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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Five — the state of innocence

QUESTION IV. Whether in the state of innocence Adam's descendants, once generated, would have been confirmed in grace

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QUESTION IV. Whether in the state of innocence Adam's descendants, once generated, would have been confirmed in grace.1

QUAESTIO IIII. Vtrum in statu innocentiae, posteri Adae generati, fuissent in gratia confirmati.

Sed illa gravior est quaestio, utrum, si Adam non peccasset, posteri eius nati fuissent in gratia confirmati. Tres feruntur Theologorum sententiae. Prima est Scoti, qui in secundo Sententiarum, distinctione 20, quaestione 1, negat posteros Adae sic iri confirmatum in gratia, ut in posterum ipsi peccare non possent: quia hoc est proprium status comprehensorum, et repugnat statui viatorum: in quo quicunque versantur, eorum voluntas ad bonum et malum iuxta flexibilis est et mutabilis. Nam cum ipsum per se bonum quod est Deus non sit clare visum viatori, atque omne aliud bonum sit finitum, particulare, et cui aliqua ratio boni desit, non id potest voluntatem hominis viatoris necessario avertere a malo et in bono confirmare: quemad-...
But that is a weightier question, whether, if Adam had not sinned, his descendants would have been born confirmed in grace. Three opinions of the Theologians are reported. The first is Scotus's, who, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 20, question 1, denies that Adam's descendants would be so confirmed in grace that thereafter they could not sin: because this is proper to the state of the comprehensores (the blessed), and is repugnant to the state of wayfarers; in which, whoever are engaged, their will is equally flexible and mutable toward good and evil. For since the very good in itself, which is God, is not clearly seen by the wayfarer, and every other good is finite, particular, and lacking some aspect of good, this cannot necessarily turn the will of the wayfaring man away from evil and confirm it in good: just-as...2
...modum beatos essentia divina clare visa, quae omne bonum in se continet, et eminenter plenissimeque satiare et explere potest omnem appetitum humanae voluntatis, necessario voluntatem abducit a malo et in bono confirmat. Et hac ipsa ratione usus est B. Thomas in 1. part. quaest. 100. artic. 2, eandem hanc tractans quaestionem. His praeterea Scotus addit, si Adam primam illam tentationem vicisset, in gratia confirmatum iri, ut deinceps peccare non posset, non quidem ratione status, sed ex speciali assistentia et protectione Dei, sicut de confirmatione Apostolorum in gratia, et super omnes beatissimae Virginis sentiunt Theologi. Nec solus Adam, ut placet Scoto, confirmatus esset in gratia, sed etiam omnes eius posteri, si, cum ad usum rationis venissent, primo eis ingruentem tentationem superassent. Hanc Scoti opinionem etiam Beatus Thomas in secundo Sententiarum, dist. 20, quaest. 2, art. 3, probabilem putavit.
...[just as] the blessed, the divine essence being clearly seen—which contains all good in itself, and can eminently and most fully satisfy and fill every appetite of the human will—necessarily draws the will away from evil and confirms it in good. And this very reasoning the Blessed Thomas used in the first part, question 100, article 2, treating this same question. To these Scotus further adds that, if Adam had conquered that first temptation, he would have been confirmed in grace, so that thereafter he could not sin—not indeed by reason of his state, but by the special assistance and protection of God, just as the Theologians hold concerning the confirmation in grace of the Apostles, and above all of the most blessed Virgin. Nor would Adam alone, as Scotus holds, have been confirmed in grace, but also all his descendants, if, when they had come to the use of reason, they had overcome the first temptation that assailed them. This opinion of Scotus the Blessed Thomas too, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 20, question 2, article 3, thought probable.3
Mihi tamen nequaquam videtur probabilis. Cum enim Deus Adamo dixerit: In quocumque die de eo ligno comederis, morte morieris, satis indicavit Adamum per totam vitam astrictum fore praecepto non edendi ex arbore scientiae boni et mali, semperque futurum in periculo et discrimine perdendi gratiam quam acceperat: ita ut non prima modo superanda illi fuerit tentatio, sed omnis etiam quae deinceps potuisset accidere: hoc enim demonstrat illud, In quocumque die comederis. Id quod ratione item probabili concluditur. Non enim similis ratio est Angeli atque hominis: nimirum illius via primo actu ab eo, postquam est creatus, edito sive bono sive malo terminatur: huius autem via pariter cum ipsa vita extenditur, idemque utriusque terminus et finis est: dumque vitam in terris agit quisque, potest vel ex malo ad bonum vel ex bono ad malum converti. Possum item eo Scotum urgere argumento: Aut victoria illius primae tentationis promeruisset confirmationem in gratia vi et natura sua, aut ex aliquo Dei privilegio seu pacto, non vi ac potestate sua: idem enim efficeret in nobis: nec tale aliquod privilegium aut pactum, vel in Sacris literis expressum aut indicatum, vel a Patribus traditum invenitur.
