecta animi virtute, quae complectitur scientiam et virtutes morales atque etiam supernaturales; quanquam Graece pro illo secundum se pluraliter legitur κατ' ἑαυτούς, id est, secundum seipsos, ut ad homines referatur. Tota enim lectio Graeca pluraliter loquitur: vel quia de Adamo et Eva agit, vel quoniam loquitur de his quae in Adamo toti humanae naturae collata sunt.
Besides, some consider that there pertains to the confirmation of this opinion what is written in chapter 17 of the book of Ecclesiasticus in these words: ‘God created man of the earth, and made him according to his own image: and according to himself he clothed him with virtue.’ But that ‘according to himself’ means the same as ‘to his own likeness.’ For just as it is said of God, ‘Thou hast put on confession and beauty’; and in another Psalm, ‘The Lord hath reigned, he hath put on beauty, the Lord hath put on strength and hath girded himself’; so also man, to the likeness of God, was in his own way adorned with virtue, that is, endowed with that keenness of intellect by which he might penetrate all things in mind and thought, and powerfully effect many splendid things. For in this place that word ‘virtue’ (virtute) does not signify the moral virtue which is contrary to the vices, which the Greeks call ἀρετήν (aretēn), but signifies vigor and strength, for in Greek it is ἰσχύν (ischyn). Wherefore some argue, more probably, from that place that Adam was founded with perfect bodily strength and perfect virtue of soul, which embraces knowledge and the moral and even supernatural virtues; although in Greek, for that ‘according to himself,’ it is read in the plural κατ' ἑαυτούς (kat' heautous), that is, ‘according to themselves,’ so that it refers to men. For the whole Greek reading speaks in the plural: either because it treats of Adam and Eve, or because it speaks of those things which in Adam were conferred on the whole human nature.13
B. Thomas 1. part. quaest. 95 et 100, ex illa sententia quae est in capite 7 libri Ecclesiastae, Fecit Deus hominem rectum, ut probet fuisse Adamum cum gratia a Deo creatum, hoc modo ratiocinatur: Rectitudo primi hominis in eo erat posita, ut ratio eius Deo esset subdita: rationi autem inferiores animae vires, et animae etiam corpus. Huius autem triplicis rectitudinis prima erat causa secundae et tertiae: secunda vero rectitudo, per quam inferiores animae vires subditae atque obedientes erant rationi; tertia item rectitudo qua corpus erat subiectum animae, non erant naturales: alioquin mansissent in homine post peccatum: quae enim naturalia sunt homini, ea propter peccatum non fuere homini ablata: sed erant gratuito concessa homini per Dei gratiam.
The Blessed Thomas, first part, questions 95 and 100, from that sentence which is in the seventh chapter of the book of Ecclesiastes, ‘God made man upright,’ in order to prove that Adam was created by God with grace, reasons in this way: The uprightness of the first man was placed in this, that his reason was subject to God; but to his reason the lower powers of the soul, and to the soul also the body. Now of this threefold uprightness the first was the cause of the second and third: but the second uprightness, by which the lower powers of the soul were subject and obedient to reason; and likewise the third uprightness, by which the body was subject to the soul, were not natural: otherwise they would have remained in man after sin: for the things that are natural to man were not taken away from man on account of sin: but they were freely granted to man through the grace of God.14
Prima igitur illa rectitudo, qua mens omnino subiecta erat Deo, ex qua scilicet aliae duae pendebant, non erat naturale, sed supernaturale donum gratiae Dei. Hinc concluditur, si primus homo creatus est cum illa rectitudine, eum cum Dei gratia creatum esse. Illud autem quod inferiores animae vires continebat in officio et in obedientia rationis fuisse supernaturale donum gratiae, non obscure indicavit Paulus ad Roman. 7. Cum enim dixisset: Sentio aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege peccati: cumque miserrimum statum suum quasi deplorans exclamasset: Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? subiecit, Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum. Sola igitur Dei gratia carnem spiritui rebellem coercere et mentis imperio subiugare potest. Ergo cum in Adamo ante peccatum caro rationi minime rebellis fuerit, id profecto non aliter quam per gratiam Dei factum esse existimari debet. Sic B. Thomas.
