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QUESTION III. Whether in the state of innocence men would have been generated with the grace of God.1
QUAESTIO III. Vtrum in statu innocentiae fuissent generati homines cum gratia Dei.
Sequitur tertia quaestio, utrum, si Adam non peccasset et mansisset status innocentiae, posteri Adae generati fuissent cum gratia gratum faciente. Videtur id negare Hugo Sancti Victoris, in libro primo de Sacramentis, parte sexta, cap. 23:...
There follows the third question, whether, if Adam had not sinned and the state of innocence had remained, the descendants of Adam would have been generated with sanctifying grace. Hugh of St. Victor seems to deny this, in the first book of On the Sacraments, part six, chapter 23:...2
...sic enim scribit: Primus homo ante peccatum generasset quidem filios sine peccato, sed non paterna iustitia heredes. Idem sensisse putandum est quicumque dixerunt Adamum non fuisse creatum cum gratia. Verumtamen contraria sententia probabilior habetur, quam secutus est Sanctus Thomas in prima parte, quaest. 100, eaque probari posset eiusmodi argumentatione: Posteri Adae generati fuissent cum iustitia originali, ergo etiam cum gratia gratum faciente. Nam, ut paulo infra ostendam, iustitia originalis vel re ipsa non differebat a gratia gratum faciente, vel ab ea certe nullo modo disiungi poterat. Illud autem quod sumpsimus, in statu innocentiae omnes generatum iri cum iustitia originali, sententia est Theologorum, ut videre licet in secundo sententiarum, distinctione vigesima, et valde consentaneum rationi est: generati enim fuissent filii cum dono immortalitatis et impassibilitatis, atque aliis praerogativis illius status. At haec necessario erant connexa cum iustitia originali, cum hac igitur nati illi fuissent.
...for thus he writes: ‘The first man before sin would indeed have begotten sons without sin, but not heirs of his paternal justice.’ The same is to be thought to have been the view of whoever said that Adam was not created with grace. Nevertheless the contrary opinion is held more probable, which Saint Thomas followed in the first part, question 100, and it could be proved by this kind of argument: Adam's descendants would have been generated with original justice, therefore also with sanctifying grace. For, as I shall show a little below, original justice either did not really differ from sanctifying grace, or certainly could in no way be separated from it. And that which we assumed—that in the state of innocence all would be generated with original justice—is the opinion of the Theologians, as may be seen in the second book of the Sentences, distinction twenty, and is very consonant with reason: for the sons would have been generated with the gift of immortality and impassibility, and the other prerogatives of that state. But these were necessarily connected with original justice, with which therefore they would have been born.3
Deinde, Adam peccando et se suamque omnem progeniem vitiavit atque corrupit, peccatumque suum in omnes posteros per generationem carnalem transfudit: ergo si non peccasset, similiter in generatione carnali transisset ad omnes posteros iustitia originalis. Sicut enim peccatum originale, quia est peccatum naturae, derivatur ad omnes qui naturam accipiunt ex Adamo, ita iustitia originalis, quae erat donum sanans et perficiens naturam, et cuius privatio est peccatum originale, per communicationem ipsius naturae cum omnibus posteris Adami fuisset communicata. Valet ad hoc probandum etiam auctoritas Concilii Arausicani, capite 5, et Concilii Tridentini in Sessione quinta, de Peccato originali; in utroque enim definitum est, Adamum peccando sanctitatem et iustitiam perdidisse non sibi tantum, sed omnibus etiam posteris suis. Ex quo apparet, si Adam non peccasset, non perditurum fuisse ipsum posteris iustitiam originalem, sed eam fuisse posteris donandam in ipsa generatione carnali. Notanda autem sunt verba Concilii quibus dicitur Adamum perdidisse posteris sanctitatem et iustitiam: non enim obscure indicat vocabulo sanctitatis gratiam gratum facientem, vocabulo autem iustitiae ipsam iustitiam originalem. Sententiam autem illam Hugonis dicentis posteros Adae non futuros heredes iustitiae eius, benigne interpretans Sanctus Thomas, prima parte, quaestione centesima, articulo primo, putat esse id accipiendum de iustitia non quantum ad habitum, sed quantum ad executionem actus: habuissent enim illi a primo ortu habitus virtutum, sed illos in usum explicare et in actum proferre ante usum rationis non potuissent. At vero Adam, quia perfecta aetate et ratione utens creatus est, ab exordio habuit gratiam non modo secundum habitum, sed etiam secundum actum.
