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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Five — the state of innocence

DISPUTATION ON THE THIRD EXCELLENCE of the state of innocence, that is, on Original Justice

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DISPUTATION ON THE THIRD EXCELLENCE of the state of innocence, that is, on Original Justice.1

DISPUTATIO DE TERTIA EXCELLENTIA status innocentiae, id est, de Iustitia originali.

Huius quinti libri, qui totus in explanando felicissimo innocentiae primorum hominum statu consumetur, principem sibi locum nobilis illa et apud Theologos valde celebris de Iustitia originali disputatio iure suo vendicat: tam propter excellentem eius rei dignitatem, quam propter magnam eiusdem rei obscuritatem multiplicemque difficultatem. Nobis igitur omni studio et contentione animi enitendum ac perficiendum est, ut diligenti et accurato rei obscurissimae et perplexissimae tractatu explicatuque, si non pro eo ac res ipsa postulat, certe quantum nostri fert ingenii ac doctrinae tenuitas, divinarum litterarum amatoribus, quorum in manus haec forte scripta incident, aliquo modo satisfaciamus.
Of this fifth book, which will be wholly spent in explaining the most happy state of innocence of the first men, that noble and, among the Theologians, greatly celebrated disputation on Original Justice claims for itself by its own right the chief place: both on account of the excellent dignity of the matter, and on account of the great obscurity and manifold difficulty of the same matter. We, therefore, must strive and endeavor with all zeal and exertion of mind, that, by a diligent and careful treatment and explanation of this most obscure and most perplexed matter—if not according to what the matter itself demands, yet certainly as far as the slenderness of our talent and learning permits—we may in some way satisfy the lovers of the divine writings into whose hands these writings shall perhaps fall.2
Quatuor autem hoc loco de iustitia originali quaestiones excutiendae sunt: Prima, quidnam fuerit illa iustitia originalis: Secunda, in qua parte hominis insidebat, et tanquam in subiecto inhaerebat: Tertia, utrum iustitia originalis fuerit res quaedam diversa et separabilis a gratia gratum faciente: Quarta, an primum hominem creatum esse cum iustitia originali, auctoritate divinarum litterarum evidenter ostendi et probari possit. Verum, quo rectius investigari et facilius reperiri queat quae fuerit vis et natura iustitiae originalis, pauca quaedam lectorem prae-...
Now in this place four questions concerning original justice are to be examined: First, what that original justice was: Second, in what part of man it resided, and as in a subject inhered: Third, whether original justice was a thing distinct and separable from sanctifying grace: Fourth, whether the fact that the first man was created with original justice can be evidently shown and proved by the authority of the divine writings. But, that the force and nature of original justice may be more rightly investigated and more easily found, [there are] a few things [with which] to fore-[warn] the reader...3
...monere ac praedocere non parvo fuerit adiumento. Ante omnia scire convenit, sex humanae naturae status animo fingi et cogitatione designari posse; quorum alii re vera aut sunt, aut fuerunt, aut erunt aliquando; alii vero nec sunt, nec erunt, nec fuerunt unquam, sed esse tamen possunt. Primus status est hominis sine gratia Dei et sine ullo peccato constituti: quem in scholis appellant statum hominis in puris naturalibus. Alter est hominis propter Adami peccatum vitiati et corrupti. Tertius est hominis habentis naturalem integritatem rationi congruentem. Quartus est hominis iustitia originali praediti et ornati. Quintus est hominis per gratiam Christi a peccato Adami liberati et a vitiis sanati. Sextus est hominis usque ad coelestem gloriam et divinae naturae conspectum provecti atque perducti. Inter hos status quid conveniat quidve differat, sigillatim indicandum est, quo qualitas et praestantia conditionis primi hominis in statu originalis iustitiae constituti liquidius perspiciatur.