That first uprightness, therefore, by which the mind was wholly subject to God, on which namely the other two depended, was not a natural but a supernatural gift of the grace of God. Hence it is concluded that, if the first man was created with that uprightness, he was created with the grace of God. And that what kept the lower powers of the soul in their duty and in obedience to reason was a supernatural gift of grace, Paul not obscurely indicated in Romans 7. For when he had said, ‘I perceive another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin’; and when, as if deploring his most wretched state, he had exclaimed, ‘Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?’ he added, ‘The grace of God through Jesus Christ.’ The grace of God alone, therefore, can restrain the flesh rebellious to the spirit, and subjugate it to the command of the mind. Therefore, since in Adam before sin the flesh was in no way rebellious to reason, that assuredly must be reckoned to have come about in no other way than through the grace of God. Thus the Blessed Thomas.15
Ad hoc etiam confirmandum valet quod scribit Augustinus lib. 13 de Civit. Dei, cap. 13: Posteaquam, inquit, precepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt: senserunt enim novum motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedientiae suae. Iam quippe anima, libertate in perversum propria delectata et Deo dedignata servire, pristino corporis servitio destituebatur. Et quia superiorem dominum suo arbitrio deseruerat, inferiorem famulum ad suum arbitrium non tenebat: nec omnino habebat subditam carnem, sicut semper habere potuisset, si Deo subiecta ipsa mansisset. In libro autem 14 eiusdem operis, cap. 17, tractans illa verba tertii cap. Geneseos, Aperti sunt oculi eorum, cumque cognovissent se esse nudos, etc., ita scribit Augustinus: Patebant oculi eorum, sed adhuc non erant aperti, hoc est, non attenti ut cognoscerent quod eis indumento gratiae praestaretur, quando membra eorum voluntati repugnare nesciebant. Qua gratia remota, ut poena reciproca inobedientia plecteretur, extitit in motu corporis quaedam impudens novitas, unde esset indecens nuditas, et fecit attentos reddiditque confusos. Aperti sunt, inquit, oculi amborum, non ad videndum, nam et antea videbant, sed ad discernendum inter bonum quod amiserant et malum in quod ceciderant. Haec Augustinus.
To confirm this there also serves what Augustine writes in book 13 of the City of God, chapter 13: ‘After,’ he says, ‘the transgression of the precept was committed, at once, the divine grace deserting [them], they were confounded at the nakedness of their bodies: for they felt a new motion of their disobedient flesh, as a reciprocal penalty of their own disobedience. For now the soul, delighting perversely in its own liberty and disdaining to serve God, was deprived of the former service of the body. And because it had deserted its higher Lord by its own choice, it did not hold the lower servant to its own choice: nor had it the flesh wholly subject, as it could always have had it, if it had itself remained subject to God.’ But in book 14 of the same work, chapter 17, treating those words of the third chapter of Genesis, ‘Their eyes were opened, and when they had known that they were naked,’ etc., Augustine writes thus: ‘Their eyes were open, but not yet opened, that is, not attentive to know what was furnished to them by the garment of grace, when their members did not know how to resist their will. When this grace was removed, so that disobedience might be punished by a reciprocal penalty, there arose in the motion of the body a certain shameless novelty, whence there was an unseemly nakedness; and it made them attentive and rendered them confounded. Their eyes were opened, he says, of both, not to see, for they saw before too, but to discern between the good they had lost and the evil into which they had fallen.’ Thus Augustine.16
Quanquam qui iustitiam originalem donum quoddam faciunt a gratia gratum faciente diversum, hisce Pauli et Augustini sententiis nequaquam moventur. Respondent enim ipsam iustitiam originalem, quia erat donum Dei supernaturale non debitum homini, sed...
