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Library / Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

Book Five — the state of innocence

QUESTION III. Whether original justice was a thing distinct from sanctifying grace

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QUESTION III. Whether original justice was a thing distinct from sanctifying grace.1

QUAESTIO III. Vtrum iustitia originalis res diversa esset a gratia gratum faciente.

Circa hanc quaestionem quatuor esse video inter se discrepantes Theologorum sententias. Scotus, primo libro de Natura et gratia, cap. 5, secundum B. Thomam iustitiam originalem et gratiam gratum facientem unam eandemque rem fuisse arbitratur: id quod ipse argumentatur ex his quae scribit Sanctus Thomas in prima parte, quaestione 95, articulo primo, et quaest. 100, art. 1, ubi censet rectitudinem rationis erga Deum et rectitudinem appetitus sensitivi sub rationis imperium omnino subiecti ex gratia gratum faciente provenisse ac dependisse. Eiusdem quoque rei illud esse non obscurum argumentum, quod B. Thomas in prima secundae, quaest. 83, iustitiam originalem ponit in essentia animae ut in subiecto, in qua nimirum postea, quaestione 110 eiusdem partis, collocat gratiam gratum facientem, quae vim habet sanandi superiorem hominis partem, non autem inferiorem. Formaliter igitur iustitia originalis, secundum B. Thomam, non erat res diversa a gratia gratum faciente.
Concerning this question I see that there are four opinions of the Theologians, discrepant among themselves. Scotus, in the first book On Nature and Grace, chapter 5, holds, following the Blessed Thomas, that original justice and sanctifying grace were one and the same thing: which he argues from what Saint Thomas writes in the first part, question 95, article one, and question 100, article 1, where he judges that the uprightness of reason toward God, and the uprightness of the sensitive appetite wholly subjected under the command of reason, proceeded from and depended on sanctifying grace. And it is no obscure argument of the same thing that the Blessed Thomas, in the first of the second part, question 83, places original justice in the essence of the soul as in a subject—in which, namely, he afterward, in question 110 of the same part, locates sanctifying grace, which has the power of healing the higher part of man, but not the lower. Formally, therefore, original justice, according to the Blessed Thomas, was not a thing distinct from sanctifying grace.2
Putat igitur Scotus non fuisse aliud iustitiam originalem quam ipsam gratiam gratum facientem, maiorem tamen quam est in statu naturae humanae post peccatum: maiorem dico, non intensive, nec quantum ad principalem effectum gratiae, qui est esse gratum Deo et acceptum ad vitam aeternam, sed extensive, quia tunc gratia extendebat se ad perficiendam sanitatem, integritatem, et rectitudinem etiam partis inferioris. Appetitum namque tranquillissime compositum et moderatum, et usquequaque rationi subiectum reddebat. Non placet mihi haec opinio. Etenim gratia gratum faciens perficit hominem in ordine ad finem supernaturalem, non autem in ordine ad finem naturalem, neque ad naturalem integritatem et perfectionem hominis: hoc autem praestabat iustitia originalis. Erant igitur dona diversa, et ad diversos fines et status hominis pertinentia. Et quemadmodum per iustitiam originalem non perficiebatur homo supernaturaliter, quia erat donum naturae ad complendam eius integritatem et perfectionem datum, ita gratia gratum faciens, quia est ordinis supernaturalis et ad supernaturalem statum et finem hominis relata, non habebat vim perficiendi hominem naturaliter et in his quae ad naturae humanae absolutionem pertinent. Cumque possimus animo fingere et cogitatione informare hominem aliquem secundum omnem naturae et potentiarum eius integritatem et rectitudinem naturalem perfectum sine gratia supernaturali gratum faciente (ordo enim naturalis est diversus, nec per se depen-...
