Mind of the Church

The mind of the Church, faithfully rendered into English

Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Five — the state of innocence

QUESTION II. Whether in the state of innocence any venial sin could have been admitted

LatineEnglish

QUESTION II. Whether in the state of innocence any venial sin could have been admitted.1

QUAESTIO II. An in statu innocentiae potuisset admitti peccatum aliquod veniale.

Altera quaestio est, utrum gratia quam habuit Adam in statu innocentiae, et quam, nisi peccasset ipse, posteri eius habuissent, talis fuerit ut omnis peccati venialis admistionem et societatem excluderet? vel, ut alii proponunt eandem quaestionem, utrum Adam, manente statu innocentiae, peccare venialiter potuisset; vel utrum prius venialiter peccare potuerit quam mortaliter. Videtur enim in illo statu potuisse admitti peccatum veniale. Si enim Apostoli, qui fuerunt confirmati in gratia, et Ioannes Baptista, qui in utero matris suae sancti-...
The second question is, whether the grace which Adam had in the state of innocence—and which, had he not sinned, his descendants would have had—was such that it excluded all admixture and association of venial sin? Or, as others propose the same question, whether Adam, while the state of innocence remained, could have sinned venially; or whether he could have sinned venially before mortally. For it seems that in that state venial sin could have been admitted. For if the Apostles, who were confirmed in grace, and John the Baptist, who in his mother's womb was sancti-[fied]...2
...ficatus est, potuerunt venialiter peccare, cur non etiam Adam? neque enim maiorem in hoc quam in illis fuisse gratiam credibile est. Quod si facilius est committere peccatum veniale quam mortale, facilius igitur fuit Adamum in peccatum veniale labi quam in mortale. Et si gratia quam habebat non impediebat quominus mortaliter peccare posset, multo minus impedivisset ne posset facere qualecumque peccatum veniale. Ex adverso autem, videtur omne peccatum veniale, quia malum quoddam est dignumque aliqua poena, habensque aliquid tristitiae ac doloris adiunctum, plane adversari felicissimo statui innocentiae, qui ab omni malo corporis et animi, culpae ac poenae, vacuus erat.
...[was sancti]fied, could sin venially, why not Adam too? for it is not credible that there was greater grace in him than in them. But if it is easier to commit a venial sin than a mortal one, it was therefore easier for Adam to slip into a venial sin than into a mortal one. And if the grace he had did not prevent his being able to sin mortally, much less would it have prevented his being able to commit any venial sin whatever. On the contrary, however, it seems that every venial sin—because it is a certain evil and deserving of some penalty, and has something of sadness and pain attached—plainly opposes the most happy state of innocence, which was empty of all evil of body and soul, of fault and of penalty.3
Circa hanc quaestionem duas reperio sententias. Altera sententia est Alexandri de Hales et Bonaventurae in secundo Sententiarum, distinctione vigesima prima, articulo tertio, et Sancti Thomae in prima secundae, quaestione octuagesima nona, negantium in statu innocentiae potuisse fieri ullum peccatum veniale: sed necessarium fuisse primum peccatum esse mortale: et hanc opinionem Bonaventura dicit communiter a Doctoribus Theologiae probari, et merito sane. Namque status innocentiae non poterat destrui nisi per peccatum mortale, quippe quod aufert gratiam Dei et hominem Dei amore ac beneficiis reddit indignum. Peccatum igitur veniale non poterat destruere illum statum, nec tamen simul cum eo esse poterat, siquidem peccatum veniale multa fert secum illi tranquillissimo ac felicissimo statui omnino repugnantia.