Although those who make original justice a certain gift distinct from sanctifying grace are by no means moved by these sentences of Paul and Augustine. For they answer that original justice itself, because it was a supernatural gift of God not owed to man, but...17
...sed gratuito ei tributum a Deo; propterea gratiam Dei a Patribus appellari. Sed enim creatum esse primum hominem cum gratia gratum faciente, aliis praeterea rationibus confirmari posset. Etenim, si est creatus Adam perfectus corpore et secundum omnia membra et facultates corporis, quis dubitet eum similiter creatum esse perfectum animo et ratione, et secundum omnes potentias animae rationalis? Non fuisset autem perfectus sine gratia. Si conditus est Adam in statu felicissimo et beatissimo, ut multis in locis inculcat Augustinus, idque declarat Paradisus in quo est Adam collocatus; cum primae huius felicitatis partes sint ipsius gratiae, haec illi deesse non debuit. Si talis est conditus ut fuerit amicus et familiaris Deo, non potuit sane gratia carere, quae hanc amicitiam parit et tuetur. Si talis est conditus ut posset non mori, cuius rei gratia comparavit ei Deus lignum vitae; si quae ad corporis conservationem aut delectationem pertinent, ea Deus illi statim et tam abunde providit, cur non bonorum quae ad animum pertinent potissimum maximeque necessarium, gratiam ei dederit? Si gratiam habuit ante peccatum, cur non habuerit simul atque est conditus?
...but was freely bestowed on him by God; and therefore it is called by the Fathers the grace of God. But indeed, that the first man was created with sanctifying grace can be confirmed by other reasons as well. For if Adam was created perfect in body, and as regards all his members and the faculties of the body, who would doubt that he was likewise created perfect in soul and reason, and as regards all the powers of the rational soul? But he would not have been perfect without grace. If Adam was founded in a most happy and blessed state, as Augustine inculcates in many places, and as the Paradise in which Adam was placed declares; since the foremost parts of this happiness belong to grace itself, this ought not to have been lacking to him. If he was so founded as to be a friend and intimate of God, he surely could not lack the grace which produces and guards this friendship. If he was so founded that he could escape death—for which purpose God provided him the tree of life—if the things that pertain to the conservation or delight of the body God provided him at once and so abundantly, why would he not have given him grace, the most important and most necessary of the goods that pertain to the soul? If he had grace before sin, why would he not have had it as soon as he was founded?18
Denique, si Adam factus est animo rectus et ratione perfectus, consentaneum fuit ut primum omnium cognosceret Deum, a quo, propter quem, et ad quem amandum, colendum, fruendumque creatus fuerat, atque ut ad eum tanquam ad finem suum supernaturalem se suaque omnia referret ac dirigeret: sine hac enim cognitione, ceterarum omnium rerum scientia inanis et futilis est. Vani enim sunt omnes homines, ut scriptum est in capite 13 libri Sapientiae, in quibus non subest scientia Dei. Illud etiam praeclare dictum est a Deo per Hieremiam, capite nono: Non glorietur sapiens in sapientia sua, et non glorietur fortis in fortitudine sua, et non glorietur dives in divitiis suis: sed in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur, scire et nosse me, quia ego sum Dominus qui facio misericordiam et iudicium et iustitiam in terra: haec enim placent mihi, ait Dominus. Atque haec cognitio Dei, ut est ultimus ipse ac supernaturalis finis hominis, non aliunde quam ex fide, quae donum Dei est, proficisci potuit: cum fide igitur Adam creatus est, nec sane cum fide informi aliisque virtutibus incomitata, cum fide igitur, spe et charitate. Adiice, quod principalius Adam creatus est propter finem supernaturalem quam propter naturalem: sed ad consequendum finem naturalem, statim ei dedit multa et praeclara dona: non est igitur dubitandum quin ei gratiam, quae ad supernaturalem finem adipiscendum necessaria est, statim impertiverit. Quod si Adam statim ut factus est habuit perfectum usum rationis, ergo statim potuit, aut etiam debuit, seipsum dirigere ac referre ad ultimum finem suum supernaturalem, potuitque bene mereri: quod quidem sine gratia facere non poterat; non igitur sine gratia creatus est.