Next, Adam by sinning vitiated and corrupted both himself and all his progeny, and transfused his sin into all his descendants through carnal generation: therefore, if he had not sinned, original justice would likewise have passed to all his descendants in carnal generation. For just as original sin, because it is a sin of nature, is derived to all who receive nature from Adam, so original justice, which was a gift healing and perfecting nature, and whose privation is original sin, would have been communicated, through the communication of nature itself, to all the descendants of Adam. There serves also to prove this the authority of the Council of Orange, chapter 5, and of the Council of Trent in the fifth session, on Original Sin; for in each it was defined that Adam, by sinning, lost holiness and justice not for himself only, but also for all his descendants. From which it appears that, if Adam had not sinned, he would not have lost original justice for his descendants, but it would have been given to his descendants in carnal generation itself. And the words of the Council are to be noted, in which it is said that Adam lost holiness and justice for his descendants: for it not obscurely indicates, by the word ‘holiness,’ sanctifying grace, and by the word ‘justice,’ original justice itself. And that opinion of Hugh, saying that Adam's descendants would not be heirs of his justice, Saint Thomas, interpreting it benignly in the first part, question one hundred, article one, thinks must be taken of justice not as to the habit, but as to the execution of the act: for they would have had the habits of the virtues from their first birth, but they could not have unfolded them into use and brought them into act before the use of reason. But Adam, because he was created at a perfect age and using reason, had grace from the beginning not only as to habit, but also as to act.4
Verum duo possent nobis obiici. Si enim homines in statu innocentiae per generationem habuissent gratiam, utique gratia illa fuisset homini naturalis: at repugnat gratiam esse naturalem non solum homini, sed etiam Angelo: etenim gratia est ex genere et ordine rerum supernaturalium. Verum facile hoc diluitur: licet enim gratia simul cum natura et anima rationali data fuisset homini, et ob eam causam dici posset quodammodo naturalis, quod ab origine naturae affuisset homini: simpliciter tamen et absolute fuisset supernaturalis, quia non dabatur homini per vim et potentiam naturae et facultatis generatricis, sed per solius Dei potentiam: nec erat aliquid naturaliter debitum homini, nec ad naturalem eius integritatem et perfectionem pertinens.
But two things could be objected to us. For if men in the state of innocence had had grace through generation, surely that grace would have been natural to man: but it is repugnant for grace to be natural, not only to man, but even to the Angel; for grace is of the genus and order of supernatural things. But this is easily dissolved: for although grace would have been given to man together with nature and the rational soul, and for that reason could be called in a way natural, because it would have been present to man from the origin of nature, nevertheless simply and absolutely it would have been supernatural, because it would not be given to man by the force and power of nature and of the generative faculty, but by the power of God alone: nor was it anything naturally owed to man, nor pertaining to his natural integrity and perfection.5
Illud quoque posset obiici, posteros Adami in statu innocentiae non fuisse habituros ab initio scientiam, ut supra ostendimus: ergo simili ratione nec gratiam habuissent. Sed hoc solvitur a B. Thoma quaest. 18 de Veritate, art. 2, in responsione ad secundum et septimum: diversa enim est ratio scientiae atque gratiae: haec enim per se facit ad gratitudinem hominis, nec potest ullo tempore separari a statu iustitiae originalis, et erat donum supernaturale nulla facultate hominis parabile. Scientia autem est hominis perfectio quaedam naturalis, quam naturale est homini paulatim per sensus et experimenta, per assiduam item atque multiplicem mentis agitationem, comparare. Quemadmodum nunc in statu legis Evangelicae omnes per baptismum in Christo regenerati simul accipiunt gratiam, sic in statu innocentiae omnes posteri Adae in generatione carnali, per quam naturam humanam accepissent, simul etiam gratiam et virtutes habuissent.
This too could be objected: that Adam's descendants in the state of innocence would not have had knowledge from the beginning, as we showed above: therefore by like reasoning neither would they have had grace. But this is solved by the Blessed Thomas, question 18 of On Truth, article 2, in the response to the second and seventh [objections]: for the character of knowledge and of grace is different: for grace of itself makes for the gratitude (acceptableness) of man, nor can it at any time be separated from the state of original justice, and was a supernatural gift procurable by no faculty of man. But knowledge is a certain natural perfection of man, which it is natural for man to procure gradually through the senses and experiences, and likewise through assiduous and manifold agitation of the mind. Just as now, in the state of the Evangelical law, all who are regenerated in Christ through baptism receive grace at once, so in the state of innocence all the descendants of Adam, in carnal generation—through which they would have received human nature—would at once also have had grace and the virtues.6
Translator’s notes
- Question divider opening the third question of the disputation on grace. (The text below calls it 'tertia quaestio'; its subject—posterity born with grace—corresponds to the fourth item of the disputation's prefatory list on p.545, so Pererius's running numbering differs from that preface.) ↩
- Opening of Question III: would Adam's posterity have been born with sanctifying grace? Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacramentis I.6.23) seems to deny it. The Hugh quotation continues on the next page (catchword 'sic'). ↩
- Hugh's text quoted ('would have begotten sons without sin, but not heirs of his justice'). Pererius prefers the contrary, more probable view (Aquinas ST I q.100): posterity would be born with original justice—hence with grace, since the two are inseparable (Lombard Sent. II d.20). The immortality/impassibility prerogatives presuppose original justice. ↩
- Marginal gloss: 'Interpretatio sententiae Hugonis, secundum B. Thomam' (interpretation of Hugh's opinion, according to the Blessed Thomas). Original justice transmitted like original sin; Councils of Orange (c.5) and Trent (sess. 5)—'holiness' = grace, 'justice' = original justice. Aquinas (ST I q.100 a.1) reads Hugh benignly: posterity would have had the habit but not the act before the use of reason. Catchword 'VERUM' to next page. ↩
- Marginal gloss: 'Solutio duarum obiectionum' (the solution of two objections). Objection 1: grace would then be natural. Answer: though present from the origin of nature, it would still be simply supernatural, given by God's power alone, not owed to nature. ↩
- Objection 2: posterity would not have knowledge from birth, so why grace? Answer (Aquinas, De Veritate q.18 a.2 ad 2 & 7): grace differs from knowledge—grace is supernatural and inseparable from original justice; knowledge is natural and acquired gradually. As the baptized now receive grace, so in innocence all would receive grace and virtues in carnal generation. ↩