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QUESTION II. In what manner Adam was immortal before sin.1
QUAESTIO II. Quomodo Adam ante peccatum fuerit immortalis.
Beatus Thomas, in 1 parte quaestione 97 articulo 1, de immortalitate corporis in qua Adam conditus est, & permansisset si legem Dei servasset, tripliciter docet aliquid dici posse incorruptibile. Primo, propter materiam, quod vel eam non habeat sicut Angeli, vel habeat quidem, sed quae non sit in potentia nisi ad unam formam quam tenet, ut est coelum: & hoc dicitur secundum naturam incorruptibile. Deinde, propter formam, cum rei incorruptibili secundum naturam inhaeret aliqua dispositio, per quam a corruptione omnino prohibetur: & hoc dicitur incorruptibile secundum gloriam. Nam ut ait Augustinus in Epistola 56 quam scripsit ad Dioscorum, Tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius beatitudine redundet in corpus plenitudo sanitatis & incorruptionis vigor. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile propter causam efficientem: Et hac ratione in statu innocentiae fuisset homo incorruptibilis & immortalis, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Quaestionibus...
Blessed Thomas, in the First Part, question 97, article 1, concerning the immortality of the body in which Adam was created and would have remained had he kept the law of God, teaches in three ways that something can be said to be incorruptible. First, on account of matter—either that it has no matter, as the Angels, or that it has matter indeed, but matter that is in potency only to the one form it holds, as is the heaven: and this is called incorruptible according to nature. Second, on account of form, when there inheres in a thing incorruptible according to nature some disposition by which it is altogether kept from corruption: and this is called incorruptible according to glory. For as Augustine says in Epistle 56, which he wrote to Dioscorus, 'God made the soul of so powerful a nature that from its beatitude there overflows into the body a fullness of health and the vigor of incorruption.' In the third way something is called incorruptible on account of the efficient cause: and in this way, in the state of innocence, man would have been incorruptible and immortal, because, as Augustine says in the book On Questions...2
...stionibus novi & veteris Testamenti, quaestione 19: Deus hominem fecit, qui quandiu non peccaret immortalitate vigeret, ut sibi auctor esset aut ad vitam, aut ad mortem. Non enim, inquit Beatus Thomas, corpus Adami erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem: sed inerat animae eius vis quaedam supernaturalis divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quamdiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod rationi consentaneum fuit: cum enim anima rationalis excedat proportionem corporalis materiae, conveniens fuit ut in principio virtus ei daretur per quam corpus conservare posset super naturam corporalis materiae. Porro vis illa praeservandi corpus a corruptione, non erat humanae animae naturalis, sed per donum gratiae: & quamvis post peccatum, Adam per poenitentiam recuperaverit gratiam Dei quantum ad remissionem culpae, non tamen quantum ad amissae immortalitatis effectum. Hoc enim reservabatur Christo per quem natura defectus in melius reparandus erat. Hactenus ex B. Thom.
...[On Questions] of the New and Old Testament, question 19: God made man so that, as long as he did not sin, he would flourish in immortality, that he might be to himself the author either of life or of death. For Blessed Thomas says: Adam's body was not indissoluble through any vigor of immortality existing in it; but there was in his soul a certain supernatural power divinely given, by which it could preserve the body from all corruption, as long as the soul itself remained subject to God. This was consonant with reason: for since the rational soul exceeds the proportion of corporeal matter, it was fitting that in the beginning a power should be given to it by which it could conserve the body beyond the nature of corporeal matter. Furthermore, that power of preserving the body from corruption was not natural to the human soul, but came through the gift of grace: and although after sin Adam recovered the grace of God by penitence as regards the remission of guilt, yet not as regards the effect of lost immortality. For this was reserved for Christ, through whom the defect of nature was to be repaired for the better. Thus far from Blessed Thomas.3
Scotus tamen 2. Sent. dist. 19. hanc B. Thom. sententiam minime probat, dicens se non videre quemadmodum qualitas aliqua seu vis in anima existens, possit corpus natura sua corruptibile & passibile praeservare, ne pati & corrumpi queat. Omne igitur corpus natura sua corruptibile, potest pati passione corruptiva, quae si vel perseveret vel intendatur, necessario tandem perducit ad interitum. Censet igitur Scotus, etiam in statu innocentiae potuisse hominem mori: non moriturum tamen, nec potentiam illam moriendi reductum iri ad actum, Deo praeveniente tempus mortis: priusquam enim adveniret tempus quo naturaliter coepisset sanitas & firmitas humani corporis debilitari, & declinare ac labi ad interitum, Deus transtulisset hominem e terris in coelum, vita eius animali & terrena in spiritualem & coelestem commutata.
