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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Five — the state of innocence

QUESTION I. What original justice was

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QUESTION I. What original justice was.1

QUAESTIO I. Quid fuerit iustitia originalis.

His expositis atque constitutis, quae fuerit originalis iustitiae vis, natura, et praestantia, deinceps disputandum est. Henricus Gandavensis Quodlibeto sexto, quaestione 11, tradit per iustitiam originalem datam fuisse hominis voluntati rectitudinem quandam naturalem, per quam poterat voluntas dominari appetitui sensitivo sibique obedientem reddere, cui rectitudini opponitur curvitas naturalis et pronitas ad malum, inflicta voluntati propter peccatum: exemplum ponit virgae, quae primo est recta, deinde flectitur et curvatur. Quod autem eiusmodi rectitudo ponenda sit praeter omnem aliam rectitudinem infusam et supernaturalem, si quam habuit primus homo per iustitiam originalem, probat eo argumento, quod ex sententia omnium Theologorum homo propter peccatum Adae non modo est spoliatus gratuitis donis, sed etiam vulneratus in naturalibus: ergo non solum perdidit rectitudinem supernaturalem, sed etiam naturalem sibi inditam; alioqui tantum diceretur spoliatus gratuitis. Quod si homo propter peccatum donum supernaturale perdidisset, sed naturalia salva et integra retinuisset, nullum profecto discrimen esse posset inter hominem originali peccato infectum et aliquem alium creatum in puris naturalibus sine gratia et peccato: quare aequaliter essent puniendi.
These things being explained and established, what the force, nature, and excellence of original justice was must next be disputed. Henry of Ghent, in Quodlibet six, question 11, hands down that through original justice there was given to man's will a certain natural uprightness, by which the will could dominate the sensitive appetite and render it obedient to itself; to which uprightness is opposed a natural crookedness and proneness to evil, inflicted on the will on account of sin: he sets down the example of a rod, which is first straight, then is bent and curved. And that an uprightness of this sort must be posited besides every other infused and supernatural uprightness which the first man had through original justice, he proves by this argument: that, according to the opinion of all the Theologians, man on account of Adam's sin was not only despoiled of gratuitous gifts, but also wounded in his naturals: therefore he lost not only the supernatural uprightness, but also a natural one implanted in him; otherwise he would only be said to be despoiled of the gratuitous [gifts]. But if man, on account of sin, had lost the supernatural gift, but had retained his naturals safe and whole, there could surely be no difference between a man infected with original sin and some other man created in pure naturals without grace and sin: wherefore they would be equally to be punished.2
Verumtamen hanc opinionem, ut falsam et improbabilem, bene refellit Scotus in secundo, distinctione 29, quaestione unica, his duobus argumentis. Primo, secundum Henricum non posset voluntas hominis non habens talem rectitudinem peccare, quia secundum ipsum peccatum est corruptio istius rectitudinis: id autem absurdum est. Si enim Deus crearet voluntatem sine ista rectitudine (est enim illa separabilis a voluntate), posset illa proculdubio, cum esset libera, elicere actum rectae rationi et legi divinae vel congruentem vel discrepantem: posset peccare, nec tamen peccatum illud ullius rectitudinis naturalis esset privatio: posset etiam evidenter cognosci per rationem naturalem, praesentem statum hominis non esse naturalem. Et cum non solum primum peccatum, sed et cetera posteriora sint formaliter peccata, et eidem opponatur: si igitur primum peccatum corrupit illam rectitudinem, etiam secundum et ter-...
Nevertheless this opinion, as false and improbable, Scotus well refutes in the second [book], distinction 29, the single question, by these two arguments. First, according to Henry the will of a man not having such uprightness could not sin, because according to him sin is the corruption of that uprightness: but this is absurd. For if God should create a will without that uprightness (for it is separable from the will), it could without doubt, since it would be free, elicit an act either congruent or discrepant with right reason and the divine law: it could sin, and yet that sin would not be the privation of any natural uprightness: it could also be evidently known by natural reason that the present state of man is not natural. And since not only the first sin, but also the rest that follow, are formally sins, and are opposed to that same [uprightness]: if, therefore, the first sin corrupted that uprightness, then the second and the thi-...3
...tium debebat corrumpere: quod est impossibile, cum illa per primum peccatum omnino fuerit sublata. Alterum argumentum est: illa rebellio appetitus contra rationem itidem et aequaliter fuisset in homine creato in puris naturalibus; ergo illa non accidit ob privationem ullius rectitudinis naturalis. Probatur antecedens: Naturale est omni appetitui ferri in suum proprium obiectum; et si est appetitus non liber, naturale est ei summe et quantum potest ferri: talis enim appetitus, ut docent Philosophi, ducitur, et sicut non est in potestate eius agere vel non agere, ita nec tanta vel tanta intentio actus, sed agit quantum potest. Cum igitur appetitus sensitivus hominis etiam in puris naturalibus haberet proprium suum obiectum delectabile, toto nisu tenderet in illud, et ea ratione impediret actum rationis: istae enim potentiae, cum sint in una et eadem anima, propter hanc unitatem impediunt se mutuo in actibus suis intensis. Quare deberet tunc ratio reprimere et cohibere impetum illum appetitus: quod sine aliqua eius difficultate et tristitia fieri non posset, quamobrem ibi esset rebellio: haec enim non est aliud quam inclinatio potentiae inferioris ad suum obiectum delectabile, et difficultas superioris potentiae in refraenando illum appetitum.