Scotus thinks, therefore, that original justice was nothing other than sanctifying grace itself, yet greater than it is in the state of human nature after sin: greater, I say, not intensively, nor as regards the principal effect of grace—which is to be pleasing to God and accepted to eternal life—but extensively, because then grace extended itself to perfecting the health, integrity, and uprightness also of the lower part. For it rendered the appetite most tranquilly composed and moderated, and in every way subject to reason. This opinion does not please me. For sanctifying grace perfects man in order to a supernatural end, but not in order to a natural end, nor to the natural integrity and perfection of man: but this original justice furnished. They were, therefore, distinct gifts, pertaining to distinct ends and states of man. And just as through original justice man was not perfected supernaturally—because it was a gift of nature given to complete its integrity and perfection—so sanctifying grace, because it is of the supernatural order and referred to the supernatural state and end of man, did not have the power of perfecting man naturally and in those things that pertain to the completion of human nature. And since we can fashion in mind and form in thought some man perfect according to all the integrity of his nature and powers and his natural uprightness, without supernatural sanctifying grace (for the natural order is distinct, and does not of itself depen-[d]...3
...dens a supernaturali), consentaneum profecto est rem diversam fuisse iustitiam originalem a gratia gratum faciente, nec repugnare ab ea separari posse. Caietanus, prima parte quaestione nonagesimaquinta, existimat fuisse res diversas iustitiam originalem et gratiam gratum facientem, sed illam tamen non potuisse ab hac separari: idque putat sensisse B. Thomam. Neque enim aliud ipse ait quam gratiam gratum facientem radicem fuisse atque fundamentum iustitiae originalis. Et in prima secundae quaestione centesimanona primis articulis manifeste distinguit statum naturae integrae, scilicet per iustitiam originalem, a statu gratiae gratum facientis, docens in illo statu potuisse hominem facere omne bonum morale, vitare omne peccatum, implere totam legem, et in bono usque ad finem perseverare: non potuisse tamen sine gratia gratum faciente quicquam facere supernaturale aut dignum vita aeterna. Sic Caietanus.
...d on the supernatural), it is assuredly consistent that original justice was a thing distinct from sanctifying grace, and that there is no contradiction in its being able to be separated from it. Cajetan, in the first part, question ninety-five, judges that original justice and sanctifying grace were distinct things, but that the former nevertheless could not be separated from the latter: and he thinks the Blessed Thomas held this. For Thomas says nothing other than that sanctifying grace was the root and foundation of original justice. And in the first of the second part, question one hundred and nine, in the first articles, he manifestly distinguishes the state of integral nature—namely, through original justice—from the state of sanctifying grace, teaching that in that state man could do every moral good, avoid every sin, fulfill the whole law, and persevere in good unto the end: yet that he could not, without sanctifying grace, do anything supernatural or worthy of eternal life. Thus Cajetan.4
Videtur tamen doctrinae S. Thomae congruentior opinio Scoti. Supradictis enim locis non obscure significat B. Thomas rectitudinem partis inferioris respectu superioris, qui erat proprius iustitiae originalis effectus, provenisse ex supernaturali dono gratiae gratum facientis. Nec video equidem, si iustitia originalis ponatur re differens a gratia gratum faciente, cur non ab illa quoque seiungari et dissociari ac separatim existere posset, cum rectitudo naturalis quam una tribuebat homini diversa sit minimeque pendens a rectitudine supernaturali quam largiebatur altera.
