FOURTH DISPUTATION. How it is not unjust for some to be punished by God for the sins of others — Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis, Volume II

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FOURTH DISPUTATION. How it is not unjust for some to be punished by God for the sins of others.

QUARTA DISPUTATIO. Quomodo non sit iniquum aliquos propter peccata aliena puniri a Deo.

ALTERA quaestio est, iniquum videri propter patris peccatum et filium et posteros eius tam gravi poena puniri. Ponamus autem hoc loco (quod plerique sentiunt) Chanaan sceleris Cham patris sui non fuisse auctorem vel participem. Etenim perspicuis verbis testatus est Deus per Ezechielem: Filius, inquit, non portabit iniquitatem patris, sed anima quae peccaverit ipsa morietur; et per legem Mosis vetuit patres occidi pro peccatis filiorum, aut filios pro peccatis parentum, sed unumquemque pro peccato suo puniri iussit. Denique alibi sic est scriptum de Deo: Cum sis iustus, iuste omnia disponis; ipsum quoque qui non debet puniri, condemnare exterum iudicas a tua virtute. Ex adverso tamen, propter peccata parentum non solum filios sed etiam nepotes ac prone[potes]…

The second question is, that it seems unjust that, for the father's sin, both his son and his posterity should be punished with so grave a penalty. But let us suppose in this place (which most think) that Chanaan was not the author or partaker of the crime of Cham his father. For God testified in plain words through Ezekiel: “The son,” He says, “shall not bear the iniquity of the father, but the soul that has sinned, the same shall die”; and by the law of Moses He forbade fathers to be killed for the sins of sons, or sons for the sins of parents, but commanded each to be punished for his own sin. Finally, elsewhere it is thus written of God: “Since thou art just, thou orderest all things justly; him also, who ought not to be punished, thou judgest it foreign [to thy power] to condemn.” But on the contrary, for the sins of parents not only sons but even grandsons and great-grand[sons]…¹

…potes puniri a Deo, et multa sunt in sacris literis exempla, et apertissima est illa Dei sententia: Ego sum Dominus Deus tuus fortis, zelotes, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios in tertiam et quartam generationem eorum qui oderunt me.

…are punished by God, and there are many examples in the sacred letters, and most plain is that sentence of God: “I am the Lord thy God, strong, jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me.”²

HANC ego quaestionem more scholastico, id est, distincte, circumscripte, presseque tractabo, praemittens quatuor e quibus fere pendet quaestionis explicatio. Horum primum est, vocabulum Poena tribus modis sumi posse: vel proprie, ut poena tantum est; vel improprie, ut medicinae potius quam poenae rationem habeat; vel utroque modo, ut habet rationem poenae simul et medicinae. Si poena proprie sumatur, necessario respondet peccato, nec sine eo potest esse; siquidem per poenam compensatur et reficitur aequalitas iustitiae per peccatum violatae: ut, quia peccando quis (ut suae voluntati obsequeretur) transgressus est legem, subeat a lege poenam contra suam voluntatem, et dulcedo peccati contra legem admissi compensetur acerbitate poenae per legem illatae. Quoniam autem peccatum non est nisi voluntarium, necesse est actum esse personalem: quocirca nemo talem poenam proprie luit pro alieno, sed pro suo peccato.

This question I will treat in the scholastic manner — that is, distinctly, circumscribed, and concisely — premising four things on which the explication of the question largely depends. The first of these is that the word “Penalty” can be taken in three ways: either properly, as it is penalty alone; or improperly, so that it has the character of medicine rather than of penalty; or in both ways, so that it has the character of penalty and medicine at once. If penalty be taken properly, it necessarily responds to sin, and cannot be without it; since by penalty the equality of justice violated by sin is compensated and restored: so that, because in sinning a man (to gratify his own will) transgressed the law, he undergoes from the law a penalty against his will, and the sweetness of the sin committed against the law is compensated by the bitterness of the penalty inflicted by the law. And since sin is nothing but voluntary, the act must be personal: wherefore no one properly pays such a penalty for another's sin, but for his own.³

ALTERUM est, poenam improprie sumptam, quae rationem habet potissimum medicinae, esse privationem minorum bonorum propter consecutionem maiorum: sunt autem maxima bona spiritualia (ut quae non ordinantur ad alia), minora autem bona sunt corporalia (ea quippe ordinantur ad spiritualia). Poena igitur quae vim habet medicinae proprie locum non habet in bonis spiritualibus, sed tantum in corporalibus; quemadmodum medicus non caecat oculum ut sanet aurem, sed inurit brachio cauterium ut oculorum vel capitis servet incolumitatem. Ac tali quidem poena saepenumero afficiuntur etiam innocentes, ut Iob et Tobias; nec ea respondet peccato actuali et mortali. Dixi actuale, ut excipiam originale, cuius omnes naturae humanae defectus corporales sunt quodammodo poenae et effectus: dixi mortale, nam sine venialibus etiam iusti non vivunt. Proficit autem iustis talis poena, vel ad sanandas praeteritorum peccatorum reliquias, vel ad praesentem animae sanitatem tuendam, vel ad imminentia peccata praecavenda. Tertium est, aliquando poenam habere rationem et poenae et medicinae, quando scilicet per eam et satisfit legi per peccatum violatae, et is qui patitur inde capit spiritualem utilitatem — vel quod a malo revocetur ad bonum, vel, si iam bonus est, ut in eo firmetur et proficiat. Quartum est, duplex esse genus poenae quo plectuntur homines, unum corporale, alterum spirituale. Corporale est bonorum corporalium privatio (ut sanitatis, roboris, vitae, divitiarum, honorum, denique amicorum et cognatorum); spirituale est privatio bonorum spiritualium (uti est divina gratia et virtutes infusae, auxilia item divina quaedam singularia, denique quaecunque bonum hominis spirituale vel continent vel conservant vel ad ipsum per se conducunt).