...the third would have to corrupt it: which is impossible, since it was wholly taken away by the first sin. The other argument is: that rebellion of the appetite against reason would have been likewise and equally in a man created in pure naturals; therefore it does not befall on account of the privation of any natural uprightness. The antecedent is proved: it is natural for every appetite to be borne to its own proper object; and if it is an appetite that is not free, it is natural to it to be borne to the utmost and as far as it can: for such an appetite, as the Philosophers teach, is led, and just as it is not in its power to act or not to act, so neither [is] this or that intensity of the act, but it acts as far as it can. Since, therefore, the sensitive appetite of man even in pure naturals would have its own delectable object, it would tend toward it with all its effort, and for that reason would impede the act of reason: for these powers, since they are in one and the same soul, by reason of this unity impede one another in their intense acts. Wherefore reason would then have to repress and check that impulse of the appetite: which could not happen without some difficulty and sadness of it; and for this reason there would be rebellion there: for this is nothing else than the inclination of the lower power to its delectable object, and the difficulty of the higher power in bridling that appetite.4
Argumenta Henrici brevibus solvi possunt. Dicitur enim homo vulneratus in naturalibus, non respectu naturae humanae consideratae in puris naturalibus, sed prout condita fuit a Deo cum iustitia originali, quae habebat vim rectificandi et perficiendi omnia naturalia in ordine ad omne bonum connaturale homini: qua iustitia propter peccatum amissa, illa quoque periit perfectio potentiarum naturalium; eamque ob causam dicitur homo vulneratus in naturalibus. Si quis autem crearetur in puris naturalibus, non esset aequalis homini peccato originali infecto. Nam quia hic debitor est iustitiae originalis quam accepit in Adam, ille vero nequaquam, propterea hic reus est, ille autem minime: et damnum non videndi Deum utrique contingens, uni est privatio et poena ob peccatum, alteri est mera negatio dignitatis ex conditione naturae.
Henry's arguments can be solved briefly. For man is said to be wounded in his naturals, not with respect to human nature considered in pure naturals, but as it was founded by God with original justice, which had the power of rectifying and perfecting all natural things in order to every good connatural to man: when that justice was lost on account of sin, that perfection of the natural powers also perished; and for this cause man is said to be wounded in his naturals. But if anyone were created in pure naturals, he would not be equal to a man infected with original sin. For because the latter is a debtor of the original justice which he received in Adam, but the former by no means, therefore the latter is guilty, but the former not at all: and the loss of not seeing God, befalling both, is to the one a privation and a penalty for sin, but to the other a mere negation of dignity from the condition of nature.5
Hac igitur repudiata opinione, nos vim et naturam iustitiae originalis ad hunc modum investigemus. Non erat iustitia originalis unus aliquis habitus, vel unum aliquod Dei donum, quo uno totus homo rectus et perfectus evaderet: sed erat absoluta quaedam complexio et comprehensio omnium habituum, quibus homo secundum omnes vires et facultates suas rectus et perfectus reddebatur, et idoneus ad exercendas expedite ac perfecte omnes actiones naturae suae convenientes. Ac non fuisse unum duntaxat habitum quo totus homo efficeretur rectus, adeo manifestum est, ut non tam probatione egeat quam consideratione et animadversione. Cum enim facultatum animae nostrae aliae sint incorporeae atque immortales, ut mens et voluntas, aliae mortales et corporeae, ut quae ad animam sentientem et alentem pertinent, qui fieri potuit ut unus numero habitus tot poten-...
This opinion, therefore, being rejected, let us investigate the force and nature of original justice in this manner. Original justice was not some one habit, or some one gift of God, by which alone the whole man would come out upright and perfect: but it was a certain absolute combination and comprehension of all the habits by which man was rendered upright and perfect according to all his powers and faculties, and fit to exercise readily and perfectly all the actions suited to his nature. And that it was not merely one habit by which the whole man was made upright is so manifest that it needs not so much proof as consideration and attention. For since some of the faculties of our soul are incorporeal and immortal, such as the mind and the will, others mortal and corporeal, such as those that pertain to the sentient and nourishing soul, how could it come about that one numerically single habit [should perfect] so many pow-[ers]...6
...potentias non solum numero et specie, sed etiam genere distinctas perficeret? praesertim cum habitus distinguantur per actus, et actus per obiecta. Nam in qua, obsecro, potentia unus ille habitus iustitiae originalis fuisset? si in intellectu, quomodo perfecisset voluntatem? et quamvis in utraque facultate fuisset, quomodo tamen vires et potentias animae sentientis expeditas et perfectas ad agendum convenienter iudicio et imperio rationis facere potuisset? Non igitur erat unus habitus iustitia originalis, sed continebat omnes habitus quibus ad integritatem et rectitudinem hominis omniumque facultatum eius complendam opus est. Itaque in speculativo intellectu continebat omnes scientias speculativas rerum omnium quae naturaliter sciri ab homine possunt, ut Metaphysicam, Physiologiam, omnesque disciplinas Mathematicas. In intellectu practico circa ea quae agenda sunt homini tam privatim quam publice, exquisitissimam habebat prudentiam, artium quoque eas quae usum habent ingenuum ac liberalem et honestam oblectationem, ut est Agricultura, Musica, Architectura, ars pingendi ac fingendi. In voluntate duo erant habitus: unus erga Deum, scilicet religionis, quae Deo ut supremo omnium rerum principio et fini naturali cultum honoremque tam interiori veneratione animi quam externis ritibus et ceremoniis adhibet; alter erga proximum, iustitiae, quae in distributivam et commutativam dividitur.