Yet the opinion of Scotus seems more congruent with the doctrine of St. Thomas. For in the aforesaid places the Blessed Thomas not obscurely signifies that the uprightness of the lower part with respect to the higher—which was the proper effect of original justice—proceeded from the supernatural gift of sanctifying grace. Nor indeed do I see, if original justice be posited as really differing from sanctifying grace, why it could not also be sundered and dissociated from it, and exist separately, since the natural uprightness which the one bestowed on man is distinct and in no way dependent on the supernatural uprightness which the other granted.5
Tertia sententia est Bonaventurae, libro 2 distinct. 29, Scoti distinct. 32, Tostati in tertium caput Geneseos quaestio. 6 et 7, et Catharini super idem caput, arbitrantium illas duas gratias re diversas fuisse et separabiles invicem, quin etiam vere separatas. Namque putant primum fuisse Adam conditum cum iustitia originali, postea vero superadditam ei fuisse gratiam gratum facientem; et post peccatum Adae omnes iusti habuerunt gratiam gratum facientem, nullus autem iustitiam originalem; quinimo Eva, cum comedit fructum vetitum, haud dubie perdidit gratiam gratum facientem, non tamen iustitiam originalem, priusquam comedit Adam. Cuius rei illud putant signum et argumentum manifestum esse, quod Eva non erubuit de sua nuditate, nec sensit rebellionem carnis sicut post esum Adam. Existimat porro Catharinus inter Deum et Adamum hoc intercessisse pactum, ut per solam Adami obedientiam vel inobedientiam donum illud iustitiae originalis vel conservaretur vel amitteretur: itaque si sola Eva comedisset fructum vetitum, nec Adamo nec posteris utriusque ad iustitiae originalis amissionem offuisset; neque donum illud amittendum erat ob aliud ullum peccatum quam propter esum fructus interdicti, de quo Deus dixit: In quocumque die comederis ex eo, morte morieris.
The third opinion is that of Bonaventure, in book 2, distinction 29; of Scotus, distinction 32; of Tostatus, on the third chapter of Genesis, questions 6 and 7; and of Catharinus, on the same chapter—who judge that those two graces were really distinct, and separable from each other, indeed even actually separated. For they think that Adam was first founded with original justice, and afterward sanctifying grace was superadded to him; and that after Adam's sin all the just had sanctifying grace, but none original justice; indeed that Eve, when she ate the forbidden fruit, undoubtedly lost sanctifying grace, but not original justice, before Adam ate. Of which they think this is a manifest sign and argument: that Eve did not blush at her nakedness, nor feel the rebellion of the flesh, as [she did] after Adam ate. Catharinus moreover thinks that this pact passed between God and Adam: that by Adam's obedience or disobedience alone that gift of original justice would be either conserved or lost; and so, if Eve alone had eaten the forbidden fruit, it would have harmed neither Adam nor the descendants of either toward the loss of original justice; nor was that gift to be lost on account of any other sin than the eating of the forbidden fruit, of which God said: ‘In whatever day thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death.’6
Verum hanc opinionem, quantum ad duo, falsam esse supra ostendimus, cum probavimus et Adamum fuisse creatum cum gratia gratum fa-...
But this opinion, as to two points, we showed to be false above, when we proved both that Adam was created with sanctifying gra-[ce]...7
...ciente, et omne peccatum mortale plane adversari iustitiae originali: quippe omnia peccata mortalia sunt contra rectitudinem rationis quam potissimum iustitia originalis praestabat homini; et pleraque peccata mortalia sunt contra rectitudinem appetitus sensitivi, qui erat iustitiae originalis effectus. Illud autem argumentum non amissae propter peccatum iustitiae originalis, propterea quod Eva non statim ut ex arbore vetita edit erubuerit nec inordinatum aliquem carnis motum senserit, obtusius profecto est quam auctores isti putant. Caietanus certe ita solvit in prima parte, quaest. 95, art. 1: Ad hoc, inquit, dicendum mihi videtur, propter peccatum Evae ademptam ei fuisse iustitiam originalem, non simpliciter et totaliter, sed quoad aliquid. Simpliciter enim adimenda reservabatur peccato Adae secundum ordinem divinae providentiae: ea ratione, ut donum naturae primo auferretur ei qui erat principium totius naturae, cui donum illud primo ac principaliter tributum fuerat. Nec obstat quod potuisset Adam post peccatum Evae non peccare: quia apud Deum praescientia casus in ratione ordinis fuit. Et hoc satis congruit rationi et proportioni: excisa enim radice, possunt aliquandiu rami vivere; demptoque animali corde, aliquandiu etiam calere et vigere membra cernimus. Sic Caietanus.