Concerning this question I find two opinions. The one opinion is that of Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction twenty-one, article three, and of Saint Thomas, in the first part of the second part, question eighty-nine, denying that any venial sin could have been done in the state of innocence: but [holding] that it was necessary that the first sin be mortal. And this opinion Bonaventure says is commonly approved by the Doctors of Theology, and rightly indeed. For the state of innocence could not be destroyed except by mortal sin, inasmuch as that takes away the grace of God and renders man unworthy of God's love and benefits. A venial sin, therefore, could not destroy that state, nor yet could it coexist with it, since a venial sin brings with it many things wholly repugnant to that most tranquil and happy state.4
Etenim, peccatum veniale per se magnum est malum, pro quo scilicet evitando quantavis poena corporis iure sit subeunda: dolorem affert, et poenitentiam habet coniunctam, et morsum conscientiae: debetur ei aliqua poena: minuit fervorem caritatis: multiplicatumque auget difficultatem bene agendi, facitque ut cum tristitia bonum faciamus: haec autem omnia fuissent ab illius status tranquillitate et felicitate remotissima. Nihil enim erat, ut scribit Augustinus libro decimoquarto de Civitate Dei, capite decimo, quod hominis in eo statu feliciter viventis carnem animumque offenderet. Erat enim in eo tranquilla peccati devitatio: qua manente, nullum omnino malum erat quod eum undecunque contristaret. Et in eiusdem libri capite 26: Summa, inquit, erat in carne sanitas, in anima tota tranquillitas: sicut in Paradiso nullus erat aestus aut frigus, sic in eius habitatore nulla ex cupiditate vel timore accedebat bonae voluntatis offensio. Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum: gaudium vero perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat charitas ex corde puro, conscientia bona, et fide non ficta. Sic Augustinus.
For a venial sin is in itself a great evil, to avoid which any bodily penalty whatever may rightly be undergone: it brings pain, and has penitence joined to it, and the gnawing of conscience: some penalty is owed it: it lessens the fervor of charity: and, multiplied, it increases the difficulty of doing well, and makes us do good with sadness: but all these things would have been most remote from the tranquillity and happiness of that state. For there was nothing, as Augustine writes in the fourteenth book of the City of God, chapter ten, that could offend the flesh and soul of man living happily in that state. For there was in it a tranquil avoidance of sin: which remaining, there was no evil at all that could from any source sadden him. And in chapter 26 of the same book: ‘The highest,’ he says, ‘health was in the flesh, in the soul entire tranquillity: as in Paradise there was no heat or cold, so in its inhabitant no offense of good will arose from desire or fear. Nothing at all was sad, nothing was vainly glad: but joy was perpetuated from God, toward whom charity glowed out of a pure heart, a good conscience, and faith unfeigned.’ Thus Augustine.5
Deinde, peccatum veniale est quaedam inordinatio hominis, repugnat igitur summae rectitudini, in qua secundum omnes suas partes et potentias homo creatus est. Ad haec, si in illo statu fuisset tanta sanitas corporis ut nullus vel levissimus homini morbus potuisset accidere, ergo par fuisset animi sanitas et ab omni culpa vacuitas. Denique, si in...
Next, a venial sin is a certain disorder of man, and therefore is repugnant to the highest uprightness in which man was created according to all his parts and powers. Besides, if in that state there had been such health of body that not even the slightest disease could have befallen man, then there would have been equal health of soul and freedom from all fault. Finally, if in...6
...si in eo statu admisisset homo peccatum veniale, aut propter id doluisset, aut nihil doluisset: si doluisset, dolor ille et tristitia poena fuisset animi, et gaudio quo in eo statu usquequaque plenissimo fruebatur homo, contraria: si nihil doluisset, hoc ipsum auxisset culpam, et deteriorem hominem graviorique dignum supplicio fecisset.
...if in that state man had committed a venial sin, either he would have grieved for it, or grieved not at all: if he had grieved, that pain and sadness would have been a penalty of the soul, and contrary to the joy which in that state man enjoyed everywhere most fully: if he had grieved not at all, this very thing would have increased the guilt, and made the man worse and worthy of a heavier punishment.7
Altera fuit sententia, potuisset Adam in illo statu prius peccare venialiter quam mortaliter: quam Scotus in secundo sententiarum, dist. 21, quaest. 1, sequitur, et hisce confirmat argumentis: Rectitudo status innocentiae magis repugnabat peccato mortali quam veniali: sed non obstante illa rectitudine potuit Adam peccare mortaliter: ergo potuisset etiam peccare venialiter. Deinde, donum illius innocentiae vel iustitiae originalis non magis hominem iungebat cum Deo quam qualiscumque et quantacumque gratia gratum faciens quae est in viatore: sed quantacumque fuerit gratia gratum faciens, potest ea simul esse cum peccato veniali, ut fuit in Apostolis: ergo similiter in Adamo potuit contingere.