Finally, if Adam was made upright in soul and perfect in reason, it was fitting that he should first of all know God—by whom, for whom, and to the loving, worshiping, and enjoying of whom he had been created—and that he should refer and direct himself and all that was his to God as to his supernatural end: for without this knowledge, the knowledge of all other things is empty and futile. ‘For vain are all men,’ as is written in chapter 13 of the book of Wisdom, ‘in whom there is not the knowledge of God.’ This too was excellently said by God through Jeremiah, chapter nine: ‘Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches: but let him that glorieth glory in this, to know and understand me, that I am the Lord, who do mercy and judgment and justice in the earth: for these things please me, saith the Lord.’ And this knowledge of God, since he is the very last and supernatural end of man, could proceed from nothing else than from faith, which is the gift of God: with faith, therefore, Adam was created, and surely not with formless faith unaccompanied by the other virtues, but with faith, then, hope, and charity. Add that Adam was created more principally for his supernatural end than for his natural one: but to attain his natural end, [God] at once gave him many and excellent gifts: there is no doubt, therefore, that he at once imparted to him grace, which is necessary for attaining the supernatural end. But if Adam, as soon as he was made, had the perfect use of reason, then at once he could, or even ought, to direct himself and refer himself to his ultimate supernatural end, and was able to merit well: which indeed he could not do without grace; he was not, therefore, created without grace.19
Nec vero in ortu suo Adam gratiam tantum accepit secundum habi-...
And indeed at his origin Adam received grace not only as a hab-[it]...20
...habitum, sed etiam secundum actum, id est, concurrendo ad receptionem gratiae cum proprio actu liberi arbitrii, eique consentiendo, et in Deum tendendo per actum fidei et dilectionis. Hoc autem ita esse, ex quatuor rebus, fere apud Theologos minime dubiis et controversis, argumentari possumus. Primo, Adam creatus est perfectus animo et ratione, et potens, statim ut est conditus, uti ratione et libero arbitrio. Deinde, actus liberi arbitrii, id est, voluntatis et intellectus, sunt indivisibiles, et uno instanti perfici et absolvi possunt. Ad haec, Adam creatus est rectus, quae rectitudo in primis faciebat ut Adam ratione et voluntate se ac sua subiiceret Deo, et ut primus actus mentis et voluntatis quem exerceret ad Deum conferretur. Postremo, excellentior ratio est sanctificationis et iustificationis, sanctificari et iustificari hominem per proprium actum et consensum liberi arbitrii, quam sine eo.
...[a hab]it, but also as an act, that is, by his concurring to the reception of grace by his own act of free will, and consenting to it, and tending toward God by an act of faith and love. And that this is so we can argue from four things, hardly doubtful or controverted among the Theologians. First, Adam was created perfect in soul and reason, and able, as soon as he was founded, to use his reason and free will. Next, the acts of free will, that is, of the will and the intellect, are indivisible, and can be completed and accomplished in a single instant. Besides, Adam was created upright, which uprightness made, first of all, that Adam by reason and will should subject himself and what was his to God, and that the first act of mind and will which he exercised should be directed to God. Finally, it is a more excellent manner of sanctification and justification that a man be sanctified and justified through his own act and the consent of free will, than without it.21
Ex his quatuor conficitur et concluditur quod volumus, Adamum eo ipso puncto temporis quo est creatus simul et ipsum exercuisse actum fidei et dilectionis erga Deum, et ipsum Deum gratia sanctificantem ei dedisse; ad eum scilicet modum quo Theologi disputant in iustificatione hominis adulti, in eodem instanti ex parte hominis esse ultimam dispositionem eius ad gratiam per proprium actum liberi arbitrii recipiendam, et ex parte Dei infusionem ipsius gratiae. Cum hac nostra sententia plane concordat B. Thomae doctrina. Is enim 1. parte, quaest. 96, art. 1, adversus id quod docere volebat, Adam scilicet creatum esse cum gratia, quinto loco sic subiicit: Ad hoc, inquit, quod quis accipiat gratiam, requiritur consensus ex parte recipientis, cum per hoc perficiatur matrimonium quoddam spirituale inter Deum et animam: sed consensus in gratiam esse non potest nisi prius existentis; ergo primus homo non accepit gratiam in primo instanti suae conditionis. Hanc obiectionem sub finem eius articuli sic ipsemet diluit: Ad quintum, inquit, dicendum est, quod cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse.