...[grace], and that every mortal sin plainly opposes original justice: inasmuch as all mortal sins are against the uprightness of reason which original justice chiefly furnished to man; and most mortal sins are against the uprightness of the sensitive appetite, which was an effect of original justice. But that argument—that original justice was not lost on account of sin, because Eve, as soon as she ate from the forbidden tree, did not blush, nor feel any disordered motion of the flesh—is assuredly more obtuse than those authors think. Cajetan indeed solves it thus, in the first part, question 95, article 1: ‘To this,’ he says, ‘it seems to me to be said, that on account of Eve's sin original justice was taken from her, not simply and totally, but in a certain respect. For its simple removal was reserved to Adam's sin, according to the order of divine providence: in this manner, that the gift of nature should first be taken from him who was the principle of the whole nature, to whom that gift had been first and principally bestowed. Nor does it matter that Adam could, after Eve's sin, not sin: because with God the foreknowledge of the fall was in the order of reason. And this is sufficiently congruent with reason and proportion: for when the root is cut, the branches can live for a while; and, the animal heart removed, we see the members for a while still warm and vigorous.’ Thus Cajetan.8
Addimus nos praeterea Evam perdidisse iustitiam originalem non modo statim post esum illius fructus, sed etiam ante, propter interiorem eius vanitatem, elationem animi atque superbiam: quibus cum vitiis rectitudo iustitiae originalis nullo modo cohaerere poterat. At enim non statim erubuit Eva, inquiunt isti: sed fuit tamen in ea inordinata voluptas in visu, aspiciendo pomum, et in gustatu aviditas immoderata, esum eius concupiscendo: haec autem vitia arguebant animum eius fuisse iam iustitia originali spoliatum atque privatum. Verum hoc non animadvertit Eva: videlicet vel propter antecedentem superbiam iam animo obcaecata, vel quia fortasse omnes iustitiae originalis vel privationis eius effectus non plane perspectos et cognitos habebat.
We add, moreover, that Eve lost original justice not only at once after the eating of that fruit, but even before, on account of her interior vanity, elation of soul, and pride: with which vices the uprightness of original justice could in no way cohere. ‘But Eve did not blush at once,’ these authors say: yet there was in her a disordered pleasure in the sight, looking at the apple, and in the taste an immoderate greed, in craving the eating of it: and these vices proved that her soul was already despoiled and deprived of original justice. But Eve did not notice this: namely, either because she was already blinded in mind by the antecedent pride, or because perhaps she did not have all the effects of original justice, or of its privation, plainly perceived and known.9
Verum urgent nos: Cur igitur, inquiunt, non statim erubuit de sua nuditate, vel cur carnis rebellionem non protinus sensit? Atqui non fuit necessarium ut, amissa iustitia originali, statim exurgerent et foras erumperent omnes privationis eius effectus, sed suo quisque tempore et sua cuique data occasione. Quoniam autem inter esum Evae et Adami breve intercessit tempus, propterea non est mirum illo tam exiguo temporis spatio non sensisse eam inordinatam carnis concupiscentiam, praesertim vero cum tunc Eva ad esum illius fructus vehementer esset intenta, et quemadmodum etiam ad esum eius maritum suum induceret valde cogitabunda et solicita: post esum vero Adae, propter mutuum nudorum corporum conspectum et eximiam utriusque pulchritudinem, statim in utriusque animis et membris libido excitata et inflammata est. Ego quartam sententiam ceteris probabiliorem censeo, iusti-...