...should perfect powers distinct not only in number and species, but even in genus? especially since habits are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects. For in which power, I pray, would that one habit of original justice have been? If in the intellect, how would it have perfected the will? And although it had been in both faculties, how nevertheless could it have made the powers of the sentient soul ready and perfect for acting suitably to the judgment and command of reason? Original justice, therefore, was not one habit, but contained all the habits which are needful for completing the integrity and uprightness of man and of all his faculties. And so in the speculative intellect it contained all the speculative sciences of all things that can naturally be known by man, such as Metaphysics, Physiology, and all the Mathematical disciplines. In the practical intellect, concerning the things to be done by man both privately and publicly, it had the most exquisite prudence; and also those of the arts that have an honorable and liberal use and an honest delight, such as Agriculture, Music, Architecture, the art of painting and sculpting. In the will there were two habits: one toward God, namely of religion, which renders to God, as the supreme principle and natural end of all things, worship and honor, both by the inner veneration of the soul and by external rites and ceremonies; the other toward the neighbor, of justice, which is divided into distributive and commutative.7
Quaeri posset hoc loco, utrum fuit tertius aliquis habitus in voluntate, videlicet charitatis naturalis vel moralis, qua Deus ut finis ultimus et naturalis super omnia diligeretur ab homine: sed non videtur istiusmodi habitu fuisse tunc opus, cum enim in statu innocentiae voluntas esset recta, sua sponte, quasi pondere et naturali quodam impetu ferebatur ad diligendum Deum super omnia, ut ad finem suum ultimum: quantum enim erat unumquodque naturaliter amabile, tantum a voluntate recta naturaliter amabatur: nec impetus ille voluntatis ab inferiori appetitu vel minimum impediebatur aut retardabatur.
It could be asked in this place whether there was some third habit in the will, namely of natural or moral charity, by which God, as the ultimate and natural end, would be loved by man above all things: but there does not seem to have been need of a habit of this sort then, for since in the state of innocence the will was upright, of its own accord, as by a weight and a certain natural impulse, it was borne to love God above all things, as toward its ultimate end: for as much as each thing was naturally lovable, so much was it naturally loved by the upright will; nor was that impulse of the will in the least impeded or delayed by the lower appetite.8
In appetitu vero sensitivo, qui duplex est, irascibilis et concupiscibilis, erant virtutes morales quibus illi domantur et rationi obedientes efficiuntur: temperantiam dico et fortitudinem. Non enim assentior Durando, qui in secundo sententiarum, distinct. 29, negat opus fuisse istis virtutibus ad perficiendum appetitum sensitivum, propterea quod perfectionem eius appetitus praestabat iustitia originalis. Praestabat sane: verum non per se sola; quomodo enim, ut paulo supra diximus, unus habitus tot tamque diversas facultates hominis formaliter, ut in scholis loquimur, perficere potuisset? Ergo perfectionem appetitus sensitivi praestabat quidem iustitia originalis, sed per habitus temperantiae et fortitudinis, qui sunt proprie habitus et perfectiones eius appetitus. Naturale enim est ut potentiae perfi-...
But in the sensitive appetite, which is twofold, the irascible and the concupiscible, there were the moral virtues by which they are tamed and made obedient to reason: I mean temperance and fortitude. For I do not assent to Durandus, who in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 29, denies that there was need of these virtues for perfecting the sensitive appetite, because original justice furnished the perfection of that appetite. It furnished it indeed: but not by itself alone; for how, as we said a little above, could one habit formally (as we speak in the schools) perfect so many and so diverse faculties of man? Therefore original justice did indeed furnish the perfection of the sensitive appetite, but through the habits of temperance and fortitude, which are properly the habits and perfections of that appetite. For it is natural that the powers be perfec-[ted]...9
...perficiantur per suos habitus: et hic est modus naturalis quo potentiae singulae perficiantur, ut idoneae sint ad obeundas, uti oportet, functiones suas. Praedictos autem omnes habitus iustitia originalis continebat in gradu perfectissimo et, ut vocant, heroico.
...be perfected through their own habits: and this is the natural mode by which the individual powers are perfected, so that they may be fit to perform, as is fitting, their functions. And all the aforesaid habits original justice contained in the most perfect and, as they call it, heroic degree.10
Illud quaesitu explicatuque dignum videtur, utrum in statu innocentiae appetitus sensitivus ita subiectus esset rationi ut nunquam contra praescriptum eius insurgeret, id est, nec praecurrendo eius iudicium nec imperio eiusdem repugnando, sed sic esset in potestate rationis ut non nisi quando et quatenus ipsa vellet commoneretur; an potius ratio quidem prompte et cum delectatione ferretur in bonum et honestum, omneque honestati contrarium refugeret, appetitus autem inferior ita moveretur ut suapte vi et naturali propensione aptus est moveri in suum obiectum, sed quia ratio esset valentior ac potentior, contineret ipsum in officio et intra terminos ei praescriptos coerceret, quod, licet fieri non posset sine aliqua tristitia appetitus sensitivi, fieret tamen circa tristitiam aliquam, quin etiam magna cum delectatione rationis.
This seems worthy of inquiry and explanation: whether in the state of innocence the sensitive appetite was so subject to reason that it never rose against its prescription—that is, neither by forestalling its judgment nor by resisting its command—but was so in the power of reason that it was stirred only when and so far as reason itself willed; or rather whether reason indeed was borne promptly and with delight to the good and honorable, and shunned everything contrary to honor, while the lower appetite was moved as by its own force and natural propensity it is apt to be moved toward its object, but because reason was stronger and more powerful, it would contain it in its duty and coerce it within the bounds prescribed to it—which, although it could not happen without some sadness of the sensitive appetite, would nevertheless happen amid some sadness, yet with great delight of reason.11
Quoniam vero cum operatur homo secundum rationem, tunc dicitur simpliciter operari; cum autem secundum sensum operatur, retinente repugnanteque rationi voluntate, tunc non dicitur homo operari nisi secundum quid: quapropter ad Romanos 7 Paulus ait, Non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum: idcirco in statu innocentiae, licet homo aliquando operaretur bonum cum aliqua sensus tristitia, quia tamen semper operatus fuisset cum delectatione rationis, vere dici potest hominem in eo statu semper cum gaudio et voluptate bene acturum.