The other opinion was that Adam in that state could have sinned venially before mortally: which Scotus, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 21, question 1, follows, and confirms by these arguments: The uprightness of the state of innocence was more repugnant to mortal than to venial sin: but, notwithstanding that uprightness, Adam could sin mortally: therefore he could also have sinned venially. Next, the gift of that innocence or original justice did not join man to God more than any sanctifying grace whatever, of whatever degree, which is in the wayfarer: but whatever sanctifying grace there be, it can coexist with venial sin, as it was in the Apostles: therefore the same could happen likewise in Adam.8
His accedit, quod tria sunt genera peccati venialis: quoddam enim accidit homini ex surreptione sensualitatis: alterum provenit ex subito aliquo et indeliberato rationis motu, uti est primus motus infidelitatis aut desperationis: atque haec duo genera peccati venialis et Scotus fatetur, nec ullus Theologorum abnuit, in statum innocentiae cadere non potuisse. Siquidem in eo sensualitas usque eo rationi erat subiecta, ut nec praeverteret eius imperium et moderationem, nec detrectaret. Ratio autem ipsa sic erat affecta et divino munere firmata, ut nullum in actum exiret, nisi hominis consilio, deliberatione et electione perfectum. Verum, praeter haec duo genera peccati venialis, est tertium quoddam, quod ex suo genere est veniale ob imperfectionem actus et levitatem materiae: cuiusmodi est verbum ociosum, et mendacium aut iocosum aut officiosum: hoc genus peccati venialis non videt Scotus qui posset negari in eo statu admitti potuisse. Nam si donum illud innocentiae vel iustitiae originalis non obstabat quin posset Adam peccare mortaliter, multo minus obstitisset ut non posset peccare venialiter. Non enim admissio huiusmodi peccati venialis arguit inordinatam esse partem superiorem aut inferiorem hominis, nec aliam inordinationem ponit quam quae in ipso actu peccati venialis implicatur.
To these is added that there are three kinds of venial sin: for one befalls man from the surreption of sensuality; another arises from some sudden and undeliberate motion of reason, such as is the first motion of unbelief or despair: and these two kinds of venial sin both Scotus admits, and no Theologian denies, could not fall into the state of innocence. For in it sensuality was so subject to reason that it neither forestalled its command and moderation, nor refused it. And reason itself was so disposed and strengthened by the divine gift that it issued into no act unless perfected by the man's counsel, deliberation, and choice. But besides these two kinds of venial sin, there is a third, which is by its own kind venial on account of the imperfection of the act and the lightness of the matter: of which kind is an idle word, and a lie, whether jocose or officious: this kind of venial sin Scotus does not see how it could be denied that it could have been admitted in that state. For if that gift of innocence or original justice did not prevent Adam from being able to sin mortally, much less would it have prevented his being able to sin venially. For the admission of a venial sin of this kind does not prove that the superior or inferior part of man was disordered, nor does it posit any disorder other than what is implicated in the very act of the venial sin.9
Quod autem contra quidam obiiciunt, omni peccato veniali deberi poenam aliquam, omnem autem poenam illi statui fuisse contrariam; ad id Scotus dupliciter respondet: Primo, non quamcumque poenam repugnasse illi statui, sed poenam duntaxat mortis corporalis, quae soli peccato mortali debebatur: tum, potuisse peccatum veniale citra poenam elui, per solam videlicet voluntatis displicentiam: denique etiam sine animi tristitia per actus ferventes charitatis eiusmodi peccata consumi ac deleri potuisse. Hactenus ex ipso Scoto. Et quanquam Bonaventura non negat hanc positionem satis esse pro-...
But as for what some object against this—that to every venial sin some penalty is owed, but that every penalty was contrary to that state—to this Scotus answers in two ways: First, that not every penalty was repugnant to that state, but only the penalty of bodily death, which was owed to mortal sin alone: then, that a venial sin could have been washed away without penalty, namely by the mere displeasure of the will: finally, that even without sadness of soul, such sins could have been consumed and blotted out by fervent acts of charity. Thus far from Scotus himself. And although Bonaventure does not deny that this position is sufficiently pro-[bable]...10
probabilem, affirmat tamen communiter eam non approbari a Doctoribus Theologiae. Et sane, inquit, ea opinio improbabilitatem habet, si quis attendat ad perfectionem status et regulam rectitudinis in qua erat Adam: a quo etiam cum nullum haberet impellens, exire non poterat, nisi contemnendo divinam iustitiam et foedando suam innocentiam et corrumpendo naturam suam: quae omnia faciunt primam culpam Adae non venialem sed mortalem fuisse, nec potuisse aliter esse. Et idem est communis opinio quam hodie approbant Doctores, primum peccatum Adae non veniale sed mortale esse debuisse. Sic Bonaventura.