But they press us: Why, then, they say, did she not at once blush at her nakedness, or why did she not immediately feel the rebellion of the flesh? But it was not necessary that, original justice being lost, all the effects of its privation should at once arise and burst forth, but each in its own time and on its own given occasion. And since between the eating of Eve and of Adam a brief time intervened, it is therefore no wonder that in so small a space of time she did not feel the disordered concupiscence of the flesh—especially since Eve was then vehemently intent on the eating of that fruit, and, as also she was inducing her husband to eat of it, very thoughtful and anxious: but after the eating of Adam, on account of the mutual sight of their naked bodies and the exceeding beauty of each, at once in the souls and members of both, lust was excited and inflamed. I judge the fourth opinion more probable than the rest, [namely that] orig-[inal justice]...10
...iustitiam originalem re ipsa diversam fuisse a gratia gratum faciente. Et quamvis in illo statu innocentiae neutra potuerit ab alterutra dissociari et disiungi, quod dignitas et excellentia eius status alterutra sublata constare non posset: si tamen ratio iustitiae originalis presse, proprie praeciseque accipiatur, non repugnabat eam esse sine gratia gratum faciente negative, repugnabat tamen esse sine ea privative; hoc est, potuit Adam prius habere solam iustitiam originalem, postea vero gratiam gratum facientem accipere, quemadmodum opinantur qui putant Adam creatum cum iustitia originali et sine gratia gratum faciente. At vero amissa gratia propter peccatum mortale, non potuit manere iustitia originalis: cuius rei hanc esse reor causam, quod propria ratio propriusque effectus iustitiae originalis nec includit necessario nec exigit gratiam gratum facientem, repugnat tamen omnino privationi gratiae quae propter peccatum mortale accidit. Siquidem omne peccatum mortale, ut supra docuimus, iustitiae originali adversabatur. Atque hanc sententiam nostram non alia ratione confirmare attinet, quam qua Scoti et Caietani sententiam paulo supra confutavimus.
...that original justice was in itself a thing distinct from sanctifying grace. And although in that state of innocence neither could be dissociated and disjoined from the other—because the dignity and excellence of that state could not stand if either were removed—yet if the notion of original justice be taken strictly, properly, and precisely, there was no contradiction in its being without sanctifying grace negatively, but there was a contradiction in its being without it privatively; that is, Adam could first have original justice alone, and afterward receive sanctifying grace, as those think who hold that Adam was created with original justice and without sanctifying grace. But indeed, grace being lost on account of mortal sin, original justice could not remain: of which I reckon this to be the cause, that the proper notion and proper effect of original justice neither necessarily includes nor requires sanctifying grace, yet is wholly repugnant to the privation of grace which befalls on account of mortal sin. For every mortal sin, as we taught above, was opposed to original justice. And this our opinion it is fitting to confirm by no other reasoning than that by which we refuted, a little above, the opinion of Scotus and of Cajetan.11
Quanquam autem iustitia originalis simpliciter et absolute potuisset separari a gratia sanctificante, in illo tamen statu innocentiae ex voluntate et decreto Dei separari non poterat. Nimirum Deus voluit et constituit ut felicitatem illius status non haberet nemo sine gratia sanctificante, et ut quicumque gratiam hanc haberet in eo statu nec iustitia originali nec omni felicitate eius status careret. Huius autem divinae voluntatis et decreti illud signum esse, nec obscurum, potest, quod statim ut homo peccavit et gratiam Dei amisit, et iustitia originali spoliatus et omnibus bonis orbatus cunctaque illius status felicitate privatus est. Atque haec Dei voluntas et decretum cum ratione et iustitia maxime congruit: non enim aequum et decens erat ut homo in tanta bonorum omnium affluentia et status felicitate Deo gratus et amicus non esset. Adiice quod directio et ordinatio hominis ad finem supernaturalem potior et principalior est quam ad finem naturalem: non igitur decebat ut primum hominem Deus crearet perfectissimum in ordine ad finem naturalem, in ordine autem ad finem supernaturalem omnino imperfectum.