...to forewarn and pre-instruct the reader will be of no small help. Before all things it is fitting to know that six states of human nature can be fashioned by the mind and designated by thought; of which some really either are, or have been, or will be at some time; but others neither are, nor will be, nor ever were, but yet can be. The first state is that of man constituted without the grace of God and without any sin: which in the schools they call the state of man in pure naturals. The second is that of man vitiated and corrupted on account of Adam's sin. The third is that of man having natural integrity congruent with reason. The fourth is that of man endowed and adorned with original justice. The fifth is that of man freed from Adam's sin and healed of his vices through the grace of Christ. The sixth is that of man advanced and led even to heavenly glory and the sight of the divine nature. Between these states what agrees and what differs must be indicated one by one, so that the quality and excellence of the condition of the first man, constituted in the state of original justice, may be more clearly perceived.4
Inter duos primos status hoc interest, quod primus includit meram negationem gratiae et peccati: secundus autem, privationem gratiae et praesentiam peccati. Quantum vero ad potentiam vel impotentiam agendi bonum et vitandi malum, par est utriusque status ratio: eodem enim modo se habet nunc homo in statu naturae lapsae, ac se habuisset si in puris naturalibus esset creatus: peccatum enim Adami nihil de his quae naturalia sunt homini aut perdidit aut diminuit: tantumque, removendo iustitiam originalem propter quam humana natura erat recta, integra et in naturalibus bonis perfecta, fecit ut sibi ipsa relinqueretur illo bono privata.
Between the first two states there is this difference, that the first includes the mere negation of grace and of sin: but the second, the privation of grace and the presence of sin. But as regards the power or impotence of doing good and avoiding evil, the character of both states is equal: for man is now in the same condition in the state of fallen nature as he would have been if he had been created in pure naturals: for Adam's sin neither lost nor diminished anything of the things that are natural to man; and only, by removing original justice—on account of which human nature was upright, whole, and perfect in natural goods—it made nature to be left to itself, deprived of that good.5
Quemadmodum enim post peccatum Adami corpus humanum nihilo magis factum est mortale aut passibile quam fuisset si homo esset in puris naturalibus conditus: ita humanus animus per se non est Adami peccato imbecillior ad bene agendum quam fuisset si eum Deus in puris naturalibus creasset. Plurimum autem interest inter eos status ratione personae: quia conditus homo in puris naturalibus non fuisset inimicus Dei, nec filius irae, nec indignus Dei gratia (sumendo vocabulum indigni non negative pro eo quod est, non dignus—sic enim re vera fuisset indignus—sed privative): nec absentia gratiae ei fuisset culpa; nec mors aut defectus alii corporales fuissent illi velut culpae poena et peccati supplicium: quemadmodum contingit in secundo statu, in quo gratia carere culpa est, mori autem et malis corporeis afflictari supplicium est. Denique, in primo statu nullum quidem fuisset meritum divinae gratiae, sed nec ullum tamen eius fuisset demeritum: in secundo autem non modo nullum est meritum, sed magnum etiam inest demeritum.
For just as after Adam's sin the human body was made no more mortal or passible than it would have been if man had been founded in pure naturals: so the human soul is not of itself, by Adam's sin, weaker for doing well than it would have been if God had created him in pure naturals. But there is the greatest difference between those states by reason of the person: because man founded in pure naturals would not have been an enemy of God, nor a son of wrath, nor unworthy of God's grace (taking the word ‘unworthy’ not negatively, for that which is ‘not worthy’—for thus he would really have been unworthy—but privatively): nor would the absence of grace have been a fault to him; nor would death or other bodily defects have been to him, as it were, the penalty of fault and the punishment of sin: as happens in the second state, in which to lack grace is a fault, but to die and to be afflicted with bodily evils is a punishment. Finally, in the first state there would indeed have been no merit of divine grace, but yet neither any demerit of it: but in the second there is not only no merit, but there is also great demerit.6
Deinde, inter primum et tertium statum perquam insigne discrimen est. Etenim in primo statu appetitus rationalis et sensitivus naturali impetu raperentur ad obiecta sibi convenientia, nec sensitivus plene subiiceretur rationi. Nam, ut Aristoteles tradit libro primo Politicorum,...