The second [premise] is that penalty taken improperly — which has chiefly the character of medicine — is a privation of lesser goods for the obtaining of greater: now the greatest goods are spiritual (as not ordered to others), but the lesser goods are corporeal (for these are ordered to the spiritual). A penalty, therefore, which has the force of medicine, properly has no place in spiritual goods, but only in corporeal; just as a physician does not blind the eye to heal the ear, but burns a cautery on the arm to preserve the soundness of the eyes or the head. And with such a penalty even the innocent are often afflicted, as Job and Tobias; nor does it respond to actual and mortal sin. I said ‘actual’ to except original [sin], of which all the corporeal defects of human nature are in a way penalties and effects; I said ‘mortal,’ for not even the just live without venial [sins]. And such a penalty profits the just, either for healing the remnants of past sins, or for protecting the present health of the soul, or for forestalling imminent sins. The third [premise] is that sometimes a penalty has the character both of penalty and of medicine — namely, when by it both satisfaction is made to the law violated by sin, and he who suffers takes from it a spiritual benefit (either being recalled from evil to good, or, if he is already good, being strengthened in it and advancing). The fourth [premise] is that there are two kinds of penalty by which men are struck: one corporeal, the other spiritual. The corporeal is the privation of corporeal goods (such as health, strength, life, riches, honors, finally friends and kindred); the spiritual is the privation of spiritual goods (such as divine grace and the infused virtues, likewise certain singular divine helps, finally whatever either contains or preserves or of itself conduces to a man's spiritual good).⁴

His positis, haud erit difficilis propositae quaestionis explicatio. Principio, ex supradictis liquet neminem puniri poena spirituali pro alieno peccato: tum quia poena spiritualis est poena proprie dicta, quae respondet peccato proprie dicto, id autem non est nisi voluntarium, ergo proprium; tum etiam quod poena spiritualis proprie attingit animam rationalem, secundum quam unus homo non est aliquid alterius, nec ex alio homine pendet. Et ad hoc praecipue spectat illa Domini sententia per Ezechielem edita, quam supra memoravimus: Filius non portabit iniquitatem patris, neque pater filii, sed anima quae peccaverit ipsa morietur. Ecce omnes animae meae sunt: ut anima patris, ita et anima filii mea est. Et addit: Si impius genuerit filium, qui videns omnia peccata patris sui quae fecit timuerit Deum, nec fecerit simile eis, hic non morietur in iniquitate patris sui, sed vita vivet.

These things being laid down, the explication of the proposed question will not be difficult. First, from the aforesaid it is clear that no one is punished with a spiritual penalty for another's sin: both because the spiritual penalty is penalty properly so called, which responds to sin properly so called — and that is nothing but voluntary, therefore personal; and also because the spiritual penalty properly affects the rational soul, according to which one man is not something of another's, nor depends on another man. And to this especially pertains that sentence of the Lord uttered through Ezekiel, which we recalled above: “The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, nor the father of the son, but the soul that has sinned, the same shall die. Behold, all souls are mine: as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine.” And He adds: “If a wicked man beget a son who, seeing all his father's sins which he did, fears God and does not the like, this man shall not die in his father's iniquity, but shall live.”⁵

AT enim poena corporali puniri aliquem propter aliorum peccata, ex sacris literis manifestum est. Sed hoc fit dupliciter: vel cum is qui punitur expers est peccati propter quod punitur, vel cum est particeps. Si expers est, aliquando ea punitio fit tam bono eius qui punitur quam bono eorum propter quorum peccata punitur: exempli causa, Ezechiel et Daniel participes fuerunt captivitatis et calamitatum Hebraei populi, qui propter impietatem magnaque scelera punitus a Deo est, a quibus sceleribus prophetae illi longissime abfuerunt. Sed ea poena illis profuit ad bonum spirituale et corporale, ut patet in Daniele; et redundavit in bonum illius populi: ducti enim illi simul cum popularibus suis in captivitatem, magno illis bono fuere ad tolerandam captivitatis acerbitatem, magno item adiumento ad veri Dei religionem inter Idololatras conservandam. Nonnunquam vero accidit ut quis corporali poena puniatur propter aliorum peccata quorum ipse non est particeps, sed ea castigatio cedit in malum et poenam eius cuius causa punitur, ipsi autem qui punitur bono et emolumento esse potest. Hac ratione propter parentum peccata etiam innocentes filii puniuntur, et propter dominorum scelera servi et subditi insontes. Talis autem animadversio, quia filii aliquid sunt patrum et servi dominorum, magno illis est tormento doloris; filii autem et subditi eiusmodi poenis deterrentur a parentum et dominorum imitandis et consectandis sceleribus.

But that someone is punished with a corporeal penalty for the sins of others is manifest from the sacred letters. But this happens in two ways: either when he who is punished is free of the sin for which he is punished, or when he is a partaker. If he is free, sometimes that punishment is for the good both of him who is punished and of those for whose sins he is punished: for example, Ezekiel and Daniel were partakers of the captivity and calamities of the Hebrew people, which was punished by God for its impiety and great crimes — crimes from which those prophets were most far removed. But that penalty profited them for spiritual and corporeal good, as is plain in Daniel; and it redounded to the good of that people: for they, led into captivity together with their countrymen, were of great good to them for bearing the bitterness of captivity, and of great help for preserving the religion of the true God among the idolaters. But sometimes it happens that someone is punished with a corporeal penalty for the sins of others of which he is not a partaker, but that chastisement turns to the evil and penalty of him for whose cause he is punished, while to him who is punished it can be a good and an advantage. In this way, for the sins of parents even innocent sons are punished, and for the crimes of masters innocent servants and subjects. And such an animadversion, because sons are something of their parents, and servants of their masters, is a great torment of grief to them; but sons and subjects are by penalties of this kind deterred from imitating and pursuing the crimes of their parents and masters.⁶

VERUNTAMEN plerunque usu venit ut qui propter aliorum peccata puniuntur, ipsi quoque eorundem peccatorum rei sint. Id vero tripliciter contingit: vel per imitationem, ut filii fere imitantur parentum scelera et servi dominorum (illorum enim exemplo proniores et audaciores fiunt ad peccandum); vel per modum cuiusdam meriti, quemadmodum scelerati subditi merentur habere sceleratum quoque rectorem (frequenter enim evenit quod dixit Iob, Deus regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi; et propter peccatum David numerandi populum etiam populus Israel gravissime punitus est, verum id supplicii multis ille magnisque crimi[nibus]…