To me, however, it by no means seems probable. For when God said to Adam, ‘In whatever day thou shalt eat of that tree, thou shalt die the death,’ he sufficiently indicated that Adam would throughout his whole life be bound by the precept of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and would always be in peril and danger of losing the grace he had received: so that not only the first temptation was to be overcome by him, but also every one that could afterward befall: for this is what that phrase shows, ‘In whatever day thou shalt eat.’ This is likewise concluded by probable reason. For the case of the Angel and of man is not alike: for the Angel's ‘way’ is terminated by the first act, whether good or evil, that he produced after he was created; but man's ‘way’ extends together with his very life, and the term and end of both is the same: and while each lives his life on earth, he can be converted either from evil to good, or from good to evil. I can also press Scotus with this argument: Either the victory over that first temptation would have merited confirmation in grace by its own force and nature, or by some privilege or pact of God, not by its own force: for [if the former] it would do the same in us; but no such privilege or pact is found either expressed or indicated in the Sacred Scriptures, or handed down by the Fathers.4
Altera sententia est, si Adam non peccasset, posteros eius confirmatum iri in iustitia originali, non tamen in gratia gratum faciente: potuissent enim peccare, et peccando gratiam Dei amittere, non tamen iustitiam originalem. Nam secundum huius sententiae auctores, peccatum mortale per se ac formaliter repugnat gratiae gratum facienti, non tamen iustitiae originali, quam isti faciunt et re diversam et separabilem a gratia: putant enim ipsam fuisse gratiam gratis datam, quam nihil repugnat simul esse cum peccato mortali. Ita sensit Catharinus super tertium caput Geneseos, et super idem caput Tostatus 6. et 7. quaest. Nos hanc opinionem, qua iustitiam originalem facit re diversam et separabilem a gratia, infra confutabimus: qua vero tradit eam...
The other opinion is that, if Adam had not sinned, his descendants would be confirmed in original justice, but not in sanctifying grace: for they could have sinned, and by sinning lost the grace of God, but not original justice. For according to the authors of this opinion, mortal sin of itself and formally is repugnant to sanctifying grace, but not to original justice—which they make both really distinct from, and separable from, grace: for they think it was a grace freely given, with which it is in no way repugnant to coexist with mortal sin. So Catharinus held, on the third chapter of Genesis, and on the same chapter Tostatus, questions 6 and 7. We shall refute below this opinion, by which it makes original justice really distinct from and separable from grace: but as for what it asserts, that it...5
...eam simul cum peccato mortali esse potuisse, hac nunc argumentatione refellemus. Peccatum mortale necessario tollebat quatuor effectus proprios iustitiae originalis, ergo ipsam quoque iustitiam originalem auferebat. Primus enim effectus iustitiae originalis erat rectitudo partis superioris, qua scilicet homo secundum rationem et voluntatem erat divinae legi et voluntati omnino subiectus, sed omne peccatum mortale est contra rectitudinem rationis et contra legem et voluntatem Dei: omne igitur peccatum mortale originali iustitiae plane adversabatur. Alter originalis iustitiae effectus rectitudo erat partis inferioris, qua caro et sensus ad rationis et spiritus iudicium plane conformabantur, et sub eorum imperium erant omnino subiecta. Hanc vero rectitudinem partis inferioris funditus evertebant peccata mortalia, quae circa appetitum irascibilem et concupiscibilem versantur. Tertius effectus erat nullam habere propensionem ad malum, nullamque bene agendi difficultatem: peccatum autem mortale propensum hominem facit ad malum. Cum igitur per iustitiam originalem efficeretur homo idoneus valensque ad omne bonum facile, prompte et gaudenter efficiendum, et ad omne peccatum evitandum: peccatum autem mortale saepenumero iteratum atque multiplicatum reddat hominem ad bene agendum tardum, ignavum, imbecillum: concluditur iustitiam originalem omnis peccati mortalis coniunctionem et societatem exclusisse.