...[that this position is sufficiently] probable, yet he affirms that it is not commonly approved by the Doctors of Theology. ‘And indeed,’ he says, ‘that opinion has improbability, if one attends to the perfection of the state and the rule of rectitude in which Adam was: from which, even though he had nothing impelling him, he could not depart except by despising the divine justice and defiling his innocence and corrupting his nature: all of which make the first fault of Adam to have been not venial but mortal, nor able to have been otherwise.’ And it is the common opinion which the Doctors approve today, that the first sin of Adam ought to have been not venial but mortal. Thus Bonaventure.11
Nos igitur priori sententiae, quae gravioribus rationum momentis et Doctorum auctoritatibus fulta probabilior est, assentientes, contrarias ei rationes supra positas breviter dissolvamus. Ad primam rationem Scoti ita respondendum est: mortale peccatum eo nomine magis quam veniale repugnasse illi statui, quod eum statum penitus destruebat: at peccatum veniale non satis erat ad eum statum evertendum: non enim felicitatem illam amitti decebat nisi propter id quo fieret homo inimicus Deo, eius lege contempta atque violata. Nihilominus tamen peccatum veniale omnino adversabatur illi statui, quem, dum is manebat, omnis mali tam culpae quam poenae expertem esse conveniebat, ut a Deo constitutum fuerat. Itaque Adamum committere peccatum mortale nihil repugnabat, sicut nec excidere illo statu innocentiae et felicitatem illam perdere: at manente felicitate illius status, admitti peccatum veniale, manifesta erat repugnantia, propterea quod status ille, ut diximus, nullius mali particeps erat: veniale autem peccatum nec leve, nec unum malum homini attulisset.
We, therefore, assenting to the former opinion, which is more probable, supported by weightier weights of reasons and by the authorities of the Doctors, let us briefly dissolve the contrary reasons set down above. To Scotus's first reason it must be answered thus: that mortal sin was more repugnant to that state than venial under this title, that it utterly destroyed that state; but venial sin was not enough to overthrow that state: for it was not fitting that that happiness be lost except on account of that by which man became an enemy of God, his law despised and violated. Nevertheless venial sin was wholly opposed to that state, which, while it remained, ought to be free of all evil, both of fault and of penalty, as it had been established by God. And so for Adam to commit a mortal sin was in no way repugnant, just as neither to fall from that state of innocence and lose that happiness: but, the happiness of that state remaining, for a venial sin to be admitted there was a manifest repugnance, because that state, as we said, partook of no evil: and a venial sin would have brought man no slight nor single evil.12
Ad secundam rationem Scoti sic respondeatur: Donum innocentiae et iustitiae originalis quantum ad aliqua magis hominem cum Deo coniungebat quam gratia gratum faciens, siquidem iustitia originalis sanabat omnes animae vires, et carnem sensumque perfecte subiiciebat rationi, ipsamque rationem vigilantissimam reddebat, et usque eo intentam ad id quod agi oportebat, ut nihil ea nisi scienter, consulte, ac deliberate ageret. Quocirca in illo statu facilis erat cuiuslibet venialis peccati vitatio: nunc autem, etiam a magna praeditis gratia, ad unum omnia venialia peccata perpetuo declinari non possunt.
To Scotus's second reason let it be answered thus: The gift of innocence and of original justice, as regards some things, joined man more to God than sanctifying grace, since original justice healed all the powers of the soul, and perfectly subjected the flesh and sense to reason, and rendered reason itself most watchful, and so intent upon what ought to be done, that it did nothing except knowingly, advisedly, and deliberately. Wherefore in that state the avoidance of any venial sin was easy: but now, even by those endowed with great grace, all venial sins down to the last cannot be perpetually avoided.13
Tertia Scoti ratio hoc a nobis habeat responsum. Nos quidem ingenue fatemur, ad perpetuo vitanda omnia venialia peccata tertii generis, quae Theologi appellant venialia ex genere suo, non satis fuisse donum gratiae gratum facientis, nec virtutes morales aut divinas Adami animo insidentes atque inhaerentes: eiusmodi enim dona et habitus multo magis arcere ab Adamo et excludere peccatum mortale debuissent quam veniale, maiorem enim cum illo quam cum hoc repugnantiam habent. Quod si Adamum admissione peccati mortalis prohibere non potuerunt, multo minus venialis peccati effectione prohibuissent. Existimamus igitur, praeter illa dona et...