From these four it is made out and concluded what we maintain: that Adam, in that very point of time in which he was created, at once both exercised an act of faith and love toward God, and God himself gave him sanctifying grace; in the very manner in which the Theologians dispute, concerning the justification of an adult, that in the same instant there is, on man's part, the ultimate disposition for receiving grace through his own act of free will, and, on God's part, the infusion of grace itself. With this our opinion the doctrine of the Blessed Thomas plainly agrees. For he, in the first part, question 96, article 1, against what he wished to teach—namely that Adam was created with grace—in the fifth place adds thus: ‘For a man to receive grace,’ he says, ‘consent is required on the part of the receiver, since by this a certain spiritual marriage is completed between God and the soul: but consent to grace can only be of one already existing; therefore the first man did not receive grace in the first instant of his founding.’ This objection, toward the end of the same article, he himself thus dissolves: ‘To the fifth it must be said that, since the motion of the will is not continuous, nothing prevents the first man from having consented to grace even in the first instant of his creation.’22

Translator’s notes

  1. Question divider opening the first question of the disputation on sanctifying grace. ↩
  2. Marginal gloss: 'Catharinus in Genes.' (Catharinus on Genesis). Opening of Question I: Catharinus's view that Adam was first created in 'pure naturals' (puris naturalibus) and only afterward endowed with grace. Continues to next page (catchword 'ornatum'). ↩
  3. Marginal gloss: 'Adamum fuisse in gratia ante lapsum' (that Adam was in grace before the fall). Completes Catharinus's view (pure naturals → original justice → grace) from p.545 catchword 'ornatum'. The settled point: Adam had grace before the fall—Lombard Sent. II d.29; Gratian, De Poenitentia d.2 c. 'Tolle charitatem'; Councils of Orange and Trent (Trent sess. 5 on original sin). ↩
  4. Marginal gloss: 'Qui censuerint Adamum non esse creatum in gratia, et quibus argumentis id probaverint' (who held Adam was not created in grace, and by what arguments). The first opinion: Adam created with original justice but not grace—held by Hugh of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Scotus, Marsilius of Inghen, and William of Auxerre (Altissiodorensis). ↩
  5. Bonaventure's three arguments for grace given after creation: (1) the order grace-before-glory implies nature-before-grace; (2) the 'spiritual marriage' of God and soul requires consent; (3) clearer recognition of grace as a free, supernatural gift. ↩
  6. Scotus's distinction: the original justice with which Adam was created was a supernatural gift but not 'gratia gratum faciens' (sanctifying grace). Continues to next page (catchword 'originalis'). ↩
  7. Scotus on how original justice and grace relate as 'exceeding and exceeded': original justice exceeded grace in four practical effects (ordering of the powers, union with God, exclusion of all sin, ease of doing good), but grace exceeds it by joining man to God as to his supernatural end—making him God's friend, son, and heir, able to merit 'de condigno.' ↩
  8. Marginal gloss: 'Augusti. sententia fuit, et vera, Adamum creatum esse cum gratia' (Augustine's opinion was—and the true one—that Adam was created with grace). The second opinion (Pererius's): Adam created in grace, per Augustine, Enchiridion 104 and De Correptione et gratia 10 (no good will without grace). ↩
  9. Augustine, De Correptione et gratia 10-11: man made blessed; the divine 'help' (adiutorium) given so he could persevere if he willed, the willing left to free choice. Without that help his fall would not have been his own fault. ↩