...that it could coexist with mortal sin, this we shall now refute by this argument. Mortal sin necessarily took away the four proper effects of original justice; therefore it also took away original justice itself. For the first effect of original justice was the rectitude of the superior part, by which, namely, man was wholly subject, according to reason and will, to the divine law and will; but every mortal sin is against the rectitude of reason and against the law and will of God: every mortal sin, therefore, was plainly opposed to original justice. The second effect of original justice was the rectitude of the inferior part, by which the flesh and sense were plainly conformed to the judgment of reason and spirit, and were wholly subject under their command. But this rectitude of the inferior part the mortal sins, which are concerned with the irascible and concupiscible appetite, utterly overthrew. The third effect was to have no propensity to evil, and no difficulty in doing well: but mortal sin makes man prone to evil. Since, therefore, by original justice man was made fit and able to do every good easily, readily, and joyfully, and to avoid every sin, but mortal sin, often repeated and multiplied, renders man slow, sluggish, and weak for doing well: it is concluded that original justice excluded all conjunction and association with mortal sin.6
Quartus denique effectus erat perpetuum animi gaudium et laetitia, iugis conscientiae pax et securitas, summaque mentis quies et tranquillitas: quibus plane contraria fert secum omne peccatum mortale, tristitiam scilicet animi, morsum conscientiae, et horrificum inferni suppliciorum et divini iudicii metum et terrorem. Quid multa? potestas non peccandi individuus erat comes iustitiae originalis, cum non moriendi potestate coniuncta, uti disputat Augustinus in libro de Correptione et gratia, cap. 11, et ex ipsa Scriptura facile est intelligere: sed potentia non peccandi fuisset peccando amissa, ergo similiter etiam potentia non moriendi: at, duplici illa potentia non moriendi et non peccandi perdita, stare non poterat iustitia originalis, nec illius status felicitas: fuisset nempe perquam indecorum rationique dissentaneum atque humanae vitae perniciosum, si in sceleratissimis hominibus potentia non moriendi mansisset.
The fourth and last effect, finally, was perpetual joy and gladness of soul, continual peace and security of conscience, and the highest quiet and tranquillity of mind: to which every mortal sin brings with it things plainly contrary, namely sadness of soul, the gnawing of conscience, and the horrific fear and terror of the punishments of hell and of the divine judgment. In short: the power of not sinning was an inseparable companion of original justice, joined with the power of not dying, as Augustine disputes in the book On Reproof and Grace, chapter 11, and it is easy to understand from Scripture itself: but the power of not sinning would have been lost by sinning, therefore likewise the power of not dying: and, those two powers of not dying and not sinning being lost, original justice could not stand, nor the happiness of that state: for it would have been most unseemly, contrary to reason, and pernicious to human life, if in the most wicked men the power of not dying had remained.7
Posset forte dici, licet quodlibet peccatum mortale contrarium esset iustitiae originali, non tamen quodlibet peccatum ad eam destruendam vim habuisse: quemadmodum habitum virtutis moralis acquisitae, uti est temperantia, non quodlibet peccatum intemperantiae penitus destruit. Verum esto: certe quodlibet peccatum mortale remittit et relaxat vim et vigorem virtutis, tollitque summam rationis rectitudinem et ad bene agendum promptitudinem, et si fuerit saepius iteratum, tandem ipsum virtutis habitum radicitus ex animo evellet.
It could perhaps be said that, although every mortal sin was contrary to original justice, yet not every sin had the force to destroy it: just as not every sin of intemperance utterly destroys the habit of acquired moral virtue, such as temperance. But be it so: certainly every mortal sin remits and relaxes the force and vigor of virtue, and takes away the highest rectitude of reason and the readiness for doing well; and if it be more often repeated, it will at last uproot the very habit of virtue from the soul.8
Tertia opinio est Anselmi, qui putat, si Adam non peccasset, omnes eius posteros in gratia confirmatum iri. His enim verbis scribit in libro primo, Cur Deus homo, cap. 18: In illa iustitia in qua erant primi homines constituti, videtur quod, si vicissent ut non peccarent tentati, ita confirmarentur cum omni propagine sua, ut peccare ultra non possent: quemadmodum, quia victi peccare, sic infirmati sunt, ut, quantum in ipsis est, sine peccato esse non possent. Quis enim audeat dicere plus valere iniustitiam ad alligandum in servitutem hominem in prima persuasione sibi consentientem, quam valeret iustitia ad confirmandum cum libertate sibi in eadem prima tentatione adhaerentem? Nam quemadmodum, quoniam humana natura tota, quae erat in parentibus primis, tota in illis victa est ut peccaret (excepto illo solo homine, quem Deus, sicut sine viri semine de Virgine facere scivit, sic a peccato Adae secernere voluit), ita in eisdem tota vicisset, si non peccasset. Haec Anselmus.
