QUESTION II. Where, as in a subject, original justice was — Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume I

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QUESTION II. Where, as in a subject, original justice was.¹

QUAESTIO II. Vbi tanquam in subiecto fuerit iustitia originalis.

Caeterum, illa gravior ducitur quaestio, in qua parte hominis vel facultate tanquam in subiecto esset iustitia originalis. Certum est non fuisse eam in corpore, sed in anima. Verum dubitatur utrum in animae essentia fuerit, an in aliqua eius potentia: et si in potentia fuerit, utrum in aliqua superiori, ut est voluntas et ratio, an in potentiis inferioribus, quae sunt appetitus sensitivi. B. Thomas in prima secundae, quaestione 83, arbitratur iustitiam originalem, ut in subiecto, fuisse in essentia animae rationalis, in qua ipse posuit deinde, quaestione 110 eiusdem partis, gratiam gratum facientem. Hoc ille ad hunc modum argumentatur: Habitus et privatio in eodem subiecto versantur, sed peccatum originale, quod est privatio iustitiae originalis, est ut in subiecto in ipsa hominis natura, quia contrahitur per generationem ipsius naturae: ergo similiter iustitia originalis in eodem erat subiecto: praesertim cum ipsa esset donum naturae, id est, eius rectitudo, absolutio, et perfectio.

Now that weightier question is raised, in what part of man or faculty original justice was, as in a subject. It is certain that it was not in the body, but in the soul. But it is doubted whether it was in the essence of the soul, or in some power of it; and if it was in a power, whether in some higher one, such as the will and reason, or in the lower powers, which are the sensitive appetites. The Blessed Thomas, in the first of the second part, question 83, judges that original justice, as in a subject, was in the essence of the rational soul—in which he afterward placed, in question 110 of the same part, sanctifying grace. He argues in this manner: A habit and its privation are in the same subject; but original sin, which is the privation of original justice, is as in a subject in the very nature of man, because it is contracted through the generation of nature itself: therefore likewise original justice was in the same subject; especially since it was a gift of nature, that is, its uprightness, completion, and perfection.²

Mihi haec opinio non probatur. Nimirum iustitia originalis perficiebat hominem non in ordine ad esse supernaturale vel ad supernaturalem finem, sed secundum conditionem et statum naturalem hominis, et intra naturalis integritatis et perfectionis humanae naturae terminos. Videamus igitur quidnam intra latitudinem et cancellos naturae humanae rectum et perfectum iustitia originalis facere potuerit. Essentia hominis et esse naturale eius non indigebat perfectione aliqua superaddita, sicut nec vitiari aut corrumpi poterat: cum ipsum esse substantiale et naturale hominis sit invariabile atque indivisibile: ergo solum poterat perfici id quod erat capax obliquitatis vel rectitudinis: cuiusmodi erant potentiae et facultates animi in ordine ad actus suos naturales seu morales, qui et vitiosi et recti, ac perfecti esse possunt.

This opinion is not approved by me. For original justice perfected man not in order to supernatural being or to a supernatural end, but according to the natural condition and state of man, and within the bounds of the natural integrity and perfection of human nature. Let us see, then, what within the breadth and bounds of human nature original justice could make upright and perfect. The essence of man and his natural being needed no superadded perfection, just as it could not be vitiated or corrupted: since the substantial and natural being of man is invariable and indivisible: therefore only that could be perfected which was capable of obliquity or uprightness—of which kind were the powers and faculties of the soul in order to their natural or moral acts, which can be both vicious and upright, and perfect.³

...recti ac perfecti esse possunt. Ex his concluditur iustitiam originalem non in essentia animae, sed in eius viribus ac potentiis fuisse. Sed in qua potissimum erat potentia? Quicumque sedem et subiectum gratiae gratum facientis constituunt voluntatem rationalem hominis, in eadem illi voluntate collocant iustitiam originalem. Vide Scotum in distinctione 29 et 31, et ibidem Bonaventuram, atque alios eiusdem sententiae propugnatores. Et id quidem Scotus ita probat: Voluntas habet pro obiecto ipsum finem ultimum, qui est regula omnium actionum humanarum: ergo ex rectitudine voluntatis pendet rectitudo totius hominis; sed iustitia originalis rectitudinis humanae naturae erat perfectrix: ipsam igitur in voluntate, ut in subiecto, fuisse existimandum est.

...can be both upright and perfect. From these it is concluded that original justice was not in the essence of the soul, but in its powers and faculties. But in which power chiefly was it? Whoever constitute the rational will of man as the seat and subject of sanctifying grace place original justice in the same will. See Scotus in distinctions 29 and 31, and there Bonaventure, and others who defend the same opinion. And Scotus proves this thus: The will has for its object the ultimate end itself, which is the rule of all human actions: therefore on the uprightness of the will depends the uprightness of the whole man; but original justice was the perfecter of the uprightness of human nature: it must therefore be thought to have been in the will, as in a subject.⁴

At nec vera haec est opinio, et infirma est Scoti argumentatio. Etenim rectitudinem voluntatis ordine naturae praecedit rectitudo intellectus, et hanc tamen ipsam praestabat iustitia originalis. Nec sane rectitudo voluntatis efficere potest rectitudinem appetitus sensitivi nisi secundum quid: potest enim facere ut voluntas non eligat quod appetitus concupiscit; sed ut appetitus non antevertat rationis iudicium, ut caro non concupiscat adversus spiritum, quod praestabat iustitia originalis, hoc, inquam, sola voluntatis rectitudo non potest efficere. Durandus supradicto loco putat in appetitu sensitivo, ut in subiecto, fuisse iustitiam originalem. Nam proprius, inquit, iustitiae originalis effectus erat continere appetitum ne contra aut praeter rationem commoveretur, sed eius imperio semper esset obediens: privationis etiam iustitiae originalis effectus fuit rebellio carnis adversus spiritum, et appetitus sensitivi adversus rationem. Verum neque Durandi haec sententia usquequaque vera est. Efficiebat quidem iustitia originalis rectitudinem appetitus sensitivi: verum eius potior ac principalior effectus erat rectitudo superioris partis, id est, voluntatis et rationis, in qua scilicet praecipua rectitudo hominis posita est.