Scotus, however, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 19, by no means approves this opinion of Blessed Thomas, saying that he does not see how any quality or power existing in the soul could preserve a body corruptible and passible by its own nature, so that it could not suffer and be corrupted. Every body, therefore, corruptible by its own nature, can suffer a corruptive passion, which, if it either persists or is intensified, necessarily leads at last to destruction. Scotus therefore holds that even in the state of innocence man could have died; yet that he would not have died, nor would that potency of dying have been reduced to act, since God would have forestalled the time of death: for before there arrived the time at which the health and firmness of the human body would naturally have begun to be weakened, and to decline and slide toward destruction, God would have transferred man from earth to heaven, his animal and earthly life being changed into a spiritual and heavenly one.4
But it is well to set down here the opinion of Scotus expressed in his own words: I say, he says, that with innocence standing, death would not have befallen, although man would have the potency of dying, because each one would have been translated into Paradise before he was altered by an alteration disproportionate to the soul or form. And this translation would not have been miraculous, but just and regular, namely that each one would be transformed in his own state, and not all men at once. This I show as follows: for those parents would either always have merited continuously while they were in this life, or not. If so, and afterward all had been translated, the first-born would have been of greater merit than one born later, which is false: for if the state of innocence had remained, the Blessed Virgin, and many of the later-born, would have been more blessed than many of the earlier, or than some of the earlier-born.5
Sed libet sententiam Scoti propriis eius verbis expressam hic ponere: Dico, inquit, quod stante innocentia, non accidisset mors, licet homo potentiam moriendi haberet, quia quilibet fuisset translatus in Paradisum, antequam fuisset alteratus alteratione improportionata animae sive formae. Et haec translatio non fuisset miraculosa: sed iusta & regularis, ut scilicet quilibet in statu suo transformaretur, & non omnes homines simul. Quod sic ostendo: nam illi parentes aut semper continue meruissent dum essent in vita ista, vel non: Si sic, & postea omnes fuissent translati, primo natus, fuisset maioris meriti quam posterius natus, quod falsum est: nam si mansisset status innocentiae, Beata Virgo, & multi posteriores fuissent beatiores quam multi praecedentes, vel quam aliqui praecedentium.
If you should say that in that state he would not always have merited, but only up to the term of life: then, if they had not been translated to glory, when that term arrived God would have done them an injustice, by deferring to give the reward after they had completed the meritorious works they were going to do. Therefore it follows that in the state of innocence one would have been translated before another, and to each would have been rendered the reward of his merits, before anyone's power had been weakened to such a degree that corruption would necessarily be present. Thus Scotus.6
Si dicas quod in illo statu non semper meruisset, sed usque ad terminum vitae: tunc si non fuissent translati ad gloriam, illo termino adveniente Deus fecisset eis iniustitiam, differendo dare praemium, postquam opera meritoria consummassent quae facturi erant. Ideo sequitur quod in statu innocentiae unus fuisset translatus prius alio, & cuilibet fuisset redditum praemium suorum meritorum, antequam virtus alicuius fuisset in tantum debilitata, quod necessario adesset corruptio. Ita Scotus.
Verum Caietanus in Commentariis suis in 1. partem B. Thomae super...
But Cajetan, in his Commentaries on the First Part of Blessed Thomas, upon...7
...super illis ipsis verbis eius quae proxime commemorata sunt, occurrens Scoto dicenti se non posse videre quomodo verum sit quod dixit B. Thom. Si Scotus, inquit, ocularia reverentia erga B. Augustinum habuisset, vidisset utique quod homo erat sibi auctor vitae, quamdiu anima erat subdita Deo. Etenim cum haec credita ex facto pendeant, & supernaturali virtute indigeant, de his nulla est maior ratio, quam auctoritas divina per se vel per sanctos suos nobis manifestata. Et haec quidem Caietanus.
...upon those very words of his which were just now mentioned, meeting Scotus, who says that he cannot see how what Blessed Thomas said is true. If Scotus, he says, had had a watchful reverence toward Blessed Augustine, he would surely have seen that man was the author of his own life, as long as the soul was subject to God. For since these matters of belief depend on a fact, and require a supernatural power, of them there is no greater reason than the divine authority manifested to us either of itself or through his saints. And so far Cajetan.8
Quibus verbis videtur concedere quod oppugnat Scotus, in Adamo scilicet fuisse vim quandam in anima eius inhaerentem, quae corpus eius servabat a corruptione. Hanc autem vim animae si intelligat ab anima derivatam in corpus, adversatur B. Thomae affirmanti Adamum non fuisse immortalem intrinsecus per aliquam vim seu vigorem sibi inhaerentem, sed tantum extrinsecus & ex parte causae efficientis. Adversatur item rectae rationi: nam ne animo quidem fingi potest, qualis fuerit illa virtus, & quemadmodum ageret in corpus. Quid quod, si ea fuisset in Adamo vis, vel sola ipsa satis fuisset ad tuendam hominis immortalitatem, neque ad id fuisset opus vel arbore vitae, vel temperatissimo & saluberrimo Paradisi domicilio.