But since, when man works according to reason, he is then said to work simply; but when he works according to sense, while the will holds back and resists reason, then man is not said to work except in a certain respect: wherefore, in Romans 7, Paul says, ‘It is not I that work it, but the sin that dwelleth in me’: therefore in the state of innocence, although man might sometimes work good with some sadness of sense, yet because he would always have worked with delight of reason, it can truly be said that man in that state would always have acted well with joy and pleasure.12
Hanc quaestionem tangens Scotus 2. sententiarum, distinct. 29, q. unica, in dubio relinquit quidnam sentiendum sit, neutram in partem aliquid ex suo sensu decernens. Libet hoc loco verba Scoti adscribere. Sic autem ait: Potest dici ergo quod, si originalis iustitia habuit illum effectum, facere scilicet perfectam tranquillitatem in anima quantum ad omnes potentias, ita quod natura inferior non inclinaretur contra iudicium superioris; aut, si inclinaretur quantum ex se, posset tamen a superiori regulari et ordinari sine difficultate superioris et sine tristitia inferioris: cum hoc non habuerit potentia facta in puris naturalibus, necesse est ipsam ponere donum supernaturale, quod sit ista tranquillitas perfecta in anima. Post haec autem paulo infra subdit: Sed nunquid ex hoc tollitur omnis rebellio, ut potentia inferior delectabiliter se retrahat a suo delectabili proprio? Respondeo: si voluntas abstinet delectabiliter a condelectando potentiae inferiori, totus homo delectabiliter abstinet a delectabili appetitus sensitivi inferioris; non autem totus homo cum tristitia abstinet, si vis illa inferior abstinet cum tristitia: hoc enim convenit homini simpliciter, quod ei convenit secundum potentiam superiorem, nec propter hoc ab eo negatur, etsi non conveniat ei secundum potentiam inferiorem. Denique his paulo post adiungit: Nec forte necesse est ponere quod nullus sensus appetitus potuit tunc tristari: potuit enim visus...
Touching this question, Scotus in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 29, the single question, leaves it in doubt what is to be thought, deciding nothing from his own judgment on either side. It is fitting here to set down Scotus's words. He says thus: ‘It can be said, then, that if original justice had that effect, namely to make perfect tranquillity in the soul as regards all the powers, so that the lower nature was not inclined against the judgment of the higher; or, if it were inclined of itself, it could nevertheless be regulated and ordered by the higher without difficulty of the higher and without sadness of the lower: since a power made in pure naturals would not have this, it is necessary to posit it [as] a supernatural gift, which is this perfect tranquillity in the soul.’ And then a little below he adds: ‘But is all rebellion thereby removed, so that the lower power delightfully withdraws from its own delectable [object]? I answer: if the will abstains delightfully from co-delighting with the lower power, the whole man delightfully abstains from the delectable of the lower sensitive appetite; but the whole man does not abstain with sadness, even if that lower power abstains with sadness: for that belongs to a man simply which belongs to him according to the higher power, nor is it on this account denied of him, even if it does not belong to him according to the lower power.’ Finally he adds a little after: ‘Nor perhaps is it necessary to posit that no sense-appetite could then be saddened: for sight could...’13
...visus tunc videre turpe visibile, et auditus audire turpe audibile, et utrumque potuit ostendere appetitum sensitivum, sicut et conveniens sensibile delectare. Sed voluntas tunc bene usa fuisset istis tristitiis et delectabilibus appetituum inferiorum: ita quod non constristata fuisset immoderate ab appetitibus inferioribus, sicut bene usa fuisset delectabilibus eorum, non immoderate condelectando. Haec Scotus.
...sight could then see a base visible thing, and hearing hear a base audible thing, and each could exhibit [it to] the sensitive appetite, just as a suitable sensible thing also delights it. But the will would then have used well those sadnesses and delights of the lower appetites: so that it would not have been immoderately saddened by the lower appetites, just as it would have used well their delights, not co-delighting immoderately. Thus Scotus.14
At enimvero longe credibilius est, quin etiam pro certo haberi debet, in illo statu iustitiae originalis ita fuisse motus appetitus sensitivi subiectos rationi, ut nunquam aut contra aut etiam praeter eius mandatum, id est, nec repugnando nec praecurrendo, concitarentur: alioqui nullum fuisset discrimen inter statum innocentiae et naturae integrae, ac inter statum naturae lapsae per Christi tamen gratiam reparatae. Paulus sane ad Rom. 7 rebellionem carnis adversus spiritum ex peccato esse natam perspicuis verbis docet: ex quo etiam et ipsa concupiscentia carnis nominatur peccatum.
But indeed it is far more credible, nay rather it ought to be held as certain, that in that state of original justice the motions of the sensitive appetite were so subject to reason that they were never stirred either against or even beyond its command—that is, neither by resisting nor by forestalling [it]: otherwise there would have been no difference between the state of innocence and integral nature, and the state of fallen nature repaired nevertheless through the grace of Christ. Paul indeed, in Romans 7, teaches in clear words that the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit was born from sin: whence also the very concupiscence of the flesh is called sin.15
Augustinus quidem certe libro de Correptione et gratia, cap. 10 et 11, tradit in illo statu fore ut caro nunquam concupisceret adversus spiritum, sed eius ductum imperiumque perpetuo sequeretur. Et in lib. 14 de Civitate Dei cap. 10: Erat tunc, inquit, devitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente nullum omnino aliunde malum quod contristaret irruebat. Sed apertius hoc ille declarat in cap. 19 eiusdem libri: Motus, inquit, appetitus ante peccatum, in Paradiso vitiosi non erant. Non enim contra rectam voluntatem ad aliquid movebantur, unde necesse esset eos ratione tanquam frenis regentibus abstinere. Nam quod nunc ita moventur, et ab eis qui temperate et iuste et pie vivunt, alias facilius alias difficilius, tamen cohibendo et refraenando modificatur, non est utique sanitas ex natura, sed languor ex culpa. Sic Augustinus.