Next, between the first and the third state there is a very notable difference. For in the first state the rational and the sensitive appetite would be carried by natural impulse to the objects suited to them, nor would the sensitive be fully subject to reason. For, as Aristotle hands down in the first book of the Politics,...7
...Politicorum, membra corporis humani servili obsequio et subiectione rationi subduntur, ut quae nullam vim et potestatem habeant eius imperio resistendi: appetitus autem sensitivus non servili, sed civili subiectione subditur rationi, quippe qui vim habet repugnandi iussaque eius detrectandi. Quamvis de hac re contraria scripsit Aristoteli M. Tullius in libro tertio de Republica, his fere verbis, uti commemorat ea S. Augustinus in libro 4 adversus Iulianum, cap. 12: Ut animus corpori dicitur imperare, dicitur etiam libidini: sed corpori, ut rex civibus suis aut parens liberis; libidini autem, ut servis dominus, quo eam coercet et frangit. Sic regum, sic imperatorum, sic magistratuum, sic patrum, sic populorum imperia sociis civibusque praesunt, ut corporibus animus. Domini autem servos ita fatigant, ut optima pars animi, id est sapientia, eiusdem animi vitiosas imbecillesque partes, ut libidines, ut iracundias, ut perturbationes ceteras. Haec Cicero.
...of the Politics, the members of the human body are subjected to reason by a servile obedience and subjection, as having no force and power to resist its command: but the sensitive appetite is subjected to reason not by servile, but by civil subjection, inasmuch as it has the power of resisting and of declining its commands. Although on this matter Marcus Tullius [Cicero] wrote the contrary to Aristotle, in the third book of the Republic, in nearly these words, as Saint Augustine records them in the fourth book against Julian, chapter 12: ‘As the soul is said to command the body, so it is said also to command lust: but the body, as a king [commands] his citizens or a parent his children; but lust, as a master [commands] his slaves, by which he restrains and breaks it. Thus the commands of kings, of emperors, of magistrates, of fathers, of peoples, preside over their allies and citizens as the soul over the body. But masters so wear down their slaves as the best part of the soul, that is wisdom, [wears down] the vicious and weak parts of the same soul, such as lusts, such as angers, such as the other disturbances.’ Thus Cicero.8
Verum, ut revertar ad id quod agebatur, in primo statu posset homo facere bonum aliquod morale: sed nec omne bonum facere, nec in bono faciendo diu perseverare potuisset. In tertio autem statu, qui est consonus rationi habensque integritatem naturae et debitam partium animi ordinationem, et appetitus obediens rationi subiectusque esset, et ipsa ratio recte se haberet erga Deum tanquam primum principium et ultimum finem naturalem hominis. Ac licet in eo statu appetitus sensitivus nonnunquam adversaretur rationi eiusque mandata transgredi conaretur, vigore tamen rationis seu freno quodam repressus atque coercitus in officio suo contineretur: et in hoc statu posset homo bonum omne morale persequi, et itidem omne malum fugere et in bene agendo perseverare.
But, to return to what was being treated, in the first state man could do some moral good: but he could neither do every good, nor persevere long in doing good. But in the third state, which is consonant with reason and has the integrity of nature and the due ordering of the soul's parts, the appetite would be obedient and subject to reason, and reason itself would rightly stand toward God as the first principle and ultimate natural end of man. And although in that state the sensitive appetite would sometimes oppose reason and try to transgress its commands, yet, repressed and coerced by the vigor of reason or by a certain bridle, it would be contained in its duty: and in this state man could pursue every moral good, and likewise flee every evil and persevere in doing well.9
Porro tertius hic status ea re differret a quarto qui habet iustitiam originalem, quod hic quartus status, praeter vigorem illum rationis integritatemque naturae, adiunctam habebat indefectibilem subordinationem corporis sub anima, appetitus sub ratione, rationis sub Deo. Praeterea, tertius status capax erat doloris, morbi, et quorumlibet malorum quae corpori possunt accidere, denique ipsius mortis: itemque tristitiae, timoris, angoris, aliarumque animi perturbationum et molestiarum. Ad haec, in tertio statu posset homo peccata venialia committere. Haec autem omnia a quarto statu, in quo aliquandiu versatus est Adam, longe remotissima fuerunt.