The third opinion is Anselm's, who thinks that, if Adam had not sinned, all his descendants would have been confirmed in grace. For in these words he writes in the first book, Why God Became Man, chapter 18: ‘In that justice in which the first men were constituted, it seems that, if they had conquered so as not to sin when tempted, they would have been so confirmed together with all their offspring that they could sin no more: just as, because, being conquered, [they consented] to sin, they were so weakened that, as far as in them lies, they cannot be without sin. For who would dare to say that injustice avails more to bind into servitude the man consenting to it at the first persuasion, than justice would avail to confirm in liberty the man adhering to it in the same first temptation? For just as, because the whole human nature which was in the first parents was wholly conquered in them so that it sinned (except that one man alone, whom God, as he knew how to make from the Virgin without the seed of man, so willed to separate from the sin of Adam), so in those same it would wholly have conquered, if it had not sinned.’ Thus Anselm.9
Cuius quasi adstipulator Gregorius, in lib. 4 Moralium, cap. 36, vel secundum distinctionem capitum quam alii codices habent 28, fere similia videtur scribere: Si nulla, inquit, primum parentem peccati putredo corrupisset, nequaquam ex se filios gehennae generasset: sed hi qui nunc per Redemptorem nostrum servandi sunt, soli ab illo electi nascerentur. Sic Gregorius. Verum hanc sententiam, quae pro quarta opinione disputaturi sumus, falsam esse convincent. Est igitur quarta opinio Durandi in secundo Sentent. dist. 20, quaest. 5, et beati Thomae in 1. parte, quaest. 100, artic. 2: tametsi Adam non peccasset, non idcirco tamen posteros eius generatum iri confirmatos in gratia; quae fuit etiam B. Augustini sententia. In lib. enim 1 Retractationum, cap. 23, ita scribit: Si et in parentibus et in filiis foecunditas felicitasque mansisset, usque ad certum sanctorum numerum quem praedestinavit Deus, nascerentur homines non parentibus successuri morientibus, sed cum viventibus regnaturi. Essent ergo etiam ista cognationes atque affinitates, si nullus delinqueret nullusque moreretur. Verum hoc apertius dixit Augustinus lib. 14 de Civitate Dei, cap. 10: Tam felix, ait, universa societas esset humana, si nec illi malum quod etiam in posteros traiicerent, nec quisquam ex eorum stirpe iniquitatem committeret, qua damnationem reciperet. Sic Augustinus.
Of whom Gregory is, as it were, a confirmer, in the fourth book of the Morals, chapter 36 (or, according to the division of chapters which other codices have, 28), where he seems to write nearly similar things: ‘If,’ he says, ‘no putrefaction of sin had corrupted the first parent, he would by no means have begotten of himself sons of hell: but those who are now to be saved through our Redeemer would be born his elect alone.’ Thus Gregory. But this opinion the arguments for the fourth opinion, which we are about to dispute, will convince to be false. The fourth opinion, then, is that of Durandus in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 20, question 5, and of the Blessed Thomas in the first part, question 100, article 2: that, even if Adam had not sinned, his descendants would not on that account have been generated confirmed in grace; which was also the opinion of the Blessed Augustine. For in the first book of the Retractations, chapter 23, he writes thus: ‘If both in the parents and in the children fruitfulness and happiness had remained, up to the certain number of the saints which God predestined, men would be born not to succeed dying parents, but to reign with the living. There would, therefore, be these kinships and affinities, if no one sinned and no one died.’ But Augustine said this more openly in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 10: ‘So happy,’ he says, ‘would the whole human society be, if neither those [first parents] should transmit any evil to their descendants, nor any of their stock should commit the iniquity by which he would receive damnation.’ Thus Augustine.10
Atque id licet ad hunc modum argumentari. Si Adam non est creatus in gratia stabilis et confirmatus, non est credibile posteros eius generatum iri confirmatos in gratia: non enim maiorem illi accepturi fuissent gratiam quam primus eorum parens initio accepisset.