But although original justice could simply and absolutely have been separated from sanctifying grace, yet in that state of innocence it could not be separated by the will and decree of God. For God willed and established that no one should have the happiness of that state without sanctifying grace, and that whoever had this grace in that state should lack neither original justice nor all the happiness of that state. And there can be this sign—and no obscure one—of this divine will and decree: that as soon as man sinned and lost the grace of God, he was both despoiled of original justice and bereft of all goods and deprived of all the happiness of that state. And this will and decree of God is most congruent with reason and justice: for it was not equitable and fitting that man, in so great an affluence of all goods and happiness of state, should not be pleasing to God and his friend. Add that the direction and ordering of man to the supernatural end is greater and more principal than to the natural end: it was therefore not fitting that God should create the first man most perfect in order to the natural end, but in order to the supernatural end wholly imperfect.12
Patres autem, cum de iustitia originali agunt, loquuntur de statu primi hominis ante peccatum, prout scilicet status ille comprehendebat omnia bona, tam naturalia quam supernaturalia, quibus ornatus Adam creatus est a Deo. Lege Augustinum libro 14 de Civitate Dei, capite 10 et 19. At secundum Patres, praesertim autem secundum Augustinum, nulla est hominis perfectio et rectitudo coram Deo sine gratia eius gratum faciente. Recte enim argumentatur Paulus ad Romanos 4: Si Abraham non ex fide et gratia Dei iustificatus est, habere quidem laudem potuit, sed non coram Deo. Observandum autem est, si post peccatum Evae non peccas-...
But the Fathers, when they treat of original justice, speak of the state of the first man before sin, as, namely, that state comprehended all goods, both natural and supernatural, with which Adam was created adorned by God. Read Augustine, book 14 of the City of God, chapters 10 and 19. But according to the Fathers, and especially according to Augustine, there is no perfection and uprightness of man before God without his sanctifying grace. For Paul rightly argues in Romans 4: if Abraham was not justified by faith and the grace of God, he could indeed have praise, but not before God. But it must be observed, if after Eve's sin [Adam] had not sin-[ned]...13
...set Adam, perdidisset quidem Eva iustitiam originalem, filii autem qui ex ea et Adamo innocente procreati essent, generati essent cum iustitia originali: eius enim vel amissio vel conservatio apud posteros ex solius Adami obedientia vel inobedientia pendebat. Quod si Adam genuisset aliquos filios habens iustitiam originalem, et postea comedens cibum vetitum eam perdidisset: filii eius ante peccatum ex eo progeniti cum iustitia originali fuissent generati; erant enim posteri Adae innocentis, non autem peccatoris. Et quia posteri Adae non fuissent confirmati in gratia, ut supra manifestis rationibus addiximus, etiam si Adam non peccasset, potuissent eius posteri, alii iustitiam originalem habere, alii non habere.
...[if after Eve's sin Adam] had not sinned, Eve indeed would have lost original justice, but the sons who would have been procreated from her and the innocent Adam would have been generated with original justice: for its loss or conservation among his descendants depended on the obedience or disobedience of Adam alone. But if Adam, having original justice, had begotten some sons, and afterward, eating the forbidden food, had lost it: his sons begotten from him before the sin would have been generated with original justice; for they were descendants of innocent Adam, not of the sinner. And because Adam's descendants would not have been confirmed in grace, as we said above by manifest reasons, even if Adam had not sinned, his descendants could—some have original justice, others not have it.14
Dicet aliquis, sic futuram fuisse magnam confusionem et perturbationem humanae societatis, aliis maximis peccatoribus, aliis plane innocentibus: oportuissetque nocentes segregari ab innocentibus, et quidem saepenumero uxores a maritis et filios a parentibus. Verum istiusmodi confusioni et perturbationi occurrisset Deus, prospiciens ne quid inde bonis et innocentibus detrimenti contingeret. Et quemadmodum ferocissima animalia fecisset homini plane subiecta et obedientia, nedum innocua: sic innocentes conversari fuissent innoxie cum peccatoribus. Iniecisset enim illis Deus singularem quendam timorem et reverentiam innocentium hominum, ut eis non modo nocere et adversari non auderent, sed etiam subesse eis et obtemperare vellent.