Nevertheless it mostly comes about that those who are punished for the sins of others are themselves also guilty of the same sins. And this happens in three ways: either by imitation, as sons generally imitate the crimes of their parents, and servants those of their masters (for by their example they become more prone and more bold to sinning); or by a kind of merit, as wicked subjects deserve to have a wicked ruler too (for it frequently happens, as Job said, “God makes a hypocrite man to reign because of the sins of the people”; and for David's sin of numbering the people, the people of Israel too was most gravely punished — though it had deserved that punishment by many and great crim[es]…⁷

…nibus promeruerat: vel denique per tacitum quendam consensum et dissimulationem, quemadmodum saepe boni divinae iustitiae flagello una cum malis feriuntur, quod eorum peccata, cum possent ac deberent redarguere, non curarunt.

…it had deserved: or finally by a certain tacit consent and dissimulation, as the good are often struck by the scourge of divine justice together with the wicked, because, when they could and ought to have reproved their sins, they took no care.⁸

AUDIAT lector brevem sed praeclaram ea de re S. Augustini sententiam. Plerunque a malis hominibus docendis, admonendis, etiam obiurgandis male dissimulatur, vel quia laboris piget, vel quia os eorum verecundamur offendere, vel quia eorum inimicitias devitamus, ne nobis noceant aut obstent in his rebus quas adipisci appetit nostra cupiditas, vel quas amittere formidat infirmitas. Quo fit ut, quamvis bonis vita malorum displiceat, et ideo cum eis non incidant in damnationem aeternam, tamen quia peccatis eorum parcunt, iure cum eis temporaliter flagellantur; iure hanc vitam amaram sentiunt, cuius nimium amando dulcedine peccantibus amari esse noluerunt. Nam si propterea quisque obiurgandis et corripiendis male agentibus parcit, quod opportunius tempus expectet, vel metuat ne obiurgati deteriores evadant, et infirmis erudiendis impedimento sint, aliosque premant atque avertant a fide, non videtur esse cupiditatis occasio, sed consilium caritatis. Sic Augustinus.

Let the reader hear a brief but excellent saying of St. Augustine on this matter: “Mostly it is ill that wicked men are not taught, admonished, and even rebuked — whether because the labor is irksome, or because we are ashamed to offend their faces, or because we avoid their enmities, lest they harm us or stand in our way in those things which our cupidity desires to obtain, or which our weakness fears to lose. Whence it comes about that, although the life of the wicked displeases the good (and therefore they do not fall with them into eternal damnation), yet, because they spare their sins, they are justly scourged temporally with them — justly do they feel this life bitter, by too much loving whose sweetness they were unwilling to be bitter to the sinners. For if anyone spares to rebuke and correct evildoers because he awaits a more opportune time, or fears lest the rebuked become worse and be an impediment to the instruction of the weak, and oppress others and turn them from the faith — this seems to be not the occasion of cupidity, but the counsel of charity.” So Augustine.⁹

CASTIGAT praeterea Deus alios pro peccatis aliorum duas ob causas: tum ad commendandam humanae societatis unitatem (omnes enim velut membra sumus unius corporis, ut mirum non sit unius membri dolorem dolori esse aliis membris; Deus igitur ea re significat alios pro aliis debere esse solicitos ne peccent, cum propter societatis nexum aliorum mala aliis quoque malo et damno sint); tum etiam ad ipsius peccati detestationem, cuius tantum est virus ut non modo peccantibus exitiale sit, sed aliis quoque perniciosum.

Besides, God chastises some for the sins of others for two causes: both to commend the unity of human society (for we are all as it were members of one body, so that it is no wonder that the pain of one member is a pain to the other members; God therefore by this thing signifies that some ought to be solicitous for others lest they sin, since, on account of the bond of society, the evils of some are an evil and harm to others too); and also for the detestation of sin itself, whose poison is so great that it is not only deadly to the sinners, but pernicious to others too.¹⁰

VERUM expendamus sententiam illam Dei supra commemoratam, in qua haeret magna ex parte huius quaestionis difficultas: Ego sum Deus tuus, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios in tertiam et quartam generationem eorum qui oderunt me. Apud Theodoretum duas huius sententiae reperio interpretationes. Ait primum verba illa continere Dei comminationem terrificam magis quam efficacem, id est, quae vim habeat deterrendi homines a flagitiis, iniecto metu malorum quae posteritati eorum ventura sint; non autem quod ea comminatio sit aliquando ad exitum et effectum perducenda: Deum enim, pro sua clementia quae vult omnes homines salvos fieri, graviora solere minari supplicia quam sumere. Namque neminem vere puniri propter aliena peccata testatissimum fecit Deus apud Ezechielem dicens: Filius non portabit iniquitatem patris, sed anima quae peccaverit ipsa morietur.

But let us weigh that sentence of God recalled above, in which the difficulty of this question largely sticks: “I am thy God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me.” In Theodoret I find two interpretations of this sentence. He says first that those words contain a threat of God terrifying rather than effective — that is, one which has the force of deterring men from crimes, fear being cast in of the evils that are to come upon their posterity; but not that that threat is at some time to be brought to issue and effect: for God, by His clemency which wills all men to be saved, is wont to threaten graver punishments than He inflicts. For that no one is truly punished for the sins of others, God made most attested in Ezekiel, saying: “The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, but the soul that has sinned, the same shall die.”¹¹

ADIICIT praeterea Theodoretus alteram interpretationem, quam sibi placere magis et probari ait: verba illa Dei non significare severitatem divinae vindictae, sed contra potius inenarrabilem divinae patientiae et longanimitatis suavitatem; quippe qui non statim ut quis peccavit poenas de eo sumat, sed perdiu supplicium differat, scilicet vel in tertiam et quartam generationem prorogans vindictam. Verùm si posteri maiorum suorum scelera imitari pergant, Deum non…