By which words he seems to concede the very thing Scotus attacks—namely, that there was in Adam a certain power inhering in his soul, which preserved his body from corruption. But if he understands this power of the soul to be derived from the soul into the body, he is opposed to Blessed Thomas, who affirms that Adam was not immortal intrinsically through any power or vigor inhering in him, but only extrinsically and on the part of the efficient cause. He is opposed, likewise, to right reason: for one cannot even imagine in the mind what that power was, and in what manner it would act upon the body. What of this—that, if that power had been in Adam, either it alone would have sufficed to safeguard man's immortality, and there would have been no need either of the tree of life or of the most temperate and most salubrious dwelling of Paradise?9
Auctoritas autem illa Augustini ex lib. de Quaestionibus Veteris & novi Testamenti, qua vehementer urgeri & premi Scotum putat Caietanus, nihil plane, aut certe parum nocet Scoto. Nam nec Augustini esse librum illum, multis & manifestis coniecturis & argumentis compertum est: nec si esset Augustini, locus tamen ille valde confirmaret quod intendit Caietanus. Auctor enim eius libri illud tantum eo loco significat, primum hominem ita esse factum, ut ipse sibi auctor esset & ad vitam & ad mortem: auctor, inquam, non efficiendo immortalitatem aut mortem, sed merendo: vel (ut in scholis loquimur) erat sibi auctor vitae & mortis non effective, sed meritorie. Namque obediendo legi divinae, meruisset vitam sibi perpetuari, eam vero legem violando, poenam mortis promeruit.
But that authority of Augustine from the book On the Questions of the Old and New Testament, by which Cajetan thinks Scotus is vehemently pressed and constrained, plainly does no harm, or certainly very little, to Scotus. For it has been established by many and manifest conjectures and arguments that that book is not Augustine's; nor, if it were Augustine's, would that passage greatly confirm what Cajetan intends. For the author of that book signifies in that place only this: that the first man was so made that he himself was the author both of his life and of his death—the author, I say, not by effecting immortality or death, but by meriting: or (as we say in the schools) he was the author of his life and death not effectively but meritoriously. For by obeying the divine law he would have merited that life be perpetuated for him, but by violating that law he deserved the penalty of death.10
Illam ergo vim animae corpus hominis in statu innocentiae servantem a corruptione, equidem interpretor non aliam S. Thomae esse visam, quam singularem quandam scientiam rerum omnium, earum praesertim quae prodesse Adamo vel obesse poterant, simul & summam vim atque prudentiam ea discernendi atque praecavendi: quae quia fuerat homini a Deo supernaturaliter donata, & humanae prudentiae ac providentiae vim excedebat, propterea vocatur a S. Thoma vis supernaturalis in animam Adami collata.
That power of the soul, then, preserving man's body in the state of innocence from corruption, I for my part interpret to have seemed to St. Thomas to be none other than a certain singular knowledge of all things—especially of those which could benefit or harm Adam—together with a supreme power and prudence of discerning and guarding against them: which, because it had been supernaturally given to man by God, and exceeded the power of human prudence and providence, is therefore called by St. Thomas a supernatural power conferred upon Adam's soul.11
Translator’s notes
- Second question of the disputation on immortality. ↩
- Marginal gloss: 'Opinio S. Th.' (The opinion of St. Thomas). Citation: Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 97, a. 1, on the threefold sense of 'incorruptible'—per matter (secundum naturam), per form (secundum gloriam), and per efficient cause. Augustine, Epistula 56 ad Dioscorum, is quoted; the page ends with a further appeal to Augustine's De Quaestionibus (catchword 'stionibus' = Quaestionibus), continued on the next page. ↩
- Continuation (catchword 'stionibus' = Quaestionibus) of the citation begun on the previous page: Augustine [pseudo], Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti, q. 19, adduced by Aquinas (ST I q.97 a.1). Closes the Thomist section: 'Hactenus ex B. Thom.' (Thus far from Blessed Thomas). ↩
- Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Scoti de immortalitate hominis in statu innocentiae' (The opinion of Scotus on man's immortality in the state of innocence). Citation: Duns Scotus, In II Sententiarum, dist. 19. Scotus denies any intrinsic preserving power, holding Adam's immortality to be a divinely-timed translation before natural decay. ↩
- Marginal gloss: 'Verba Scoti' (The words of Scotus). Verbatim quotation of Scotus, continued onto the next paragraph and concluding 'Ita Scotus.' ↩
- Conclusion of the verbatim Scotus quotation: 'Ita Scotus.' ↩
- Cajetan's rebuttal of Scotus begins; sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'super'). Cajetan = Thomas de Vio, Commentaria in Summam Theologiae I. ↩
- Marginal gloss: 'Expenditur propugnatio Caietani pro S. Thoma adversus Scotum' (Cajetan's defense of St. Thomas against Scotus is weighed). Cajetan appeals to Augustine's authority over Scotus's reasoning. ↩
- Pererius's critique: Cajetan's reading, if it makes the preserving power intrinsic to the soul, contradicts Aquinas's own extrinsic/efficient-cause doctrine and would render the tree of life and Paradise superfluous. ↩
- Pererius blunts Cajetan's prooftext: the De Quaestionibus is spurious (not genuinely Augustine's), and even if genuine, it makes man author of his fate only meritorie (by meriting), not effective (by causing)—which favors Scotus, not Cajetan. ↩
- Pererius's reconciling interpretation: the 'supernatural power' Aquinas means is Adam's supernaturally-given knowledge and prudence to foresee and avoid all harm—not a mysterious physical incorruption-force. ↩