Further, this third state would differ from the fourth, which has original justice, in this: that this fourth state, besides that vigor of reason and integrity of nature, had adjoined an indefectible subordination of body under soul, of appetite under reason, of reason under God. Besides, the third state was capable of pain, disease, and of any evils that can befall the body, and finally of death itself; and likewise of sadness, fear, anguish, and the other disturbances and troubles of the soul. Moreover, in the third state man could commit venial sins. But all these things were far most remote from the fourth state, in which Adam dwelt for a while.10
Quintus autem status, hominis per Christi gratiam a peccato liberati, ea ratione prioribus quatuor excellentior iudicari debet, quod faciat hominem gratum et amicum Deo, et acceptum admissumque ad participationem vitae aeternae, iungitque hominem cum Deo ut cum fine supernaturali: eumque facit potentem efficiendi opera virtutum omnium, tam moralium quam supernaturalium, quibus aeternam felicitatem de condigno, ut loquuntur Theologi, promereatur. Sextus et ultimus status omnium est multo praestantissimus: nempe...
But the fifth state, of man freed from sin through the grace of Christ, ought to be judged more excellent than the prior four for this reason, that it makes man pleasing to God and his friend, and accepted and admitted to the participation of eternal life, and joins man with God as with his supernatural end: and it makes him able to perform the works of all the virtues, both moral and supernatural, by which he may merit eternal happiness by condign merit, as the Theologians speak. The sixth and last state is by far the most excellent of all: namely...11
...nempe continens gratiae confirmationem atque consummationem, et coelestis gloriae omniumque bonorum possessionem, nullius indigentiam rei, impotentiam peccandi atque moriendi, denique clarissimam divinae essentiae visionem.
...namely containing the confirmation and consummation of grace, and the possession of heavenly glory and of all goods, the need of nothing, the inability to sin and to die, and finally the clearest vision of the divine essence.12
Illud praeterea non est hoc loco premendum silentio, non unum fuisse iustitiae originalis effectum, sed multos ac varios, eosque perquam eximios et admirabiles effectus. Primum enim iustitia originalis naturam humanam efficiebat secundum omnes eius partes et facultates integram, et his rebus omnibus quae naturaliter ei conveniunt perfectam: ita ut omnes ac singulae vires et facultates hominis naturaliter sibi convenientes actiones et munera integre, expedite, et absolute possent exequi et obire. Deinde, faciebat iustitia originalis hominem usquequaque rectum, de qua rectitudine loquens Salomon, capite septimo libri Ecclesiastae, Fecit Deus, inquit, hominem rectum. Ex hac rectitudine existebat naturalis et vehemens hominis ad omne bonum morale propensio, et ab omni malo alienatio et aversio. Huius autem rectitudinis privatio, quae propter peccatum homini accidit, est animi curvitas quaedam et obliquitas, toties in divinis litteris nominata et exprobrata homini: quae nihil aliud est quam (ut definierunt Theologi) naturalis quaedam inclinatio animi ad bona creata et caduca, et propensio ad malum, et aversio a bonis aeternis et divinis.