Theodoret adds besides another interpretation, which he says pleases and approves to him more: that those words of God do not signify the severity of the divine vengeance, but rather, on the contrary, the unspeakable sweetness of the divine patience and long-suffering; in that He does not at once, as soon as one has sinned, take penalties from him, but for a very long time defers the punishment — namely, prolonging vengeance even to the third and fourth generation. But if the descendants go on imitating the crimes of their ancestors, God no longer…¹²

…amplius connivere ac dissimulare, sed quae in maioribus inulta praeterierat in hoc mundo, ea tandem in posteris vindicare. Quemadmodum enim ad divinam pertinet misericordiam quod hominum scelera longo tempore patienter ferat, et ad ea plectenda lentissimo procedat gradu; ita spectat vel quam maxime ad divinae providentiae opinionem (sine qua hominum societas stare non potest) ut hominum crimina non plane inulta et impunita in hoc mundo relinquat. Nimirum ex perpetua impunitate nasceretur intoleranda peccandi licentia, eaque opinio hominum animis accideret, nulla Dei providentia regi mundum — qua opinione nihil potest contingere reipublicae humanae pestilentius. Etenim, ut vere dixit Salomon: Quia non profertur cito contra malos sententia, absque timore ullo filii hominum perpetrant mala.

…[but if the posterity persist in imitating their forefathers' crimes,] He no longer connives and dissembles, but at length avenges in the posterity what He had passed over unpunished in the forefathers in this world. For just as it pertains to the divine mercy that He bears men's crimes patiently for a long time, and proceeds to the punishing of them with the slowest step; so it pertains very greatly to the opinion of divine providence (without which human society cannot stand) that He should not leave men's crimes plainly unavenged and unpunished in this world. For from perpetual impunity would be born an intolerable license of sinning, and that opinion would befall men's minds, that the world is governed by no providence of God — than which opinion nothing more pestilent can happen to the human commonwealth. For, as Solomon truly said: “Because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the wicked, the children of men commit evils without any fear.”¹³

Non omittam dicere quid super hac ipsa Dei sententia Hebraei quoque commentati sint. Aiunt quidem differre Deum patris supplicium, si is forte resipiscat, aut probum filium gignat. At si nec ille desistat male agere, et filii eius nepotesque atque etiam pronepotes illius improbitatis vestigiis insistant, tunc demum poenas Deum repetere, et quasi memorem eorum quae maiores continua serie patrarunt maleficia vindicare. Rabbi Moses Gerundensis arbitratur unius tantum idololatriae criminis poenas luere filios, si ipsi quoque Idola colant; ceterorum vero flagitiorum minime: similiter atque civiles leges minutae seu laesae maiestatis crimen, non autem alia maleficia, vindicant in filiis.

I will not omit to say what the Hebrews too have commented on this very sentence of God. They say indeed that God defers the father's punishment, if perchance he repent or beget a worthy son. But if neither does he cease to do evil, and his sons and grandsons and even great-grandsons tread in the footsteps of that wickedness, then at last God repeats the penalties, and as it were, mindful of the misdeeds which their forefathers perpetrated in a continuous series, avenges them. Rabbi Moses Gerundensis [Nachmanides] judges that sons pay the penalties of the one crime of idolatry only, if they too worship idols; but by no means of the other crimes — just as the civil laws avenge in sons the crime of treason or lèse-majesté, but not other misdeeds.¹⁴

SED enucleatius declaremus illam sententiam, singula verba ponderantes, praemonentes duplicem esse posse eius sententiae intellectum. Potest enim illis verbis significari tantam fore severitatem divinae vindictae adversus eos qui debitum vero Deo cultum falsis diis adhibuerint, ut non solum id criminis in auctoribus eius puniturus sit Deus, verum et in eorum posteris usque ad quartam generationem: id quod non semel ita factum esse ex sacris literis manifestum est. Alter est eius sententiae intellectus plerisque omnibus probatus: illis verbis declarari patientiam et longanimitatem Dei, non statim punientis peccata, sed in longum tempus vindictam differentis, et patienter expectantis dum resipiscant homines, suorumque scelerum intelligentes ac paenitentes ipsi de se poenas sumant, et vicem impleant divinae vindictae. ILLUD praeterea advertendum est, verbum (pachad) non tantum significare visitare, sed recordari et memorem esse; sicut dictio (Aon) significans iniquitatem saepe ponitur pro poena merita et debita iniquitati, ut apud Hieremiam: Maior effecta est iniquitas filiae populi mei peccato Sodomorum, quae subversa est in momento. Sensus enim est, supplicium quod Deus sumpserat de Iudaeis per captivitatem Babylonicam gravius fuisse supplicio Sodomorum: nam calamitas Iudaeorum lenta et diuturna fuit, excidium autem Sodomorum brevissimum; brevi[tas]…

But let us more distinctly declare that sentence, weighing the individual words, premising that there can be a twofold understanding of it. For by those words it can be signified that the severity of divine vengeance against those who give the worship due to the true God to false gods will be so great, that God will punish that crime not only in its authors, but also in their posterity unto the fourth generation: which it is manifest from the sacred letters has been done more than once. The other understanding of that sentence, approved by most of all, is that by those words is declared the patience and long-suffering of God — not at once punishing sins, but for a long time deferring vengeance, and patiently waiting until men repent and, understanding and repenting of their crimes, themselves take penalties upon themselves and fill up the place of divine vengeance. This too is to be noted, that the word (pachad) signifies not only ‘to visit,’ but ‘to remember and be mindful’; just as the term (Aon), signifying iniquity, is often put for the penalty merited and due to iniquity — as in Jeremiah: “The iniquity of the daughter of my people is made greater than the sin of the Sodomites, which was overthrown in a moment.” For the sense is, that the punishment which God took of the Jews by the Babylonian captivity was graver than the punishment of the Sodomites: for the calamity of the Jews was slow and long-lasting, but the destruction of the Sodomites most brief; and brev[ity]…¹⁵

…brevitas autem poenae quantamlibet acerbitatem eius valde mitigat ac minuit. Deum igitur visitare iniquitatem patrum in filiis significat Deum, qui patrum peccata quasi punire oblitus reliquerat inulta, deinde tanquam eorum memorem vindicare ea in posteris. Huc spectat quod in Psalmis scriptum est: In memoriam redeat iniquitas patrum eius in conspectu Domini, et peccatum matris eius non deleatur; et illud Tobiae: Domine, ne vindictam sumas de peccatis meis, neque reminiscaris delicta mea vel parentum meorum; et vidua illa Sareptana dixit Eliae: Quid mihi et tibi, vir Dei? Ingressus es ad me ut rememorarentur iniquitates meae, et interficeres filium meum.