And this may be argued in this manner. If Adam was not created stable and confirmed in grace, it is not credible that his descendants would be generated confirmed in grace: for they would not have received a greater grace than their first parent had received at the beginning.11
Sicut igitur Adam ita creatus est in gratia, ut eam tamen perdere peccando potuerit, ita posteros eius ad eundem modum generatum iri in gratia existimandum est. Nec vero cogitari potest perseverantiam Adami in obedientia divinae legis causam futuram, ut vocant, meritoriam cur posteri eius generandi essent in gratia confirmati. Si enim nec Adam potuit, nec ullus hominum potest alii homini de condigno promereri vel primae gratiae donationem vel eiusdem accretionem (id enim unius Christi, qui caput est totius Ecclesiae omniumque electorum, proprium est): multo igitur minus confirmationem posterorum suorum in gratia promereri potuit. Quid, quod si Christus dominus, cum sit caput Ecclesiae verusque Deus et homo, et qui meruit omnibus de condigno gratiam et gloriam, his tamen qui per baptismum in ipso regenerantur non tribuit confirmationem in gratia: quanto igitur minus credibile est, ex Adamo progeneratos, propter illius meritum, gratiae confirmationem accepturos?
As, therefore, Adam was so created in grace that he could nevertheless lose it by sinning, so it must be supposed that his descendants would be generated in grace in the same way. Nor indeed can it be thought that Adam's perseverance in obedience to the divine law would be the meritorious cause (as they call it) why his descendants should be generated confirmed in grace. For if neither Adam could, nor can any man, merit for another man by condign merit either the gift of first grace or its increase (for this is proper to Christ alone, who is the head of the whole Church and of all the elect): much less, then, could he merit the confirmation of his descendants in grace. What of the fact that, if Christ the Lord—since he is the head of the Church and true God and man, and who merited grace and glory for all by condign merit—nevertheless does not grant confirmation in grace to those who are regenerated in him through baptism: how much less credible is it, then, that those begotten from Adam would, on account of his merit, receive the confirmation of grace?12
Dicet aliquis, confirmationem in gratia concessum iri posteris Adae non propter eius meritum, sed propter conditionem illius status innocentiae qui hoc exigebat: quam etiam ob causam nati fuissent illi cum gratia et potentia non moriendi. Sed hoc futile est: non enim confirmatio in gratia pertinebat ad integritatem aut felicitatem illius status: neque enim ea fuisset Adamo denegata, quippe qui primus in eo statu collocatus est. Si quis porro dicat id eventurum propter aliquod Dei pactum quo promiserit Adamo, si custodiret ipse praeceptum quod ei imposuerat, se omnes eius posteros in gratia confirmaturum: respondebimus id gratis dici, sine ulla auctoritate vel Scripturae vel Patrum, quocirca contemni et reiici debere. Nec moveat quemquam auctoritas Anselmi, cui nos maiorem Augustini opponimus: quanquam Beatus Thomas scribat Anselmum id non asseverando sed opinando dixisse, quia usus est verbo illo, Videtur. Neque S. Gregorius contra nos est: supradictis enim verbis illud tantum significat, si Adam non peccasset, posteros eius non nascituros filios gehennae, id est, cum peccato sicut nunc nascuntur (Omnes enim, inquit Paulus, nascimur filii irae), solosque electos et praedestinatos tunc generatum iri ex Adamo; ex quo tamen non efficitur eos generatum iri confirmatos in gratia. Non enim idem est esse praedestinatum atque esse confirmatum in gratia: nimirum hoc paucissimorum quorundam praedestinatorum extraordinarium et singulare munus est atque privilegium.