Let Scotus's third reason have this answer from us. We indeed candidly admit that, for the perpetual avoidance of all venial sins of the third kind, which the Theologians call venial by their own kind, the gift of sanctifying grace was not enough, nor the moral or divine virtues seated and inhering in Adam's soul: for gifts and habits of this sort ought much more to have warded off from Adam and excluded mortal sin than venial, since they have greater repugnance with the former than with the latter. But if they could not prevent Adam from the admission of a mortal sin, much less would they have prevented him from the commission of a venial sin. We think, therefore, that besides those gifts and...14
...et habitus virtutum divinitus inditos, adfuisse Adamo singularem quandam providentiam, curam et protectionem Dei, qui, manente illo statu, servabat Adamum et continebat ne in istiusmodi peccata venialia prolaberetur: quemadmodum et vitam et sanitatem eius mirabiliter conservabat, ne ab innumerabilibus rebus quae extrinsecus accidere et nocere ei poterant vel minimum laederetur. Constituerat enim Deus (id quod maxime consentaneum erat) ut status ille non nisi usquequaque integer et expers omnis mali permaneret: ob idque vacuitas omnis mali poenae cum vacuitate ab omni malo culpae necessario coniuncta erat.
...and the habits of the virtues divinely implanted, there was present to Adam a certain singular providence, care, and protection of God, who, while that state remained, preserved Adam and kept him from slipping into venial sins of this kind: just as he also wondrously preserved his life and health, lest he be even slightly harmed by the innumerable things that could from without befall and injure him. For God had established (which was most fitting) that that state should remain only wholly intact and free of all evil: and on this account, freedom from all evil of penalty was necessarily joined with freedom from all evil of fault.15
Non sum inscius quemadmodum hanc Scoti rationem Bonaventura dissolvat: censet enim huiusmodi peccata genere suo venialia, uti est verbum ociosum aut mendacium officiosum sive iocosum, quae nunc in statu naturae lapsae sunt venialia, tunc ob illius status perfectionem et personae dignitatem futura fuisse mortalia. Sic enim in lib. 2 sententiarum, distinct. 21, ar. 3, quaest. 1, scribit Bonaventura: Ad illud quod obicitur, potuisse Adamum dicere verbum ociosum, quod est veniale peccatum, respondendum est verbum ociosum futurum Adamo fuisse mortale propter status eius perfectionem: unde quod dicitur communiter, aliquod esse peccatum ex genere suo veniale, hoc intelligendum est respectu naturae lapsae. Verum hanc opinionem merito refellit Sanctus Thomas, prima secundae, quaest. 89, artic. 3: Communiter, inquit, ponitur hominem in statu innocentiae non potuisse venialiter peccare: quod non ita est intelligendum, quasi id quod nobis est veniale, si Adam commisisset, futurum ei fuisset mortale propter altitudinem sui status, dignitas enim personae est circumstantia aggravans quidem peccatum, non tamen ipsum transferens in aliam speciem, nisi forte superveniente deformitate inobedientiae aut voti aut alicuius eiusmodi: quod in proposito dici non potest. Unde id quod est de se veniale non potuit transferri in mortale propter dignitatem primi status. Sic ergo intelligendum est, non potuisse Adam primo peccare venialiter, quia non potuit fieri ut committeret aliquid quod esset ex se peccatum veniale, priusquam integritatem primi status amitteret peccando mortaliter. Haec S. Thomas.