…but the brevity of a penalty greatly mitigates and lessens however great a bitterness of it. For God to ‘visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the sons,’ therefore, signifies God, who, as if forgetful, had left the sins of the fathers unpunished, then, as it were mindful of them, avenging them in the posterity. To this pertains what is written in the Psalms: “Let the iniquity of his fathers be in remembrance in the sight of the Lord, and let not the sin of his mother be blotted out”; and that of Tobias: “Lord, take not vengeance for my sins, neither remember my offenses or those of my parents”; and that widow of Sarepta said to Elijah: “What have I to do with thee, O man of God? Art thou come to me that my iniquities should be remembered, and that thou shouldst kill my son?”¹⁶

SED cur Deus punit patrum peccata in filiis usque ad tertiam et quartam generationem? Quia filii peccatis parentum innutriti procliviores et audentiores sunt ad peccandum, tum propter consuetudinem peccandi, tum propter exemplum, sequuntur enim auctoritatem parentum. Quamobrem divina scriptura quasi magnum quoddam miraculum narrat, Numerorum capite 26, filios Core peccati eius non fuisse participes nec una cum illo periisse: Factum est, inquit, grande miraculum, ut Core pereunte filii eius non perirent. Additur autem, In tertiam et quartam generationem: quia usque ad id temporis possunt patres vivere, et sic invicem videre possunt et posteri peccata maiorum ad imitandum, et maiores posterorum suorum poenas ad dolendum. Nisi forte illud, In tertiam et quartam generationem, dictum sit pro eo quod est, in multas generationes: gaudet enim Hebraea lingua usurpatione ternarii numeri ad significandam multitudinem; addens autem tribus quartum, excessum multitudinis designat. Legenti sacras literas obvia sunt exempla, vel non quaerenti. Ego ad praesens uno contentus ero. In libro Ecclesiastici sic est: Ab uno sensato inhabitabitur patria, et a tribus impiis deseretur. Nec apud externos scriptores ea phrasis non est frequens. Unde sunt illa, Ter maximus, ter sapiens; et, O terque quaterque beati. Ergo, In tertiam et quartam generationem, id est, in multas admodum generationes. Extremis porro illis verbis huius sententiae, Eorum qui oderunt me, satis aperte declaratur ita Deum animadvertere in filios propter parentum scelera, ut etiam ipsi filii propter suam improbitatem et impietatem similem paternae ea dignissimi sint animadversione.

But why does God punish the sins of fathers in the sons unto the third and fourth generation? Because sons reared in the sins of their parents are more prone and more daring to sinning, both on account of the habit of sinning and on account of the example, for they follow the authority of their parents. Wherefore divine scripture narrates, as a great miracle, in the twenty-sixth chapter of Numbers, that the sons of Core were not partakers of his sin nor perished together with him: “It was made a great miracle,” it says, “that, Core perishing, his sons did not perish.” And it is added, ‘Unto the third and fourth generation,’ because up to that time fathers can live, and thus they can mutually see — the posterity, the sins of their forefathers, to imitate; and the forefathers, the penalties of their posterity, to grieve over. Unless perhaps that ‘unto the third and fourth generation’ be said for that which is, ‘unto many generations’: for the Hebrew tongue delights in the use of the ternary number to signify a multitude; but adding a fourth to three, it designates an excess of multitude. To one reading the sacred letters examples are obvious, even to one not seeking them. I will for the present be content with one. In the book of Ecclesiasticus it is thus: “By one man of sense a country shall be inhabited, and by three wicked ones it shall be made desolate.” Nor among external writers is that phrase infrequent. Whence are those [phrases], “Thrice greatest, thrice wise”; and, “O thrice and four times blessed.” Therefore, ‘unto the third and fourth generation,’ that is, unto very many generations. And by those last words of this sentence, ‘of them that hate me,’ it is sufficiently openly declared that God so animadverts on the sons for the crimes of their parents, that the sons themselves, for their own wickedness and impiety like their father's, are most worthy of that animadversion.¹⁷

SED, dicet aliquis, cur dicuntur filii puniri propter scelera patrum, si eam vindictam ipsi sceleribus suis commeruerunt? Ob eam scilicet causam, quod parentes suo exemplo, auctoritate, assuefactione auctores fuere filiis prolabendi in ea scelera: sic enim fere homines iudicare et dicere solent, cum maiorum peccata (quae in ipsis punita non sunt) cernunt a posteris eorum repetita puniri a Deo in ipsis, clamitant venisse tandem divinam vindictam eorum quae maiores illorum patraverant — quae Deus quasi oblitus in ipsis punire, in posteris eorum velut recordatus tandem vindicaverit.