Augustine indeed, in the book On Reproof and Grace, chapters 10 and 11, hands down that in that state the flesh would never lust against the spirit, but would perpetually follow its leading and command. And in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 10: ‘There was then,’ he says, ‘a tranquil avoidance of sin, which remaining, no evil at all rushed in from any source that could sadden.’ But more openly he declares this in chapter 19 of the same book: ‘The motions of appetite before sin,’ he says, ‘in Paradise were not vicious. For they were not moved against the right will toward anything, whence it would be necessary to restrain them by reason as by governing reins. For that they are now so moved, and are modified by those who live temperately and justly and piously—now more easily, now more hardly—by restraining and bridling, is certainly not health from nature, but languor from fault.’ Thus Augustine.16
Verum, qui fieri poterat, inquit supradicto loco Scotus, ut in illo statu voluntas rationalis, cum naturaliter coniuncta sit appetitui sensitivo, non alliceretur et afficeretur eius delectationibus, et ab illis se ipsam abstineret sine ulla difficultate aut molestia? Respondet Scotus id propterea accidisse, quia voluntas longe maiori delectatione detinebatur circa obiectum suum quam erat delectatio sensibilis: delectabilius enim erat illi ultimo suo fini et his quae ad finem illum ordinantur adhaerere, quam oblectamentis sensuum perfrui. Sed quomodo appetitus sensitivus abstinebat se ab obiecto suo delectabili etiam sine tristitia, iucunde sequens praescriptum et deductum rationis? Respondet eodem loco Scotus, ad id opus fuisse singularibus quibusdam Dei donis, quibus ita afficeretur et perficeretur appetitus sensitivus, ut delectabilius esset sequi rationis imperium quam contra ductum eius reniti, inhaerendo propriis voluptatibus et oblectamentis. Quanquam, ut mox dicemus, nec id satis erat: sed in primis hoc efficiebat singularis Dei assistentia, cura, et providentia ita continentis, regentis, et moderantis appetitum sensitivum, ut nunquam sineret eum ad aliquid quod esset contra...
But how could it come about, says Scotus in the aforesaid place, that in that state the rational will, since it is naturally joined to the sensitive appetite, would not be allured and affected by its delights, and would abstain from them without any difficulty or trouble? Scotus answers that this happened because the will was held by a far greater delight about its own object than was the sensible delight: for it was more delightful to it to cling to its ultimate end and to the things that are ordered to that end, than to enjoy the pleasures of the senses. But how did the sensitive appetite abstain from its delectable object even without sadness, pleasantly following the prescription and conduct of reason? Scotus answers in the same place that for this there was need of certain singular gifts of God, by which the sensitive appetite was so affected and perfected that it was more delightful to follow the command of reason than to strive against its leading by clinging to its own pleasures and delights. Although, as we shall soon say, even this was not enough: but chiefly the singular assistance, care, and providence of God brought this about, so containing, ruling, and moderating the sensitive appetite that it never allowed it [to move] toward anything that was against...17
...vel praeter rationis iudicium et imperium incitari. Illud quoque in quaestionem vocari posset, utrum in statu innocentiae futuri essent in homine motus illi appetitus sensitivi, quos vulgo appellamus passiones, Latini vel morbos, vel perturbationes, vel affectus nominant, ut sunt desiderium, gaudium, metus, tristitia. Sicut enim corpus hominis in eo statu fuisset impassibile, ita futurus videtur fuisse animus ab huiusmodi passionibus vacuus et plane impassibilis. Hanc quaestionem tractat Augustinus libro 14 de Civitate Dei, capite 9 et 10, et S. Thomas in prima parte, quaestio. 95, artic. 2. Verum facilis est huius quaestionis explicatio. Passionum enim appetitus aliae respiciunt bonum, vel absens et parabile, ut desiderium et spes; vel iam partum et praesens, ut gaudium et laetitia; vel indifferenter ipsum bonum, ut amor: et huiusmodi passiones fuissent in homine: sunt enim motus naturales humani animi, et ad animi oblectationem et laetitiam pertinent.
...or to be stirred beyond the judgment and command of reason. This too could be called into question: whether in the state of innocence there would have been in man those motions of the sensitive appetite which we commonly call ‘passions,’ and which the Latins name either ‘diseases,’ or ‘disturbances,’ or ‘affections’—such as desire, joy, fear, sadness. For just as the body of man in that state would have been impassible, so the soul seems likely to have been empty of passions of this sort and plainly impassible. This question Augustine treats in book 14 of the City of God, chapters 9 and 10, and St. Thomas in the first part, question 95, article 2. But the explanation of this question is easy. For of the passions of the appetite, some regard a good—either absent and obtainable, such as desire and hope; or now obtained and present, such as joy and gladness; or the good indifferently, such as love: and passions of this sort would have been in man, for they are natural motions of the human soul, and pertain to the soul's delight and gladness.18
Sed enim, multo aliter tunc erant in homine quam nunc sunt in nobis: erant enim rationis arbitratu et imperio penitus modificatae ac determinatae, erantque in potestate rationis tripliciter, videlicet quantum ad earum excitationem et inchoationem, quantum ad continuationem et durationem, denique quantum ad contentionem et remissionem. Fuissent igitur homini tunc non modo nulli molestiae aut impedimento, sed magno etiam adiumento et oblectamento. Aliae passiones spectant malum, vel absens et impendens, ut timor, vel iam praesens, ut tristitia et dolor. Hisce passionibus caruit Adam ante peccatum, et nisi peccasset ipse, omnes eius posteri caruissent. Istiusmodi enim passiones adiunctam habent poenam et molestiam, quae in illum statum innocentiae tranquillissimum et felicissimum, et ab omnibus tam corporis quam animi malis remotissimum, competere non poterant.