Someone will say that thus there would have been great confusion and disturbance of human society, some being the greatest sinners, others plainly innocent: and it would have been necessary that the guilty be segregated from the innocent—and indeed often wives from husbands and sons from parents. But God would have met confusion and disturbance of this kind, providing that no detriment thence befall the good and innocent. And just as he would have made the fiercest animals plainly subject and obedient to man, indeed harmless, so the innocent would have conversed harmlessly with sinners. For God would have cast into the [sinners] a certain singular fear and reverence of the innocent men, so that they would not only not dare to harm and oppose them, but would even wish to be subject to them and obey them.15
Sed illud est dubium, si status innocentiae permansisset, et aliqui peccando utramque gratiam amisissent: utrum postea per poenitentiam, sicut recuperassent gratiam sanctificantem, ita recepissent simul et iustitiam originalem. Sed probabile est poenitentibus utramque simul restitutum iri: siquidem amissio iustitiae originalis in perpetuum pendere videbatur ex peccato primi hominis, quod erat in omnes eius posteros transfundendum. Sed dicet aliquis: si iustitia originalis tunc separari non poterat a gratia sanctificante, et habere hominem iustitiam originalem et ipsi et aliis manifestum erat ex conspicuis eius effectibus et signis: ergo notum fuisset cuilibet se esse in gratia Dei. Fuisset profecto id notum quantum ad praesentiam gratiae, sed non quantum ad eius intensionem seu gradus, neque quantum ad futuram eius durationem.
But this is doubtful: if the state of innocence had remained, and some by sinning had lost both graces, whether afterward, through penance, just as they would have recovered sanctifying grace, so they would have received at the same time also original justice. But it is probable that to penitents both would be restored at once: since the perpetual loss of original justice seemed to depend on the sin of the first man, which was to be transfused into all his descendants. But someone will say: if original justice then could not be separated from sanctifying grace, and a man's having original justice was manifest both to himself and to others from its conspicuous effects and signs, then it would be known to each that he was in the grace of God. It would indeed be known as to the presence of grace, but not as to its intensity or degrees, nor as to its future duration.16

Translator’s notes

  1. Question divider opening the third question of the disputation on original justice (whether it was distinct from, and separable from, sanctifying grace). ↩
  2. Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Scoti. S. Thomas.' Four opinions on Q3. The first (Scotus, De Natura et gratia 1.5, reading Aquinas): original justice and sanctifying grace were one and the same—from Aquinas ST I q.95 a.1 & q.100 a.1 (the rectitude of reason and appetite came from grace) and ST I-II q.83 (original justice in the soul's essence, where grace too is placed at q.110). ↩
  3. Scotus's view: original justice = grace, but greater 'extensively' (reaching the lower part's health), not 'intensively' or as to grace's principal effect. Pererius rejects it: grace perfects toward the supernatural end, original justice toward the natural—so they are distinct gifts for distinct ends; and a man can be conceived perfect in natural integrity without grace. Continues to next page (catchword 'dependens'). ↩
  4. Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Caietani.' Second opinion (Cajetan, on ST I q.95): original justice and grace were distinct, but the former could not be separated from the latter (grace being its 'root and foundation'). Cajetan (on ST I-II q.109) distinguishes the state of integral nature (all moral good, the whole law) from the state of grace (the supernatural, worthy of eternal life). Completes Pererius's refutation of the first opinion (catchword 'dependens'). ↩
  5. Pererius notes that Scotus's reading (identity) is actually more congruent with Aquinas's texts (which derive the lower part's rectitude from grace); but if original justice is really distinct from grace, he sees no reason it could not also be separated and exist apart—the natural rectitude being independent of the supernatural. ↩