But, someone will say, why are sons said to be punished for the crimes of their fathers, if they themselves merited that vengeance by their own crimes? For this cause, namely, that the parents, by their example, authority, and habituation, were the authors of the sons' falling into those crimes: for so men are generally wont to judge and to say, when they perceive the sins of forefathers (which were not punished in themselves) repeated by their posterity and punished by God in them — they cry out that the divine vengeance of what their forefathers had perpetrated has come at last, which God, as if forgetful, [failed] to punish in them, [but], as if at last remembering, has avenged in their posterity.¹⁸

POSTREMO loco excutiendus est unus qui etiamnum restat scrupus. Si Deus visitat iniquitatem patrum in filios usque in quartam generationem, quomodo idem ipse lege lata per Mosen vetuit filios occidi pro peccatis parentum? Cur enim non fuerit aequum homines facere quod aequissimo iudicio facit Deus? Sed longe diversa hominum ac Dei ratio est. Deus enim, cum sit auctor, conservator, largitor et supremus dominus hominum vitae ac mortis omniumque bonorum, potest ea suo iure suoque arbitratu, citra cuiusquam iniuriam, cuicunque libuerit vel dare vel auferre; potest filios etiam innocentes propter scelera parentum affligere, quippe qui novit mala temporalia posse homini spiritualiter prodesse, et instar medicinae magno esse bono: cui autem et quando expediat istiusmodi malis affici, solus ipse novit, qui occultissimis iustitiae et misericordiae suae iudiciis variisque hominum ea varie dispensat. Plectit autem filios pro patribus, quo tali genere vindictae vehementius homines a maleficiis absterreantur, scilicet intelligentes divinam flagitiorum suorum vindictam seram quidem esse posse, irritam tamen esse non posse, ut quam, si forte ipsi evaserint, ipsorum tamen [posteri] subituri sint.

Lastly, one scruple is to be examined which still remains. If God visits the iniquity of fathers upon the sons unto the fourth generation, how did the same God, by a law given through Moses, forbid sons to be killed for the sins of parents? For why would it not be just for men to do what God does by a most just judgment? But the reason of men and of God is far different. For God, since He is the author, preserver, bestower, and supreme Lord of men's life and death and of all goods, can, by His own right and at His own discretion, without injury to anyone, either give or take them away from whomever He pleases; He can afflict even innocent sons for the crimes of parents, since He knows that temporal evils can spiritually profit a man, and be a great good in the manner of medicine: but to whom and when it is expedient to be afflicted with evils of this kind, He alone knows, who dispenses them variously by the most hidden judgments of His justice and mercy, and variously among men. And He strikes sons for fathers, that by such a kind of vengeance men may the more vehemently be deterred from misdeeds — understanding, namely, that the divine vengeance of their crimes can indeed be late, but cannot be void; so that, if perchance they themselves have escaped it, their [posterity] nevertheless will undergo it.¹⁹

VERUM paulo explicatius hoc ipsum dicamus, magni enim momenti fuerit perfusam esse hanc opinionem hominibus et in eorum animis haerere infixam. Duplex igitur divinae vindictae genus est: altero utitur Deus puniendis improbis in hac vita, altero post hanc vitam. In hac vita non semper Deus peccantes manifestis et corporalibus poenis punit, et nonnunquam alios punit etiam insontes propter aliorum peccata; sed ita, ut iis qui peccaverunt id genus vindictae poena sit, his vero qui non peccaverunt non poena, sed salutaris velut quaedam sit medicina. Post hanc vitam Deus tantum punit merentes, nec punit quenquam propter aliena peccata: tunc enim poenae tantum poenae sunt, nec medicinae rationem habent ullam. Humanum porro iudicium imitari debet divinum in hoc posteriori genere puniendi, non in illo priori: nam nec quisquam hominum dominus est vitae, mortis, corporis ceterorumque bonorum aliorum hominum, nec scire potest cui aut quando mala temporalia profutura sint, vel facere ut ea prosint.

But let us say this same thing a little more explicitly, for it would be of great moment that this opinion be poured into men and stick fixed in their minds. There are, then, two kinds of divine vengeance: the one God uses for punishing the wicked in this life, the other after this life. In this life God does not always punish sinners with manifest and corporeal penalties, and sometimes He punishes others, even the innocent, for the sins of others; but in such a way that to those who have sinned that kind of vengeance is a penalty, but to those who have not sinned it is not a penalty, but as it were a salutary medicine. After this life God punishes only the deserving, nor punishes anyone for the sins of others: for then penalties are penalties only, and have no character of medicine. And human judgment ought to imitate the divine in this latter kind of punishing, not in that former: for no man is the lord of the life, death, body, or other goods of other men, nor can he know to whom or when temporal evils will profit, or make them profit.²⁰

NEMO igitur humano iudicio nisi pro peccatis propriis condemnari et puniri debet poena (ut aiunt) flagelli, id est, mortis, mutilationis corporalis aut verberationis. Poena vero damni bonorum temporalium nonnunquam fit ut quidam etiam sine culpa (nec tamen inique) propter aliorum peccata afficiantur: exempli causa, cum propter ingens aliquod scelus civitatis aut communitatis alicuius ea privatur vel immunitate vel libertate vel cathedra Episcopali; cumque haec sint bona omnium communia, sublatis illis, quemlibet civium etiam innocentium eorum bonorum damno affici necesse est. Quemadmodum etiam si quis propter crimen laesae maiestatis omnibus bonis externis [honoribusque]…

No one, therefore, by human judgment ought to be condemned and punished, except for his own sins, with the penalty (as they call it) of the scourge — that is, of death, of bodily mutilation, or of flogging. But the penalty of loss of temporal goods sometimes is such that certain men, even without fault (and yet not unjustly), are affected for the sins of others: for example, when, on account of some huge crime of a city or some community, it is deprived either of immunity, or of liberty, or of an episcopal see; and since these are goods common to all, those being taken away, any of the citizens, even the innocent, must necessarily be affected by the loss of those goods. Just as also, if anyone, for the crime of treason, [is deprived] of all external goods [and honors]…²¹

…honoribusque ac publicis officiis privetur, ea poena in filios eius redundat, qui participes paternorum bonorum hereditario iure futuri erant. Sed, ut apparet, istiusmodi poenae per se quidem ac primo sunt eorum qui peccaverunt, consequenter autem aliorum qui ex illis quodammodo pendent.