This, moreover, must not in this place be suppressed in silence: that there was not one effect of original justice, but many and various, and those exceedingly outstanding and admirable effects. For first, original justice made human nature whole according to all its parts and faculties, and perfect in all those things that naturally suit it: so that all and each of the powers and faculties of man could carry out and perform the actions and offices naturally suited to them, wholly, readily, and absolutely. Next, original justice made man upright in every way, of which uprightness Solomon, speaking in the seventh chapter of the book of Ecclesiastes, says, ‘God made man upright.’ From this uprightness there existed a natural and vehement propensity of man to every moral good, and an alienation and aversion from every evil. But the privation of this uprightness, which befell man on account of sin, is a certain crookedness and obliquity of the soul, so often named in the divine writings and reproached to man: which is nothing else than (as the Theologians have defined) a certain natural inclination of the soul to created and perishable goods, and a propensity to evil, and an aversion from eternal and divine goods.13
Post haec, iustitia originalis ita vires omnes naturae nostrae perficiebat ordinate, ut inferiores ita subiicerentur atque obedirent superioribus, ut earum actiones nequaquam impedirent, ac ne tardarent quidem, quin potius eas adiuvarent: superiores autem nulla tristitia et difficultate in regendis ac moderandis inferioribus afficerentur. Quod igitur omnes appetitiones et motus animae sentientis sic essent in potestate rationis, ut eius iudicium et imperium nec praeverterent unquam nec detrectarent, sed earum excitatio, duratio, contentio vel remissio ex rationis imperio penderet, effectus erat et munus iustitiae originalis. Cuius praeterea ille erat mirabilis effectus, hominem non modo omnis veri cognoscendi cupidissimum esse, sed etiam omnium rerum quae naturaliter sciri possunt perfectam cognitionem et scientiam consequendi potentem esse, et ad omne bonum morale perficiendum omneque malum et vitium declinandum, et ad perseverandum in bono firmum, valentem, et constantem esse. Denique, iustitia originalis praestabat homini felicitatem quae naturaliter ab eo expeti et comparari potest: quae in eo posita erat, ut Augustinus inquit libro 14 de Civitate Dei, capite 10, ut nullum bonum abesset homini quod recta voluntas optare posset, nullumque malum adesset quod hominis feliciter viventis carnem vel animum offenderet.
After these, original justice so perfected all the powers of our nature in order, that the lower were so subjected and obeyed the higher that they in no way hindered their actions, nor even delayed them, but rather helped them: while the higher were affected by no sadness and difficulty in governing and moderating the lower. That, therefore, all the appetitions and motions of the sentient soul were so in the power of reason that they neither ever forestalled its judgment and command nor declined it, but their excitation, duration, intensity, or remission depended on the command of reason—this was an effect and office of original justice. Of which, moreover, there was that admirable effect, that man was not only most eager to know every truth, but also able to attain the perfect knowledge and science of all things that can naturally be known, and was firm, strong, and constant for accomplishing every moral good and shunning every evil and vice, and for persevering in good. Finally, original justice furnished man with the happiness that can naturally be sought and procured by him: which consisted in this (as Augustine says in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 10), that no good should be lacking to man which the right will could wish, and no evil be present which could offend the flesh or soul of a man living happily.14
Non est autem in praesentia ignorandum, aliud esse iustitiam originalem, et aliud statum hominis in iustitia originali: illa continebat supradictos effectus; hic, praeter illos, tria extrinsecus Dei privilegia habebat adiuncta:...
But it must not at present be unknown that original justice is one thing, and the state of man in original justice another: the former contained the above-mentioned effects; the latter, besides them, had three extrinsic privileges of God adjoined:...15
...adiuncta: videlicet non posse hominem decipi, non posse labi in peccatum veniale, denique, manente eo statu, non posse mori: quae non tam proveniebant ex iustitia originali, quam ex singulari quadam assistentia et protectione Dei erga illum statum.