But indeed they were then far otherwise in man than they now are in us: for they were thoroughly modified and determined by the choice and command of reason, and were in the power of reason in three ways, namely as regards their excitation and beginning, as regards their continuation and duration, and finally as regards their intensity and remission. They would therefore have been to man then not only no trouble or impediment, but also a great help and delight. Other passions regard an evil—either absent and impending, such as fear; or now present, such as sadness and pain. Of these passions Adam was free before sin, and had he not sinned, all his descendants would have been free. For passions of this kind have an adjoined penalty and trouble, which could not befit that state of innocence, most tranquil and most happy, and most remote from all evils both of body and of soul.19
Sed obiiciet aliquis non ignorasse Adamum se in peccatum labi, ob idque tot tantisque bonis quibus ornatus a Deo fuerat orbari posse: fieri igitur non potuit quin casum et lapsum suum et tantorum bonorum amissionem timeret: praesertim cum supra dictum sit ruinam Angelorum ei fuisse divinitus indicatam, quae non potuit non ei magnum similis casus et lapsus metum ac pavorem iniicere. At hoc facile solvitur: metus enim qui hominem angit et cruciat non est nisi mali impendentis et quod difficulter vitari possit, et ad quod multa sint quae hominem urgeant et quasi impellant. At in statu innocentiae nullum malum impendebat Adamo nisi peccaret ipse: peccatum autem omne maxima facilitate vitare poterat, cum nihil aut interius aut exterius incitaret eum ad peccandum; nulla igitur ratio suberat timendi: timendi inquam cum molestia et angore animi.
But someone will object that Adam was not ignorant that he could slip into sin, and on that account be deprived of so many and so great goods with which he had been adorned by God: it could not be, therefore, but that he should fear his fall and slip and the loss of such goods—especially since it was said above that the ruin of the Angels was divinely shown to him, which could not but cast into him a great fear and dread of a like fall and slip. But this is easily solved: for the fear that distresses and torments a man is only of an impending evil, and one that can be avoided only with difficulty, and toward which there are many things that urge and as it were impel the man. But in the state of innocence no evil impended over Adam unless he himself should sin; and he could avoid every sin with the greatest ease, since nothing either within or without incited him to sin: there was therefore no reason for fearing—for fearing, I say, with trouble and anguish of soul.20
Verum talis tantaque omnium motuum appetitus sensitivi sub rationis imperium potestatemque subiectio non efficiebatur a solis habiti-...
But such and so great a subjection of all the motions of the sensitive appetite under the command and power of reason was not effected by the habits alone...21
...habitibus appetitum inferiorem aut etiam superiorem perficientibus, sed maxima ex parte proficiscebatur e singulari assistentia Dei, et providentia atque cura quam is gerebat hominis in eo statu constituti, non sinens eius vel animo vel corpori quicquam contingere quod eius tranquillitatem et felicitatem perturbare aut inquinare posset. Illa vero Dei assistentia, licet maxime singularis et admirabilis esset, erat tamen in eo statu ordinaria atque valde conveniens.
...by the habits perfecting the lower or even the higher appetite, but for the greatest part proceeded from the singular assistance of God, and the providence and care which he had for man constituted in that state, not allowing anything to befall his soul or body that could disturb or defile his tranquillity and happiness. And that assistance of God, although it was most singular and admirable, was nevertheless in that state ordinary and most fitting.22
Ea vero assistentia Dei sex magna homini bona praestabat. Primo, servabat intellectum ne is deciperetur circa singularia et futura contingentia, quae humana ratione et solertia certo cognosci non possunt. Tum, continebat voluntatem ne eligeret actus inordinatos, cuiusmodi est verbum ociosum, vel mendacium iocosum aut officiosum, vel risus intempestivus aut supervacaneus, quae vocantur a Theologis peccata venialia ex genere: supra enim ostensum est, in statu innocentiae nullum ab homine veniale peccatum admitti potuisse. Deinde, arcebat a phantasia hominis omnia quae eam confundere, perturbare, et contaminare potuissent: scilicet coercens potentiam daemonis, ne visa obscoena vel tristia ei ingereret. Ad haec, cohibebat appetitum sensitivum ne ante iudicium rationis ad aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum commoveretur, etiam praesente obiecto admodum delectabili et ad illiciendum appetitum acerrimo. Praeterea, servabat corpus non solum a rebus mortiferis, sed etiam ab omnibus quae ei noxia et molesta possent accidere. Denique, expleto tempore quod homini Deus ad vivendum in terris praefiniisset, transtulisset eum in coelestem patriam, animali et terrena vita in spiritualem et divinam commutata, qualem videlicet post resurrectionem mortuorum victuros nos esse speramus.
And that assistance of God furnished man with six great goods. First, it preserved the intellect lest it be deceived concerning singulars and future contingents, which cannot be known with certainty by human reason and skill. Then, it contained the will lest it choose disordered acts, of which kind is an idle word, or a jocose or officious lie, or untimely or superfluous laughter, which are called by the Theologians venial sins by their kind: for it was shown above that in the state of innocence no venial sin could be admitted by man. Next, it kept away from man's imagination all things that could confuse, disturb, and contaminate it: namely, coercing the power of the demon, lest he obtrude obscene or sad sights upon it. Besides, it restrained the sensitive appetite lest it be moved, before the judgment of reason, to desiring or fleeing anything, even with a most delectable object present and most keen to allure the appetite. Moreover, it preserved the body not only from deadly things, but also from all things that could befall it as harmful and troublesome. Finally, when the time was completed which God had appointed for man to live on earth, it would have translated him to the heavenly fatherland, his animal and earthly life being changed into a spiritual and divine one—such, namely, as we hope we shall live after the resurrection of the dead.23
Sed cur appellata est iustitia originalis? Appellatur iustitia, non illa quae est una et quidem princeps virtutum cardinalium, suam in voluntate hominis sedem habens; nec illa iustitia qua iustificamur remissis peccatis Deoque nobiscum reconciliato, cuius frequens usus est apud Paulum: haec enim perficit hominem in ordine ad actus supernaturales et ad finem supernaturalem. Hoc igitur donum Dei appellatur iustitia, quasi naturalis perfectio totius hominis omniumque facultatum eius, optimaque dispositio et affectio omnium animae potentiarum, et inter se et in ordine ad suos cuiusque actus, per quam scilicet dicitur Deus fecisse hominem rectum. Originalis porro nominatur, quod eam ab origine sua habuisset homo, et quod per originalem generationem ex Adamo transfundenda erat in eius posteros, non quidem potestate seminis aut ullius causae naturalis, sed proxime a Deo, non aliter quam ipsa rationalis anima. Huiusmodi autem iustitia originali non eguit Angelus: quippe qui simplex natura est, nec diversis ex partibus aut etiam contrariis appetitibus concretus, quemadmodum homo est. Si quis vero ex nobis quaerat, utrum iustitia originalis fuerit do-...