  6. Marginal gloss: 'Tertia sententia Bonaventurae, Scoti, Tostati et Catharini.' Third opinion: the two graces were really distinct AND separable—indeed actually separated. They hold Adam was first created with original justice, grace superadded later; after the Fall the just have grace but not original justice; Eve lost grace (not original justice) at her eating, before Adam ate (sign: she did not blush). Catharinus posits a pact (Gen 2:17): only Adam's disobedience would forfeit the gift. ↩
  7. Pererius begins refuting the third opinion on two points (the first: that Adam was created with grace—shown above). Continues to next page (catchword 'faciente'). ↩
  8. Marginal gloss: 'An Eva statim ut comedit fructum vetitum perdiderit iustitiam originalem' (whether Eve lost original justice as soon as she ate the forbidden fruit). Refutation continues: every mortal sin opposes original justice. The third opinion's argument (Eve did not blush at once) is solved by Cajetan (ST I q.95 a.1): Eve's sin took her original justice not simply but 'in a certain respect'; its full removal was reserved to Adam (the principle of the whole nature)—as branches live a while after the root is cut. Ends 'Sic Caietanus.' ↩
  9. Pererius adds: Eve lost original justice even before eating, through her vanity, elation, and pride (incompatible with its rectitude). Though she did not blush at once, the disordered pleasure in seeing and the immoderate greed in tasting already showed her soul despoiled—which she did not notice, blinded by pride or not clearly perceiving the effects. ↩
  10. The pressed objection (why no immediate blush or carnal rebellion) answered: the privation's effects need not all burst out at once, but each in its time; the interval between Eve's and Adam's eating was brief, and Eve was intent on the fruit and on inducing Adam—but after Adam ate, lust was at once inflamed in both. Pererius then declares the fourth opinion the most probable. Continues to next page (catchword 'Iustitiam'). ↩
  11. Marginal gloss: 'Probabilior decernitur 4. sententia, quam Auctor sequitur' (the fourth opinion, which the Author follows, is judged more probable). The fourth (Pererius's) view: original justice was really distinct from grace; in innocence neither could be dissociated (the state needed both), yet 'strictly' original justice could be without grace 'negatively' (Adam could have it first, grace later) though not 'privatively'—grace once lost by mortal sin, original justice could not remain (every mortal sin opposes it). ↩
  12. Although original justice could in itself be separated from grace, in the state of innocence God's will and decree did not allow it: God willed that no one have that state's felicity without grace. The sign: when man sinned and lost grace, he was at once stripped of original justice and all the state's goods. This is congruent with reason (man should not be in such felicity without being God's friend), and the supernatural end is more principal than the natural. ↩
  13. The Fathers (esp. Augustine, De Civ Dei 14.10 & 19), when treating original justice, mean the whole pre-sin state with all its goods (natural and supernatural); and for them there is no perfection/uprightness before God without grace (Paul, Romans 4: Abraham unjustified by grace could have praise, but not 'before God'). Continues to next page (catchword 'peccasset'); colophon 'DDD 3'. ↩
  14. Observations (from p.581 catchword 'peccasset') on the Eve/Adam sequence: original justice's loss in posterity depended on Adam's disobedience alone; sons begotten before his sin would have it; even without the Fall, some descendants might have it and others not. ↩
  15. Marginal glosses: 'Prima obiectio' and 'Solutio'. First objection: such a mix would confuse human society (segregating the guilty from the innocent). Solution: God would prevent harm to the innocent—as he would make the fiercest animals harmless, so he would cast into the sinners a singular fear/reverence of the innocent. ↩
  16. Marginal glosses: 'Secunda obiectio'/'Solutio' and 'Tertia obiectio'/'Solutio'. Second objection: would penitents recover original justice along with grace? Probably yes (its perpetual loss depended on the first man's sin). Third objection: then everyone would know he was in grace—answer: known as to the presence of grace, but not its degree or future duration. ↩