…and honors and public offices be deprived, that penalty redounds upon his sons, who would have been partakers of their father's goods by hereditary right. But, as is apparent, penalties of this kind are of themselves and primarily of those who have sinned, but consequently of others who in a way depend on them.²²

PECCATUM igitur Cham adversus Noë patrem suum (nam quo id subtilius expressiusque intelligeretur, ad hanc digressi sumus disputationem) non in ipso Cham vindicatum legitur, sed in filio eius Chanaan, vel potius in eius posteritate — gentem dico Chananaeorum. Quanquam quod Chananaei ab Hebraeis partim internecione caesi, partim sedibus suis exterminati, partim etiam sub iugum vilissimae servitutis missi fuerint, non id peccato Cham adversus Noë solet assignare scriptura, sed propriis ipsorum Chananaeorum iisque infandis et abominandis sceleribus, ut manifestum sit legenti 18 caput Levitici et caput 9 Deuteronomii. Veruntamen Cham ex Noëtica maledictione suae posteritatis acerbissimum traxisse dolorem nullo modo dubitandum est: quippe qui, cum aeque filius esset Noë ac Sem et Iaphet, quin etiam natu maior quam Iaphet (ut plerisque visum est), suos tamen posteros vilissimos servos posterorum Sem et Iaphet futuros esse intellexerit.

The sin of Cham, therefore, against his father Noah (for, that it might be more subtly and expressly understood, we have digressed to this disputation) is read to have been avenged not in Cham himself, but in his son Chanaan, or rather in his posterity — I mean the nation of the Canaanites. Although that the Canaanites were by the Hebrews partly slain by slaughter, partly exterminated from their seats, partly also sent under the yoke of a most base servitude, Scripture is not wont to assign that to the sin of Cham against Noah, but to the proper and unspeakable and abominable crimes of the Canaanites themselves, as is manifest to one reading the 18th chapter of Leviticus and the 9th chapter of Deuteronomy. Nevertheless that Cham drew the bitterest grief from the Noachic curse of his posterity is in no way to be doubted: since he, though he was equally a son of Noah as Sem and Iaphet — nay, even greater in birth than Iaphet (as it has seemed to most) — yet understood that his posterity would be the basest servants of the posterity of Sem and Iaphet.²³

BEATUS Gregorius, exemplum peccati Cham non in ipso puniti sed in posteris eius belle accommodans ad Tropologicam eruditionem, docet peccata hominum aliquando Deum in hac vita manifestis suppliciis punire, interdum vero minime; et utrumque optima ratione fieri, magnaque hominum utilitate. Puniri quidem aliquos in hac vita, ut fidem providentiae suae (qua res humanas spectare ac regere creditur) in animis hominum conservet; non omnes autem in hac vita punire, ne hic peccata hominum ex toto vindicare putetur, sed aliud esse peccatorum post hanc vitam et iudicium et supplicium futurum credatur. Verum sententiae Gregorii vim ac venustatem nisi propriis eius verbis exprimere non est facile. Ponam igitur eius verba. Tractans illa verba Iob cap. 35, Nunc non infert furorem suum, nec ulciscitur valde Deus, ad hunc modum scribit: Peccata hominum divina severitas inulta remanere non permittit, sed iram iudicii a nostra hic correctione inchoat, ut in reproborum damnatione conquiescat. Eant ergo nunc reprobi, et voluptatum suarum desideria inulta iniquitate consumment, atque eo temporalia flagella non sentiant, quo aeterna eos supplicia expectant. Bene autem inulta eorum nequitia Cham peccante signata est, cui a patre dictum est, Maledictus Chanaan puer, servus servorum erit fratribus suis. Sed quid est quod, Cham peccante, Chanaan eius filius sententiam ultionis accepit, nisi quod reproborum nequitia hic quidem inulta proficiunt, sed in posterum feriuntur? Recte igitur dixit Iob: Nunc non infert furorem suum, nec ulciscitur valde Deus: quia, etsi quaedam longanimiter tolerat, quaedam etiam in hac vita flagellat; et hic nonnunquam ferire inchoat, quos postea aeterna damnatione consummat. Ergo quaedam Deus in hac vita percutit, quaedam vero inulta relinquit: si enim nulla puniret, quis [Deum]…

St. Gregory, beautifully accommodating to Tropological instruction the example of Cham's sin punished not in himself but in his posterity, teaches that God sometimes punishes men's sins in this life with manifest punishments, but sometimes not at all; and that both are done with the best reason and the great benefit of men. That some are punished in this life, to preserve in men's minds faith in His providence (by which He is believed to watch over and govern human affairs); but that He does not punish all in this life, lest here men's sins be thought wholly avenged, but it be believed that there will be after this life both a judgment and a punishment of sins. But the force and grace of Gregory's saying it is not easy to express except in his own words. I will therefore set down his words. Treating those words of Job ch. 35, “Now he brings not on his fury, nor avenges greatly, God,” he writes thus: “Divine severity does not permit men's sins to remain unavenged, but begins the wrath of judgment here from our correction, that it may rest in the damnation of the reprobate. Let the reprobate, then, go now, and consume the desires of their pleasures with unavenged iniquity, and let them not feel temporal scourges at the time when eternal punishments await them. And well was their unavenged wickedness signified in Cham's sinning, to whom it was said by his father, ‘Cursed be the boy Canaan, a servant of servants shall he be to his brothers.’ But what is it that, when Cham sinned, Chanaan his son received the sentence of vengeance, unless that the wickedness of the reprobate here indeed advances unavenged, but is struck in the future? Rightly, then, said Job: ‘Now he brings not on his fury, nor avenges greatly, God’: because, although He tolerates some things long-sufferingly, He also scourges some in this life; and here He sometimes begins to strike those whom afterward He consummates with eternal damnation. Therefore some things God strikes in this life, but some He leaves unavenged: for if He punished none, who [would believe God]…”²⁴

…Deum res humanas curare crederet? Sin autem cuncta puniret, extremum iudicium unde restaret? Quaedam igitur feriuntur, ut rectoris nostri super nos sollicitudinem formidemus; quaedam vero inulta servantur, ut adhuc iudicium restare sentiamus. Hactenus ex Gregorio.