But why was it called ‘original justice’? It is called ‘justice,’ not that one which is single and indeed the chief of the cardinal virtues, having its seat in the will of man; nor that justice by which we are justified, our sins being remitted and God reconciled to us, whose use is frequent in Paul: for this perfects man in order to supernatural acts and to a supernatural end. This gift of God, therefore, is called ‘justice’ as it were the natural perfection of the whole man and of all his faculties, and the best disposition and affection of all the powers of the soul, both among themselves and in order to the acts of each—by which, namely, God is said to have ‘made man upright.’ And it is named ‘original’ because man would have had it from his origin, and because it was to be transfused through original generation from Adam into his descendants—not indeed by the power of the seed or of any natural cause, but immediately from God, no otherwise than the rational soul itself. But of such original justice the Angel had no need: inasmuch as he is of a simple nature, not compounded of diverse, or even contrary, appetites, as man is. But if anyone of us should ask whether original justice was a gi-[ft]...24
...num supernaturale an naturale: respondebimus, simpliciter et absolute donum fuisse supernaturale. Nam nec ex causis ullis naturalibus efficiebatur, nec erat naturaliter homini debitum, nec nisi coniunctum cum dono supernaturalis gratiae in homine esse poterat: et gratuito donabatur a Deo, et habebat adiuncta privilegia quaedam extraordinaria et supernaturalia. Potest tamen aliqua ratione, et ut vocant secundum quid, appellari naturale donum: quia proprie ac per se non perficiebat hominem in ordine ad finem supernaturalem, neque ad actus supernaturales, sed supplebat defectus naturae, et naturalem duntaxat homini integritatem, rectitudinem, et perfectionem praestabat.
...a supernatural or a natural [gift]: we shall answer that simply and absolutely it was a supernatural gift. For it was effected by no natural causes, nor was it naturally owed to man, nor could it be in man except joined with the gift of supernatural grace: and it was freely given by God, and had adjoined to it certain extraordinary and supernatural privileges. Yet in some respect, and (as they say) ‘in a certain respect,’ it can be called a natural gift: because properly and of itself it did not perfect man in order to a supernatural end, nor to supernatural acts, but supplied the defects of nature, and furnished man only with natural integrity, uprightness, and perfection.25

Translator’s notes

  1. Question divider opening the first question of the disputation on original justice. ↩
  2. Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Henrici' (the opinion of Henry [of Ghent]). Q1 opens with Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet 6 q.11): original justice = a natural uprightness given to the will to dominate the sensitive appetite; its opposite is the 'curvitas'/proneness to evil (the bent-rod image). He argues this natural rectitude is distinct from any supernatural one—since the Fall both despoiled man of gratuitous gifts AND wounded his naturals. ↩
  3. Marginal gloss: 'Scotus refellit Henricum' (Scotus refutes Henry). Scotus (Sent. II d.29 q. unica) refutes Henry with two arguments: (1) on Henry's view a will lacking that rectitude could not sin—absurd, since a free will created without it could still sin without that being the privation of a natural rectitude; (2) since all sins (not just the first) are formally sins opposed to it... Continues to next page (catchword 'tertium'). Colophon at foot: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with signature 'CCC'. ↩
  4. Completes Scotus's refutation of Henry of Ghent (from p.569 catchword 'tertium'): the second/third sin would also have to corrupt that rectitude (impossible, since the first sin removed it); and the appetite's 'rebellion' against reason would equally exist in pure naturals, so it is not the privation of a natural rectitude. ↩
  5. Marginal gloss: 'Solutio argumentorum Henrici' (the solution of Henry's arguments). Pererius answers Henry: man is 'wounded in his naturals' because, with original justice (which perfected the natural powers) lost, that perfection perished too. A man in pure naturals would not equal one with original sin: the latter is a 'debtor' of the justice received in Adam (hence guilty); the loss of the vision of God is for one a penalty, for the other a mere negation. ↩
  6. Marginal gloss: 'Quid fuerit iustitia originalis: et an fuerit unus habitus' (what original justice was, and whether it was a single habit). Pererius's own view (Henry rejected): original justice was not one habit but an 'absolute combination and comprehension of all the habits' perfecting man in every power—it could not be a single habit, given the diversity of the soul's faculties. Continues to next page (catchword 'potentiis'). ↩
  7. Why original justice cannot be one habit (it would have to perfect powers distinct in number, species, even genus). It contained all the habits: in the speculative intellect, all the sciences (Metaphysics, natural philosophy, mathematics); in the practical intellect, prudence and the liberal arts (agriculture, music, architecture, painting/sculpture); in the will, two—religion (toward God) and justice (toward neighbor: distributive and commutative). ↩
  8. Marginal gloss: 'An voluntas hominis in statu innocentiae habuisset habitum charitatis naturalis erga Deum, ut ultimum finem naturalem' (whether man's will in innocence had a habit of natural charity toward God as the ultimate natural end). A possible third habit of the will (natural charity)—but no such habit was needed, since the upright will was carried by a natural 'weight' to love God above all. ↩
  9. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur Durandus, negans in appetitu sensitivo fuisse opus propriis virtutibus, sed unam satis fuisse iustitiam originalem' (Durandus is refuted, who denied the sensitive appetite needed its own virtues, [holding] original justice alone sufficed). In the sensitive appetite (irascible/concupiscible) were temperance and fortitude. Against Durandus (Sent. II d.29): original justice furnished the appetite's perfection, but through these proper virtue-habits, not by itself alone. Continues to next page (catchword 'perficiantur'). ↩