Someone will say that confirmation in grace would be granted to Adam's descendants not on account of his merit, but on account of the condition of that state of innocence which required it: for which cause also they would have been born with grace and the power of not dying. But this is futile: for confirmation in grace did not pertain to the integrity or happiness of that state; for it would not have been denied to Adam, who was the first placed in that state. If anyone further says that this would come about on account of some pact of God by which he promised Adam that, if he himself kept the precept imposed on him, he would confirm all his descendants in grace: we shall answer that this is said gratuitously, without any authority either of Scripture or of the Fathers, and therefore ought to be despised and rejected. Nor let the authority of Anselm move anyone, to whom we oppose the greater authority of Augustine: although the Blessed Thomas writes that Anselm said this not by asserting but by opining, because he used that word, ‘It seems.’ Nor is St. Gregory against us: for by the aforesaid words he means only this, that if Adam had not sinned, his descendants would not be born sons of hell—that is, with sin, as they are now born (‘For we are all,’ says Paul, ‘born children of wrath’)—and that the elect and predestined alone would then be generated from Adam; from which, however, it does not follow that they would be generated confirmed in grace. For to be predestined and to be confirmed in grace are not the same: this is, in fact, the extraordinary and singular gift and privilege of certain very few of the predestined.13

Translator’s notes

  1. Question divider opening the fourth running question of the disputation on grace (corresponding to the fifth item of the prefatory list on p.545). ↩
  2. Marginal gloss: 'Scoti opinio' (Scotus's opinion). Question IV: would Adam's posterity be born confirmed in grace? Three opinions reported. The first (Scotus, Sent. II d.20 q.1): no—confirmation in grace belongs to the blessed (comprehensores) and is repugnant to the wayfarer's state, whose will remains flexible/mutable. Continues to next page (catchword 'quemadmodum'). Colophon at foot: 'AAA 3'. ↩
  3. Completes Scotus's first opinion (from p.557 catchword 'quemadmodum'): the wayfarer's will is confirmed only by the clear vision of God (cf. Aquinas ST I q.100 a.2). Scotus adds: had Adam (and each descendant) won the first temptation, he would be confirmed by God's special assistance, as the Apostles and the Virgin. Aquinas (Sent. II d.20 q.2 a.3) thought it probable. ↩
  4. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur Scotus' (Scotus is refuted). Pererius's refutation: Genesis 2:17 ('In whatever day thou shalt eat... thou shalt die') shows Adam was bound for life, at perpetual risk—not just the first temptation. The angel's 'way' ends with its first act; man's extends through his whole life. And no privilege/pact for confirmation by the first victory is found in Scripture or the Fathers. ↩
  5. Marginal gloss: 'Secunda sententia Catharini, et Tostati, refellitur' (the second opinion, of Catharinus and Tostatus, is refuted). Second opinion: posterity confirmed in original justice but not sanctifying grace, since (they say) mortal sin is repugnant to grace but not to original justice, which they make distinct from and separable from grace. Catharinus (on Gen 3) and Tostatus (qq. 6-7). Continues to next page (catchword 'eam'). ↩
  6. Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor effectus iustitiae originalis' (the four effects of original justice). Refutation: mortal sin removes the four proper effects of original justice (hence original justice itself). First three effects: rectitude of the superior part (reason/will under God), rectitude of the inferior part (flesh under reason), no propensity to evil. ↩
  7. The fourth effect of original justice (perpetual joy, peace of conscience, tranquillity), opposed by mortal sin. The power of not-sinning is an inseparable companion of original justice, joined to the power of not-dying (Augustine, De Correptione et gratia 11): both lost by sin, so original justice cannot survive mortal sin. ↩
  8. Objection (not every mortal sin destroys original justice, as not every act of intemperance destroys acquired temperance) and reply (every mortal sin at least relaxes virtue, and repeated, uproots it). Continues to next page (catchword 'Tertia'). ↩
  9. Marginal gloss: 'Tertia opinio Anselmi' (the third opinion, of Anselm). Third opinion (Anselm, Cur Deus Homo 1.18): had Adam not sinned, all posterity would have been confirmed in grace, unable to sin (Christ excepted, made from the Virgin without man's seed). ↩
  10. Marginal gloss: 'Quarta opinio, et vera, Augustini, Thomae, et Durandi' (the fourth opinion, and true one, of Augustine, Thomas, and Durandus). Gregory (Moralia 4.36/28) seems to support Anselm; but the fourth (true) opinion (Durandus Sent. II d.20 q.5; Aquinas ST I q.100 a.2; Augustine, Retractations 1.23 and De Civ Dei 14.10) holds posterity would NOT be generated confirmed in grace. ↩
  11. Pererius's argument for the fourth opinion: since Adam himself was not created confirmed in grace, his posterity (who would not receive more grace than he) would not be born confirmed either. Continues to next page (catchword 'omnium'). ↩
  12. Pererius's argument continued: Adam's perseverance could not be a meritorious cause of posterity's confirmation, since no man can merit grace for another 'de condigno' (that is Christ's alone). And even Christ does not give the baptized confirmation in grace—much less would Adam's descendants get it by his merit. ↩
  13. Objection (confirmation owed to the condition of the state of innocence) and replies: confirmation was not part of that state's integrity (else Adam would have had it); a divine pact for it is asserted gratuitously without Scripture/Father authority. Anselm's authority outweighed by Augustine's (and Aquinas notes Anselm spoke by opinion—'Videtur'). Gregory only means posterity would not be born sons of hell (Eph 2:3 'we are all born children of wrath'); being predestined ≠ being confirmed in grace. ↩