But neither is this opinion true, and the argumentation of Scotus is weak. For the uprightness of the will is preceded, in the order of nature, by the uprightness of the intellect, and this too original justice furnished. Nor indeed can the uprightness of the will effect the uprightness of the sensitive appetite except in a certain respect: for it can bring it about that the will not choose what the appetite craves; but that the appetite not forestall the judgment of reason, that the flesh not lust against the spirit—which original justice furnished—this, I say, the uprightness of the will alone cannot effect. Durandus, in the aforesaid place, thinks that original justice was in the sensitive appetite, as in a subject. ‘For the proper effect of original justice,’ he says, ‘was to contain the appetite lest it be moved against or beyond reason, but be always obedient to its command: and the effect of the privation of original justice too was the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, and of the sensitive appetite against reason.’ But neither is this opinion of Durandus wholly true. Original justice did indeed effect the uprightness of the sensitive appetite: but its stronger and more principal effect was the uprightness of the superior part, that is, of the will and reason, in which, namely, the chief uprightness of man is placed.⁵

Quocirca iustitia originalis potius in parte superiori quam inferiori collocanda esset. Sed quia supra docuimus iustitiam originalem non fuisse unum aliquem habitum, sed fuisse comprehensionem omnium habituum quibus totus homo rectus efficitur, et omnes eius potentiae redduntur perfectae circa actus suos vel naturales vel morales: hinc necessario efficitur et evidenter apparet iustitiam originalem non fuisse in una aliqua potentia, sed fuisse in omnibus potentiis animae rationalis, in his nempe potentiis in quibus erant habitus per quos homo secundum statum naturae integer, rectus, et perfectus reddebatur. Restant duae quaestiones tractandae, quibus explicatis finem de originali iustitia disserendi faciemus. Una quaestio est, utrum iustitia originalis fuerit res diversa a gratia gratum faciente et ab ea separabilis: altera quaestio, an primum hominem cum iustitia originali fuisse a Deo creatum, e sacra Scriptura colligi et probari queat.

Wherefore original justice should rather be placed in the superior part than in the inferior. But because we taught above that original justice was not some one habit, but was the comprehension of all the habits by which the whole man is made upright, and all his powers are rendered perfect about their acts, whether natural or moral: hence it necessarily follows and evidently appears that original justice was not in some one power, but was in all the powers of the rational soul—namely, in those powers in which were the habits by which man, according to the state of nature, was rendered whole, upright, and perfect. There remain two questions to be treated, which being explained we shall make an end of discoursing on original justice. One question is whether original justice was a thing distinct from sanctifying grace and separable from it; the other question, whether the fact that the first man was created by God with original justice can be gathered and proved from sacred Scripture.⁶

Translator’s notes

Question divider opening the second question of the disputation on original justice (in what part of man it resided). ↩
Marginal gloss: 'S. Thomas subiectum iustitiae originalis censet fuisse ipsam rationalis animae essentiam' (Aquinas holds the subject of original justice was the essence of the rational soul). Q2 opens: in what part did original justice reside—not the body but the soul; in its essence or a power? Aquinas (ST I-II q.83, with grace placed in the essence at q.110) holds it was in the essence of the rational soul, arguing from the parity of habit and privation (since original sin, its privation, is in human nature). ↩
Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur opinio S. Tho.' (the opinion of St. Thomas is refuted). Pererius rejects Aquinas: original justice perfected man only within natural bounds, not toward the supernatural; but the soul's essence (invariable, indivisible) needs no superadded perfection—only what is capable of obliquity or rectitude (the powers/faculties in their acts) could be perfected. Continues to next page (catchword 'recti'). ↩
Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Scoti, et Bonaventurae' (the opinion of Scotus and Bonaventure). Conclusion: original justice was in the soul's powers, not its essence. In which chiefly? Those placing grace's seat in the will put original justice there too—Scotus (Sent. II d.29, 31), Bonaventure, and others: the will has the ultimate end (the rule of all action) as object, so the whole man's rectitude depends on the will's. ↩
Marginal glosses: 'Refellitur Scotus' (Scotus is refuted); 'Opinio Durandi' and 'Refellitur Durandus'. Against Scotus: the intellect's rectitude naturally precedes the will's, and the will's rectitude can't effect the appetite's except 'secundum quid.' Durandus (in the sensitive appetite) is also refuted: original justice did rectify the appetite, but its chief effect was the rectitude of the superior part (will/reason). ↩
Marginal gloss: 'Auctoris iudicium de subiecto iustitiae originalis' (the author's judgment on the subject of original justice). Pererius's conclusion: original justice belongs rather to the superior part, but since it was a comprehension of all the habits (not one habit), it was in all the powers of the rational soul. Concludes Q2, and announces the two remaining questions: Q3 (distinct/separable from grace?) and Q4 (Scripture proof of creation with it?). Colophon at foot: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with signature 'DDD'; catchword 'QVAE' heads Q3. ↩