  10. Completes the point (from p.571): powers are perfected through their own habits; original justice contained all these habits in the most perfect ('heroic') degree. ↩
  11. Marginal gloss: 'Vtrum in statu innocentiae appetitus sensitivus, licet nunquam adversus rationem praevaleret, nonnunquam tamen adversus eam insurgeret' (whether in innocence the sensitive appetite, though never prevailing against reason, sometimes nonetheless rose against it). The question stated two ways: was the appetite so subject it never rose, or did reason (being stronger) restrain it—not without some sadness of sense, but with great delight of reason? ↩
  12. Distinction: man working 'according to reason' works 'simply'; working 'according to sense' (the will resisting) only 'in a certain respect'. Romans 7:17/20 ('It is not I that work it, but the sin that dwelleth in me'). So in innocence, even good done with some sadness of sense was always done with the delight of reason. ↩
  13. Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Scoti' (the opinion of Scotus). Scotus (Sent. II d.29 q. unica) leaves the question undecided, quoted at length: original justice made 'perfect tranquillity' (a supernatural gift) in the soul; whether 'all rebellion' is removed; what belongs to the whole man is what belongs to him by the higher power; and perhaps the sense-appetite could still be saddened. Quote continues onto next page (catchword 'visus'). ↩
  14. Conclusion of the Scotus quotation (Sent. II d.29 q. unica): in innocence the senses could perceive base objects affecting the sensitive appetite, but the will would have used well both the sadnesses and the delights of the lower appetites, immoderate in neither. Ends 'Haec Scotus.' ↩
  15. Marginal gloss: 'Vera sententia' (the true opinion). Pererius's own (against Scotus's hesitation): far more credible—indeed certain—that in original justice the sensitive appetite's motions never rose against or beyond reason's command; else innocence would not differ from grace-repaired fallen nature. Romans 7: the flesh's rebellion was born of sin (hence concupiscence is 'called sin'). ↩
  16. Augustine, De Correptione et gratia 10-11 (the flesh would never lust against the spirit) and De Civitate Dei 14.10 and 14.19 ('the motions of appetite before sin in Paradise were not vicious... not health from nature but languor from fault'). Ends 'Sic Augustinus.' ↩
  17. Two questions of Scotus with his answers: (1) why the rational will was not allured by the appetite's delights—because it was held by a far greater delight in its own ultimate end; (2) how the sensitive appetite abstained without sadness—by certain singular gifts of God. Pererius adds that even this was not enough: chiefly God's singular assistance and providence governed the appetite. Continues to next page (catchword 'vel'). ↩
  18. Marginal gloss: 'Vtrum in statu innocentiae fuissent passiones in appetitu sensitivo' (whether in innocence there would have been passions in the sensitive appetite). Completes from p.573 (God's providence over the appetite). The passions discussed (Augustine De Civ Dei 14.9-10; Aquinas ST I q.95 a.2): those toward good (desire/hope, joy/gladness, love) would have been present, as natural motions of delight. ↩
  19. The good-passions in innocence were wholly governed by reason (in their onset, duration, and intensity)—a help, not a trouble. The evil-passions (fear, sadness, pain) Adam lacked before sin, since they carry an adjoined penalty incompatible with the blessed state. ↩
  20. Marginal glosses: 'Obiectio' and 'Solutio'. Objection: Adam knew he could fall (especially after the angels' ruin was shown him), so he must have feared. Solution: tormenting fear is only of an impending evil hard to avoid; but no evil threatened Adam unless he sinned, and he could avoid sin with the greatest ease—so there was no ground for anguished fear. ↩
  21. Transition: the appetite's complete subjection to reason was not from the habits alone—but chiefly (next page) from God's singular assistance. Continues to next page (catchword 'habitibus'). ↩
  22. The appetite's subjection came chiefly from God's singular assistance and providence over man in that state—which, though most singular, was for that state 'ordinary and most fitting.' ↩
  23. Marginal gloss: 'Sex bona praestabat homini in statu innocentiae specialis Dei assistentia' (God's special assistance furnished man six goods in innocence). The six: (1) preserved the intellect from deception about singulars/future contingents; (2) contained the will from venial-by-kind sins (idle word, jocose/officious lie, untimely laughter); (3) kept the imagination from the demon's obscene/sad images; (4) restrained the appetite before reason's judgment; (5) preserved the body from harm; (6) at the appointed time, would translate man to heaven (life changed to spiritual/divine, as after the resurrection). ↩
  24. Marginal glosses: 'Cur dicta sit iustitia originalis' (why it is called original justice); 'Cur Angelus non eguerit originali iustitia' (why the Angel did not need original justice). Called 'justice' not as the cardinal virtue nor as justifying justice, but as the natural perfection of the whole man (whereby 'God made man upright,' Eccl 7:29). Called 'original' because had from one's origin and transfused (like the rational soul, immediately from God). The angel needed it not, being simple in nature. Continues to next page (catchword 'donum'). ↩
  25. Marginal gloss: 'Vtrum iustitia originalis appellari debeat donum naturale, aut supernaturale' (whether original justice should be called a natural or a supernatural gift). Answer: simply and absolutely supernatural (not from natural causes, not owed, only with grace, freely given, with supernatural privileges); yet 'in a certain respect' natural, since it perfected man only within the bounds of his natural integrity, not toward a supernatural end. ↩