...adjoined: namely, that man could not be deceived, could not slip into venial sin, and finally, while that state remained, could not die: which came not so much from original justice as from a certain singular assistance and protection of God toward that state.16

Translator’s notes

  1. MAJOR DIVIDER: the third disputation of Book V, treating the third internal good of innocence—original justice (iustitia originalis). Follows the disputations on Adam's knowledge (1st) and sanctifying grace (2nd). ↩
  2. Preface to the disputation on original justice: it claims the chief place in Book V, for its dignity, obscurity, and difficulty. ↩
  3. Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor quaestiones de iustitia originali tractandae' (four questions on original justice to be treated). The four questions of this disputation: (1) what original justice was; (2) in what part of man it resided; (3) whether it was distinct/separable from sanctifying grace; (4) whether Scripture proves man's creation with it. Continues to next page (catchword 'monere'). Colophon at foot: 'BBB 3'. ↩
  4. Marginal gloss: 'Sex humanae naturae statuum distinctio, et inter se comparatio' (the distinction of the six states of human nature, and their comparison among themselves). Preliminary to Q1 (from p.565 catchword 'monere'): the six conceivable states of human nature—(1) pure naturals, (2) vitiated by Adam's sin, (3) natural integrity, (4) original justice, (5) restored by Christ, (6) heavenly glory. ↩
  5. States 1 vs 2: state 1 is the mere negation of grace and sin; state 2 the privation of grace plus the presence of sin. As to the power for good, they are equal—Adam's sin removed nothing natural, only original justice, leaving nature to itself. ↩
  6. Continued comparison of states 1 and 2: the body and soul are no weaker after the Fall than if created in pure naturals; but the great difference lies in the person—in pure naturals man would not be God's enemy or 'son of wrath,' and lack of grace would be no fault. State 1: no merit but no demerit; state 2: no merit but great demerit. ↩
  7. States 1 vs 3: in pure naturals the appetites are carried by natural impulse, the sensitive not fully subject to reason. Aristotle, Politics I (continues to next page, catchword 'Politicorum'). ↩
  8. Aristotle, Politics I (the body's members obey reason 'servilely,' the sensitive appetite by 'civil' subjection, being able to resist). Cicero, De Republica III (preserved by Augustine, Contra Julianum 4.12): the soul rules the body as a king his citizens, but rules lust as a master his slaves. Ends 'Haec Cicero.' ↩
  9. States 1 vs 3 (powers): in pure naturals man could do some moral good but not all, nor persevere; in the third state (natural integrity) the appetite is bridled by reason, so man could pursue all moral good and persevere. ↩
  10. States 3 vs 4: the fourth (original justice) adds the indefectible subordination of body→soul, appetite→reason, reason→God; the third remained capable of pain, disease, death, sadness, and venial sin—all far removed from the fourth (Adam's state). ↩
  11. State 5 (restored by Christ's grace): more excellent than the prior four (makes man God's friend, heir of eternal life, able to merit). State 6 (heavenly glory) most excellent of all (continues to next page, catchword 'nempe'). ↩
  12. Description of the sixth state (heavenly glory): confirmation and consummation of grace, possession of all goods, no need, inability to sin or die, and the beatific vision. ↩
  13. Marginal gloss: 'Quinque mirabiles effectus iustitiae originalis' (the five wondrous effects of original justice). First two effects: (1) it made human nature whole and perfect in all its faculties; (2) it made man upright (Eccl 7:29 'Fecit Deus hominem rectum'), the privation of which is the soul's 'curvitas'—inclination to perishable goods, propensity to evil, aversion from divine goods. ↩
  14. Effects three, four, and five of original justice: (3) the ordered subjection of the lower powers to the higher; (4) eagerness and ability for the perfect knowledge of all naturally knowable things, and firmness in good; (5) the natural happiness (Augustine, De Civ Dei 14.10: no good lacking that the right will could wish, no evil to offend the happy man). ↩
  15. An important distinction: original justice (which contained the five effects) differs from the state of man in original justice, which additionally had three extrinsic divine privileges (named on the next page). Continues to next page (catchword 'adiuncta'). ↩
  16. The three extrinsic privileges of the state in original justice: man could not be deceived, could not slip into venial sin, and (while the state lasted) could not die—these from God's singular assistance, not from original justice itself. Completes from p.568 catchword 'adiuncta'. ↩