…would believe that God cares for human affairs? But if He punished all, whence would the last judgment remain? Some things, therefore, are struck, that we may dread the solicitude of our Ruler over us; but some are kept unavenged, that we may perceive that a judgment still remains. Thus far from Gregory.²⁵

Translator’s notes

§162. The difficulty: how just to punish the (innocent) Canaan and his line for the father's sin? Scripture says each dies for his own sin (Ezek 18; Deut 24; Wisd 12) — yet God elsewhere visits fathers' sins on descendants. Margins: Ezek. 18; Deut. 24; Wisd. 12. Continues on p. 377. ↩
§162 (cont.). The opposing text: God ‘visiting the iniquity of fathers upon the children’ (Exod 20). Margin: Exod. 20. ↩
§163. The scholastic method; first premise: ‘penalty’ has three senses — properly (it answers a personal sin), as medicine, or both. Margin: “The various signification of the word ‘penalty.’” ↩
§164. The remaining three premises: medicinal penalty = loss of lesser (bodily) goods for greater (spiritual) — even the innocent (Job, Tobias); the mixed penalty; and the two kinds, bodily and spiritual. Margins: “How a penalty is medicine”; Job 1; Tob. 1. ↩
§165. First conclusion: no one is punished spiritually for another's sin (the spiritual penalty answers a personal, voluntary sin; the rational soul is one's own — Ezek 18). Margins: “That no one is punished spiritually for [another's] sin”; Ezekiel ch. 18. ↩
§166. Corporeal penalty for others' sins is twofold: if the punished is innocent, it may even profit him (Ezekiel, Daniel in the captivity); or fall to his grief but the other's penalty (innocent sons/servants). Margin: “How someone is punished with a corporeal penalty for others' sins.” ↩
§167. Yet usually those punished for others' sins share their guilt — threefold: by imitation; by a kind of merit (wicked subjects deserve a wicked ruler — Job; David's census); … Margins: “How the sins of others pass over to others”; Job 34; 2 Kings [Samuel], last ch. Continues on p. 379. ↩
§167 (cont.). The third way: tacit consent — the good suffer with the wicked for failing to rebuke them. ↩
§168. Augustine: the good are scourged with the wicked for sparing to rebuke them — unless their silence is from prudent charity. Margin: Augustine, City of God bk. 16 [bk. 1], ch. 2. ↩
§169. God punishes some for others to commend society's unity (members of one body) and to show sin's contagious poison. ↩
§170. The Exodus 20 text; Theodoret's first reading: a deterrent threat, not always executed (God threatens more than He inflicts; no one truly punished for another's sin — Ezek 18). Margins: “The passage Exodus ch. 20 explained”; Theodoret, q. 20 on Exodus; 1 Tim. 2; Ezek. 18. ↩
§171. Theodoret's preferred reading: the words show not severity but God's patience — deferring vengeance to the third/fourth generation; but if the descendants persist in imitating their ancestors' crimes, God no longer connives (continues on printed p. 380: ‘…connives and dissembles, but what He left unavenged in the ancestors He at last avenges in the posterity’). ↩
§171 (cont.). If posterity persist, God avenges at last; for total impunity would breed license and deny providence (Eccles 8). Margin: Eccles. 8. ↩
§172. The Hebrews: God defers the father's penalty if he repents or has a good son, but punishes a persistent line; Rabbi Moses Gerundensis (Nachmanides) — only idolatry's penalty falls on idol-worshipping sons, as civil law on treason. Margin: Rabbi Moses Gerundensis. ↩
§173. Weighing the words: the twofold sense (severity to the 4th generation, or — preferred — God's patience); the Hebrew ‘pachad’ = ‘visit’/‘remember,’ and ‘iniquity’ for ‘penalty’ (Jer.: Judah's slow captivity worse than Sodom's swift end). Margins: “The passage Lamentations 4”; Gen. 19 & Jer. 49. Continues on p. 381. ↩
§173 (cont.). ‘Visit’ = ‘remember’ a long-deferred penalty (Ps 108; Tobit 3; the widow of Sarepta, 3 Kings 17). Margins: Ps. 108; Tobit 3; 3 Kings 17. ↩
§174. Why to the 3rd/4th generation: sons reared in sin are bolder (the sons of Core spared, Num 26); ‘3rd and 4th’ = ‘very many’ (a Hebrew triad-idiom; Virgil's ‘thrice and four times blessed’); ‘of them that hate me’ shows the sons deserve it. Margins: “What it is to punish unto the third and fourth generation”; Ecclus. 16; Virgil, Aeneid bk. 1. ↩
§175. Objection: how ‘punished for fathers' sins’ if they earned it themselves? — Because the parents, by example and habituation, authored the sons' fall; men say the long-deferred vengeance has come at last on the line. Continues on p. 382. ↩
§175 (cont.) / §176. The remaining scruple: how can God forbid (Deut 24) men to kill sons for fathers' sins, yet do so Himself? — God, as Lord of life, may take/give without injury, knowing temporal ills can be medicine; He punishes sons for fathers to deter. Margins: “The passage Deuteronomy ch. 24 explained”; “Why men cannot also punish some for others' sins, as God does.” ↩
§177. The twofold divine vengeance: in this life (where the innocent's share is medicine, not penalty) and after (pure penalty, only the deserving); human judgment must imitate the latter, not the former. Margin: “The twofold kind of divine vengeance.” ↩
§178. By human judgment, the ‘scourge’ (death, mutilation, flogging) only for one's own sins; but loss of temporal goods can innocently fall on others (a city losing its franchise; a traitor's confiscation reaching his heirs). Continues on p. 383. ↩
§178 (cont.). Such temporal penalties fall primarily on the guilty, only secondarily on the dependents. ↩
§179. The application: Cham's sin punished in Chanaan/the Canaanites — though Scripture ascribes their destruction to their own crimes (Lev 18, Deut 9); yet Cham grieved bitterly at his line's curse. ↩
§180. Gregory's tropology (on Job 35): God punishes some sins now (to keep faith in providence) and leaves others (so a last judgment is believed) — with the Cham/Chanaan example. Margin: “A notable saying of Gregory, Morals bk. 26.” Continues on p. 384. ↩
§180 (cont.). Gregory: if God punished nothing, none would believe in providence; if all, no last judgment would remain. ↩