  10. Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.11 and 17; the parity of angels and first men: if angels were created in grace, so was man. Continues to next page (catchword 'Augustinus'). ↩
  11. Augustine, De Civitate Dei 12.9: the angels created with grace ('founding nature and bestowing grace at once'), their good will being charity poured out by the Holy Spirit (cf. Rom 5:5). ↩
  12. Jerome on Hosea (demons created 'in great fatness of spirit'); Isaiah 14 (Lucifer as king of Babylon), Ezekiel 28 (prince of Tyre). The 'image and likeness' (Gen 1:26): the 'likeness' refers to grace and virtues (Origen, Victorinus, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, Bede, Rupert, Hugh). Colossians 3:9-10 (renewal of the image by grace); Adam lost the image by sin. ↩
  13. GLYPHS verified by magnification: ἀρετήν (aretēn = moral virtue) and ἰσχύν (ischyn = strength/vigor)—Pererius distinguishes the two senses of 'virtus' in Sirach 17:1-3; and κατ' ἑαυτούς (kat' heautous = 'according to themselves,' plural), the Greek of 'secundum se.' Marginal refs: 'Locus Ecclesiastici' (Sirach 17); 'Psal. 103' (Ps 103/104:1 'Confessionem et decorem induisti'); 'Psal. 92' (Ps 92/93:1 'Dominus regnavit, decorem induit'). Continues to next page (catchword 'B. Thomas'). ↩
  14. Marginal gloss: 'Locus Ecclesiastae cap. 7' (Ecclesiastes 7:29 'God made man upright'). Aquinas, ST I qq.95 & 100: Adam's threefold uprightness (reason under God, lower powers under reason, body under soul) was not natural—else it would have survived sin—but a gift of grace. ↩
  15. Aquinas concludes: the first uprightness (mind subject to God) was a supernatural gift; Romans 7:23-25 ('another law in my members'... 'the grace of God through Jesus Christ'). Adam's flesh not rebelling = grace. Ends 'Sic B. Thomas.' ↩
  16. Augustine, De Civitate Dei 13.13 (the loss of grace and confusion at nakedness) and 14.17 (Genesis 3:7 'their eyes were opened'—they perceived the loss of grace's 'garment'). Ends 'Haec Augustinus.' ↩
  17. The opposing party (who distinguish original justice from sanctifying grace) reply that the Pauline/Augustinian texts do not move them: original justice was a supernatural gift not owed to man. Continues to next page (catchword 'sed'). ↩
  18. Marginal gloss: 'Probatur multis rationibus, Adamum cum gratia esse creatum' (it is proved by many reasons that Adam was created with grace). Completes the reply (from p.549 catchword 'sed'): original justice, being a free gift, is called grace by the Fathers. Then Pererius's own arguments for Adam created in grace (perfect body→perfect soul; the blessed state/Paradise; friend of God; tree of life). ↩
  19. Wisdom 13:1 ('vain are all men in whom there is not the knowledge of God'); Jeremiah 9:23-24 ('let him that glorieth glory in this, to know me'). Arguments: knowledge of God as supernatural end requires faith; Adam created with faith, hope, and charity; created chiefly for the supernatural end; perfect use of reason from creation implies ability to merit, which requires grace. ↩
  20. Transition to the next point: Adam received grace not only as a habit but also as an act. Continues to next page (catchword 'habitum'). ↩
  21. Marginal gloss: 'Non tantum Adam creatum esse cum habitu gratiae, sed etiam cum eius actu et usu' (Adam was created not only with the habit of grace but also with its act and use). Four arguments that Adam received grace as both habit and act (cooperating by free will). ↩
  22. Conclusion: Adam exercised acts of faith and love at the very instant of creation, God giving sanctifying grace simultaneously (as in the justification of an adult). Aquinas ST I q.96 a.1, objection 5 (the 'spiritual marriage' needs consent of one already existing) and its resolution (the will's motion is not continuous). ↩