I am not unaware how Bonaventure dissolves this reason of Scotus: for he holds that sins of this kind venial by their own genus—such as an idle word, or an officious or jocose lie, which now in the state of fallen nature are venial—then, on account of the perfection of that state and the dignity of the person, would have been mortal. For thus, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 21, article 3, question 1, Bonaventure writes: ‘To that which is objected, that Adam could have spoken an idle word, which is a venial sin, it must be answered that an idle word would have been mortal to Adam on account of the perfection of his state: whence what is commonly said, that some sin is by its own genus venial, this is to be understood with respect to fallen nature.’ But Saint Thomas rightly refutes this opinion, in the first of the second part, question 89, article 3: ‘It is commonly held,’ he says, ‘that man in the state of innocence could not sin venially: which is not to be understood as if what is venial to us, had Adam committed it, would have been mortal to him on account of the loftiness of his state—for the dignity of a person is a circumstance that indeed aggravates a sin, yet does not transfer it into another species, unless perhaps a deformity of disobedience or of a vow or of some such thing supervenes, which cannot be said in the case proposed. Hence what is of itself venial could not be transferred into mortal on account of the dignity of the first state. So therefore it is to be understood that Adam could not first sin venially, because it could not come about that he should commit something that was of itself a venial sin, before he lost the integrity of the first state by sinning mortally.’ Thus S. Thomas.16

Translator’s notes

  1. Question divider opening the second question of the disputation on sanctifying grace. ↩
  2. Opening of Question II, with the 'videtur' (it seems venial sin was possible): the Apostles (confirmed in grace) and John the Baptist (sanctified in the womb) could sin venially. Continues to next page (catchword 'ficatus'). ↩
  3. Completes the 'videtur' (the Apostles/John the Baptist could sin venially, so why not Adam) and the contrary view ('Ex adverso'): venial sin, an evil bringing sorrow, opposes the blessed state of innocence. ↩
  4. Marginal gloss: 'Prima opinio, quae est probabilior' (the first opinion, which is more probable). First opinion (Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure Sent. II d.21 a.3, Aquinas ST I-II q.89): no venial sin possible in innocence; the first sin had to be mortal. The state is destroyed only by mortal sin, yet venial sin could not coexist with it either. ↩
  5. Why venial sin opposes innocence (it brings pain, remorse, lessens charity). Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.10 and 14.26 ('the highest health in the flesh, entire tranquillity in the soul'; 1 Tim 1:5 'charity out of a pure heart, good conscience, faith unfeigned'). Ends 'Sic Augustinus.' ↩
  6. Further arguments of the first opinion: venial sin is a disorder repugnant to man's created rectitude; perfect bodily health implies perfect spiritual health. Continues to next page (catchword 'si in'). ↩
  7. Final argument of the first opinion: a venial sin in that state leads to a dilemma—grief (a penalty contrary to his joy) or no grief (which would increase guilt). ↩
  8. Marginal gloss: 'Secunda opinio Scoti' (the second opinion, of Scotus). Second opinion (Scotus, Sent. II d.21 q.1): Adam could sin venially before mortally—two arguments (uprightness more opposed to mortal than venial; grace coexists with venial sin, as in the Apostles). ↩
  9. Marginal gloss: 'Tria genera peccati venialis' (three kinds of venial sin). Scotus's three kinds: (1) from surreption of sensuality; (2) from a sudden undeliberate motion of reason (first motion of unbelief/despair)—these two could not fall into innocence; (3) venial by kind through imperfect act/light matter (idle word, jocose or officious lie)—which Scotus sees no reason could not be admitted. ↩
  10. Objection (every venial sin deserves a penalty, every penalty opposes that state) and Scotus's twofold reply (only bodily death opposed it; venial sin could be cleansed without penalty by the will's displeasure or fervent acts of charity). Ends 'Hactenus ex ipso Scoto.' Colophon at foot: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with new gathering signature 'AAA'. Continues to next page (catchword 'probabilem'). ↩
  11. Completes the Bonaventure citation (from p.553 catchword 'probabilem'): although the Scotist position is probable, Bonaventure himself holds with the common opinion that Adam's first sin had to be mortal. Ends 'Sic Bonaventura.' ↩
  12. Marginal gloss: 'Solutio rationum Scoti' (the solution of Scotus's reasons). Pererius sides with the first (more probable) opinion and answers Scotus's first argument: mortal sin destroys the state; venial sin, though it could not destroy it, was nonetheless wholly incompatible with a state free of all evil. ↩
  13. Marginal gloss (continued): 'Unde habuerit Adam, ut in statu innocentiae nullum posset facere peccatum veniale' (whence Adam had it that in the state of innocence he could commit no venial sin). Answer to Scotus's second argument: original justice (unlike ordinary grace in the wayfarer) healed all the soul's powers and made reason fully deliberate, so venial sin was easily avoided. ↩
  14. Answer to Scotus's third argument: grace and the infused virtues by themselves were not enough to prevent every venial sin 'by kind'—so the explanation must lie elsewhere (God's special providence, developed on the next page). Continues to next page (catchword '&'). ↩
  15. Pererius's answer to Scotus's third argument completed: God's special providence guarded Adam from venial sins (as it preserved his life and health), since the state was to remain wholly free of evil—freedom from penalty-evil joined to freedom from fault-evil. ↩
  16. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur Bonaventura' (Bonaventure is refuted). Bonaventure's solution (Sent. II d.21 a.3 q.1): venial-by-kind sins would have been mortal for Adam because of his state's dignity. Aquinas (ST I-II q.89 a.3) refutes this: dignity aggravates but does not change the species, so what is venial by kind cannot become mortal. ↩